TIGHAR

Amelia Earhart Search Forum => Celestial choir => Topic started by: Don M Casillas on May 28, 2011, 11:47:31 PM

Title: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Don M Casillas on May 28, 2011, 11:47:31 PM
I want to know why the flight was so far south? Noonan was an "expert navigator" and was very professional in his work. So How could he have been so far off? Unless in the late 30's that was considered accureate navigating?
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Martin X. Moleski, SJ on May 29, 2011, 12:03:51 AM
I want to know why the flight was so far south? Noonan was an "expert navigator" and was very professional in his work. So How could he have been so far off? Unless in the late 30's that was considered accurate navigating?

Randy Jacobson's article on his Monte Carlo Simulation (http://tighar.org/wiki/Monte_carlo) discusses why he thinks ending up SSW of Howland at the time of the last transmission is the most probable outcome for the flight.

The plan for the flight was for Noonan to get close enough for Radio Direction Finding (http://tighar.org/wiki/RDF) to guide them to Howland.  He did an excellent job doing so.  They did not succeed because there were many failures in communication. (http://tighar.org/wiki/Failure_to_communicate)

See also "Air Navigation: State of the Art in 1937" (http://Air Navigation: State of the Art in 1937) and the articles to which it links.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on May 29, 2011, 01:51:33 AM
Moles. All  o/b of A/c forces available were set in to reach Howland , why is it that certain researches (like ´Monte Carlo´) always state or predict that nevertheless , the aircraft arrived at positions far away from the destination those forces were directed to ? If the pilot announces to be on destination , whereas she would be a couple of hundred miles (SSW) off , she must late or early have her navigator knocked cold.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on May 29, 2011, 03:51:01 AM
I want to know why the flight was so far south? Noonan was an "expert navigator" and was very professional in his work. So How could he have been so far off? Unless in the late 30's that was considered accurate navigating?

Randy Jacobson's article on his Monte Carlo Simulation (http://tighar.org/wiki/Monte_carlo) discusses why he thinks ending up SSW of Howland at the time of the last transmission is the most probable outcome for the flight.

The plan for the flight was for Noonan to get close enough for Radio Direction Finding (http://tighar.org/wiki/RDF) to guide them to Howland.  He did an excellent job doing so.  They did not succeed because there were many failures in communication. (http://tighar.org/wiki/Failure_to_communicate)

See also "Air Navigation: State of the Art in 1937" (http://Air Navigation: State of the Art in 1937) and the articles to which it links.

-----------------------------------------

No, they didn't plan to rely solely on the radio to find the island but planned on having two separate redundant methods either one of which, all by itself, was capable of taking them to a safe landing at Howland.

When you jump out of an airplane you have two separate, independent parachutes attached to
your harness. If the first one fails then the other one will get you back to earth safely. This is the
principal of redundancy. No one jumps with just one and-a-half parachutes.

This principle of redundancy has been well known in aviation forever. We pilots want dual
everything, dual navigation radios, dual communication radios, aircraft engines have two
separate ignition systems with two spark plugs in each cylinder, two engines each with two fuel
pumps with each fuel pump powered by a separate power source, two different sets of flight
instruments each also powered by a different power source, a second method for lowering  the
landing gear, etc., etc.

It certainly makes sense that they planned to use their on board RDF to home in on the Itasca’s
transmissions when they came within range since it is a very convenient way to navigate and it
gets more accurate as you get closer to the transmitter. Ric points out that there is no proof that
Noonan ever used the landfall method for finding an island when flying for Pan Am. So What?
Flying a landfall takes you out of the way and adds time to the flight so if on the Pan Am flights they were receiving
radio bearings as they approached their destination then there would be no reason that Noonan
would then go out of his way to do the landfall. There is also no proof that I have ever used a fire
extinguisher (because I never have) but I sure know how to do it and I would use a fire
extinguisher if the need ever arose.   Noonan knew the technique and would have used it if he needed to.
Earhart and Noonan must have appreciated the very real
possibility that their radio would not be working at that point based on the unreliability of radios
in 1937 in general and their own experience with their own radios which failed them on many
occasions while flying around he world.

I think this logic applies to Earhart and Noonan’s planning to find Howland, they planned to have
two separate, independent, redundant methods with which they could find the island, radio
bearings and celestial.  Either method, by itself, would have been good enough to lead them
safely to Howland. You don't want to put all of your eggs in one basket.

So what proof do we have that they believed that celestial was good enough, by itself, to get them
to Howland so that it provided a redundant method to the use of the unreliable radio? We can
break this down into separate questions.

================================================

1. Is celestial navigation accurate enough to find Howland?

Proof and evidence:

 A. )I just used this method three weeks ago and it worked perfectly. I have also used it many times in the
past and it has always worked for me. See http://www.fer3.com/arc/m2.aspx?i=116311&y=201104

 B.) Every flight navigation manual teaches this method.

“Landfall the safest way get to destination”

I have posted excerpts from eleven flight navigation manuals that prove this point here:

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/landfall-procedure



 C.) Pelegreno’s navigator, Bill Polhemus, used a landfall and it brought them to Howland.

====================================================
2. Was Noonan aware of this technique?

Proof and evidence:

 A.) The technique was used in 1922 by Gago Coutinho to find several small islands on the first flight
across the South Atlantic. Admiral Coutinho had an audience with the Pope about his
accomplishment and it was well publicised world wide.

 B.) Sir Francis Chichester also used the technique to find two small islands when he crossed the
Tasman Sea in 1931 and he extensively publicised his flight in his 1933 book, “Seaplane Solo.”


 C.) A well developed methodolgy for this technique was printed in “Flight Navigation” 1938 ed. by
Noonan’s friend, Philip Van Horn Weems.

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/weems

 D.) Noonan was in very frequent contact with Weems sharing their knowledge of flight navigation so
it would be hard to believe that Noonan had not discussed this technique with Weems.


 E.) Noonan expected that his celestial navigation was accurate
all by itself for them to find Howland if the radio did not work. Since we know that the radio did
not work we know that Noonan was forced to use the celestial which would have taken them a
bit out of the way but should have gotten them to Howland. It was more reliable than the
unreliable radio but for some reason something went wrong with both of the redundant methods
that they had to complete the flight.



==============================================================
3. How do we know they didn’t just plan to use radio to find Howland?

Proof and evidence:

 A.) They delayed their departure from Lae for two days so that Noonan could check his
chronometers. This would not have been necessary if they did not plan to use celestial to actually
find the island.  Accurate time is only necessary for determining longitude it is not necessary for
determining latitude. If they were only planning to get close enough to Howland to pick up the
radio signal from Itasca then they didn’t need to accurately know their longitude. Since they were
flying toward the east they only needed to know their latitude accurately enough to make sure
that they did not pass Howland too far to the north or south to pick up the radio signal and the
radio signals could be heard for hundreds of miles. If Noonan’s chronometer was wrong by an
entire week their latitude would only be in error by 15 miles so they would certainly pass close
enough to Itasca to hear the radio signal. This error in latitude would be caused by the change in
the sun’s declination, its location north and south equivelent to the sun’s latitude. You can see
the change in the sun’s declination in the 1937 Nautical Almanac, page 22:

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/nautical-almanac-1937

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 B.) If Earhart planned on relying only on radio to find the island then she didn’t need a navigator since
dead reckoning all the way from Lae was accurate enough to get her within radio range of Itasca
The range of the RDF in the plane that Earhart planned to use to home in on Itasca’s signals was
at least 250 NM.

 C.) I know this based on my own experience.  Many times I have homed on WLS in Chicago all the way
from Florida, a distance of a thousand NM. Two months ago while I was on Kauai Hawaii I used a small
portable radio to measure a bearing on  radio station KFI in Los Angles which, by coincidence, was
2222 NM away, exactly the same distance as from Lae to Howland. So we know that low frequency
signals can travel this far, however the station I was listening to put our 50,000 watts which is a hundred
times more than Itasca's radio which only put out 500 watts. But the range of a ground wave, in general,
varies with the square root of the power output. KFI's signal was a hundred times as powerful as Itasca's
so its range should be ten times greater, or to put it another way, we can expect Itasca's signal to go one-tenth
as far as KFI's or 222 NM

 D.) I also have an old  chart showing a fix I got on a radio beacon on the island of Flores in the Azores. I
crossed the radio bearing with a sun line and the fix was 230 NM west of Flores. I know I had
been receiving the radio signal for a long time before I took the sun line so I know that I could
receive that signal at least 300 NM from the transmitter.

E.) I have also flown on route A-17 from Bimini to Grand Turk, a distance of 518 NM,  on the way to Puerto Rico and was able to hear the radio
beacons on those islands at least 258 NM away. Grand Turk only puts out 400 watts, Itasca put out 500 watts so
its range should be even longer.


F.) But it is not just my experience to rely on, the government agency that impemented route A-17 also had to test to be
assured that the radio signals could be heard at the middle of the leg which is 258 NM from each island
radio beacon.


 G.) Since the leg from Lae to Howland is 2222 NM and the common estimate
of DR accuracy is 10% of the distance flown then one could expect to
fly the distance from Lae to Howland solely by dead reckoning and
still be confident of coming within 222 NM of Itasca and so be
close enough to pick up the radio signal and track inbound to Howland.
So if AE had been willing to rely only on radio she didn't need Fred. But
obviously they wouldn't just rely on radio.
-----------------------------------------------------------

It is hard for young people today who have grown up with cell phones,
the internet, TV, satellite dishes and IPODs to have any gut feeling
for the unreliability of radio equipment in the 1930s. Modern
equipment and systems are so reliable people don't even think about it
anymore. But in the '30s comparing the reliability and trust in
complicated pieces of electronic equipment with resistors, capacitors,
and tubes that burned out without warning in your own equipment and in
the transmitting equipment that was not under your control to the
proven reliability of a simple sextant, a book of tables and a clock
(or two clocks for redundancy) and celestial won hands down. That was
why AE hauled Fred's butt all the way around the world.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Martin X. Moleski, SJ on May 29, 2011, 07:08:53 AM
Moles. All  o/b of A/c forces available were set in to reach Howland , why is it that certain researches (like ´Monte Carlo´) always state or predict that nevertheless , the aircraft arrived at positions far away from the destination those forces were directed to ? If the pilot announces to be on destination , whereas she would be a couple of hundred miles (SSW) off , she must late or early have her navigator knocked cold.

You place the flight 85 nautical miles NNW of Howland.

Randy Jacobson places it 100 nm SSW. (http://tighar.org/wiki/Monte_carlo)

"Finally, when Earhart believed she was at Howland, the plane was actually somewhere about 100 to 135nm to the SW of Howland. Caution must be used, however, as it was assumed that Earhart did not have a single celestial fix to update her flight, and that her entire Expected Path was based solely on dead reckoning."

You both agree Noonan missed Howland.  You disagree about the reasons for the miss.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Martin X. Moleski, SJ on May 29, 2011, 07:11:29 AM
No, they didn't plan to rely solely on the radio to find the island but planned on having two separate redundant methods either one of which, all by itself, was capable of taking them to a safe landing at Howland.

I don't buy your argument that AE could have flown without navigating to within RDF range of Howland, but I accept the idea that Fred did provide a backup system of sorts.

The RDF systems we know about are three: Itasca, Howland Island, and the plane.  All three failed.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on May 29, 2011, 12:54:49 PM
No, they didn't plan to rely solely on the radio to find the island but planned on having two separate redundant methods either one of which, all by itself, was capable of taking them to a safe landing at Howland.

I don't buy your argument that AE could have flown without navigating to within RDF range of Howland, but I accept the idea that Fred did provide a backup system of sorts.

The RDF systems we know about are three: Itasca, Howland Island, and the plane.  All three failed.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Some more evidence to convince you:

On the flight from Oakland to Hawaii they were able to get radio bearings on stations that were more than 600 NM away.

Pilots ferrying small planes across the Pacific and the Atlantic back in the 1970's, before the advent of LORAN C or GPS, universally did exactly that,  they DRed all the way with only an ADF for terminal guidance, relying on DR to be able to get them within the range of the radio beacon at the destination. (I only know of two exceptions to this, one is Ken Gebhart, who now owns the company CELESTAIRE which sells navigation equipment, and myself, we both used celestial navigation.) (see: http://www.celestaire.com/ ) Of course, in the '70s, radio was much more reliable but the range was still the same, the physics of radio propagation had not changed.

The longest leg on the Pacific crossing is California to Hawaii and is about 2100 NM depending on which airport you leave from which is insignificantly shorter than the leg from Lae to Howland. See:  http://www.fer3.com/arc/m2.aspx?i=108664&y=200906


So it would not have been unreasonable for Earhart, by herself, alone in the airplane, to rely solely on DR and then trust the radio for terminal guidance, to fly the leg from Lae to Howland if she had been content to have no redundancy, no second independent navigation method that was capable, by itself, to get her all the way to Howland. To have this second, redundant, navigation system on board she need Noonan.

In the end, both systems failed, stuff happens. Similarly, sometimes a skydiver's reserve parachute fails too and he gets killed. Even redundant systems cannot guarantee success.

BTW, the Itasca's radio direction finder did not fail. The Itasca's RDF was not capable of taking bearings on the frequencies that Earhart transmitted on. Since it was limited to 270 to 550 kcs  she could have transmitted on 3105 and 6210 kcs until the cows came home and they could not have taken a bearing on her. Itasca informed Earhart of the frequency range of their RDF by radiogram on June 28th and this document is available on the Purdue archive website.

Gary LaPook
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Martin X. Moleski, SJ on May 29, 2011, 02:01:13 PM
So it would not have been unreasonable for Earhart, by herself, alone in the airplane, to rely solely on DR and then trust the radio for terminal guidance, to fly the leg from Lae to Howland if she had been content to have no redundancy, no second independent navigation method that was capable, by itself, to get her all the way to Howland. To have this second, redundant, navigation system on board she needed Noonan.

OK.  I'll take your word for it.

Quote
BTW, the Itasca's radio direction finder did not fail. The Itasca's RDF was not capable of taking bearings on the frequencies that Earhart transmitted on. Since it was limited to 270 to 550 kcs  she could have transmitted on 3105 and 6210 kcs until the cows came home and they could not have taken a bearing on her. Itasca informed Earhart of the frequency range of their RDF by radiogram on June 28th and this document is available on the Purdue archive website.

True enough.  I was composing on my way out the door for a 10:00 AM Mass half-an-hour away from here.
Actually, only one of the three systems "failed"--the one on Howland.  AE's did, at least, pick up a signal,
albeit on a frequency that was too high for her to find a null (7500 kcs).

I've got the story of the mismatched frequencies both for her set and for Itasca (including the 28 June telegram) in the  "Failure to Communicate" (http://tighar.org/wiki/Failure_to_communicate#Apparent_ignorance_of_the_limitations_of_her_equipment) article.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on June 10, 2011, 03:17:12 PM
GLpk. To mr Collopy of Lae Aero mr.Noonan  , thereupon ,  replied positively when asked for being able to find Howland without difficulty ; for such answer you must have your own plans ready , this being a set of precomputations concerning the entire journey , with the possibility , of course , that necessary adaptations must be made . You can not a priori make statement that the island will be " easily" detected  by RDF , especially not since you know that the o/b 500 kc installation has been rendered unservicable. It can be safely assumed that the priority list contained : 1 . Celnav , 2 . (RDF) , with the brackets.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Monty Fowler on June 14, 2011, 11:13:25 AM
Mr. Van Asten -  ???
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on July 29, 2011, 02:26:46 AM
No, they didn't plan to rely solely on the radio to find the island but planned on having two separate redundant methods either one of which, all by itself, was capable of taking them to a safe landing at Howland.

I don't buy your argument that AE could have flown without navigating to within RDF range of Howland, but I accept the idea that Fred did provide a backup system of sorts.

The RDF systems we know about are three: Itasca, Howland Island, and the plane.  All three failed.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Some more evidence to convince you:

On the flight from Oakland to Hawaii they were able to get radio bearings on stations that were more than 600 NM away.

Pilots ferrying small planes across the Pacific and the Atlantic back in the 1970's, before the advent of LORAN C or GPS, universally did exactly that,  they DRed all the way with only an ADF for terminal guidance, relying on DR to be able to get them within the range of the radio beacon at the destination. (I only know of two exceptions to this, one is Ken Gebhart, who now owns the company CELESTAIRE which sells navigation equipment, and myself, we both used celestial navigation.) (see: http://www.celestaire.com/ ) Of course, in the '70s, radio was much more reliable but the range was still the same, the physics of radio propagation had not changed.

The longest leg on the Pacific crossing is California to Hawaii and is about 2100 NM depending on which airport you leave from which is insignificantly shorter than the leg from Lae to Howland. See:  http://www.fer3.com/arc/m2.aspx?i=108664&y=200906


So it would not have been unreasonable for Earhart, by herself, alone in the airplane, to rely solely on DR and then trust the radio for terminal guidance, to fly the leg from Lae to Howland if she had been content to have no redundancy, no second independent navigation method that was capable, by itself, to get her all the way to Howland. To have this second, redundant, navigation system on board she need Noonan.

In the end, both systems failed, stuff happens. Similarly, sometimes a skydiver's reserve parachute fails too and he gets killed. Even redundant systems cannot guarantee success.

BTW, the Itasca's radio direction finder did not fail. The Itasca's RDF was not capable of taking bearings on the frequencies that Earhart transmitted on. Since it was limited to 270 to 550 kcs  she could have transmitted on 3105 and 6210 kcs until the cows came home and they could not have taken a bearing on her. Itasca informed Earhart of the frequency range of their RDF by radiogram on June 28th and this document is available on the Purdue archive website.

Gary LaPook

----------------------------------------------------------------------

You may have seen the movie "Mercy Mission: The Rescue of Flight 771" in which a guy ferrying a Cessna Ag Truck (a crop duster) from the U.S. to Australia had a failure of his ADF and was lost over the Pacific on the 1700 SM leg from Pago Pago to Norfolk Island. The captain of a nearby airliner used some basic celestial navigation techniques to locate the lost plane.

This movie is based on a true story. The plane had successfully flown from San Francisco to Honolulu (2400 SM) and on to Pago Pago (2600 SM) before taking off on the 1700 SM leg to Norfolk Island which is about 900 SM east of Australia. Ag Trucks cruise at about 90 knots so these legs each took more than  24 hours. Ag Trucks don't have IFR panels so you have to install a temporary small panel with the IFR instruments (you need a form 337). On the other hand, Ag Trucks are convenient because you plumb the chemical hopper into the fuel line and then fill the hopper with fuel so you don't need to install an additional ferry tank.

This was a common routing to Australia and thousands of single engine planes flown by single pilots flew this route safely so Earhart's flight was nothing out of the ordinary.


I just checked the Australian Aircraft Registry

http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:PWA::pc=PC_90127

and found that there are 3656 Cessna, 1861 Piper and 710 Beech aircraft registered. (These are the three largest manufacturers of small aircraft.) So I was right, there were thousands of small aircraft flown across the Pacific by solo pilots. About 6000 planes flown on three legs of about 2400 SM each makes about 18,000 legs each about the same length as the Earhart flight. Earhart's flight was no longer than these many thousands of flights and she had Fred who could spell her on the controls.

