Since this thread has been divested of the fuel consumption and range discussion, I'm bumping my question to Mr. LaPook back up. I think it may have been overwhelmed by other subjects:
Since you must be the only person in the world who knows where FN was at or near the time of landing approach, maybe you could tell us where the plane ended up?
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Yep, on the bottom of the ocean.
gl
Gary--I'm curious if you have any thoughts on approximately where the plane would have most likely ended up on the bottom of the ocean. Given your detailed analyses of Noonan's navigation techniques and theories on what he would have advised Earhart to do as their ill-fated flight drew to a close, have you reached any conclusions on where they most likely would have gone down? Further, do you have any ideas on why the multiple searches of the sea floor around Howland haven't found anything?
I'd appreciate your insights!
My question basically boils down to this: all the deep sea searches have focused on the sea floor to the north and west of Howland. Since they haven't found anything, it leads to a few possibilities...
1) They're looking in the right place but just haven't found the Electra because of equipment limitations, obscuration by terrain, or plain bad luck.
2) The plane went down further north or further west than has been searched.
3) The plane didn't end up north or west of Howland after all (South or east? Gardner Island? Mili Atoll? New Britain? The Delta Quadrant??)
Gary, what is your opinion?
For reference, here is a map of the region searched by the Waitt Institute.
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You may appreciate my frustration since celestial navigation was accurate enough to get them to Howland without any assistance from the radio. You can see excerpts from flight navigation manuals that explain this method and provide authority for my position and you can also read my in depth analysis of this on my website at:
https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/Rather than saying the most probable location for the wreckage (since it makes no sense that they ended up there either) I would call it the "least unlikely" place to find the plane. I go with northwest of Howland near the LOP and far enough away that they were in the cloudy area described by Itasca, at least 40 NM away from Howland. If they had flown into the clear near Howland then Noonan could have taken accurate observations of the Sun and of the
Moon, gotten an accurate fix and locate Howland. So I will go with explanation 1 with a touch of 2 on the side.
See
https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/navigation-to-howland-island"Based on this last report of in-flight weather conditions, we can be certain that Noonan was able to take sights at 1623 Z, only two hours and forty-nine minutes before the "must be on you" transmission at 1912 Z. So looking at this as the worst case scenario, we can do the same computations as before about the uncertainty of the D.R. position at 1912 Z. In two hours and forty-nine minutes the plane would have covered 366 NM at 130 knots so the uncertainty caused by dead reckoning for 366 NM is 18 NM for the 5% estimate; 36 NM for the 10% estimate and 60 NM using the most pessimistic estimate of DR accuracy. We have to add to these estimates the original 10 NM uncertainty in a fix obtained at 1623 Z so the totals are 28 NM, 46 NM and 70 NM of uncertainty at 1912 Z. Noonan knew the time that he obtained his last celestial fix and would have used the right amount of offset to allow for the possible uncertainty.
So these two cases mark the bounds of the possible uncertainty in the north and south direction, 70 NM if the last fix was obtained at 1623 Z and 42 NM if the last fix was obtained as late as possible (clouds permitting) at 1740 Z. Either way they would not have flown for hours southward still expecting to find Howland."
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And this does not even take into account using the Moon, which was well placed to provide another LOP running across the Sun LOP and telling them their latitude. The Moon was well up in the sky but we know that Noonan was capable of taking such high shots since he took observations as high as the Moon was on his crossing to Dakar. (see:
https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/navigation-to-dakar )
Without any additional sights after twilight at 1740 Z or after the 1623 Z message there is a limit on how much uncertainty there would be in Noonan's DR position. I already showed what it would have been at 1912 Z and it would deteriorate at a rate of 13 knots (using the 10% estimate), 13 NM for every hour after 1912 Z so even at 2400 Z the extra 4:48 would have added only 62 NM to the uncertainty making the total uncertainty (using the 10% estimate) only 92 NM if the last sight was taken at 1740 Z and 110 NM if the last sight had been taken at 1623 Z. Even using the most pessimistic estimate of DR accuracy from the U.S. Navy's Flight Navigation Manual, H.O. 216, prescribed for
beginning navigators the uncertainty would have been only 134 NM for the last sight being taken at 1740 Z and 162 NM if no sight had been taken after the 1623 Z message.
Noonan had to know, even if just by DR, that he was in the vicinity of Howland and any Sun or Moon sights would have narrowed the uncertainty down to about plus and minus 7 NM from the derived LOPs so no reason to fly off to the Phoenix, Marshall, or Gilbert islands or to fly to New Britain or Hawaii or Chicago.
But, again, it makes no sense that they would not have proceeded far enough southeast on the LOP after the standard intercept northwest of the island (see:
https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/landfall-procedure ) to not break into the clear and shoot the Sun and Moon and find Howland.
gl
