High frequency direction finding equipment on Howland

For the whole story, see Finding Amelia page 51-2.

Ric Gillespie, 23 February 2009, Forum.

Shortly before the first world flight attempt, Harry Manning and Bureau of Air Commerce consultant Bill Miller had requested that a direction finder (not a high frequency direction finder [HFDF]) be set up on Howland "if practicable". At that time the aircraft had a trailing wire antenna, reasonable capability of transmitting on 500 kcs, and a crew member (Manning) who was adept at Morse code. The request arrived after the Coast Guard cutter tasked with supporting the flight had already sailed, but Dept. of Interior's Richard Black who was in charge of the expedition knew about it and thought it was a good idea.

While Itasca was in Hawaii preparing to depart for Howland in support of the second world flight attempt, Black was deeply concerned that there had been virtually no communication from Earhart about radio procedures to be used on her upcoming flight to Howland. Black also felt that Itasca's radiomen were too inexperienced and he suggested that they be replaced for this cruise with expert Navy operators. Commander Thompson had a fit and refused to consider the idea. Black decided to do an end-run around Thompson. He revived the idea of putting a DF on Howland but he also noted that in press reports Earhart had mentioned only her two higher frequencies, 3105 and 6210. He enlisted the help of Army Air Corps Lt. Dan Cooper who arranged for the loan of an experimental HFDF from the Navy.

Knowing that Thompson wouldn't accept a Navy operator, Black tried to recruit a highly experienced Coast Guard operator from the crew of USCG Taney which was laid up for refit, but the guy he wanted was sick. The best Black could do was a Radioman 2nd Class by the name of Frank Ciprianni.

Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with Putnam but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the Lae/Howland flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.

Hue Miller, 26 February 2009 [[AESF|Forum.]

... the Howland equipment, an Adcock system (of vertical antennas) was not subject to the same directional problems and errors that a loop antenna, such as in AE's plane, was. "IF" they had been up & working "AND" AE able to hear, they could have given her pretty accurate bearing info. No spare battery? - i thought you always had to have one in use, one charging or charged - standby. How hard was it, to do their job right?