You can see the movie here:

http://www.ovguide.com/movies_tv/mercy_mission_the_rescue_of_flight_771.htm






http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_New_Zealand_Flight_103

http://airodyssey.net/1999/03/01/movie-flt771/

http://www.navworld.com/navcerebrations/mayday.htm

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0107556/

It is available on Netflix:

http://movies.netflix.com/WiSearch?oq=mercy+mission&ac_posn=-1&v1=mercy+mission&search_submit=

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Martin X. Moleski, SJ on July 29, 2011, 07:47:57 AM
BTW, the Itasca's radio direction finder did not fail. The Itasca's RDF was not capable of taking bearings on the frequencies that Earhart transmitted on. Since it was limited to 270 to 550 kcs  she could have transmitted on 3105 and 6210 kcs until the cows came home and they could not have taken a bearing on her. Itasca informed Earhart of the frequency range of their RDF by radiogram on June 28th and this document is available on the Purdue archive website.

AE apparently didn't grasp the importance of transmitting on the right frequency for the right length of time.  As far as we can tell, she didn't understand the limitations of her equipment and of the RDF equipment aboard the Itasca (http://tighar.org/wiki/Failure_to_communicate#Apparent_ignorance_of_the_limitations_of_her_equipment).  The borrowed Navy HFDF rig on Howland (http://tighar.org/wiki/HFDF#HFDF_on_Howland) failed, too, although the reasons are (in my view) murky: poorly designed, too few batteries, poor power management, unskilled operators (maybe), short transmissions from AE, etc.  I don't think we have the specs on that equipment.  It seems conceivable to me that someone told AE that she could anticipate getting bearings from Itasca on her voice transmissions because they assumed that the borrowed equipment would work in that range.  However, I have seen zero evidence to that effect.  Someone wanted the HFDF available; someone must have known its range; it got to Howland; it didn't work as hoped.

Quote
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_New_Zealand_Flight_103 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_New_Zealand_Flight_103)

http://www.navworld.com/navcerebrations/mayday.htm (http://www.navworld.com/navcerebrations/mayday.htm)

Wow--what a great story!  Thanks!
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on July 31, 2011, 01:20:49 AM
The RDF battery operated HF instrument was possibly a pre-mass production model  that in WW-II was delivered with JAN specifications to the US Navy . I have the documentation of the latter and will search for it in the papers . JAN specifications guaranteed the usefullness in the field .
.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Martin X. Moleski, SJ on August 02, 2011, 05:33:28 PM
... she must have used RDF effectively enough at times before. ...
So far as I know, no other flight in her career required RDF (http://tighar.org/wiki/Amelia_Earhart).  She may have had a set aboard and may have fooled around with it a bit, but she had lots of other landmarks to help her find her way.  She didn't have or need it for her transatlantic flight.  She may have had it, but didn't much need it for her flight from Hawaii to the mainland.

Quote
Poor creature paid a terrible price for that shortcoming.

Agreed.  Fred, too.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 02, 2011, 06:32:06 PM
The RDF battery operated HF instrument was possibly a pre-mass production model  that in WW-II was delivered with JAN specifications to the US Navy . I have the documentation of the latter and will search for it in the papers . JAN specifications guaranteed the usefullness in the field .
.

'JAN Specifications' - interesting. 

As I recall from "Finding Amelia" and see again in this site, it seems the HFDF set on Howland  (http://tighar.org/wiki/High_frequency_direction_finding_equipment_on_Howland) worked OK, excepting certain tragic limitations: if only -
a) the operator had not expended the batteries] while listening much of the night prior to AE's arrival in the area, and
b) AE had had a grasp of how long to key the mic to allow a minimum, i.e. had only been savvy as to RDF technique beyond whatever elementary use she had apparently experienced during most of her career. 

I say apparently, because the game she found herself in on July 2 seemed to have required actions beyond her knowing, and she must have used RDF effectively enough at times before.  Or, perhaps she was reliant on others for that and the posing for pictures  (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/MapsandPhotos/Photo_Gallery/EPPhotopage8.html) was little more than that - posing as if attentive to the task in a meaningful way.  Poor creature paid a terrible price for that shortcoming.

Thinking along the subject of 'Noonan Navigation Error' and from all I have been able to digest about the flight, it hardly seems fair to presume much of an 'error' on FN's part: seems more likely he performed as well as conditions would allow.  What was ultimately missing was the ablilty to connect the radio-dots, voice and directional, and perhaps finally an utter inability to spot Howland among the cloud shadows on the ocean.

Many of these details will remain a mystery even after NR16020 is found.  They are consistent enough with the Electra finding its way to Niku, but if the airplane is found there it will not prove that all details occurred as we envision them.  We'll never really know who contributed to the loss in what degree and how, unless some record was made of that by either of the only two who could have known and left for us to find; I doubt we'll find that bottle lying in the coral rubble and sands of Nikumaroro. 

LTM -

------------------------------------------------------------

1. The batteries were borrowed from the Itasca where they were normally used to power up the gun mount.

2. The only use of the RDF by Earhart that I know of was Noonan's instruction to her to "keep the Makapuu beacon ten degrees on the starboard bow" as they approached Hawaii. But Manning was working the radio and most likely set up the RDF for her so the only thing she needed to do was to listen for the null as she changed the heading slightly right and left.

3. There were no cloud shadows in the vicinity of Howland on July 2, 1937. Itasca reported the nearest clouds as being 40 NM away. Don't confuse Earhart's  approach with the Pellegrino flight in 1967 or with the movie on the Waitt website.

http://searchforamelia.org/helicopter

gl

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 03, 2011, 03:24:56 PM
Your pt. b . Amelia announced "whistling now"  when she had asked for a bearing . This means that her knowledge on theory and practice of RDF was marginal : for any bearing only the carrier , not modulation , is necessary . Pressing the microphone switch would have been sufficient . Also , her switching to the "night" 3105 kcs channel at sunset near Nukumanu was erroneous : at Lae the sun was still 10 deg above the horizon , and low frequency 1000-5000 kcs signals get quenched by sunlight , which she evidently was not aware of and contact with Balfour was lost . The continuous headwinds prohibited a Fixed Square Search to have been set in from 1912 GMT : the remaining fuel  (38 galls) was insufficient , but from A/c´s  position Howland would have been seen from one of its first legs , if not the very first leg to port .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 04, 2011, 01:00:32 AM
------------------------------------------------------------

1. The batteries were borrowed from the Itasca where they were normally used to power up the gun mount.

2. The only use of the RDF by Earhart that I know of was Noonan's instruction to her to "keep the Makapuu beacon ten degrees on the starboard bow" as they approached Hawaii. But Manning was working the radio and most likely set up the RDF for her so the only thing she needed to do was to listen for the null as she changed the heading slightly right and left.

3. There were no cloud shadows in the vicinity of Howland on July 2, 1937. Itasca reported the nearest clouds as being 40 NM away. Don't confuse Earhart's  approach with the Pellegrino flight in 1967 or with the movie on the Waitt website.

http://searchforamelia.org/helicopter

gl

gl

1. - Batteries - source is interesting but moot - the batteries were depleted from the previous night's efforts to track the flight, hence my point.

2. - Interesting - good observation; that fits my wonderment to a degree.  One would think she was more experienced than that, but perhaps she was not experienced at all at handling the equipment herself.  It is one thing to chase a needle, quite another to handle the frequencies, etc.

3. - Clouds - first for me, memory not always great but I don't recall it that way - check Itasca's deck logs  (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Archivessubject.html) - if I'm reading them correctly Itasca was recording 'bc' (blue sky with clouds / scattered or broken) with 'cu's at anywhere from 2 - 3/10s coverage ('scattered') around the time of AE's closest approach. Cu's are big, puffy and dense enough to cast deep shadows; those conditions make a pretty spotted ocean.  Was not even considering '67 flight or Waitt's exercise.  However, if I've misread that deck log information then I'd appreciate the correct reading with a reference regarding the weather at Howland vicinity on morning of July 2, 1937.  In any case, they didn't 'spot' the island...

LTM -

Thompson's cruise report, page 5 says ceiling unlimited within 40 miles of Itasca and the sun rose "clear." Thompson's transcript report on page 47 said the weather was "clear" at the time.

I just read the deck log and from 7 to 11 am it notates "bc" which indicates some clouds and the type is given as "cu," cumulus, except at 7 am when the type is given as "s-cu," strato-cumulus. The sky coverage was 4/10ths at 8 am, "blank" at 9 am, 2/10ths at 10 am and 3/10ths at 11 am. The 9 am observation is the most critical as it is closest in time to Earhart's final messages. How do we interpret the "blank?" Examining he rest of the deck log shows that there is at least a "1" entered in conjunction with every other "bc" notation. So one of these entries is in error since there is a contradiction. If the "bc" notation was correct then there shouldn't be a "blank." If the blank is correct then there shouldn't be a "bc" but instead it should have been a "b." My resolution of this contradiction is to go with the "bc" being the error at 9 am based on the Thompson reports as it is fairly certain that he would have gone out on deck during this period and observed the sky conditions for himself while looking for the plane.

And don't forget that Itasca was making thick black smoke that made a ten mile long streak that should have been easily distinguishable from cloud shadows.
gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 04, 2011, 11:37:35 PM
------------------------------------------------------------

Thompson's cruise report, page 5 says ceiling unlimited within 40 miles of Itasca and the sun rose "clear." Thompson's transcript report on page 47 said the weather was "clear" at the time.

I just read the deck log...

And don't forget that Itasca was making thick black smoke that made a ten mile long streak that should have been easily distinguishable from cloud shadows.
gl

"Thompson's cruise report, page 5 says ceiling unlimited within 40 miles of Itasca and the sun rose "clear." Thompson's transcript report on page 47 said the weather was "clear" at the time." -

Excepting Thompson's later report references to 'clear at the time' (what time - and which may be in conflict with the deck logs if he is referring to the same 'time' as in the logs for the times we are speaking of), 'ceiling unlimited' and 'sun rose "clear"' can easily be entirely consistent with clouds less-than 5/10s coverage. In weather terms there is no 'ceiling' unless you have 5/10s or more sky coverage; it does not take a complete overcast to make a ceiling. 

"Sun rose clear" is also entirely consistent with "s-cu" clouds in Itasca's vicinity at 7 a.m., building to cu 4 at 8, etc.  Consider: the sun rose to the east - opposite direction from which AE would approach, and earlier than when she would have been looking...

"I just read the deck log and from 7 to 11 am it notates "bc" which indicates some clouds and the type is given as "cu," cumulus, except at 7 am when the type is given as "s-cu," strato-cumulus. The sky coverage was 4/10ths at 8 am, "blank" at 9 am, 2/10ths at 10 am and 3/10ths at 11 am. The 9 am observation is the most critical as it is closest in time to Earhart's final messages. How do we interpret the "blank?" Examining he rest of the deck log shows that there is at least a "1" entered in conjunction with every other "bc" notation. So one of these entries is in error since there is a contradiction. If the "bc" notation was correct then there shouldn't be a "blank." If the blank is correct then there shouldn't be a "bc" but instead it should have been a "b." My resolution of this contradiction is to go with the "bc" being the error at 9 am based on the Thompson reports as it is fairly certain that he would have gone out on deck during this period and observed the sky conditions for himself while looking for the plane." -

One way to 'interpret' the blank is that it is simply a "blank" - more of an omission than 'inconsistency'.

Another way to reasonably consider the blank, or 'interpret' the blank, is to note the obvious - 9 a.m. is nestled half-way between recorded times when there were between 4/10s and 2/10s coverage (8 and 10 a.m.) so 'bc' was likely; the question then is 'how much bc / cu'?  I believe my analysis is rather pale compared to one already well-made by TIGHAR (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Forum/FAQs/overcast.htm).

Perhaps whomever was writing the log failed to get an opinion from another observer as to the amount of coverage - it is one yeoman thing to record in a log - and even to see the obvious 'bc' conditions, but somewhat more of an experienced call to make as to type (s-cu / cu, etc.) and percentage of cover.  We can probably agree that Thompson and others were rather busy around that time.  I doubt weather observations were foremost on his mind if there was blue sky and clouds present; sky coverage type and percentage may have therefore easily have taken a back burner around 9 a.m.

It can also be noted that coverage increased by 11 a.m. to 3/10s - that only further suggests clouds in the area most of the morning.  Thus, 'bc' noted at 9 a.m., even with the attending 'blank' you mentioned, becomes rather well bracketed - and increases the likelihood that AE would have found shadows on the ocean when she was in the area...

"And don't forget that Itasca was making thick black smoke that made a ten mile long streak that should have been easily distinguishable from cloud shadows." -

That has been rather thoroughly challenged and debunked (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Forum/FAQs/itasca.htm) as Thompson making his best personal case for cover - one more reason for me to question much that was reported by that gentleman after the search.  Whatever smoke Itasca may have laid down was probably premature, starting at 0614 hours.  It is highly unlikely that Itasca did or even could have done such a thing - very detrimental to her boilers to have laid down that much 'black smoke', but it certainly adds poignant irony to the story.

Of course we're all stuck with 'interpretations' based on what we've found, and neither of our arguments can be 'proven' today.  We also can never really know just how close AE even got to Howland and whether these factors applied directly or not, so one is of course most welcome to his or her own interpretations. 

That said, had AE gotten close, it seems to remain a fair consideration that her ability to 'spot' Howland island may well have been visually compromised by cloud shadows.  Compare it with Niku from the air: that big, blue lagoon and fringing reef makes it a whole different consideration - which is quite consistent with the notion of her having found it later that morning.

LTM -

-----------------------------------------

1. Actually it took 6/10ths coverage to have a ceiling, not 5/10ths. Now that we have switched to the METAR format we have also switched to "octas" so now it takes 5/8ths coverage to constitute a ceiling.

2. They would have been approaching fom the northwest on the LOP at least for the final part of the flight when they couldn't get any radio bearings.

3. But even if there were clouds in the area, cloud shadows may look like islands but they do not look like ships, especially white ships making black smoke. By radiogram, Earhart had been informed that Itasca would be making smoke during the day and shining spotlights at night so she would have known to look for the smoke.

4. And just how do cloud shadows "compromise" Earhart's ability to spot Howland and the Itasca? The shadows do not obliterate the actual island or the ship. The only way they could cause a problem is if Noonan allowed Earhart to turn off the LOP to chase after a cloud shadow instead of staying on the LOP until positive identification of the island and the ship and the smoke, not very likely since none of the cloud shadows had a white ship standing just off shore making black smoke. I don't know about you, but I have flown over many islands and cloud shadows and I always managed to stay on course until I positively identified the island.

5. Since you seem concerned about cloud shadows in the vicinity of Howland, what about cloud shadows near Niku? There is no reason to believe that they knew what any of the Phoenix islands looked like so they could have been fooled by shadows in that area. And, possibly even more important, what about cloud shadows on the way to Niku? When near Howland they were not low on fuel, according to Ric, so no reason to go chasing after cloud shadows, they could calmly stay on their course and ignore such shadows. But later, on the proposed route to Niku, fuel would have been getting low, even using the most optimistic estimates, so it is very likely that desperation would have been growing in the plane tempting them to follow the Sirens' song and turn off course to chase those same shadows which were holding out the hope of saving their lives especially since they were not aiming for a particular island in the Phoenix group. They could have been zig-zagging all over the Pacific making it more likely that they used up their limited fuel before getting as far as Niku and making it more unlikely that they would find it after wandering in many directions off course.

6.  I read Brandenburg's article and he comes up with all kinds of speculative horrors if smoke is made for too long a period of time. Well from 0614 until AE's last transmission at 0842 is only two and a half hours, not very long. He conjures up scare stories about what would happen if soot is allowed to build up too thickly on the boilers' water tubes. The normal practice is to blow the tubes every watch (a four  hour period) while underway and twice a day when in harbor. (Blowing the tubes entails opening the steam valves that direct steam through perforated tubes located next to the water tubes and the steam blows out the accumulated soot making huge belching clouds of very black smoke as the soot is expelled with the stack gases.) If the boilermen were concerned that soot was being accumulated at a faster rate than normal due to having a too rich mixture necessary for laying down a smoke screen then they could blow the tubes more often and not wait the full four hour period. The boilermen and the engineering officer knew their jobs.

Brandenburg correctly points out that Itasca was using heavy bunker oil and then compares it with more modern fuel oil called NSFO. He then states: " Even NSFO smoke screens are not very durable. In anything more than a light breeze, say 5 knots or so, the smoke is pushed rapidly down onto the surface where it flattens and thins out within three to five miles. This results in rapid vertical thinning of the smoke, thus drastically reducing its visual contrast with respect to the sea surface." That is not a surprise that lighter oil would make a lighter, shorter lived smoke screen than the actual smoke screen  being made by Itasca using heavy bunker oil.


But this is all a theoretical discussion and we do not have to even consider it since there are all the contemporary eye witness accounts and documents saying that the smoke screen was there for hours, it stretched more than ten miles down wind and would have been visible for 40 miles. Elgin Long even includes a photograph of the Itasca making smoke and you can see the quality of the smoke for yourself.  If you have Morrissey's book look at pages 257, 258, 260 and 291 for various descriptions of the smoke being made by Itasca. The quote on 257-258 is from the Commanding officer of the Lexington saying that the "Itasca was laying a heavy smoke screen which hung for hours." He also says as printed on page 260 that "the Itasca's smoke plume could have been seen 40 miles or more." Now the captain of the Lexington was not there at the time so he was relying on reports from others but the captain of the Lexington would know the capabilities and characteristics of smoke made by ships in 1937 better than Mr. Brandenburg so could evaluate these reports.


Safford publishes Itasca's log for July 2nd. It contains the entry: "0614 Vessel began laying down heavy smoke to assist Miss Earhart."  There was no log entry saying when they stopped making smoke so does this mean that they never stopped and they are still making smoke to this very day? Or does it mean that they only made smoke for 30 minutes (as Brandenburg would have us believe) or for more than two hours or until they started their search, and then stopped without making a log entry? which scenario makes the most sense? Safford also publishes the Itasca radio message sent to COMHAWSEC the  higher commander at 1402 on July 2nd, just 7 hours after AE failed to arrive stating in part  that Earhart passed the island and  "missed it in the glare of the rising sun though we were smoking heavily at that time period." Itasca was at that time searching northwest of Howland with every expectation of rescuing AE so Captain Thompson would not have been in CYA mode yet. In addition to the coast guard personnel on the ship there were two wire service reporters who had no reason to cover up anything, their butts did not need to be covered so they would have reported that no smoke was being made if, in fact, it wasn't. The Hawaiians on Howland also reported that smoke was being made, see James Kamakaiwi diary.


Look at Black's cruise report, page 10.

 Entry for 8:07:

"...Itasca was laying down smoke screen stretching for ten miles. Smoke remained concentrated and did not thin out much..."
So smoke was being made until at least 8:07.

So I think we have to accept some things as fact and this is one of them unless everybody was lying.

And I don't know where Brandenburg got this:

"And making heavy black smoke for a protracted period -- more than 30 minutes or so -- was inviting trouble in the form of a tube rupture (caused by uneven heating of the tube surface due to rapid and uneven soot accumulation) which resulted in water and steam spewing into the fire box, dousing the fire and, worse, causing the firebrick lining the inside of the fire box to crack from chill shock and crumble into a pile of rubble in the middle of the firebox. Such an event would require major and expensive shipyard repairs, and avoidance of such a failure was uppermost in the mind of any ship Captain."


Holy crap, Batman!

