Why not Manila route

Rey Jude Barte Albarando · November 03, 2011, 07:44:44 AM

I just read again the recently posted biography of Noonan. A curious question crossed my mind: If Noonan had made so many trips to Manila and back, why did they choose the more risky and untested route down south? I guess when Amelia made the second trip, what was more important to her was to finish the trip than making unnecessary risks just to prop her image!?

Ric Gillespie · November 03, 2011, 09:24:33 AM

Quote from: Rey Jude Barte Albarando on November 03, 2011, 07:44:44 AM
If Noonan had made so many trips to Manila and back, why did they choose the more risky and untested route down south?

The route was chosen long before Noonan came on board. By 1936, all of the important long-distance flights had been made. Earhart and Putnam had to come up with a new gimmick - a flight around the world via the longest route, as close as possible to the Equator. Even so, they were up against some negative press. Syndicated columnist Maj. Al Williams wrote on March 31, 1937:
"Individually sponsored trans-oceanic flying is the worst racket in aviation.
Amelia Earhart's 'Flying Laboratory' is the latest and most distressing racket that has been given to a trusting and enthusiastic public."

The Pacific posed the biggest problem. Pan Am was already flying scheduled passenger service across the northern Pacific to Manila. No point in doing that and, besides, there were no runways on Midway and Wake. The first plan was to fly 4,500 miles non-stop from Hawaii to Japan, refueling in flight from a Navy PBY over Midway. That would certainly be newsworthy but it was also completely impractical and harebrained. The route via Howland was the only viable alternative and was only possible because the Department of Interior agreed to build an airfield there. For a narrative of the whole story read Finding Amelia.

Rey Jude Barte Albarando · November 05, 2011, 11:18:47 PM

... do we have any documentation on some contingency plan discussed by Earhart and Putnam in case she did not find Howland ...

AE and FN's Plan B is a perennial question. It oughta be in a FAQ. I don't have time to check just now whether it is there already. Search for "plan B," Vidal, Gilberts, etc.

Ric Gillespie · November 06, 2011, 07:40:51 AM

Quote from: Rey Jude Barte Albarando on November 05, 2011, 11:18:47 PM
... do we have any documentation on some contingency plan discussed by Earhart and Putnam in case she did not find Howland ...

The short answer is no, there is no known documentation of a contingency plan. Of course, turning back if things are not going well is always an option if you make the call before you reach the Point of No Return (after which you don't have enough fuel to get back). They did that on June 18 when they tried to fly from Akyab to Rangoon but had to turn back due to heavy rain. (Last Flight page 197). On the Lae/Howland leg they clearly continued past the Point of No Return so things must have been going okay so far.

There is some anecdotal evidence (the least reliable kind) suggesting that Noonan may have had a Plan B. "Fuzz" Furman, an American who spent time with Noonan in Bandoeng, Java, June 21-26 remembered that Fred was very anxious about finding Howland, and yet Chater in Lae reports that Earhart and Noonan both felt confident at the time of their departure on July 2. What changed? The sunrise LOP. When he was in Java, Noonan expected to make the Lae/Howland flight several days sooner than they actually did. He didn't expect the sunrise LOP advanced through Howland to be any help in finding an alternative island. But in Lae, when he knew they would depart on July 2, he could see that the sunrise LOP would be 157° -337°. Advanced through Howland, the line also fell through or close to Baker, McKean and Gardner. It seems like that would be reassuring and may account for his apparent change in his confidence level.

Quote from: mxm
AE and FN's Plan B is a perennial question. It oughta be in a FAQ. I don't have time to check just now whether it is there already. Search for "plan B," Vidal, Gilberts, etc.

Yeah, we probably need a FAQ. As I recall, during the search Vidal told somebody (the Chief of Naval Operations?) that AE had told him that if she couldn't find Howland she would turn back to the Gilberts and land on a beach. Of course it's a totally impractical plan (she was good at coming up with totally impractical plans) and, besides, she wasn't the navigator.

Anybody have the details about the story at their fingertips?

Martin X. Moleski, SJ · November 06, 2011, 08:58:51 AM

Quote from: Ric Gillespie on November 06, 2011, 07:40:51 AM
Anybody have the details about the story at their fingertips?

I think I've got it all straightened out.

See "The Gilberts Gamble" for the original citation, the search in some archives, and then a discussion of the sensibility of the plan.

Ric Gillespie · November 06, 2011, 09:04:46 AM

Thanks Marty.

Rich Ramsey · November 18, 2011, 11:02:01 AM

Back to my "if only's" again. But I can't see why they didn't turn back. I find it hard to believe that they didn't notice a problem with the radio before the point of no return. For such a risky leg of the flight I am sure I would of turned back. But it is only a "If Only", nothing we can do anything with.

Ric Gillespie · November 18, 2011, 12:19:43 PM

It's really difficult for us today to appreciate how little regard Earhart had for radio. In all of the literature, I can't find a single mention of her ever establishing two-way voice communication with anyone during any portion of the world flight.

John Ousterhout · November 18, 2011, 06:40:51 PM

"... I can't find a single mention of her ever establishing two-way voice communication with anyone during any portion of the world flight."
I submit that two-way voice communication was her "plan-B". Navigation to the landing was "plan-A", and had worked ok, so far. After repeated successes of your "plan-A", it is natural to assume that your "plan-B" must also be successful.

