See Lambrecht's letter in which he discusses the planning for the search, no mention of radio bearing as affecting that planning. Lambrecht said exactly wht Fiedell said about this planning so I don't understand your comment about sweeping the bearings under the rug.
gl
I must admit I am puzzled as to why any one would claim that the Navy swept the post loss messages under the rug. Perhaps the Navy evaluated them, took note of the different transmission times, and wisely concluded that as they were not synchronous then they couldn't cross near Gardner - or anywhere. I note from the chart that shows them that where they cross is actually in the ocean, apart from one which can be extended to Gardner but could also be on a line traversing open sea (which makes the Electra as the source impossible). There is so much background noise and static regarding these messages, and I don't mean that just in the radio sense, that they are very difficult evidence to properly assess - they offer a veritable cottage industry of theories on their own.
Then we come right back squarely to the real problem which is the Navy despite the faults assigned to them by the wisdom of hindsight did actually search Gardner and didn't see anything apart from the rather ambiguous comment by Lambrecht of "recent habitation" but people tend to ignore that a term like "recent" is ambiguous unless it is qualified by saying how recent. Apart from the great big shipwreck on the reef, this could also refer to visible remains of the buildings from the Arundel period or even traces left by the Norwich City survivors, but even more importantly there was no Electra and certainly no sign of Earhart and Noonan. Who I would think it should be clear to everyone given Gary's explanation of survival chances (with which I agree) would, if they were on the island, be still ambulatory and not starving and collapsed comatose under a tree. Gardner may have not been quite the tropical paradise of the tourist brochures but it had food and it had water albeit brackish or obtainable.
Malcom,
You may of noticed that I had posted:
"...perhaps it would be better (for me)
to just say that the radio calls were ignored after their search had been completed." as I should not use unkind metaphors in reference to fine people who were doing the best they could and I can't blame them for not mentioning Post Loss Radio after their search was complete. I would edit my original statement, but as you know 'once you put something online, it's forever there' (at least

in post 'quotes'). Let me state that I have nothing but respect for those people and what they tried to do.
Your statement: "Perhaps the Navy evaluated them, took note of the different transmission times, and wisely concluded that as they were not synchronous then they couldn't cross near Gardner - or anywhere." shows a lack of understanding of radio bearings.It is true that if you are locating a moving target, the times must be synchronous, but in locating a fixed target the times or days of the Bearings do not affect the accuracy. In fact it allows for greater precision when you are plotting a stationary target.
The Bearing Chart simplifies the accuracy of those radio bearings and actually show a more precise assignment of Gardner Island that would be possible in my opinion.
Radio bearings were not that precise and at that time period were probably +/- one degree of accuracy or one mile left or right for each sixty miles from the station. That would mean that those lines would be 1800/60=30 miles either side of center or a possible span of 60 miles. This would make
each line look as wide as the two bearings from Oahu that show 213/215.
The only area of importance is in the area of crossing, those lines that have no 'crossings' are just single LOP's and you can't determine position. (Read
the analysis if you want an explanation if those.)
If I were drawing a chart for navigation, it would just project the lines from the locations for Oahu, Midway and Wake. It would just cover the area around the crossings and those 'lines' from the bearings would be about 60 miles wide (assuming about 1800 miles from the bearings centers).
Of course we also have that bearing from Howland experimental HF/DF at a width of about 12 miles. This one was plotted from a pocket compass which was why it was drawn as "NNW/SSE".
With this you would end up with a hexagon about 100 miles across approximately centered on Gardner and the Howland bearing would only add precision. My 'one' degree came from a 1936 estimate of HF/DF Ground Station Accuracy, no matter the "degree of accuracy" (you could even assign a different "degree of accuracy" for each specific Bearing depending upon confidence) that you wish to apply, it will still center in the same location, just grow in size.
Just as when you cross LOP's from celestial points, your location is considered to be somewhere within this hexagon (or quadrilateral when you only have two bearings) and you place more confidence in the center of the area.
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Now with a disclaimer, I am going to delve into a little bit of
'coulda'-'shoulda' that has no effect on the outcome, because it was never acted upon:
From
An Answering Wave: Why the Navy Didn’t Find AmeliaRear Admiral Orin G. Murfin asked the Navy Department that he be permitted to divert the battleship U.S.S. Colorado and it was 2:08 PM on July 3rd before she cleared Pearl Harbor. By now Murfin was aware that there was a fast ship with an aircraft aboard far closer to the search area and in receipt of radio signals at 7 PM on July 2nd (or 0600Z July 3rd) believed to be distress calls from Earhart. She was the British cruiser HMS Achilles (later to win fame in the pursuit of the Graf Spee). On July 3rd Achilles was 800 nm east of the island group Colorado would eventually search on July 9th. Unlike Colorado, she was familiar with the area and could have had her Supermarine Walrus observation plane overhead the suspect islands fully four days before they were, in fact, searched.
No request was made for her assistance. Instead, the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Lexington, preparing for Fourth of July celebrations at Santa Barbara, California, was ordered to rendezvous with four destroyers and proceed immediately to join the search, refueling in Hawaii on the way. But first she had to re-provision at Long Beach and then go to San Diego to take on aircraft whose pilots had to be recalled from holiday leave. It was July 5 before the Lexington Group began its 4,000 nm voyage to join the search.
It had seemed to me that a request
would have been in order, considering the circumstances. It seems that Political Concerns (USA vs British Empire relations in 1937 in the Pacific) trumped logic. I would have thought that Admiral Murfin would have had the authority to make the request, you must know that Roosevelt would have approved...
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Just to show how TIGHAR continues research and modifies and improves their hypothesis; the Achilles reception event
was rejected in October 2000 as "not credible". Then
in a more recent study using 21st Century expertise, the
same message is now considered credible.
Malcom, I am aware that we have agreed to different opinions on validity of radio messages and am aware that not all 'experts' will agree on the Post Loss Radio subject.
I do feel a need to correct an obvious misunderstanding when it falls within an area that I am qualified to comment on.
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There is no doubt that the contributions of the members who intelligently and constructively disagree with TIGHAR are what makes this public forum worthwhile and if it were only agreeing members, it might not accomplish nearly as much.