Contrary to what Brandenburg's claims, what actually concerned the boilermen and the engineering officer about soot on the tubes was not catastrophic damage to the boiler but that "(1) The soot acts as an insulator and slows heat transfer to the water within the tubes. (2) If the soot remains in a boiler when fires are secured, it absorbs moisture from the air; the moisture activates the sulfuric acid in the soot, and this acid in turns attacks the metal of the tubes and boiler drum. (3) If allowed to remain too long, the soot packs into a solid mass and can be removed only by tedious hand cleaning. To maintain maximum boiler efficiency, tubes should be blown, while underway every 4-hour watch and, while in port, twice a day." (Knight's Modern Seamanship, Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U.S. Navy, 13 Ed. , pages 57-58, attached.) The admiral apparently forgot to mention the horrors that Mr. Brandenburg imagines. Maybe Mr. Brandenburg knows more about marine engines and boilers than Admiral Knight. Notice, as long as the tubes are blown regularly, there is no need for hand cleaning every 600 hours as Brandenburg claims. If the engineering officer or the boilermen became concerned with soot building up too rapidly when making a smoke screen they could have simply blown the tubes at more frequent intervals.

Soot is five times more efficient as an insulator than asbestos. A layer of only 1/8 inch of soot results in a heat loss of 47% and an increase in fuel consumption of 8½%.  As the layer of soot builds up, the stack temperature rises since the exhaust gasses are not being cooled by the transfer of heat to the water in the boiler. The rise in stack gas temperature is measured and  used to determine  when the tubes need to be blown.

Also see excerpts from Boilerman 3 & 2, the U.S. Navy training manual for boilermen 3rd and 2nd class which is attached. BTW, nowhere in this manual or in Knight's Modern Seamanship is there any mention of the horribles that inhabit Brandenburg's fertile imagination.

-------------------------------------------------------

For those interested in marine steam engines, the next time you are in California there are several places where you can see one. If in San Diego you can visit the Berkely moored just north of the Star of India. You can visit the boiler room and engine room and see her triple expansion, reciprocating steam engine.

http://www.sdmaritime.com/contentpage.asp?ContentID=49

When in San Francisco, you can visit the Jeremiah O'Brien which is a Liberty ship and you can see her boilers and her four cylinder, triple expansion, reciprocating steam engine. (I know it sounds like an oxymoron to have a four cylinder, triple expansion engine but this was a fairly common type. Instead of having one very large low pressure cylinder, these engines have two smaller low pressure cylinders working in unison for the final expansion of the steam.)

http://www.ssjeremiahobrien.org/


If in the L.A. area, you can visit the Lane Victory, a victory ship moored in San Pedro harbor near Long Beach. Her engine is not as interesting as those in the other two ships because Victory ships have steam turbine engines rather than reciprocating engines, but still worth the visit.

http://www.lanevictory.org/

For you lawyers out there, a case involving blowing the tubes of a ship ended up in the U.S. Supreme Court, see:  HURON CEMENT CO. v. DETROIT, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) -- US Supreme Court Cases

STEWART, J., Opinion of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

362 U.S. 440
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN
No. 86 Argued: February 29, 1960 --- Decided: April 25, 1960

MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan draws in question the constitutional validity of certain provisions of Detroit's Smoke Abatement Code as applied to ships owned by the appellant and operated in interstate commerce. [p441]

The appellant is a Michigan corporation, engaged in the manufacture and sale of cement. It maintains a fleet of five vessels which it uses to transport cement from its mill in Alpena, Michigan, to distributing plants located in various states bordering the Great Lakes. Two of the ships, the S.S. Crapo and the S.S. Boardman, are equipped with hand-fired Scotch marine boilers. While these vessels are docked for loading and unloading, it is necessary, in order to operate deck machinery, to keep the boilers fired and to clean the fires periodically. When the fires are cleaned, the ship's boiler stacks emit smoke which, in density and duration, exceeds the maximum standards allowable under the Detroit Smoke Abatement Code. Structural alterations would be required in order to insure compliance with the Code.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0362_0440_ZO.html


gl


Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 06, 2011, 12:39:53 PM
------------------------------------------------------------



"And don't forget that Itasca was making thick black smoke that made a ten mile long streak that should have been easily distinguishable from cloud shadows." -

That has been rather thoroughly challenged and debunked (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Forum/FAQs/itasca.htm) as Thompson making his best personal case for cover - one more reason for me to question much that was reported by that gentleman after the search.  Whatever smoke Itasca may have laid down was probably premature, starting at 0614 hours.  It is highly unlikely that Itasca did or even could have done such a thing - very detrimental to her boilers to have laid down that much 'black smoke', but it certainly adds poignant irony to the story.


-----------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------

6.  I read Brandenburg's article and he comes up with all kinds of speculative horrors if smoke is made for too long a period of time. Well from 0614 until AE's last transmission at 0842 is only two and a half hours, not very long. He conjures up scare stories about what would happen if soot is allowed to build up too thickly on the boilers' water tubes. The normal practice is to blow the tubes every watch (a four  hour period) while underway and twice a day when in harbor. (Blowing the tubes entails opening the steam valves that direct steam through perforated tubes located next to the water tubes and the steam blows out the accumulated soot making huge belching clouds of very black smoke as the soot is expelled with the stack gases.) If the boilermen were concerned that soot was being accumulated at a faster rate than normal due to having a too rich mixture necessary for laying down a smoke screen then they could blow the tubes more often and not wait the full four hour period. The boilermen and the engineering officer knew their jobs.


Look at Black's cruise report, page 10.

 Entry for 8:07:

"...Itasca was laying down smoke screen stretching for ten miles. Smoke remained concentrated and did not thin out much..."
So smoke was being made until at least 8:07.

Now for a DUH! moment. The normal practice it to blow the boilers to remove the soot at the end of every watch. Watches are four hours long, midnight to 0400; 0400 to 0800; 0800 to 1200, etc. Because of this schedule, the boilers were due to be blown prior to 0800 (it takes about 15 minutes) say about 0745, only one and a half hours after Itasca started to make smoke. This means that the boilers were due to be blown right in the middle of the period of interest and this would have made a hellacious amount of black smoke with the soot suspended in the smoke cloud making the smoke even more visible to earhart. Her last message was at 0842 less  than one hour after the completion of the soot removal so there is obviously no basis for Brandenburg's concern and opinion that they could not have been making smoke during the critical period that Earhart was approaching Howland. And, again, if there was concern about soot build up they could have done the blowing earlier than scheduled and more frequently.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 09, 2011, 02:10:14 PM

I read somewhere (sorry, I’ll try to find the link) that some of the Charts of the day (1937) had  Howland Island mislocated 5 nm West of its “true” position.  Had AE/FN used such a chart in their planning for the Lae to Howland leg, then they would have arrived near the charted location expecting to see Howland on their nose position only to see open ocean and They probably would have announced “We must be on you but cannot see you…”  Howland would have been 5nm away on their right wing, a very bad position for a pilot in the left seat of a low wing monoplane to see a tiny speck of island.  Was the Itasca making smoke? Could AE have seen it?
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 09, 2011, 06:08:51 PM

I read somewhere (sorry, I’ll try to find the link) that some of the Charts of the day (1937) had  Howland Island mislocated 5 nm West of its “true” position.  Had AE/FN used such a chart in their planning for the Lae to Howland leg, then they would have arrived near the charted location expecting to see Howland on their nose position only to see open ocean and They probably would have announced “We must be on you but cannot see you…”  Howland would have been 5nm away on their right wing, a very bad position for a pilot in the left seat of a low wing monoplane to see a tiny speck of island.  Was the Itasca making smoke? Could AE have seen it?
--------------------------------------

See prior post at
https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,169.210.html

and other posts on that topic.

The incorrect coordinates were west of Howland so if Noonan used them for his computations then the LOP they would have been following was about 4 NM to the west of Howland and Howland would have been on the left wingtip.
One has to allow for the possibility of a 7 NM uncertainty in a celestial LOP so Howland could have been as much as 12 NM on the left wingtip or 3 NM on the right wingtip but it would have been much more likely to be nearer to about 4 NM on the left wingtip.

It is also very possible that Noonan had the correct coordinates as they had been found prior to the second attempt and it seems unlikely that this critical information would have been kept from him as everybody involved in this enterprise appreciated the critical nature of the navigation to Howland.

See graph of altitudes at Howland and at Williams coordinates, attached.

 
gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 09, 2011, 10:49:10 PM

I read somewhere (sorry, I’ll try to find the link) that some of the Charts of the day (1937) had  Howland Island mislocated 5 nm West of its “true” position.  Had AE/FN used such a chart in their planning for the Lae to Howland leg, then they would have arrived near the charted location expecting to see Howland on their nose position only to see open ocean and They probably would have announced “We must be on you but cannot see you…”  Howland would have been 5nm away on their right wing, a very bad position for a pilot in the left seat of a low wing monoplane to see a tiny speck of island.  Was the Itasca making smoke? Could AE have seen it?

--------------------------------------------------------

Was the Itasca making smoke?

Scroll up four messages to reply # 20 for the answer to your question.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 10, 2011, 02:00:34 AM
The erroneous coordinates had been corrected by survey of Itasca , 1936 , but the results appeared in files after March 1937. Manuals like Norie , Imray , Laurie -1941, H.O.no.117 Distances Between Ports - 1943 register the westerly coordinates pair . Williams visited the Hydrographic Office in March 1937 , his Howland-Lae great circle plan is the only known , undated but evidently for the flight intended for March . Mr.Howe describes the situation as in EJN-2008 : island did not run in sight below A/c´s progression line . If the crew had the right coordinates charted , no difficulty would occur , neither for island 5 mls to port , nor to starboard : the Itasca crew members (nearly all) on deck @ GMT 1912 would have seen the aircraft if its crew would not have herself seen the island .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 10, 2011, 07:22:58 AM
The easterly coordinates , of course . H
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 10, 2011, 10:35:27 AM

Right, However I don't believe Fred planned a direct route from Lae to Howland.  I think he planned an offset route running from Lae to the midpoint of a line of position connecting Howland and Gardner.  The midpoint would have been 200 miles SSE of Howland and 200 miles NNW of Gardner on a line of 157/337 degrees (had their chart been accurate).  They then would have tracked the LOP to Howland.  They would have arrived at the LOP from Lae at about 0600 (Howland), 1800 GCT and made their turn (to port) for the 200 mile run to Howland arriving there (at the charted position, that is) at about 0730 Howland time 1930 GCT.  The watchers would have expected them to appear from the West (from 260 degrees on a course of about 080 degrees) when they were coming in from the SSE, i.e. 157 degrees on a course of 337 degrees.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 10, 2011, 11:46:15 AM

I'll make it as simple as I can.

IF the chart had Howland mislocated by 5 nm WEST of its true position, THEN Howland's true position is 5 nm EAST of the charted position. AND, when arriving at the charted position from the SSE on a track of 157/337 (a heading of about 340 degrees when corrected for wind),THEN Howland's true position would have been to starboard of the nose position (at about 110 degrees relative to the nose).  Like I said, a difficult place  for a pilot in the left seat to see.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 10, 2011, 11:55:12 AM

I'll make it as simple as I can.

IF the chart had Howland mislocated by 5 nm WEST of its true position, THEN Howland's true position is 5 nm EAST of the charted position. AND, when arriving at the charted position from the SSE on a track of 157/337 (a heading of about 340 degrees when corrected for wind),THEN Howland's true position would have been to starboard of the nose position (at about 110 degrees relative to the nose).  Like I said, a difficult place  for a pilot in the left seat to see.

--------------------------

Take a look at the standard flight navigation manuals available here:

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/landfall-procedure

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/navigation-to-howland-island

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/

You will see that the standard way to make this approach, and the most logical, would have the interception to the northwest. In addition, an approach from the southeast gives up the value of Baker Island as a backstop without providing any countervailing advantage. Also, a flat glass window was installed on the left side only of the plane which provided for more accurate celestial observations to the left  adding another reason for putting the sun out on the left wingtip while tracking the LOP. And, don't forget, Noonan has a pair of MK1 eyeballs and would have been looking for he island to the left, right, straight ahead, and back near the tail as far as he could see, (which we know was within 20 degrees of the tail from the celestial observations he took on the flight to Hawaii.) And certainly no reason to use a 200 NM intercept unless they had been dead reckoning all the way from Lae which we know was not the case.

gl

Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 10, 2011, 01:05:03 PM
[/size
Let me see if I have this straight.
FN was in the rear of the cabin with his access to the cockpit blocked by gas tanks and no way to communicate with the pilot, AE, except by way of written notes passed back and forth on the ends of a bamboo pole or screaming above the noise of the engines
He had no way to see outside the cabin except thru a window installed on the left side of the plane for the purpose of celestial viewing.  Yet this guy was supposed to be of use to the pilot trying to spot a sliver of land 1000 feet below on the starboard side of the plane in the middle of the ocean?  I think not!

Coming from the SSE they would have arrived over Baker about 20 minutes before Howland (about 70 minutes or so after the offset turn at 0600 Howland 1800 GCT.)  Baker was a little dimple of land in the ocean and certainly would not have provided a place to land, although, if ditching a fuel-starved plane were required, a good pilot might put his plane down near the "dimple" and glided on the water so that the plane stopped with its nose on or close to the shore (such as it was).

The planning of the Lae to Howland leg was atrocious.  The communication between the "Flyers" and the "Watchers" was terrible.  The RDF skills of the pilot were non-existant.  The P&DR was excellent, but remember there was a Sperry AutoGyro autopilot on the plane  "George" (and I don't mean George Putnam) did a great job of flying the plane.  All you pilots will know what I mean by "George".
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 10, 2011, 02:22:39 PM
It is to be expected that mr.Noonan , for the critical just before and after sunrise period , was in the r.h. copilot´s seat (entrance via the top of 4 fuel containers and a narrow path between the remaining 2) to have a good view on the sun first , and further to assist to RDF operations and searching for land . On the offset lane he most probably if not certainly , according to his earlier interview by P.Mantz , did not check by celestial . The turn off point was established by DR from ETA (GMT 1859) via the direct to Howland course . A course running between Howland and Baker , btw , was not in the direction of the sun from Howland´s approximate latitude , and therefore useless for an offset approach . Baker was visited by US marines in 1945 , pictures of the operation show it to be entirely covered by white sands and beaches , excellent landing ground if no better is available .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 10, 2011, 02:33:55 PM
In one of her books Amelia says mr.Noonan advised her to keep the Hawaii RR station 10 degrees to starboard , evidently during an offset approach operation assisted by RDF . That is the one only report on the RDF subject .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 10, 2011, 03:08:46 PM
An offset lane of 2,500 mls length , to follow during the night without a celestial reference ? How to do that ?
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 10, 2011, 03:26:37 PM
[/size
Let me see if I have this straight.
FN was in the rear of the cabin with his access to the cockpit blocked by gas tanks and no way to communicate with the pilot, AE, except by way of written notes passed back and forth on the ends of a bamboo pole or screaming above the noise of the engines
He had no way to see outside the cabin except thru a window installed on the left side of the plane for the purpose of celestial viewing.  Yet this guy was supposed to be of use to the pilot trying to spot a sliver of land 1000 feet below on the starboard side of the plane in the middle of the ocean?  I think not!

Coming from the SSE they would have arrived over Baker about 20 minutes before Howland (about 70 minutes or so after the offset turn at 0600 Howland 1800 GCT.)  Baker was a little dimple of land in the ocean and certainly would not have provided a place to land, although, if ditching a fuel-starved plane were required, a good pilot might put his plane down near the "dimple" and glided on the water so that the plane stopped with its nose on or close to the shore (such as it was).

The planning of the Lae to Howland leg was atrocious.  The communication between the "Flyers" and the "Watchers" was terrible.  The RDF skills of the pilot were non-existant.  The P&DR was excellent, but remember there was a Sperry AutoGyro autopilot on the plane  "George" (and I don't mean George Putnam) did a great job of flying the plane.  All you pilots will know what I mean by "George".

--------------------------------------------------------

1.There was a window on the right side also, but it was not made out of special flat glass optimized for celestial navigation.

2. On the flight to Hawaii Noonan took 14 celestial observations covering relative bearings on the right side from 36° to 108° and on the left side from 190° to 320°. There is no reason to believe that, had it been necessary, shots could not have been taken further back on the right side than the 108° actually measured. The altitudes varied from 12° all the way up to 75°. I have attached a summary table of these observations.

3. On the flight to Dakar Noonan took a sight from the cockpit of the sun, which was directly in front of them, and measured an altitude of 65° 34'. He took a sight from the back of the plane when the sun had a relative bearing of 320° and a measured altitude of 74° 48'. He took additional observations of the sun through the left window. See: https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/navigation-to-dakar

4. Noonan moved back and forth from the cockpit to the back of the plane as necessary by crawling over the fuel tanks. Manning also did the same on the flight to Hawaii. Watch the takeoff video at Lae, Noonan climbed into the cockpit through the overhead hatch and would then have had to crawl over the tanks to get to the navigation station. If they thought it was advantageous, then Noonan would have moved into the co-pilot's seat to look for the island.

5. Read the flight navigation references works I referred you to before and then come up with some explanation as to  why Noonan would have followed your plan to intercept the LOP from the southeast, telling us what advantage you see to that longer route than Noonan using the standard procedure which would have had them intercepting from the northwest.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 10, 2011, 03:34:30 PM

WOW!   FN crawled over the tops of 4 gas tanks, wiggled his way down into a narrow passageway, then manipulated his way into the co-pilot's seat?  All that, in a noisy, vibratory, gas-smelling environment travelling at about 2-1/2 miles per minute, having had no sleep for many hours.  Are you on some of FN's Benedictine Cognac?

Since you must be the only person in the world who knows where FN was at or near the time of landing approach, maybe you could tell us where the plane ended up?  It was "to be expected" that it would land at Howland.  But, as we all know, it didn't meet expectations.   Stuff Happened.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 10, 2011, 03:53:30 PM

Why from the SE?
Maybe because in that direction there was land in the form of McKean, Gardner, Hull, etc while in the NW there was only ocean for nearly 1000 miles around.

Maybe the remains of the plane will be discovered, and recovered.  Maybe the bones will be found and connected to AE or FN.  Until then all is speculation.  But then, a one-word synonym for hypothesis is "conjecture"   

Have a great day..
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 10, 2011, 04:29:37 PM

WOW!   FN crawled over the tops of 4 gas tanks, wiggled his way down into a narrow passageway, then manipulated his way into the co-pilot's seat?  All that, in a noisy, vibratory, gas-smelling environment travelling at about 2-1/2 miles per minute, having had no sleep for many hours.  Are you on some of FN's Benedictine Cognac?

Since you must be the only person in the world who knows where FN was at or near the time of landing approach, maybe you could tell us where the plane ended up?  It was "to be expected" that it would land at Howland.  But, as we all know, it didn't meet expectations.   Stuff Happened.


--------------------------------------
Yep, that's a fact that nobody else disputes. Read Earhart's own book, Last Flight, which shows that on the Dakar leg that Noonan took a sun sight from the cockpit then another sun sight from the back of the plane. I have attached Noonan's handwritten note to prove that. She also says on the Hawaii leg that "Harry (Manning) comes up to work the radio. Paul flies while Harry works over my head."  So, take up your argument with her.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 10, 2011, 04:37:09 PM

Why from the SE?
Maybe because in that direction there was land in the form of McKean, Gardner, Hull, etc while in the NW there was only ocean for nearly 1000 miles around.

Maybe the remains of the plane will be discovered, and recovered.  Maybe the bones will be found and connected to AE or FN.  Until then all is speculation.  But then, a one-word synonym for hypothesis is "conjecture"   

Have a great day..