Gary LaPook · November 18, 2011, 10:46:55 PM

Quote from: Ric Gillespie on November 06, 2011, 07:40:51 AM
Quote from: Rey Jude Barte Albarando on November 05, 2011, 11:18:47 PM
... do we have any documentation on some contingency plan discussed by Earhart and Putnam in case she did not find Howland ...

The short answer is no, there is no known documentation of a contingency plan. Of course, turning back if things are not going well is always an option if you make the call before you reach the Point of No Return (after which you don't have enough fuel to get back). They did that on June 18 when they tried to fly from Akyab to Rangoon but had to turn back due to heavy rain. (Last Flight page 197). On the Lae/Howland leg they clearly continued past the Point of No Return so things must have been going okay so far.

There is some anecdotal evidence (the least reliable kind) suggesting that Noonan may have had a Plan B. "Fuzz" Furman, an American who spent time with Noonan in Bandoeng, Java, June 21-26 remembered that Fred was very anxious about finding Howland, and yet Chater in Lae reports that Earhart and Noonan both felt confident at the time of their departure on July 2. What changed? The sunrise LOP. When he was in Java, Noonan expected to make the Lae/Howland flight several days sooner than they actually did. He didn't expect the sunrise LOP advanced through Howland to be any help in finding an alternative island. But in Lae, when he knew they would depart on July 2, he could see that the sunrise LOP would be 157° -337°. Advanced through Howland, the line also fell through or close to Baker, McKean and Gardner. It seems like that would be reassuring and may account for his apparent change in his confidence level.

Quote from: mxm
AE and FN's Plan B is a perennial question. It oughta be in a FAQ. I don't have time to check just now whether it is there already. Search for "plan B," Vidal, Gilberts, etc.

Yeah, we probably need a FAQ. As I recall, during the search Vidal told somebody (the Chief of Naval Operations?) that AE had told him that if she couldn't find Howland she would turn back to the Gilberts and land on a beach. Of course it's a totally impractical plan (she was good at coming up with totally impractical plans) and, besides, she wasn't the navigator.

Anybody have the details about the story at their fingertips?

------------------------------

When you start talking about celestial navigation, Ric, you are out of your depth. For locations near the equator the azimuth of the rising and setting sun is determined by the declination of the sun. If the declination is zero then the sun rises straight east, 90° True, and sets straight west, 270° True. When the sun's declination is 23° North then it rises and sets 23° north of east and of west, rising at 067° T and setting at 293° T. The summer solstice is June 21st and for more than two weeks on both sides of that date the sun's declination remains very close to 23° North so from June 5, 1937 all the way through July 6, 1937 the sun rose at the same azimuth, 067° True. So on any day in that period Noonan would have established the exact same LOP as on July 2nd, 157°-337° True, at right angles to the azimuth of the morning sun. There is no way that Noonan would have anticipated making the flight to Howland prior to June 5th because they were still in South America on that date.

gl

John Ousterhout · November 19, 2011, 12:34:44 AM

"setting at 337° T"?
270 + 23 = 293.

Gary LaPook · November 19, 2011, 01:29:29 AM

Quote from: John Ousterhout on November 19, 2011, 12:34:44 AM
"setting at 337° T"?
270 + 23 = 293.

Thanks John, Me bad.

gl

Ric Gillespie · November 19, 2011, 06:39:06 AM

Quote from: Gary LaPook on November 18, 2011, 10:46:55 PM
When you start talking about celestial navigation, Ric, you are out of your depth.

You're right about that. I'm not a celestial navigator nor have I ever played one on television.

So Noonan should have been able to predict that his sunrise LOP on the Lae/Howland leg would be 157 337 maybe even before they left Miami. So I wonder what accounts for the apparent change in his confidence level between Bandoeng in late June and Lae on July 2nd.

Gary LaPook · November 19, 2011, 11:06:10 AM

Quote from: Ric Gillespie on November 19, 2011, 06:39:06 AM
Quote from: Gary LaPook on November 18, 2011, 10:46:55 PM
When you start talking about celestial navigation, Ric, you are out of your depth.

You're right about that. I'm not a celestial navigator nor have I ever played one on television.

So Noonan should have been able to predict that his sunrise LOP on the Lae/Howland leg would be 157 337 maybe even before they left Miami. So I wonder what accounts for the apparent change in his confidence level between Bandoeng in late June and Lae on July 2nd.

-------------------
How about the first test of the RDF done by Balfour on 500 kc?

gl

Ric Gillespie · November 19, 2011, 11:35:41 AM

Quote from: Gary LaPook on November 19, 2011, 11:06:10 AM
How about the first test of the RDF done by Balfour on 500 kc?

Is this what you're referring to?

"At noon on June 30th Miss Earhart, in conjunction with our Operator, tested out the long wave received on the Lockheed machine while work was being carried out in the hangar. This was tested at noon on a land station working on 600 metres. During this period the Lockheed receiver was calibrated for reception of Lae radio telephone, and this was, on the next day, tested in flight."

So the airplane is in the hangar and a land station somewhere (Chater doesn't say where) transmits a signal on 500 kHz (600 meters). The airplane's receiver was able to hear the signal. Where does it say the signal was received using the loop and that this was an RDF test?