-----------------------------------------

That might be a good reason if they were aiming for the Phoenix Islands or if they were just planning to bumble around the Pacific hoping to run into some dry land by accident. But, they were not aiming for the Phoenix Islands, they were going to Howland, and any advantage that you might see to their being closer to the Phoenix Islands goes away as soon as they turn to the northwest along the LOP, flying away from them. Noonan did not just "bumble" around, he navigated so would have kept his course towards Howland, not to the empty space you point to, two hundred NM from land in either direction.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 10, 2011, 04:47:00 PM

WOW!   FN crawled over the tops of 4 gas tanks, wiggled his way down into a narrow passageway, then manipulated his way into the co-pilot's seat?  All that, in a noisy, vibratory, gas-smelling environment travelling at about 2-1/2 miles per minute, having had no sleep for many hours.  Are you on some of FN's Benedictine Cognac?

Since you must be the only person in the world who knows where FN was at or near the time of landing approach, maybe you could tell us where the plane ended up?  It was "to be expected" that it would land at Howland.  But, as we all know, it didn't meet expectations.   Stuff Happened.

--------------------------------------------

Yep, on the bottom of the ocean.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Martin X. Moleski, SJ on August 10, 2011, 06:15:07 PM
WOW!   FN crawled over the tops of 4 gas tanks, wiggled his way down into a narrow passageway, then manipulated his way into the co-pilot's seat?  All that, in a noisy, vibratory, gas-smelling environment travelling at about 2-1/2 miles per minute, having had no sleep for many hours.  Are you on some of FN's Benedictine Cognac?

That is how both AE and FN accessed the lavatory in the rear of the plane and returned from it.

FN had a “limited commercial pilot certificate #11833 with ratings airplane single engine land” (TIGHAR research paper on Noonan). (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Research/ResearchPapers/Noonan.html)  On takeoff, he was seated in the co-pilot's seat.  He would not have experienced the velocity of the plane as a difficulty.  Airline personnel and passengers routinely navigate the aisles of airplanes traveling much faster than NR16020. 
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 10, 2011, 07:04:54 PM
WOW!   FN crawled over the tops of 4 gas tanks, wiggled his way down into a narrow passageway, then manipulated his way into the co-pilot's seat?  All that, in a noisy, vibratory, gas-smelling environment travelling at about 2-1/2 miles per minute, having had no sleep for many hours.  Are you on some of FN's Benedictine Cognac?

That is how both AE and FN accessed the lavatory in the rear of the plane and returned from it.

FN had a “limited commercial pilot certificate #11833 with ratings airplane single engine land” (TIGHAR research paper on Noonan). (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Research/ResearchPapers/Noonan.html)  On takeoff, he was seated in the co-pilot's seat.  He would not have experienced the velocity of the plane as a difficulty.  Airline personnel and passengers routinely navigate the aisles of airplanes traveling much faster than NR16020.

----------------------------------------------------

Good point! That is the winning argument!

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 10, 2011, 09:26:16 PM

I wouldn't equate "navigating the aisle" with climbing up onto gas tanks, crawling over 4 of them, lowering myself  down into  a narrow space , and getting myself into the right seat.  But then, what do I know?
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Jeff Scott on August 10, 2011, 10:31:17 PM

Since you must be the only person in the world who knows where FN was at or near the time of landing approach, maybe you could tell us where the plane ended up?

--------------------------------------------

Yep, on the bottom of the ocean.

gl

Gary--I'm curious if you have any thoughts on approximately where the plane would have most likely ended up on the bottom of the ocean.  Given your detailed analyses of Noonan's navigation techniques and theories on what he would have advised Earhart to do as their ill-fated flight drew to a close, have you reached any conclusions on where they most likely would have gone down?  Further, do you have any ideas on why the multiple searches of the sea floor around Howland haven't found anything?

I'd appreciate your insights!
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 10, 2011, 10:48:46 PM
.

I say apparently, because the game she found herself in on July 2 seemed to have required actions beyond her knowing, and she must have used RDF effectively enough at times before.  Or, perhaps she was reliant on others for that and the posing for pictures  (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/MapsandPhotos/Photo_Gallery/EPPhotopage8.html) was little more than that - posing as if attentive to the task in a meaningful way.  Poor creature paid a terrible price for that shortcoming.

LTM -

------------------------------------------------------------


2. The only use of the RDF by Earhart that I know of was Noonan's instruction to her to "keep the Makapuu beacon ten degrees on the starboard bow" as they approached Hawaii. But Manning was working the radio and most likely set up the RDF for her so the only thing she needed to do was to listen for the null as she changed the heading slightly right and left.


gl

------------------------------------

We know the answer to this question.
Earhart states in her book, Last Flight, that in following Noonan's instruction to her to "keep the Makapuu beacon ten degrees on the starboard bow" as they approached Hawaii with approximately 200 miles to go, that "This was the first time that I had used this recently developed Bendix instrument."

She also says on the Hawaii leg that "Harry (Manning) comes up to work the radio. Paul flies while Harry works over my head" so it appears also that Manning tuned the RDF for her and set its controls so that all she had to do was listen for the null.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 10, 2011, 11:15:13 PM
If mr.Noonan saw sunrise from 1,000 ft altitude @ 1752:38 GMT and counted off 2m15s for actual sunrise @ 1754:53 , there is a good chance that the positon line they arrived on runs 10 miles west of Howland´s then charted position , and A/c has supposedly alighted when on that line . Several manuals of the era contain prescription how to establish longitude @ sunset and sunrise when at sea .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 11, 2011, 02:48:26 AM
It is hardly to believe that a pilot goes to a lavatory in the back of his plane by crawling over tanks , leaving all controls alone , even with automatic pilot instruments or an (unlicensed)  stand in . Pilots do not even think about that . There are good questions having no answer ...
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 11, 2011, 02:50:24 AM
If mr.Noonan saw sunrise from 1,000 ft altitude @ 1752:38 GMT and counted off 2m15s for actual sunrise @ 1754:53 , there is a good chance that the positon line they arrived on runs 10 miles west of Howland´s then charted position , and A/c has supposedly alighted when on that line . Several manuals of the era contain prescription how to establish longitude @ sunset and sunrise when at sea .

-----------------------------------------------------------

We have thoroughly discussed Mr. van Asten's theories on the  Navigating the LOP with the offset method topic, see:

https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,169.120.html

starting with reply 120

and subsequent posts, especially reply 203 pointing out his 300 NM error in his computation of this "10 mile" error line and his admission of this error in reply 204.

https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,169.203.html

Mr. van Asten has never produced any cite to any contemporary flight navigation text book or manual supporting his method and his theories about determining longitude at sunrise in spite of my many requests for such support. To be fair, he did point me to a 1986 marine navigation book entitled Emergency Navigation (which I have on my bookshelf) which describes hundreds of emergency navigation methods and that does mention his method but also contains the warning that this method only produces a longitude with, at best,  an uncertainty of plus and minus twenty minutes of longitude, a band 40 NM wide, and also possibly much greater errors. Due to additional factors involved in flight navigation, any attempt to use the method in Emergency Navigation in flight would produce a much larger band of uncertainty. This method would not produce a longitude with the precision necessary to find Howland even if used by a navigator on a ship. After all, the method is mentioned in a book entitled Emergency Navigation meaning that it may be useful in an emergency when it is better than nothing. I'm pretty certain that Noonan never read this book.

Read Mr. van Asten's submissions at your own risk.

gl

gl


Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 11, 2011, 02:52:21 AM
It is hardly to believe that a pilot goes to a lavatory in the back of his plane by crawling over tanks , leaving all controls alone , even with automatic pilot instruments or an (unlicensed)  stand in . Pilots do not even think about that . There are good questions having no answer ...

----------------------------------
According to Mr. van Asten Amelia must have just pee'ed her pants.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Jeff Lange on August 11, 2011, 08:46:16 AM
It is hardly to believe that a pilot goes to a lavatory in the back of his plane by crawling over tanks , leaving all controls alone , even with automatic pilot instruments or an (unlicensed)  stand in . Pilots do not even think about that . There are good questions having no answer ...

----------------------------------
According to Mr. van Asten Amelia must have just pee'ed her pants.

gl

Or maybe she just crossed her legs REAL hard for a very long time!

Jeff Lange
# 0748C
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Martin X. Moleski, SJ on August 11, 2011, 11:42:52 AM
I wouldn't equate "navigating the aisle" with climbing up onto gas tanks, crawling over 4 of them, lowering myself  down into  a narrow space , and getting myself into the right seat.  But then, what do I know?

I was appealing to people's experience on aircraft to deal with your remark about the speed at which the aircraft was traveling.  The speed of the aircraft is irrelevant to movement within the fuselage.  Yes, the route from front to back was awkward, but it was doable and was done routinely, both on the ground and in flight.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 11, 2011, 12:42:30 PM
Mr.Lapook ,  I have recently sent to you texts from Cugle "Practical Navigation" . This manual uses the tables of H.O.no.9-II . The sunset - sunrise method for longitude appears in the  imprints  1924 through 1943 . Also in "Precision Astrolabe" by Rogers it is recorded that Portuguese navigators of early transatlantic crossing established longitude at sunrise . It is true that it is an "emergency" fashion , but if no body other than the sun is available , it is the best you have . Mr. Noonan plotted an advanced sunline over Howland in his chart , can anybody answer to the good question how he would have done that without a sunrise observation which also gave him the distance to Howland , 100 mls out @ GMT 1815  ?
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 11, 2011, 12:54:36 PM
There is no "300 nm" error in any of the computations used for EJN-2008 - 2011 articles , or elsewhere .  If you insist plse explain .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 11, 2011, 01:08:08 PM
I went back to the " 300 mls  " error in files : there was a calculation error indeed , but only for the forum and I corrected it immediately . It was btw not me suggesting that AE did not visit A/c´s tail : after one of her long distance flights she forbade press men to come nearer ; for the same reason .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 11, 2011, 02:11:32 PM

Marty
As a physicist, I fully understand the concept of motion in a moving frame of reference such as a plane moving at 2-1/2 miles per minute.  That portion of my remark was a shorthand way of categorizing the possible  pitch, yaw, and bank motions that might have been going on in the plane while FN was attempting to get to the cockpit, to say nothing of the other elements I mentioned.

For others who might be interested in the Lavatory humor, i.e. "AE must have pee'd her pants",  pilots have long been familiar with what we refer to by the acronym HERE (Human Element Range Extender).  For males it is usually a quart glass container of some kind.  For females it is something different, that can be purchased from an accessory purveyor such as "Sporty's"  I think that they are located in Cincinnati, Ohio and they have all kinds of goodies for the Complete Pilot.   LOL
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Alex Fox on August 11, 2011, 03:16:50 PM
I think it's amazing we even need euphemisms or acronyms for that.  "Someone get me a piss bottle" would do just fine, in my book.

I don't know how many lurkers like me follow these threads, but it's interesting watching the back and forth between extremely intelligent minds from different industries (engineering, physics, SAR, pilots, survivalists, navigators, cartographers, reconstructionists, etc.).  At least those who speak English and make a certain degree of sense.  :D  The mystery only comes closer to being solved with better technology and this many brilliant minds discussing the possibilities.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 11, 2011, 04:44:23 PM

For what it is worth, an opinion with some woulda, coulda, shoulda.

Was rhere really any “Navicational Error”?

By P&DR and CEL/ NAV they got to where RDF could have, should have allowed them to find their way to Howland.
Read the Chater Report (Tighar Archived Documents) and you will see that AE used her RDF in a test flight at Lae and was unable to find a null (get a bearing) on the Lae station.  After landing, she “assumed” that the reason was that they were too close to the station. 
It is hard to understand how a pilot, knowing that the RDF would lead them directly to Howland once they got to about 200 miles of the island, would take off on a 2500 mile trip completely over water without knowing absolutely that the RDF was working properly.

AE also , apparently, had no understanding of the limitations on the RDFs on the Itasca and onshore at Howland.  She kept asking them to take bearings on her using frequencies that their equipment couldn’t operate in.  She knew, or should have known,  this before takeoff.  She didn’t and we all know the result, they (AE and FN) didn’t find Howland.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 11, 2011, 05:41:19 PM
I went back to the " 300 mls  " error in files : there was a calculation error indeed , but only for the forum and I corrected it immediately . It was btw not me suggesting that AE did not visit A/c´s tail : after one of her long distance flights she forbade press men to come nearer ; for the same reason .

Her prior planes were not equipped with a lavatory.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 11, 2011, 05:45:15 PM

Marty
As a physicist, I fully understand the concept of motion in a moving frame of reference such as a plane moving at 2-1/2 miles per minute.  That portion of my remark was a shorthand way of categorizing the possible  pitch, yaw, and bank motions that might have been going on in the plane while FN was attempting to get to the cockpit, to say nothing of the other elements I mentioned.

For others who might be interested in the Lavatory humor, i.e. "AE must have pee'd her pants",  pilots have long been familiar with what we refer to by the acronym HERE (Human Element Range Extender).  For males it is usually a quart glass container of some kind. For females it is something different, that can be purchased from an accessory purveyor such as "Sporty's"  I think that they are located in Cincinnati, Ohio and they have all kinds of goodies for the Complete Pilot.   LOL
--------------------------------------

I've used plastic gallon milk bottles on extremely long solo flights in which I couldn't leave the pilot's seat.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Martin X. Moleski, SJ on August 11, 2011, 06:44:55 PM
As a physicist, I fully understand the concept of motion in a moving frame of reference such as a plane moving at 2-1/2 miles per minute.  That portion of my remark was a shorthand way of categorizing the possible  pitch, yaw, and bank motions that might have been going on in the plane while FN was attempting to get to the cockpit, to say nothing of the other elements I mentioned.

OK.  But those same random excursions from equilibrium happen in all aircraft.  NR16020 (http://tighar.org/wiki/Lockheed_Electra_10E_Special_-_NR16020) was designed as a 10-passenger airliner.  I expect that it would handle turbulence reasonably well--or that AE and FN would wait for clear air to make the traverse of the fuel tanks.

Quote
For others who might be interested in the Lavatory humor, i.e. "AE must have pee'd her pants",  pilots have long been familiar with what we refer to by the acronym HERE (Human Element Range Extender).  For males it is usually a quart glass container of some kind.  For females it is something different, that can be purchased from an accessory purveyor such as "Sporty's"  I think that they are located in Cincinnati, Ohio and they have all kinds of goodies for the Complete Pilot.   LOL

New Zealand's Jean Batten (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Batten), "Garbo of the Skies," had a special tube in her pilot's seat.  I think AE may have had a similar rig in her Lockheed Vega.  Neither of them had an autopilot in their single engine aircraft.  I think I read that Charles Lindbergh hated having to explain how he dealt with nature's call on his flight. 
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 11, 2011, 09:26:16 PM

Marty
My first flight in a commercial passenger airplane was in a Trans-Texas Airways Douglas DC-3, a twin engined , low-winged monoplane, tail-dragger that could carry 20 to 25 passengers.  Its nickname was gained because of its behaviour in turbulence  "The Vomit Comet".  Oh My, the things we store away in our memory banks.

The HERE (Human Element Range Extender, a quart Jar, worked well last winter when my wife and I were stranded on I-80 in the Sierras for 9 hours because an 18 wheeler jackknifed and blocked both west-bound lanes.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 11, 2011, 10:19:55 PM
It is hardly to believe that a pilot goes to a lavatory in the back of his plane by crawling over tanks , leaving all controls alone , even with automatic pilot instruments or an (unlicensed)  stand in . Pilots do not even think about that . There are good questions having no answer ...

----------------------------------
According to Mr. van Asten Amelia must have just pee'ed her pants.

gl

Or maybe she just crossed her legs REAL hard for a very long time!

Jeff Lange
# 0748C

--------------------------

On September 23, 1971 I was flying a Piper Cherokee 180 with three of my skydiving buddies, three guys and one girl in the plane. We took off from Kingston Jamaica on our return to Chicago. The plane did not have the range to make it all the way to Florida (even by taking an illegal shortcut over Cuba) so we had to fly around the east end of Cuba and head for Georgetown on Great Exuma Island in the Bahamas where we could take aboard some fuel. About two hours into the four and a half hour flight my buddy, Terry, sitting in the co-pilot's seat, had to "go." We searched the cabin for a proper receptacle and all we could find was an empty Coke can that Terry promptly filled to the brim. Then we realized there was nowhere that we could put the can where it wouldn't spill. The Cherokee didn't have a big enough window to allow us to drop the can into the Carribean so Terry had to carefully hold the can in his hand for the next two and a half hours until we landed in Georgetown. It was a funny situation and we all gave him a hard time about it!

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 11, 2011, 10:32:44 PM
As a physicist, I fully understand the concept of motion in a moving frame of reference such as a plane moving at 2-1/2 miles per minute.  That portion of my remark was a shorthand way of categorizing the possible  pitch, yaw, and bank motions that might have been going on in the plane while FN was attempting to get to the cockpit, to say nothing of the other elements I mentioned.

OK.  But those same random excursions from equilibrium happen in all aircraft.  NR16020 (http://tighar.org/wiki/Lockheed_Electra_10E_Special_-_NR16020) was designed as a 10-passenger airliner.  I expect that it would handle turbulence reasonably well--or that AE and FN would wait for clear air to make the traverse of the fuel tanks.

Quote
For others who might be interested in the Lavatory humor, i.e. "AE must have pee'd her pants",  pilots have long been familiar with what we refer to by the acronym HERE (Human Element Range Extender).  For males it is usually a quart glass container of some kind.  For females it is something different, that can be purchased from an accessory purveyor such as "Sporty's"  I think that they are located in Cincinnati, Ohio and they have all kinds of goodies for the Complete Pilot.   LOL

New Zealand's Jean Batten (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Batten), "Garbo of the Skies," had a special tube in her pilot's seat.  I think AE may have had a similar rig in her Lockheed Vega.  Neither of them had an autopilot in their single engine aircraft.  I think I read that Charles Lindbergh hated having to explain how he dealt with nature's call on his flight.

----------------------------------------------------------------

I've also flown military planes that had "pilot relief tubes." You reached under the front edge of the seat and hanging on a hook under the seat you find what is, not surprisingly, a hose with a funnel on the end. The hose goes out the bottom of the fuselage.

I also remember a flight where my co-pilot's wife was sitting in the back seat of a Grumman Tiger and she had to "go." So she took a pampers out of her baby equipment bag, slid her pants down, sat on the pampers and did her business all accompanied by laughter from the front seats.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 11, 2011, 10:50:46 PM
It is hardly to believe that a pilot goes to a lavatory in the back of his plane by crawling over tanks , leaving all controls alone , even with automatic pilot instruments or an (unlicensed)  stand in . Pilots do not even think about that . There are good questions having no answer ...

----------------------------------------------

I hate to let this little secret out of the bag but the fact is that flying a plane during cruise is very, very easy to do. It is the first thing introduced to a student pilot and he flies the plane in cruise on the very first lesson and gets good at it by the end of hour four. I had my daughter doing it when she was four years old and she couldn't see over the top of the instrument panel so she had to fly on instruments! So Noonan, even if he didn't fly often (he did have a pilot certificate), certainly had the ability to fly the plane while Earhart went to the back to use the potty.

You wouldn't want to just trust the autopilot when you leave the cockpit.
 
I  worked on a case involving the crash of a Cessna 421 ( which is a cabin class twin with a maximum gross weight of 7450 pounds.)  See:
http://www.pilotfriend.com/aircraft%20performance/Cessna/C421%20C414.htm (http://www.pilotfri)

The 230 pound pilot was flying alone by himself in his plane with the autopilot engaged. He had removed all of the seats (except the pilot seat) so he could carry some bulky objects but the cabin was empty at the time of the accident. He had also purchased a portable "potty" from a camping equipment store and had placed it in the baggage area of the cabin, all the way in back. He was flying along at 21,000 feet on autopilot when he decided to use the "potty." He got up from his seat and walked to the back of the cabin and sat down on the "potty."  He apparently had not calculated how much the center of gravity would shift in the lightly loaded plane when his weight was moved back about a hundred and twenty inches. I did the calculation after the accident and determined that the center of gravity moved about three inches out of the back of the allowable center of gravity envelope. The autpilot tripped off and the nose pitched up and the plane spun in from 21,000 feet. We know that this is what happened because the autopilot had trimmed the nose full down to try to deal with the heavy weight of the pilot all the way back in the cabin but this was not enough to maintain control. We also know that this is what happened because, after the ground fire, the only parts of the pilot's body that were not burned was his back which was against the pressure bulkhead at the back of the cabin and his butt cheeks sitting on the "potty." (The calculation of the shift of the COG is easy since it moves in the ratio of the weight being shifted to the gross weight of the plane times the distance the weight is moved. If you move a weight that is one-tenth the weight of the plane twenty inches then the COG will shift two inches, one-tenth the distance that the weight was moved.)

( I call these "stupid pilot tricks")

He may have gotten away with this on prior flights but this time the plane was lightly loaded so his weight shift had a greater effect on the center of gravity than if the plane had been heavily loaded. And with the seats removed he had nothing to grab onto to pull himself up forward to regain the pilot seat.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 11, 2011, 11:06:13 PM

I think it was one of our English friends, Puck, that said it best "What Fools these Mortals be"
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 11, 2011, 11:29:28 PM

cRUISING EASY??   Yeppers, that's why flying is referred to as Hours of Boredom interrupted by Moments of Sheer TERROR!
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 11, 2011, 11:47:12 PM

I think it was one of our English friends, Puck, that said it best "What Fools these Mortals be"

------------------------

Yah, but Bill put those words in his mouth.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 12, 2011, 12:31:25 AM
If the navigator has precomputed a list of (running) time-coordinates groups (like Noonan evidently did for sunset) , an uncertainty sunset line band may get very narrow as can be seen from the position report @ 27 mls west of Nukumanu . The precomputation is somewhat extensive , but not intricate , and (ex) sea navigators being more familiar with calculation than air navigators who only learned to read tables , had no problem with it . The accuracy of the method initially suffered negative criticism since many navigators only reckoned for refraction/parallax/semi-diam. (-53´) , neglecting horizon dip (since early ships had the decks & bridge close to sea level , but later ships were higher) . With dip (separately) inserted in the algorithm , the reduction gains much more accuracy . Citing Cugle - 1943 , p. 550 of 14th imprint (first 1924) : "As it is very doubtful that a proper contact with sun and horizon has been noted , this observation is not to be entirely relied upon , but the navigator should understand it as it is often the case that he does not get any sights during the day , and the sun sets in the clear . He can then get a fairly good idea of his longitude of this problem" . (follow the rules for computation , using Tab. 33 & 34 of H.O.no.9-II , American Practical Navigator) .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 12, 2011, 01:14:31 AM
If the navigator has precomputed a list of (running) time-coordinates groups (like Noonan evidently did for sunset) , an uncertainty sunset line band may get very narrow as can be seen from the position report @ 27 mls west of Nukumanu . The precomputation is somewhat extensive , but not intricate , and (ex) sea navigators being more familiar with calculation than air navigators who only learned to read tables , had no problem with it . The accuracy of the method initially suffered negative criticism since many navigators only reckoned for refraction/parallax/semi-diam. (-53´) , neglecting horizon dip (since early ships had the decks & bridge close to sea level , but later ships were higher) . With dip (separately) inserted in the algorithm , the reduction gains much more accuracy . Citing Cugle - 1943 , p. 550 of 14th imprint (first 1924) : "As it is very doubtful that a proper contact with sun and horizon has been noted , this observation is not to be entirely relied upon , but the navigator should understand it as it is often the case that he does not get any sights during the day , and the sun sets in the clear . He can then get a fairly good idea of his longitude of this problem" . (follow the rules for computation , using Tab. 33 & 34 of H.O.no.9-II , American Practical Navigator) .

-------------------------------

The sun doesn't set or rise in the clear very often so nobody would plan on using it for finding an island before the fuel ran out in an airplane. From this quote it is clearly an emergency method only used if sights could not be obtained in the normal manner. And "fairly good" isn't good enough to find Howland. And Cugle wasn't using the sunrise table from the Nautical Almanac as you claim Noonan would do but was doing the normal celestial navigation trig. And Cugle was talking about using it on a ship, not in an airplane where the much greater values for the "dip" correction (which varies with the height of the observer's eye above the sea), and the size of this correction cannot be accurately determined in flight (as I told you before Mr. van Asten) due to inaccuracies in the altimeter. On a ship you can measure your height of eye above sea level to the nearest inch if you want so there is no uncertainty in the proper dip correction value to apply.

And we have thoroughly debunked your "sunset" observation derived fix before, the coordinates of which were received by radio in Lae one and a half minutes before the time that you claim the observation was taken!

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 12, 2011, 01:56:09 AM
Mr.Lapook ,  I have recently sent to you texts from Cugle "Practical Navigation" . This manual uses the tables of H.O.no.9-II . The sunset - sunrise method for longitude appears in the  imprints  1924 through 1943 . Also in "Precision Astrolabe" by Rogers it is recorded that Portuguese navigators of early transatlantic crossing established longitude at sunrise . It is true that it is an "emergency" fashion , but if no body other than the sun is available , it is the best you have . Mr. Noonan plotted an advanced sunline over Howland in his chart , can anybody answer to the good question how he would have done that without a sunrise observation which also gave him the distance to Howland , 100 mls out @ GMT 1815  ?
-----------------------------------------------------------


This emergency method is intended for someone without a sextant and so without the ability to measure the height of the sun accurately. In such a case a bare eyeball observation of sunrise might be "the best thing you have", anything is better than nothing. But it was not the "best thing that Noonan had" since he had a sextant and could take shots of the sun at altitudes that allowed for much more accurate position fixes than the range of 40 NM of errors (minimum if used on a ship and much more if tried in flight)  using the van Asten sunrise theory. And then van Asten has Noonan dead reckoning for an additional 130 miles adding an additional 13 miles to the band of errors so that Noonan would have had a minimum error band of 53 miles  and more likely approaching 100 NM if tried in flight. There was little chance that the van Asten method would get the plane anywhere close enough to see the island. Noonan would have used the standard landfall procedure of taking sextant shots as they neared the LOP and additional ones while tracking the LOP.

see:
https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/landfall-procedure

For those who don't follow the navigational arcana here is a simple way to see  why Noonan would never have planned to use a sunrise observation. I think we have all been on a beach watching the sun go down. Think back to your own observations. Were you able to actually see the upper limb of the sun disappear behind the sea horizon? Hmmm?  Probably not unless you have looked for it many times. The vast majority of the time there are clouds between you and the horizon and even more clouds beyond the horizon and the sun sinks behind the clouds, not behind the sea horizon. The clouds prevent you from accurately determining the time the sun is actually aligned with the true horizon and every four seconds of error in this timing causes a one nautical mile error in the derived position line. It is an even bigger problem if trying to do this in flight because the horizon is much farther away so providing a much greater opportunity for clouds to block the view. In 2009 I sailed across the Atlantic on the Royal Clipper, see

http://www.fer3.com/arc/m2.aspx?i=110827&y=200911

We were 10 days at sea so there were ten sunrises and ten sunsets and I was up every morning before sunrise to shoot the stars and everybody was on deck to catch the sunsets. So, how many sunsets and sunrises was I able to time as the sun set or rose from the sea horizon? just three times out of a possible 20! Clouds blocked the observations 17 out of 20 times. And that was from sea level, on a ship, not in an airplane.

You can repeat this experiment for yourself, just hang out at the beach.


I'm not going to be dragged back into refuting Mr. van Asten's theories one by one which I have responded to before. He keeps bringing them up as if they had not already been refuted. I will use this one example to show the pattern. He now claims that Rogers wrote that the Portuguese navigators (Gago Coutinho) used his method of using sunrise for determining longitude. I wrote before:


"Coutinho in 1922 took 40 observations with a mariner's sextant but the lowest altitude he measured was 16° 15', nowhere near the "van Asten horizon." (And nowhere near sunrise.)

But van Asten just brings it up again and again, this is his pattern.

Just go back and read the replies starting in May 2011 and you will see that Mr. van Asten's theories don't make any sense.

gl


Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 12, 2011, 02:23:43 AM
All : yes , but I still have no reply to my questions (now two) : 1 . How did Noonan advance a sunline over Howland , without having observed sunrise and established his distance off , 150 mls @ 1755 , 100 mls @ 1815 GMT  ?.  2 . How did Noonan establish the GMT 0720 ( not 0718 , see earlier comments) reported position , other than by sunset , btw with a bubble sextant @ high altitude , the horizon visibility of no importance since the entire sun is above it due refraction , dip not applicable for the type of sextant   ? 
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 12, 2011, 02:41:31 AM

For what it is worth, an opinion with some woulda, coulda, shoulda.

Was rhere really any “Navicational Error”?

By P&DR and CEL/ NAV they got to where RDF could have, should have allowed them to find their way to Howland.
Read the Chater Report (Tighar Archived Documents) and you will see that AE used her RDF in a test flight at Lae and was unable to find a null (get a bearing) on the Lae station.  After landing, she “assumed” that the reason was that they were too close to the station. 
It is hard to understand how a pilot, knowing that the RDF would lead them directly to Howland once they got to about 200 miles of the island, would take off on a 2500 mile trip completely over water without knowing absolutely that the RDF was working properly.

AE also , apparently, had no understanding of the limitations on the RDFs on the Itasca and onshore at Howland.  She kept asking them to take bearings on her using frequencies that their equipment couldn’t operate in.  She knew, or should have known,  this before takeoff.  She didn’t and we all know the result, they (AE and FN) didn’t find Howland.

---------------------

To those who don't do celestial navigation I know it appears to be a black art, witchcraft, voodoo and so everybody seems to discount its accuracy. Celestial navigation is accurate enough, all by itself, to allow Noonan to find Howland. I have read ad nauseum that celnav was only supposed to get them close enough to get within radio range and that they NEEDED radio to actually find the island. I am attaching a couple of pages from Air Force manuals showing that celnav is all that is needed to find small islands, no need for radio in addition. In previous replies I have shown that thousands of single engine planes, flown by solo pilots, used just dead reckoning to cross the Pacific knowing that dead reckoning was accurate enough to get them within radio range so that they could find the airports with their RDF. These legs across the Pacific were longer than the Lae to Howland leg. So if Earhart was planning to rely solely on RDF to find the island then she didn't need Fred. As further proof that they planned to have their celnav accurate enough to find the island is their wasting several days to get a check of the chronometers. Accurate time is only needed to find longitude, not latitude. Since they were flying basically east they only had to make sure that their latitude was accurate enough to make sure that they did not pass too far to the north or south so as to not come within the radio range of Itasca's transmitter which is more than 200 NM. If Noonan's chrometers had been error a whole WEEK their calculated latitude would have been off by only 40'. the same as 40 NM.

See recent flight test of Noonan's navigation method available here:

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/other-flight-navigation-information/recent-landfall-approach

But the reason that she hauled Fred all the way around the world was to have a separate, independent redundant method for finding Howland. They had had other problems with their radios on the flight so they knew that they needed a second method for completing the flight.

I agree with you, I would have wanted to know that my RDF was working and I would have made checks while flying away from Lae. I always tracked outbound with my ADF tuned to the station at the departure island and if I couldn't get my ADF to work then I would have turned back to get the radio fixed. They didn't do this so they were satisfied that celnav would be good enough to get them to Howland and they gave up the demand for two redundant systems.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 12, 2011, 02:59:45 AM
All : yes , but I still have no reply to my questions (now two) : 1 . How did Noonan advance a sunline over Howland , without having observed sunrise and established his distance off , 150 mls @ 1755 , 100 mls @ 1815 GMT  ?.  2 . How did Noonan establish the GMT 0720 ( not 0718 , see earlier comments) reported position , other than by sunset , btw with a bubble sextant @ high altitude , the horizon visibility of no importance since the entire sun is above it due refraction , dip not applicable for the type of sextant   ?

--------------------
1. He measured the altitude of the sun with his bubble sextant when it was above six degrees, and he did this several times.

2. He established the position and reported it and the report was received  at 0718 Z according to the Chatter Report (one and a half minutes prior to the time of the observation according to your theory) by looking out the window and seeing the west end of Nukumanu Islands. You should rely on primary sources like the Chatter Report instead of some secondary source that erroneously rounded the reporting time to 0720 Z. This slight discrepancy has absolutely no relevance in all other discussions involving the navigation on this flight so there was no reason to correct it in the literature. It only has relevance to your theory as you are the only one claiming that he observed sunset to get a fix and that that observation must have taken place at 0719:30 Z, a minute and a half after the position report was received in Lae.

3. As to the use of the bubble sextant, you have now changed your story since your whole theory in your prior posts and in your 2008 article was that he mistakenly used the marine sextant for the sunrise observation.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 12, 2011, 03:15:14 AM

Marty
My first flight in a commercial passenger airplane was in a Trans-Texas Airways Douglas DC-3, a twin engined , low-winged monoplane, tail-dragger that could carry 20 to 25 passengers.  Its nickname was gained because of its behaviour in turbulence  "The Vomit Comet".  Oh My, the things we store away in our memory banks.

The HERE (Human Element Range Extender, a quart Jar, worked well last winter when my wife and I were stranded on I-80 in the Sierras for 9 hours because an 18 wheeler jackknifed and blocked both west-bound lanes.

-----------------------------------

You can always pee on the side of the road, and I have seen women do it too, but it is hard to accomplish the same on the side of a cloud.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 12, 2011, 04:07:58 AM
1. Impossible , @ 1815 GMT sun´s elevation was far below 6 deg , nevertheless distance off was recorded . 2. About 0720 navigator had the sun only for observation , seeing the west shores of Nukumanu from 27 mls , 43 km is doubtful , separately from the specific coordinates communicated , these are by exactness for sunset , not discovered by van Asten , but by mathematics . 3 . No story changed , @ sunset the bubble sextant was used , see EJN-2011. H.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 12, 2011, 05:36:26 AM
Not Coutinho but air navigator A.W.Brown (pilot J.Alcock) , June 1919 ,  ckecked position at sunrise : " At sunrise Brown was prepared to check his position by observing the azimuth of the sun ... At five in the morning he obtained a sun line with his artificial horizon and as of 0720 worked out a fix " (evidently via sin Z = sin d / cos L , H) . (Rogers , p.70 , A/c was @ 400 ft altitude) .  Navigator G.G.H.Cooke of airship R 34 , btw used a marine sextant on the sea horizon for sights on the sun .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 12, 2011, 09:54:22 AM
1. Impossible , @ 1815 GMT sun´s elevation was far below 6 deg , nevertheless distance off was recorded . 2. About 0720 navigator had the sun only for observation , seeing the west shores of Nukumanu from 27 mls , 43 km is doubtful , separately from the specific coordinates communicated , these are by exactness for sunset , not discovered by van Asten , but by mathematics . 3 . No story changed , @ sunset the bubble sextant was used , see EJN-2011. H.

-------------------------------------

Mr. van Asten,

Thanks for giving me the opportunity to point out yet another one of your errors.

Earhart sent a position report at 0718 Z of 4° 33' south, 159° 07' east which is near the tabulated coordinates of Nukumanu island which are 4° 35' south, 159° 30' east. There has been discussion as to whether Earhart had a visual fix on the island and that she was reporting the coordinates of the island given to her by Noonan as shown on his chart with the assumption that there was an error in the actual coordinates in 1937 because the position report was 23 NM west of the published location. In fact, the published coordinates have been known since at least 1890 when they were published in the British Government publication, Pacific Islands Sailing Directions, so this doesn't explain the discrepancy as it is obvious that the island would have been correctly depicted on Noonan's chart. What does explain the discrepancy is that the published location is for the easternmost point of the atoll which is actually 11 NM long east to west so the westernmost point is at 159° 19' east, only 12 NM from the position given by Noonan. Given the scale of the chart used by Noonan this is a very small distance. Another possibility is that Noonan simply estimated that they were several nautical miles from the western end on the island and gave those estimated coordinates. You apparently thought that Nukumanu was just a geometrical point, infinitely small, (this is in keeping with all of your other posts where you work with mathematics to about ten decimal places instead of the reality of the much lower level of navigational precision in the real world) and you just read off its published location instead of realizing that Nukumanu is a real island with actual dimensions, not some theoretical mathematical construct.

See:

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/pacif-islands-sailing-directions-1890

gl

Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 12, 2011, 10:06:16 AM
1. Impossible , @ 1815 GMT sun´s elevation was far below 6 deg , nevertheless distance off was recorded . 2. About 0720 navigator had the sun only for observation , seeing the west shores of Nukumanu from 27 mls , 43 km is doubtful , separately from the specific coordinates communicated , these are by exactness for sunset , not discovered by van Asten , but by mathematics . 3 . No story changed , @ sunset the bubble sextant was used , see EJN-2011. H.

--------------------

This is so funny, so now it's "about" 0720! LOL!

Van Asten still has not explained how Earhart's radio waves managed to travel faster than the speed of light and go back in time so as to be received at Lae at 0718, a minute and a half before the 0719:30 time that van Asten claims that Noonan observed sunset. The time of this observation is critical to van Asten's theory since his whole theory is based on his mathematical (ten decimal places again) computation of this time. If Noonan had actually made an observation at 0719:30 then the position could not have been transmitted at 0720. Taking an observation with a bubble sextant in flight, as van Asten says Noonan was doing for this observation, takes about three minutes as you must take at least ten observations and average them to arrive at an accurate observation. The average time of all of these individual observations is the time used for the observation, again this is something van Asten doesn't understand. If Noonan actually did compute his position based on a sun observation that had an average time of 0719:30 then he was shooting the sun for about three minutes from about 0718:15 to about 0720:45. Then he had to figure out the average of the ten (or more, taking even more time) by hand which takes about an additional minute and a half (try it yourself using degrees and minutes of arc as read off a sextant) and about another minute to refer to his precalculated altitude data, so the claimed 0719:30 observation would not have been completed until about 0723:15 which is more than three minutes later than van Asten claims that the position report was transmitted. It is also more than five minutes after the report was actually received in Lae!

see flight navigation manuals:

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/weems/weems-314-315.JPG?attredirects=0

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/aircraft-navigation-manual-h-o-216-1941/ho216-1941-182.JPG?attredirects=0

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/aircraft-navigation-manual-h-o-216-1941/ho216-1941-183.JPG?attredirects=0

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/accuracy-of-celestial-fixes

see also:
https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/other-flight-navigation-information/recent-landfall-approach

LOL!

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 12, 2011, 10:47:54 AM
Not Coutinho but air navigator A.W.Brown (pilot J.Alcock) , June 1919 , ckecked position at sunrise : " At sunrise Brown was prepared to check his position by observing the azimuth of the sun ... At five in the morning he obtained a sun line with his artificial horizon and as of 0720 worked out a fix " (evidently via sin Z = sin d / cos L , H) . (Rogers , p.70 , A/c was @ 400 ft altitude) .  Navigator G.G.H.Cooke of airship R 34 , btw used a marine sextant on the sea horizon for sights on the sun .

------------------------------------

van Asten wrote in post #69:

Quote from: h.a.c. van asten on August 11, 2011, 12:42:30 PM

   " Mr.Lapook ,  I have recently sent to you texts from Cugle "Practical Navigation" . This manual uses the tables of H.O.no.9-II . The sunset - sunrise method for longitude appears in the  imprints  1924 through 1943 . Also in "Precision Astrolabe" by Rogers it is recorded that Portuguese navigators of early transatlantic crossing established longitude at sunrise . It is true that it is an "emergency" fashion , but if no body other than the sun is available , it is the best you have . Mr. Noonan plotted an advanced sunline over Howland in his chart , can anybody answer to the good question how he would have done that without a sunrise observation which also gave him the distance to Howland , 100 mls out @ GMT 1815  ?"


 The Portuguese navigators featured in Roger's book are Gago Coutinho and his pilot, Sacadura Cabral, the first to fly across the South Atlantic in 1922. Now he claims that he was referring to Arthur Whitten Brown who, along with John Alcock, became the first to fly non-stop, dry land to dry land, across the Atlantic in 1919. Alcock and Brown are English.

Brown used a marine sextant for some of his observations and the same sextant with a bubble attachment for others only because bubble sextants had not yet been perfected. This was 18 years before the Earhart flight, a period of rapid advances in bubble sextant development as spelled out in chapter 6 of the same book that van Asten relies on, Precision Astrolabe, by Francis M. Rogers (1971). (Rogers was a professional historian with many published books to his credit.) What did the internet look like 18 years ago, a period of similar rapid development of technology?

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Martin X. Moleski, SJ on August 12, 2011, 11:04:42 AM
... What did the internet look like 18 years ago, a period of similar rapid development of technology?

I don't know.  I wasn't there.  I did have e-mail, but I wasn't browsing until 1995.   :-\
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 12, 2011, 11:31:03 AM
Not Coutinho but air navigator A.W.Brown (pilot J.Alcock) , June 1919 ,  ckecked position at sunrise : " At sunrise Brown was prepared to check his position by observing the azimuth of the sun ... At five in the morning he obtained a sun line with his artificial horizon and as of 0720 worked out a fix " (evidently via sin Z = sin d / cos L , H) . (Rogers , p.70 , A/c was @ 400 ft altitude) .  Navigator G.G.H.Cooke of airship R 34 , btw used a marine sextant on the sea horizon for sights on the sun .

--------------------------------------------------

I saved this til last and am putting it in a separate reply because of its importance.

Up til this point I believed that Mr. van Asten just did not understand how celestial navigation in flight was done since he only has a theoretical understanding of the subject, having never done it himself. I read his two published papers and contacted him for the friendly purpose of helping him learn how celnav is done in an airplane. I now realize, that in addition to his lack of knowledge, that he is being purposefully dishonest!

In his current post he writes:

"air navigator A.W.Brown (pilot J.Alcock) , June 1919 ,  ckecked position at sunrise : ' At sunrise Brown was prepared to check his position by observing the azimuth of the sun ... At five in the morning he obtained a sun line with his artificial horizon and as of 0720 worked out a fix '" This is a direct quote from page 70 of Precision Astrolabe. Note van Asten's premeditated and calculated use of the ellipsis.

Putting back in the words that van Asten dishonestly left out, the full quote reads:

" At sunrise Brown was prepared to check his position by observing the azimuth of the sun, a technique which we are now beginning to suspect could have been employed by the Norsemen. The 'indefiniteness of dawn', however, precluded this possibility. At five in the morning he obtained a sun line with his artificial horizon and as of 0720 worked out a fix ."

The "indefiniteness of dawn" precluded any type of observation of the sun by Brown at sunrise. The words that he left out completely contradict van Asten's claim. Later, well after sunrise, Brown used a bubble attachment to his marine sextant to take a normal measurement of the sun's altitude. The "indefiniteness of dawn" obviously applied to Brown since it would make no sense to claim that every time the Norsemen tried to measure the azimuth of the sun (doing this a thousand years ago) that they were prevented by "indefiniteness of dawn" especially since this method is only a theory and doesn't have any actual proof behind it.

This time I will keep my promise and not respond to any more of van Asten's B.S. I'm going to have to bite my tongue (my fingers?) but ya'll will have to evaluate van Asten's claims for yourselves.

gl

Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 12, 2011, 12:14:54 PM
The "..."  in my sentence represents the quote of " indefiniteness etc " , being that of no importance since it concerns the Norsemen , not Brown who , as from the text obtained a sun line at 5 in the morning , which must have been close to , if not at sunrise given the point of time . Why would Brown "prepare" when knowing beforehand that the observation annex reduction would fail ? I see a lot of somewhat hostile remarks , but still no answer(s) to the primary questions : how did Noonan acquire the advanced sun line , and how did he , consequently , establish the 100 mls out position @ GMT 1815 , plus : how did he manage when communicating the 071920 fix ? Do not forget that , dip included for 1,000 ft altitude , he saw sunrise @ 0712:20 GMT , 40 seconds before 0718 if you wish , this giving Noonan the certainty that his precomputed running fix worked out excellently , so that he could safely communicate the belonging coordinates for 0754:53 GMT . From someone having good insight in navigation I would have expected positive criticism , not negative remarks on unimportant details only , giving the impression that somebody pays for "debunking" anything pointing in the direction of a reasonable view on the subject .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 12, 2011, 12:46:40 PM

GL
Yes, I have used "the side of the road" on many occasions during long drives but have never had the occasion to use the "side of a cloud" when on a long flight.  LOL

On the Sierra occasion, there was no "side of the road"  The west bound lanes were blocked , and the west bound shoulder was blocked for a distance exceeding 30 milees (statute).  Nothing moved for 9 hours as the snow built up from an inch to over 2 feet.  Fortunately the long line of stranded cars kept the pavement relatively clear of snow and we were all able to "inch" our way down rthe west side of the Hill after the Highway Patrol and CalTrans got the semi off the road (no small feat)

Neiither the  CHP nor CalTrans could figure out, or didn't care enough to figure out,  how to stop or slow down the East bound traffic, establish one lane of west bound traffic on that side  and escort cars 20 or so at a time from the west bound side to the east bound lanes and relieve somewhat the west bound jam.

Luckily we had a full tank of gas and snacks and drinks (drunk sparingly, LOL)  Our car trunk now includes two HEREs (Human Element Range Extenders)  LOL
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 12, 2011, 02:50:41 PM
Sry I was in error with sunrise with this comment , A/c was @ 7,000 ft , not 1,000 ft . Delete .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Harry Howe, Jr. on August 12, 2011, 03:20:20 PM

Gary and H.A.C
Hey Guys, relax (offerring two white flags, not of surrender but of truce), take deep breaths, think of something pleasant and just agree to disagree.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 12, 2011, 05:21:51 PM
------------------------------------------------------------


5. Since you seem concerned about cloud shadows in the vicinity of Howland, what about cloud shadows near Niku? There is no reason to believe that they knew what any of the Phoenix islands looked like so they could have been fooled by shadows in that area. And, possibly even more important, what about cloud shadows on the way to Niku? When near Howland they were not low on fuel, according to Ric, so no reason to go chasing after cloud shadows, they could calmly stay on their course and ignore such shadows. But later, on the proposed route to Niku, fuel would have been getting low, even using the most optimistic estimates, so it is very likely that desperation would have been growing in the plane tempting them to follow the Sirens' song and turn off course to chase those same shadows which were holding out the hope of saving their lives especially since they were not aiming for a particular island in the Phoenix group. They could have been zig-zagging all over the Pacific making it more likely that they used up their limited fuel before getting as far as Niku and making it more unlikely that they would find it after wandering in many directions off course.

- I'm not concerned at all, it was AE who got lost - I'm right here; however, you are ignoring the contrast between the islands which I clearly stated - Niku is nothing like Howland - it is a big string of jewels with a bright torquiose lagoon; Howland more resembles a... cloud shadow. - Jeff

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I agree with you that if they were near Niku that Niku would be easier to spot from the air, even with cloud shadows, than Howland but you missed my point that the problem with cloud shadows could have been on the way to Niku where they would have tempted Earhart to go chasing after them especially because she had no particular island destination so no ETA to dispel earlier cloud shadow "islands."

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

6.  I read Brandenburg's article and he comes up with all kinds of speculative horrors if smoke is made for too long a period of time. Well from 0614 until AE's last transmission at 0842 is only two and a half hours, not very long. He conjures up scare stories about what would happen if soot is allowed to build up too thickly on the boilers' water tubes. The normal practice is to blow the tubes every watch (a four  hour period) while underway and twice a day when in harbor. (Blowing the tubes entails opening the steam valves that direct steam through perforated tubes located next to the water tubes and the steam blows out the accumulated soot making huge belching clouds of very black smoke as the soot is expelled with the stack gases.) If the boilermen were concerned that soot was being accumulated at a faster rate than normal due to having a too rich mixture necessary for laying down a smoke screen then they could blow the tubes more often and not wait the full four hour period. The boilermen and the engineering officer knew their jobs.

- And the good captain knew how to cover his tracks; I'll trust the well-researched information on TIGHAR's site on this one, much more reliable than your speculation. - Jeff

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

The only thing I could find on the website that addresses the capability of Itasca making smoke was the article you pointed me to in your previous post, http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Forum/FAQs/itasca.htm. Since this is just an unsupported summary opinion by Brandenburg, can you provide a link to the research that you say is available on the site.  Reading the short Brandenburg article, I did not see any cites to any boiler operation manuals, just his unsupported opinion. I provided cites and excerpts of Navy manuals to support my points.


+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++==
Look at Black's cruise report, page 10.

 Entry for 8:07:

"...Itasca was laying down smoke screen stretching for ten miles. Smoke remained concentrated and did not thin out much..."
So smoke was being made until at least 8:07.

So I think we have to accept some things as fact and this is one of them unless everybody was lying.

- No, I don't think we have to 'accept' any such thing; enough careful research has gone into these 'facts' to blow battleship sized holes in many of them.  The character of the Itasca's captain is clear enough in his reporting of the effort - although much that was done was admirable, he was long on CYA.  Such an officer in the day was invincible to others aboard - no one was likely to contradict what he 'said' the record 'was'; after all, they all 'knew' he and all concerned had done their best - it had to be AE who got herself lost... - Jeff

------------------------------------------------------

So you believe that the captain, to cover his butt, got Mr. Black to lie for him? And he got the Hawaiians on Howland to lie for him too?And the captain also got the two news service reporters (who's butts were not on the line) to cover up for him also? How did he get them to miss out on their opportunity of a lifetime to advance their careers by grabbing the headlines with "CAPTAIN FAILED TO CARRY OUT ORDERS BY FAILING TO TO MAKE PROMISED SMOKE SCREEN, DIRECTLY LEADING TO LOSS OF WORLD FAMOUS AVIATRIX" film at ten.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++==


Also see excerpts from Boilerman 3 & 2, the U.S. Navy training manual for boilermen 3rd and 2nd class which is attached. BTW, nowhere in this manual or in Knight's Modern Seamanship is there any mention of the horribles that inhabit Brandenburg's fertile imagination.

- Uneven heating among the tubes, etc. create all kinds of stress; relative cooling in one section / component and extreme heat in the next creates the potential for what amounts to a bomb - it's basics 101 in boiler-world.  Point is to do what was described is counter to good practices and it was not likely what really happened.  In any case, AE certainly never reported finding any smoke that we're aware of... the rest may be - speculation.  I appreciate your insight, but also happen to be long familiar with steam engines of many sorts. - Jeff
-------------------------------------------------------

Again, are you saying that the boilermen and the engineering officer did NOT know their jobs? Are you saying that they could not have blown the tubes more frequently than at the change of the watch if they thought it necessary?


gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 12, 2011, 11:38:14 PM
It concerned central sunset , bubble sextant : no dip , refraction yes . No averaging of sights needed since position is precomputed , just see the sun in the bubble and ready you are . Since dip @ 7,000 ft is 1  deg  25´ the sun was , unarmed eye , 6 minutes plus visible after setting . For the inaccuracies you claim the 0715 to 0720 period is reasonable for position transmission time . If close to Nukumanu , why not wait a few minutes and radio "Over Nukumanu" in lieu of broadcast intricate coordinates like 04-33´.5 / 159-07´ ?  Part of the answer is that navigators use coordinates , not acres .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 12, 2011, 11:50:24 PM
Since Itasca was between A/c and horizon 38 mls , 61 km  away most probably , sea was black and smoke was black ; if smoke field was as large as Howland itself , optical angle from 1,000 ft did not trespass  1´ arc  which is the resolution limit for the eye in clear air . In case of some horizon haze ship and smoke obscured .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Jeff Scott on August 16, 2011, 10:45:09 PM
Since this thread has been divested of the fuel consumption and range discussion, I'm bumping my question to Mr. LaPook back up.  I think it may have been overwhelmed by other subjects:


Since you must be the only person in the world who knows where FN was at or near the time of landing approach, maybe you could tell us where the plane ended up?

--------------------------------------------

Yep, on the bottom of the ocean.

gl

Gary--I'm curious if you have any thoughts on approximately where the plane would have most likely ended up on the bottom of the ocean.  Given your detailed analyses of Noonan's navigation techniques and theories on what he would have advised Earhart to do as their ill-fated flight drew to a close, have you reached any conclusions on where they most likely would have gone down?  Further, do you have any ideas on why the multiple searches of the sea floor around Howland haven't found anything?

I'd appreciate your insights!

My question basically boils down to this:  all the deep sea searches have focused on the sea floor to the north and west of Howland.  Since they haven't found anything, it leads to a few possibilities...

1) They're looking in the right place but just haven't found the Electra because of equipment limitations, obscuration by terrain, or plain bad luck.
2) The plane went down further north or further west than has been searched.
3) The plane didn't end up north or west of Howland after all (South or east? Gardner Island? Mili Atoll? New Britain? The Delta Quadrant??)

Gary, what is your opinion?

For reference, here is a map of the region searched by the Waitt Institute.

(http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/conspiracy/earhart/waitt-search.jpg)
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 17, 2011, 03:56:54 AM
Since this thread has been divested of the fuel consumption and range discussion, I'm bumping my question to Mr. LaPook back up.  I think it may have been overwhelmed by other subjects:


Since you must be the only person in the world who knows where FN was at or near the time of landing approach, maybe you could tell us where the plane ended up?

--------------------------------------------

Yep, on the bottom of the ocean.

gl

Gary--I'm curious if you have any thoughts on approximately where the plane would have most likely ended up on the bottom of the ocean.  Given your detailed analyses of Noonan's navigation techniques and theories on what he would have advised Earhart to do as their ill-fated flight drew to a close, have you reached any conclusions on where they most likely would have gone down?  Further, do you have any ideas on why the multiple searches of the sea floor around Howland haven't found anything?

I'd appreciate your insights!

My question basically boils down to this:  all the deep sea searches have focused on the sea floor to the north and west of Howland.  Since they haven't found anything, it leads to a few possibilities...

1) They're looking in the right place but just haven't found the Electra because of equipment limitations, obscuration by terrain, or plain bad luck.
2) The plane went down further north or further west than has been searched.
3) The plane didn't end up north or west of Howland after all (South or east? Gardner Island? Mili Atoll? New Britain? The Delta Quadrant??)

Gary, what is your opinion?

For reference, here is a map of the region searched by the Waitt Institute.

(http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/conspiracy/earhart/waitt-search.jpg)

-----------------------------------

You may appreciate my frustration since  celestial navigation was accurate enough to get them to Howland without any assistance from the radio. You can see excerpts from flight navigation manuals that explain this method and provide authority for my position and you can also read my in depth analysis of this on my website at:

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/


Rather than saying the most probable location for the wreckage (since it makes no sense that they ended up there either) I would call it the "least unlikely" place to find the plane. I go with northwest of Howland near the LOP and far enough away that they were in the cloudy area described by Itasca, at least 40 NM away from Howland. If they had flown into the clear near Howland then Noonan could have taken accurate observations of the Sun and of the Moon, gotten an accurate fix and locate Howland. So I will go with explanation 1 with a touch of 2 on the side.

See

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/navigation-to-howland-island


"Based on this last report of in-flight weather conditions, we can be certain that Noonan was able to take sights at 1623 Z, only two hours and forty-nine minutes before the "must be on you" transmission at 1912 Z. So looking at this as the worst case scenario, we can do the same computations as before about the uncertainty of the D.R. position at 1912 Z. In two hours and forty-nine minutes the plane would have covered 366 NM at 130 knots so the uncertainty caused by dead reckoning for 366 NM is 18 NM for the 5% estimate; 36 NM for the 10% estimate and 60 NM using the most pessimistic estimate of DR accuracy. We have to add to these estimates the original 10 NM uncertainty in a fix obtained at 1623 Z so the totals are 28 NM, 46 NM and 70 NM of uncertainty at 1912 Z. Noonan knew the time that he obtained his last celestial fix and would have used the right amount of offset to allow for the possible uncertainty.

So these two cases mark the bounds of the possible uncertainty in the north and south direction, 70 NM if the last fix was obtained at 1623 Z and 42 NM if the last fix was obtained as late as possible (clouds permitting) at 1740 Z. Either way they would not have flown for hours southward still expecting to find Howland."

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

And this does not even take into account using the Moon, which was well placed to provide another LOP running across the Sun LOP and telling them their latitude. The Moon was well up in the sky but we know that Noonan was capable of taking such high shots since he took observations as high as the Moon was on his crossing to Dakar. (see: https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/navigation-to-dakar )

Without any additional sights after twilight at 1740 Z or after the 1623 Z message there is a limit on how much uncertainty there would be in Noonan's DR position. I already showed what it would have been at 1912 Z and it would deteriorate at a rate of 13 knots (using the 10% estimate), 13 NM for every hour after 1912 Z  so even at 2400 Z the extra 4:48 would have added only 62 NM to the uncertainty making the total uncertainty (using the 10% estimate) only 92 NM if the last sight was taken at 1740 Z and 110 NM if the last sight had been taken at 1623 Z. Even using the most pessimistic estimate of DR accuracy from the U.S. Navy's Flight Navigation Manual, H.O. 216, prescribed for beginning navigators the uncertainty would have been only 134 NM for the last sight being taken at 1740 Z and 162 NM if no sight had been taken after the 1623 Z message.

Noonan had to know, even if just by DR, that he was in the vicinity of Howland and any Sun or Moon sights would have narrowed the uncertainty down to about plus and minus 7 NM from the derived LOPs so no reason to fly off to the Phoenix, Marshall, or Gilbert islands or to fly to New Britain or Hawaii or Chicago.

But, again, it makes no sense that they would not have proceeded far enough southeast on the LOP after the standard intercept northwest of the island (see: https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/landfall-procedure ) to not break into the clear and shoot the Sun and Moon and find Howland.


gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Alex Fox on August 17, 2011, 04:01:39 PM
Noonan had to know, even if just by DR, that he was in the vicinity of Howland and any Sun or Moon sights would have narrowed the uncertainty down to about plus and minus 7 NM from the derived LOPs so no reason to fly off to the Phoenix, Marshall, or Gilbert islands or to fly to New Britain or Hawaii or Chicago.
This makes some sense, and you very well may be correct in your analysis.  But let's imagine they do actually find the Electra just off the reef of Nikumaroro.  Can you think of any rational reason that had happened, or did Noonan forget how to navigate?
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 17, 2011, 05:10:32 PM
Noonan had to know, even if just by DR, that he was in the vicinity of Howland and any Sun or Moon sights would have narrowed the uncertainty down to about plus and minus 7 NM from the derived LOPs so no reason to fly off to the Phoenix, Marshall, or Gilbert islands or to fly to New Britain or Hawaii or Chicago.
This makes some sense, and you very well may be correct in your analysis.  But let's imagine they do actually find the Electra just off the reef of Nikumaroro.  Can you think of any rational reason that had happened, or did Noonan forget how to navigate?


-------------------------------

Noonan didn't forget how to navigate so I am the first one to admit that I have no explanation for why they didn't find Howland.  I'm not real concerned that they will find the plane near Nikumororo nor Mili, nor New Britain, nor Saipan.

You should also read:

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/why-it-was-not-possible-to-follow-lop-to-nikumaroro

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Jeff Scott on August 17, 2011, 09:28:20 PM
I was poking around the Waitt site today and found a new photo they didn't have before.  If you feel Earhart and Noonan may have gone down further north, this one interestingly enough shows their 2006 zone searched with Nauticos as well as the 2009 search region.  How much farther north could they have possibly gotten?  I just wish their maps included some kind of scale...

(http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/conspiracy/earhart/waitt-search2.jpg)

Their site also makes the statement the "team left the area with an extremely high degree of confidence that the area explored can be eliminated from future searches."  I wonder how they can be so bold when the maps seem to suggest regions of rough topography where something could conceivably hide.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on August 17, 2011, 10:55:05 PM
I was poking around the Waitt site today and found a new photo they didn't have before.  If you feel Earhart and Noonan may have gone down further north, this one interestingly enough shows their 2006 zone searched with Nauticos as well as the 2009 search region.  How much farther north could they have possibly gotten?  I just wish their maps included some kind of scale...

(http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/conspiracy/earhart/waitt-search2.jpg)

Their site also makes the statement the "team left the area with an extremely high degree of confidence that the area explored can be eliminated from future searches."  I wonder how they can be so bold when the maps seem to suggest regions of rough topography where something could conceivably hide.

--------------------------------

Using the 36.5 NM distance between the near shores of Baker and Howland for scale, the search area extended to 68 NM north of Howland, 36 NM west and encompassed a swath a minimum of 18 NM to the west and 10 NM to the east of the 157 LOP. This also covers the 4 NM to the west offset LOP if Noonan was using the Williams coordinates but there is a gap in a high probability (least unlikely) area.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on August 18, 2011, 01:08:23 AM
Every circle of uncertainty has its own circle of uncertainty around it .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 07, 2011, 01:27:42 AM
Since Itasca was between A/c and horizon 38 mls , 61 km  away most probably , sea was black and smoke was black ; if smoke field was as large as Howland itself , optical angle from 1,000 ft did not trespass  1´ arc  which is the resolution limit for the eye in clear air . In case of some horizon haze ship and smoke obscured .

Don't know if I'm smart enough to sort all that out, but it seems to support that there are so many possible variables that could have been in play that day that we will never know for certain what combination of things may have conspired to keep AE and FN from spotting Howland.

Now Gardner, stripe it any way you wish - there was a target if ever there was one...

LTM -
-----------------------------------------

I have attached a photo of some clouds shadows and a ship. Did you have any problem separating the ship from the cloud shadows?

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Martin X. Moleski, SJ on September 07, 2011, 08:44:27 AM
However, is is clear that if the clouds were more plentiful it could be a much different matter.  But even the light clouds present do illustrate how dense the shadows can be.  Think of this picture with something approaching 40 or 50% cloud coverage with even puffier clouds - got any pix like that?  Might be closer to conditions present that day.  Maybe with an island or two thrown in - say, one like Howland, another like Gardner?

Ric Gillespie noted in another thread (http://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,452.msg5572.html#msg5572) that we know what the conditions were close to Howland that morning: "According to Itasca's deck log, visibility that whole morning was '9' - the maximum on the scale, defined as 'Prominent objects visible above 20 miles.'"

The Itasca took off to search northwest of Howland (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Research/ResearchPapers/first24hours.html) because that was the only part of the sky that was cloudy. Thompson reasoned that they must have come down there because if they had approached from the west or southwest, they would have seen the smoke signal and the island.

We do not have any weather reports from Niku that morning.

If the plane landed at Niku, then the weather was good enough to see the island and make a landing.

If the plane didn't land at Niku, the weather may or may not have played a part in its loss.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 07, 2011, 09:55:51 AM
Since Itasca was between A/c and horizon 38 mls , 61 km  away most probably , sea was black and smoke was black ; if smoke field was as large as Howland itself , optical angle from 1,000 ft did not trespass  1´ arc  which is the resolution limit for the eye in clear air . In case of some horizon haze ship and smoke obscured .

Don't know if I'm smart enough to sort all that out, but it seems to support that there are so many possible variables that could have been in play that day that we will never know for certain what combination of things may have conspired to keep AE and FN from spotting Howland.

Now Gardner, stripe it any way you wish - there was a target if ever there was one...

LTM -
-----------------------------------------

I have attached a photo of some clouds shadows and a ship. Did you have any problem separating the ship from the cloud shadows?

gl

Nice photo.  No, scattered clouds leave much open ocean for excellent contrast where the ship is concerned. 

However, is is clear that if the clouds were more plentiful it could be a much different matter.  But even the light clouds present do illustrate how dense the shadows can be.  Think of this picture with something approaching 40 or 50% cloud coverage with even puffier clouds - got any pix like that?  Might be closer to conditions present that day.  Maybe with an island or two thrown in - say, one like Howland, another like Gardner?

I'm curious though, Mr. LaPook - with your advocacy of "other than" TIGHAR's path in this quest, do you have your own site where all your research is documented? Nothing you've put up sways me away from the Niku hypothesis, but much of it is interesting and obviously you are putting a great deal of effort into some alternate approach.  Most interesting.

LTM -

-----------------------------------------------yes
See: 

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Dan Swift on September 08, 2011, 10:57:31 AM
As an instrument pilot myself, the problem I have with the analogy of driving down 1st Ave or Street to Cochran (your LOP) and knowing the Starbucks is in a particular direction down Cochran, reinforces to me the possibility of a Niku landing.  There were no VORTAC's or DME arc approaches available...so that is a moot point. 

But there also were no street signs over the Pacific that night and early morning.  So if you were say on 2nd or 3rd Ave. instead of your intended 1st Ave., when you hit you LOP (Cochran)....you can't find Starbucks where you think it is....so you drive up and down it until you find it....or not.  If you get too low on gas, you look for a gas station first....so you drive in the direction where you know (think) there may be some gas stations.   Remember, there are no street signs....no DF equipment functioning, no receiving radio.  Seems very possible to me.   
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 08, 2011, 11:40:11 AM
As an instrument pilot myself, the problem I have with the analogy of driving down 1st Ave or Street to Cochran (your LOP) and knowing the Starbucks is in a particular direction down Cochran, reinforces to me the possibility of a Niku landing.  There were no VORTAC's or DME arc approaches available...so that is a moot point. 

But there also were no street signs over the Pacific that night and early morning.  So if you were say on 2nd or 3rd Ave. instead of your intended 1st Ave., when you hit you LOP (Cochran)....you can't find Starbucks where you think it is....so you drive up and down it until you find it....or not.  If you get too low on gas, you look for a gas station first....so you drive in the direction where you know (think) there may be some gas stations.   Remember, there are no street signs....no DF equipment functioning, no receiving radio.  Seems very possible to me.   
---------------------------

There are standard search patterns to fly, starting at the most likely location for the destination and remaining in that area. Using my prior analogy, when you didn't immediately see the Starbucks, you would start again at the location that you had expected to find it and instead of just looking right and left from Cochran street to find the Starbucks you would use  a normal search methodology of driving into the shopping center parking lots on each side of the street so as to do a more complete search of the places where that Starbucks (and your friend) could be hiding. I'll bet that you have done this same thing yourself.

See: https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/standard-search-pattern (https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/standard-search-pattern)


gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Irvine John Donald on September 08, 2011, 02:29:56 PM
Too bad you guys aren't flying over Canada. We have a Tim Horton's on every corner.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 08, 2011, 02:52:24 PM
Dan makes good sense to me. 

With no signs, you couldn't know if you were on 1st or 10th street out there, only that you'd hit "Cochran" (the LOP) somewhere along its length. 

With growing jitters and in need of a caffeine fix, you look left and right, up and down Cochran: you realize there is a more limited chance of finding "Starbucks" (land) to your left than to right because you see fewer store signs to left than to right, i.e. only one or two possibilities for landfall to NNW (Howland or maybe Baker) than to SSE (Gardner and others in group). 

Belly now rumbling and blood sugar dropping, you glance to left, then right... I'd only go so far to the left - to the end of the 'signs' (LOP out to NNW to end of time willing to risk) before turning back toward the other direction where more signs lay in the distance (LOP SSE - use remaining fuel to get to known land ("Starbucks")).

As to any help from any sort of radio device, given AE's particular predicament one may as well be surfing the FM dial and trying to discern distance from stations by clarity of signal in a big city with the signals bouncing off the buildings along the street, etc.  That's about as close to any real radio help as I can imagine: a lot of noise and no help as to direction and little as to distance.

I'd trust FN's caffeine addiction on this one.

LTM -
--------------------------

Except their DR restricted the range of locations where they could have intercepted the LOP. There were only two exits off the expressway, 1st street and 10th street, so when you hit Cochran you couldn't be any farther west than 1st street of further east than 10th street. You therefore know that you can't be more than 10 blocks away from the Starbucks so you only have to search thoroughly that ten block stretch, driving up or down Cochran and driving through the adjoining shopping center parking lots looking for the Starbucks that may be towards the back of the parking lot. No reason to drive 350 NM east to start looking for a different Starbucks, one where you know your fiend is not waiting for you.

And the Moon was available for Noonan to determine an LOP that crossed th sun line LOP giving them a fix so they could determine that they were near Howland. It would be like looking up an seeing the sign saying "7th street."

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 08, 2011, 09:36:42 PM
Dan makes good sense to me. 

With no signs...

I'd trust FN's caffeine addiction on this one.

LTM -
--------------------------

Except their DR restricted the range of locations where they could have intercepted the LOP. There were only two exits off the expressway, 1st street and 10th street, so when you hit Cochran you couldn't be any farther west than 1st street of further east than 10th street. You therefore know that you can't be more than 10 blocks away from the Starbucks so you only have to search thoroughly that ten block stretch, driving up or down Cochran and driving through the adjoining shopping center parking lots looking for the Starbucks that may be towards the back of the parking lot. No reason to drive 350 NM east to start looking for a different Starbucks, one where you know your fiend is not waiting for you.

And the Moon was available for Noonan to determine an LOP that crossed th sun line LOP giving them a fix so they could determine that they were near Howland. It would be like looking up an seeing the sign saying "7th street."

gl

I thought 1st / 10th etc. were more east-west, and Cochran north-south(?) - who's on first / what's on second?   :o  Must be my bad...

What DR?  AE never got a steer, so no way to know how close or far she was from.  Moon shot - that's an interesting grab.

I added a bit more to my post while you were writing, Gary - see above, or more to the point from your own site - follow the sun (line)  ;D -

"Most interesting however seems to be:[/b]"American Air Navigator, Mattingly (1944)", Page 157 - "Running down a sun line".  This seems to touch precisely on what we have been discussing regarding the LOP and is immediately and concisely relevant to the AE-FN need as we can understand it.  I would love to read the remaining text on the "running down a sun line" subject - Page 158, etc. - do you have that, Gary? 

I recommend the reading - go to https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/standard-search-pattern, thence the link for "Page 157" under "American Air Navigator, Mattingly (1944)"."
[/color]

I think the sun line approach does much to answer these things.  Do you have page 158, etc.?  LOP still grabs me as the most plausible, reliable and easy to reach solution for FN.

-----------------------------------

I don't know why you didn't find it, it's been on my website all along.

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/landfall-procedure

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/american-air-navigator-mattingly-1944

You should also read Weems since that was written by Noonan's friend P.V.H. Weems. Noonan visited and corresponded with Weems on a regular basis so it almost certain that Noonan was familiar with (and probably contributed to the writing of) everything it that book. Look at pages 422 though 425.

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/weems

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics


gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 08, 2011, 10:00:32 PM
Dan makes good sense to me. 

With no signs...

I'd trust FN's caffeine addiction on this one.

LTM -
--------------------------

Except their DR restricted the range of locations where they could have intercepted the LOP. There were only two exits off the expressway, 1st street and 10th street, so when you hit Cochran you couldn't be any farther west than 1st street of further east than 10th street. You therefore know that you can't be more than 10 blocks away from the Starbucks so you only have to search thoroughly that ten block stretch, driving up or down Cochran and driving through the adjoining shopping center parking lots looking for the Starbucks that may be towards the back of the parking lot. No reason to drive 350 NM east to start looking for a different Starbucks, one where you know your fiend is not waiting for you.

And the Moon was available for Noonan to determine an LOP that crossed th sun line LOP giving them a fix so they could determine that they were near Howland. It would be like looking up an seeing the sign saying "7th street."

gl

I thought 1st / 10th etc. were more east-west, and Cochran north-south(?) - who's on first / what's on second?   :o  Must be my bad...

What DR?  AE never got a steer, so no way to know how close or far she was from.  Moon shot - that's an interesting grab.

I added a bit more to my post while you were writing, Gary - see above, or more to the point from your own site - follow the sun (line)  ;D -

"Most interesting however seems to be:"American Air Navigator, Mattingly (1944)", Page 157 - "Running down a sun line".  This seems to touch precisely on what we have been discussing regarding the LOP and is immediately and concisely relevant to the AE-FN need as we can understand it.  I would love to read the remaining text on the "running down a sun line" subject - Page 158, etc. - do you have that, Gary? 

I recommend the reading - go to https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/standard-search-pattern (https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/standard-search-pattern), thence the link for "Page 157" under "American Air Navigator, Mattingly (1944)"."


I think the sun line approach does much to answer these things.  Do you have page 158, etc.?  LOP still grabs me as the most plausible, reliable and easy to reach solution for FN.

-----------------------

See diagram one (https://4618319391870527131-a-1802744773732722657-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/why-it-was-not-possible-to-follow-lop-to-nikumaroro/simi.jpg?attachauth=ANoY7coL3E1nuOTcW3XkAoYvObAvsoKSbMCK2T9Tk72op3-I8Tcx2Jkq7RPOYcMfxKOGK8bPHf3esTU8jPfELtcnuASFG2kCeh9MUdBgxtQ2tSXiJNUL1Dfxn76XRI_-lqnaYdpzrtMA3M1Rr4J1r7aZeiUKMCrKx4WRjMeQFamn8o42IKZkmunQnaRhjyWcSL6RtDH5ejl6d_FtKAY4JxjezwAA_MyRA4N4ZF-w147gLCLhjyzVOgwE4tWjOASHBjhhe4AxHwnEN3y_7OavXF9w3dvKOTAadA%3D%3D&attredirects=0),

and diagram two. (https://4618319391870527131-a-1802744773732722657-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/why-it-was-not-possible-to-follow-lop-to-nikumaroro/SimiGardnerStarbucks.jpg?attachauth=ANoY7cpcr58YF1yUYDqTP0aYjk5zJ5CxnDGq_uieqkLy7J07hdCSIjlICbfLTrvgSyKBmFpBKgsUuLqEdXdhg2TOyv2Z50usrI6rDd6dOllc44sM_MvqkDKlnBBHsgEo-rdY4-QvBjalB_M_YCmaAKeeTHVyBpQ_8e_15wqEcdz4eGnFqlDgMdGJLHLBlqy6wKfstXib14wOSyOuTUCnx9DyYIBypYZZCdrWyZRa22AvD7B6MQS1_lM2imtBHx1TNfODQGXVUtrbOJuTNOsyBeLSmNhvJRHsZW9YsaKQeLI1xFMD6lKnjrc%3D&attredirects=0)
gl

Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 08, 2011, 10:25:19 PM
Dan makes good sense to me. 

With no signs...

I'd trust FN's caffeine addiction on this one.

LTM -
--------------------------

Except their DR restricted the range of locations where they could have intercepted the LOP. There were only two exits off the expressway, 1st street and 10th street, so when you hit Cochran you couldn't be any farther west than 1st street of further east than 10th street. You therefore know that you can't be more than 10 blocks away from the Starbucks so you only have to search thoroughly that ten block stretch, driving up or down Cochran and driving through the adjoining shopping center parking lots looking for the Starbucks that may be towards the back of the parking lot. No reason to drive 350 NM east to start looking for a different Starbucks, one where you know your fiend is not waiting for you.

And the Moon was available for Noonan to determine an LOP that crossed th sun line LOP giving them a fix so they could determine that they were near Howland. It would be like looking up an seeing the sign saying "7th street."

gl

I thought 1st / 10th etc. were more east-west, and Cochran north-south(?) - who's on first / what's on second?   :o  Must be my bad...

What DR?  AE never got a steer, so no way to know how close or far she was from.


I added a bit more to my post while you were writing, Gary - see above, or more to the point from your own site - follow the sun (line)  ;D -

"Most interesting however seems to be:[/b]"American Air Navigator, Mattingly (1944)", Page 157 - "Running down a sun line".  This seems to touch precisely on what we have been discussing regarding the LOP and is immediately and concisely relevant to the AE-FN need as we can understand it.  I would love to read the remaining text on the "running down a sun line" subject - Page 158, etc. - do you have that, Gary? 

I recommend the reading - go to https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/standard-search-pattern, thence the link for "Page 157" under "American Air Navigator, Mattingly (1944)"."
[/color]

I think the sun line approach does much to answer these things.  Do you have page 158, etc.?  LOP still grabs me as the most plausible, reliable and easy to reach solution for FN.
----------------------------------------------------------

Not a "grab" at all. I posted the following on the TIGHAR Forum back in 2002:


"Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2002 14:17:10 EST
From: Gary LaPook
Subject: Re: Plan "B"
The "cut" of the LOPs derived at Howland Island on July 2, 1937 for the sun and
moon lines varied between 59 degrees at 1830 Z to 125 degrees at 2100 Z and
back down to 69 degrees at 2400 Z which would provide acceptable "cuts" for
accurate celestial fixes at anytime during that period. These cuts were not all
the prefect 90 degrees but all are well above the minimum 15 degree cut stated
in "Weems" 1938 edition on page 281.
There has previously been a concern stated that the moon was too high in the
sky to be measured with the sextant as it was above 75 degrees when they
arrived in the vicinity of Howland. However, by 1945 Z its altitude was below
70 degrees and got progressively lower as the day progressed while the altitude
of the sun got higher. Both of their altitudes stayed below 70 degrees between
1945 Z and 2400 Z (presumably the tanks dry point); both were below 65 degrees
2015 Z through 2300 Z; below 60 Degrees 2030-2230 Z; and below 55 degrees
2100-2200 Z. Wouldn't these altitudes allow Noonan to get a shot of the moon?
Gary LaPook"

=====================================================================

("Cut" is the angle of the intersection between two LOPs. A perfect cut would be 90 degrees but anything over 30 degrees provides very good accuracy in the resulting fix and anything over 15 degrees is usable but not desirable because the accuracy of the fix is degraded.)
-----------------------------------------------------

Since posting that I analyzed Noonan's navigation on the Dakar flight and on the flight to Hawaii. On the Dakar flight, at 1341 Z Noonan took another observation of the sun, this time from the left side cabin
window. He measured 74̊ 48' with his octant.

On the flight to Hawaii Noonan took 14 celestial observations, the highest of which was 75 degrees.
So we know from Noonan's navigation in the same airplane using the same sextant that he could take observations 75 degrees high so could have taken observations of the moon while searching for Howland.
See: attached and

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/navigation-to-dakar
gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 08, 2011, 11:48:01 PM
Noonan had to know, even if just by DR, that he was in the vicinity of Howland and any Sun or Moon sights would have narrowed the uncertainty down to about plus and minus 7 NM from the derived LOPs so no reason to fly off to the Phoenix, Marshall, or Gilbert islands or to fly to New Britain or Hawaii or Chicago.
This makes some sense, and you very well may be correct in your analysis.  But let's imagine they do actually find the Electra just off the reef of Nikumaroro.  Can you think of any rational reason that had happened, or did Noonan forget how to navigate?


-------------------------------

Noonan didn't forget how to navigate so I am the first one to admit that I have no explanation for why they didn't find Howland.  I'm not real concerned that they will find the plane near Nikumororo nor Mili, nor New Britain, nor Saipan.

You should also read:

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/why-it-was-not-possible-to-follow-lop-to-nikumaroro

gl

Oh, you apparently DO have your own site - I see now by the link above.

What I don't get, after reading your site, is why anything TIGHAR has put up about the LOP and possible landfall at Gardner would be in question: TIGHAR never said Gardner was ON the LOP that I recall, but NEAR it (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Forum/FAQs/navigation.html) - reasonably so, it seems. 

For me, it's back to Niku being a big, reef-ringed island with a bright, blue lagoon in the middle of it - unlike the miserably small and lumpish Howland; a celestial (sunrise fixed) LOP passing directly through Howland on the day in question passes just east of Niku - and closely enough to put Niku well within reasonable spotting range - especially given its characteristics.  Regardless too of all the stuff I've seen put-up to try to debunk the idea of Howland possibly being obscured by cloud shadows, I still don't buy that angle either.  Howland could easily have been obscured among shadows - it strikes me as a little like chasing a bunch of dirty sheep across a meadow to find the one small black one among them...

So, for me anyway, given the choice of casting money onto the oceans under which AE and FN may lie, and sending the same money down a "LOP" for "landfall" at a real chance of an answer - I feel even more compelled than before to send TIGHAR some more money...  ;D  But, to each his own - and TIGHAR is to be commended for allowing so many points of view to be openly discussed here.

By the way, cool illustrations via your globe pictures.  After working through them, they actually reinforced what I already understand about LOP and all that is reasonable about TIGHAR's own "position" - "THE LOP" indeed passes very near Niku.  I think ol' FreddieNoonan coulda used that to good advantage, given the lost cause of finding Howland.

Now gotta dash and take care of raising my TIGHAR membership level...

LTM -
--------------------------
The LOP passed near Gardner only near the time of sunrise and moved quite far away by the time the plane could have been approaching that island. You seem to have missed the whole point of that web page.

gl

Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 09, 2011, 04:50:21 AM
1. Impossible , @ 1815 GMT sun´s elevation was far below 6 deg , nevertheless distance off was recorded . 2. About 0720 navigator had the sun only for observation , seeing the west shores of Nukumanu from 27 mls , 43 km is doubtful , separately from the specific coordinates communicated , these are by exactness for sunset , not discovered by van Asten , but by mathematics . 3 . No story changed , @ sunset the bubble sextant was used , see EJN-2011. H.

--------------------

This is so funny, so now it's "about" 0720! LOL!

Van Asten still has not explained how Earhart's radio waves managed to travel faster than the speed of light and go back in time so as to be received at Lae at 0718, a minute and a half before the 0719:30 time that van Asten claims that Noonan observed sunset. The time of this observation is critical to van Asten's theory since his whole theory is based on his mathematical (ten decimal places again) computation of this time. If Noonan had actually made an observation at 0719:30 then the position could not have been transmitted at 0720. Taking an observation with a bubble sextant in flight, as van Asten says Noonan was doing for this observation, takes about three minutes as you must take at least ten observations and average them to arrive at an accurate observation. The average time of all of these individual observations is the time used for the observation, again this is something van Asten doesn't understand. If Noonan actually did compute his position based on a sun observation that had an average time of 0719:30 then he was shooting the sun for about three minutes from about 0718:15 to about 0720:45. Then he had to figure out the average of the ten (or more, taking even more time) by hand which takes about an additional minute and a half (try it yourself using degrees and minutes of arc as read off a sextant) and about another minute to refer to his precalculated altitude data, so the claimed 0719:30 observation would not have been completed until about 0723:15 which is more than three minutes later than van Asten claims that the position report was transmitted. It is also more than five minutes after the report was actually received in Lae!

see flight navigation manuals:

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/weems/weems-314-315.JPG?attredirects=0

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/aircraft-navigation-manual-h-o-216-1941/ho216-1941-182.JPG?attredirects=0

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/aircraft-navigation-manual-h-o-216-1941/ho216-1941-183.JPG?attredirects=0

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/accuracy-of-celestial-fixes

see also:
https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/other-flight-navigation-information/recent-landfall-approach

LOL!

gl

------------------------------

I just had to upload this image of a radiogram for Mr. van Asten showing the time the message was received in lae was 5:18 P.M. (0718 Z)
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: JNev on September 09, 2011, 12:50:17 PM
--------------------------
The LOP passed near Gardner only near the time of sunrise and moved quite far away by the time the plane could have been approaching that island. You seem to have missed the whole point of that web page.

gl

I didn't miss the point, but I think you missed mine:

Your site includes authoritative information on the use of sun lines on the "page 157" link.  Despite the example used in that text being nearly verbatim the same case AE and FN would have faced, you continue to discount that approach for some reason beyond my understanding.

As to sun lines, LOPs and movement -

Once established and charted, the LOP does not "move" with the sun.  Think about it - the idea is to 'find' one's self and to chart that position, in this case 'along a LOP thus'...

If an established LOP, once so obtained, did move, it would be useless as a navigation tool - I agree with that.  And yes, of course the sun moves - and so does the sun line - not the same thing as a LOP once obtained and charted per above. 

A LOP could easily have been established by offset - FN would have known how far east or west he was at sunrise by the time.  From that shot he also would have had a good idea of speed.  Therefore it would have been a simple matter for him to project by offset a LOP for Howland: then it would be a matter of elapsed time by which to judge arrival at the LOP.

Once at the LOP it is a matter of track - simple enough and the obvious outcome would have been 157 - 337.

Simple and foundational.  Given the nature of able humans like FN when confronted with a need to solve a problem, I suspect FN would have done about what Occam says is rational - and LOP is about as foundational as it gets in the case he was facing.  I think that's where I'll keep my money...  ;)

Cool link between FN and the author of that material - thanks for sharing that.  Small world!

LTM -
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on September 09, 2011, 02:57:54 PM
A Fixed Square Search is the in first line evasion from getting astray , as soon as destination does not run in sight at ETA . Such searches (also if circular) are very waisteful on fuel so , if you are low your risk to run out on one of the first search legs is too geat . Generally it is in the manuals prescribed not to leave a position line once you are on it for the sake of rescuers having a guideline .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on September 09, 2011, 03:12:12 PM
Possibly if not probably , Chater´s watch was a few minutes off Zone Time . If precomputed a navigator can immediately see , even shortly before point of time , if his observation covers , or not . Can anybody explain with figures how the 0720 fix was established , with the sun only available , for the same given coordinates ?
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on September 09, 2011, 03:18:15 PM
I think the comment considered the LOP by its extension to compass point 157 , not the line itself but one estimated last point of it from which a 157 compass course , corrected or not , cold be set .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Mona Kendrick on September 09, 2011, 03:47:40 PM
. Generally it is in the manuals prescribed not to leave a position line once you are on it for the sake of rescuers having a guideline .

     A very interesting point that hasn't been brought up before on the forum.

Mona
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Irvine John Donald on September 09, 2011, 05:32:53 PM
A Fixed Square Search is the in first line evasion from getting astray , as soon as destination does not run in sight at ETA . Such searches (also if circular) are very waisteful on fuel so , if you are low your risk to run out on one of the first search legs is too geat . Generally it is in the manuals prescribed not to leave a position line once you are on it for the sake of rescuers having a guideline .
Doesn't that point argue that FN did the right thing by staying on the LOP?  Didn't the US Navy and Coastguard also use the LOP as the place to search?  Itasca heading NW to search while other US navy officials suggested the Phoenix group as southern end of the LOP to be searched?

What manual recommends this procedure Mr. Van Asten? It would likely make interesting reading.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on September 10, 2011, 03:31:25 AM
Navigator´s Information File NIF , 1944 April imprint , Section 3 , § 17 . 1 . "Landfalls" . Mr.Lapook has on this forum given a link to this manual , if you do not possess it .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 10, 2011, 11:55:36 AM
Navigator´s Information File NIF , 1944 April imprint , Section 3 , § 17 . 1 . "Landfalls" . Mr.Lapook has on this forum given a link to this manual , if you do not possess it .
------------------------------
Well there is nothing in this manual that supports Mr. van Asten's statement nor in any of the other manual excerpts that I put on my website. Here is a link to that document on my web site, see if you can find any mention of "rescuers" as van Asten claims.
https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/navigator-s-information-file-1944

But as long as we are looking at the "Landfall" section of the Navigator's Information File, I just want to point out the very first words in that section:

"Landfalls - The safest way to get to destination"

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on September 10, 2011, 01:29:26 PM
pt. 4 of the paragraph : "Stay on this line of position until another line of position shows you to be off course . pt. 5 . Then repeat the process . But stay on a line of position through destination . There is no ETA in a landfall other than your best known groundspeed" .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 10, 2011, 05:47:02 PM
--------------------------
The LOP passed near Gardner only near the time of sunrise and moved quite far away by the time the plane could have been approaching that island. You seem to have missed the whole point of that web page.

gl

I didn't miss the point, but I think you missed mine:

Your site includes authoritative information on the use of sun lines on the "page 157" link.  Despite the example used in that text being nearly verbatim the same case AE and FN would have faced, you continue to discount that approach for some reason beyond my understanding.

As to sun lines, LOPs and movement -

Once established, the LOP does not "move" with the sun.  Think about it - if they did, they would be useless. 

A LOP could easily have been established by offset - FN would have known how far east or west he was at sunrise by the time.  From that shot he also would have had a good idea of speed.  Therefore it would have been a simple matter for him to project by offset a LOP for Howland: then it would be a matter of elapsed time by which to judge arrival at the LOP.

Once at the LOP it is a matter of track - simple enough and the obvious outcome would have been 157 - 337.

Simple indeed - and foundationally sound.  Given the nature of able humans like FN when confronted with a need to solve a problem, I suspect FN would have done about what Occam says is rational - and LOP is about as foundational as it gets in the case he was facing.  I think that's where I'll keep my money...  ;)

Cool link between FN and the author of that material - thanks for sharing that.  Small world!

LTM -
--------------------------------------------
O.K.?

You did get the point that the LOP is perpendicular to the azimuth of the sun at the time that each observation is taken, right?

And if you haven't lived your whole life in a cave you have probably noticed that the azimuth of the sun changes during the day, rising in the east, passing through south at noon, and setting in the west, right?

So since the sun's azimuth changes during the day and the LOP is always perpendicular to the sun's azimuth then you do see that the azimuth of the LOP changes at the same rate as the sun's azimuth, right?

Then how can you say that "the LOP does not "move" with the sun"?

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on September 11, 2011, 12:59:22 AM
Mr.Neville probably intended to say that the given 157-337 sun line as an original did not move with the sun , thereby supposing that it was possible to set course for Gardner from a point on the original sun line , which it was .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on September 11, 2011, 08:35:21 AM
I do not claim "rescuers" , but it is clear , qualitate qua , and separating details from headlines , that searching along a line is more productive than searching at random , so if on a line and in distress : stay where you are is the word .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Ric Gillespie on September 11, 2011, 08:38:14 AM
There are standard search patterns to fly,

Please tell us which of these standard search patterns were standard search patterns in 1937 and how you know that Noonan knew them.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Ric Gillespie on September 11, 2011, 08:44:41 AM
. Generally it is in the manuals prescribed not to leave a position line once you are on it for the sake of rescuers having a guideline .

     A very interesting point that hasn't been brought up before on the forum.

Mona

And meaningless without a citation for what manuals he's talking about it. 
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on September 11, 2011, 11:16:06 AM
Navigator´s Information File , Section 3 , § 7 - 1 .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Ric Gillespie on September 11, 2011, 11:35:10 AM
Navigator´s Information File , Section 3 , § 7 - 1 .

So it's just one manual, not "the manuals."  When published?  If you're suggesting that it is something that may have influenced Noonan on July 2, 1937 it has to be published prior to that date.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 11, 2011, 02:17:42 PM
Navigator´s Information File , Section 3 , § 7 - 1 .

So it's just one manual, not "the manuals."  When published?  If you're suggesting that it is something that may have influenced Noonan on July 2, 1937 it has to be published prior to that date.
----------------------------

1944, see attached excerpt.
---------------------------------------

See

Reply #50 on

https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,452.45.html

This is from reply # 50


"BTW, this photo also illustrates why you can't determine an LOP at sunrise. For you to time an accurate sunrise you must be able to see the actual blue sea horizon edge of the earth to measure the edge of the sun against and to take an accurate time. A one minute error in timing of a celestial observation results in a fifteen nautical mile error in the resulting computed longitude. This photo was taken on a day with really good weather but the clouds are obstructing the sea horizon so a sunrise observation would not have been possible and there is reason to believe that the weather was worse north and west of Howland on July 2nd. See: https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/the-myth-of-the-sunrise-lop



gl




Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 11, 2011, 02:55:34 PM
I do not claim "rescuers" , but it is clear , qualitate qua , and separating details from headlines , that searching along a line is more productive than searching at random , so if on a line and in distress : stay where you are is the word .
-------------------------------------------
Just scroll up on this topic to van Asten's reply# 105 and you will see that he did "claim rescuers", this is just another example  of Mr. van Asten's prevarications. Also scroll up to reply # 118. For those who might have come in late, see my prior post at:

reply # 45 on the
Celestial choir / Re: LOP-Possible stupid question
« on: August 25, 2011, 02:47:31 PM »

https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,440.45.html

I had been asked my opinion on whether one should read Mr. van Asten's two published papers.

The following is from that post:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

"Don't waste your time trying to work your way through the gibberish in Mr. van Asten's two published papers.


We have thoroughly discussed Mr. van Asten's theories on the  "Navigating the LOP with the offset method" topic, see:

https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,169.120.html

starting with reply 120

and subsequent posts, especially reply 203 pointing out his 300 NM error in his computation of this "10 mile" error line and his admission of this error in reply 204.

https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,169.203.html

We have also dicussed Mr van Asten's theories on the "Noonan navigation error" thread starting at reply 47 and continuing through reply 80.

https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,383.45.html

The short answer, I can't believe he got his articles published because they are so full of errors. He wrote that he had a surface navigator review his papers prior to publication and I told him his problem was that he didn't have the papers reviewed by  a flight navigator, the procedures are quite different.

Here are links to better articles.

http://www.oceannavigator.com/content/celestial-air

http://www.avweb.com/news/avtraining/IFR_bySunAndStars_200781-1.html




gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on September 11, 2011, 11:50:11 PM
Why would rescuers be "claimed" ? The NIF texts do not contain the rescue item , but it is clear from itself that if you leave the line you are flying along , without having definite coordinates , you obstruct future rescue operations , especially if no flight plan has been left behind @ departure .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Gary LaPook on September 12, 2011, 01:38:18 AM
Why would rescuers be "claimed" ? The NIF texts do not contain the rescue item , but it is clear from itself that if you leave the line you are flying along , without having definite coordinates , you obstruct future rescue operations , especially if no flight plan has been left behind @ departure .
---------------------------------

Yes, why indeed did you write those words? Scroll up to reply # 105 and read those words that you wrote.

gl
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on September 12, 2011, 02:28:09 AM
Yes the rescue supposition was an addition of myself , being the assumed rescue feature self evident ; remember that there are essentials and inessentials .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on September 12, 2011, 08:17:31 AM
I remember Einstein when a journalist said to him that at least fifty scientists could his special relativity theory easily grind down . Albert´s answer : If so , one would have been enough .
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Ric Gillespie on September 12, 2011, 08:35:34 AM
Yes the rescue supposition was an addition of myself , being the assumed rescue feature self evident ; remember that there are essentials and inessentials .

One of the essentials of this forum is intellectual honesty.  I have asked Marty to remove you from the forum.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: h.a.c. van asten on September 12, 2011, 10:17:00 AM
  ?? I do not see anything wrong , I was giving a partial overview of a NIF paragraph with the addition that staying on a line is in favor of future rescue parties , is that forbidden ?
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Ric Gillespie on September 12, 2011, 10:22:52 AM
  ?? I do not see anything wrong , I was giving a partial overview of a NIF paragraph with the addition that staying on a line is in favor of future rescue parties , is that forbidden ?

Baloney. You wrote: "Generally it is in the manuals prescribed not to leave a position line once you are on it for the sake of rescuers having a guideline."

By your own admission that was an intentional outright falsehood.  Good bye Mr. Van Asten.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Anthony Allen Roach on July 09, 2012, 01:16:54 PM
Is there a way to move the posts regarding the discussion of black smoke making by USCGC Itasca to its own thread?  I have comments regarding smoke based on my experience as an engineer in the Navy, but do not want to contribute to thread drift.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Bruce Thomas on July 09, 2012, 01:22:02 PM
Is there a way to move the posts regarding the discussion of black smoke making by USCGC Itasca to its own thread?  I have comments regarding smoke based on my experience as an engineer in the Navy, but do not want to contribute to thread drift.

Anthony, why don't you do the honors by starting a new topic about the smoke and post what it is you want to comment on.  If you have the need, you can provide links to any other posts that you need to.  There's no need for you to wait for someone else to set up a thread for you.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Lloyd Manley on July 02, 2013, 05:01:24 PM
I want to know why the flight was so far south? Noonan was an "expert navigator" and was very professional in his work. So How could he have been so far off? Unless in the late 30's that was considered accureate navigating?

My opinion? If the plane is at Gardner there is only one likely explanation. Dead reckoning, using the techniques available at that time, would generate up to about a 10% deflection in latitude, even with a good sun line. Over 2500 miles this is 250 miles. FN most likely was not able to get a celestial fix during the night, for whatever reason. When the sun rose, he got an LOP. And that makes sense b/c that is all AE reported as far as position. But only one celestial object (the sun) means only an LOP with little or no information on latitude. It's not an exact fix. At the end of this dead reckoning run he was 250 miles south, southeast of Howland and 100 miles north, northwest of Gardner. They might have circled for a few minutes. Then they might have turned north for 50 miles on the LOP, then turned south for 100 miles and ran out of gas as they approached Gardner. This seems like the simplest explanation to me, and it doesn't require any more flying time than Elgen Long allows, much less than the TIGHAR hypothesis does. When her last words were heard ... "wait", was shortly before she probably saw what looked like ... Gardner island.

Then they died on the reef from injuries sustained from a witchy landing, exposure or some combination of both. What few transmissions were made were done off of battery power. Just one hypothesis. But I like it. ;-)
And I came up with this trying to figure out how they ended up so far south b/c that puzzles me, too.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Monty Fowler on July 03, 2013, 06:16:35 AM
All well and good, Lloyd, but you may want to read up on the chances of those post-loss radio transmissions being generated solely by battery power.

LTM,
Monty Fowler, TIGHAR No. 2189 CER
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: Don M Casillas on July 07, 2013, 08:25:51 PM
Monty; As I remember, for the radio transmissions to occur there had to be one engine running. As I remember those radio transmissions went on for 5 days so trying to transmit just on battery power would not be possible, as I understand anyway.
Title: Re: Noonan Navigation Error
Post by: JNev on July 15, 2013, 11:17:45 AM
Monty; As I remember, for the radio transmissions to occur there had to be one engine running. As I remember those radio transmissions went on for 5 days so trying to transmit just on battery power would not be possible, as I understand anyway.

This may help as a start. (http://tighar.org/wiki/Lockheed_Electra_10E_Special_-_NR16020#Battery_System)