I have never been able to understand why there has been such a rub over 'when' in the first hour of daylight the shot might have been made, given that we can understand that the sun's azimuth was constant for an hour after sunrise. The point seems to be that a shot made at any reasonable time within that hour would have been a reliable way to establish a LOP.
That's something I've learned from Gary. In my talks and writing, I've been guilty of speaking as if the observation could only be made at the crack of dawn.
That is the only point I have been trying to make, he didn't just have one opportunity to establish his position in relationship to the 157°-337° LOP running through Howland but could, and probably did (based on the published navigation manuals of the time as the normal procedure) take a number of such observations, each one leading to a more accurate measure of the distance remaining to the point of interception. And (again according to contemporary manuals including the one written by Noonan's friend P.V.H. Weems) the normal procedure was to then take additional observations while following the LOP to ensure accurately staying on the LOP.
gl
In reading this again I am struck (again) that it makes no sense for FN to have not been able to get very close to Howland. From what we know of the weather and visibility, a number of sun shots should have been easy enough, and there is nothing in AE's remarks about there being a problem with that part of the navigation. Her report of being on the line at least strongly suggests, despite the pilotage / DR possibilities, that some form of celnav was at work.
'Visibility' for whatever set of reasons seems to be a real issue - if not of the heavens, then of the sea and what lay there. Somehow they don't seem to have gotten nearly as close to Howland as AE seemed to believe in her reports - not only was Itasca listening and watching carefully, but
Kamakaiwi reported a dispersal of eager crew out at the runways, etc. to keep watch, and finally he and his crew "keeping "a shart lookout, with a field glass, on all horizons" after the plane was last hear from, so there does not seem to be any lack of attention from the surface. Of course he wrote that after the fact, but he describes an eager crowd who wanted to see the airplane arrive, etc.
Visibility of the island and ship from the air could have been a problem for many reasons - including distance: that somehow Noonan's celnav still never got them as close as he though for some reason. I don't understand that so well, given that FN should have been able to not only establish a LOP, but to find their point of intercept as Gary mentions. Gary's personally familiar with using the same technique as a 'preventer' (back-up to his primary navigation over the ocean) to ensure his own landfalls and may have some ideas of what could go wrong, and perhaps how close or distant that may have left the flight from Howland.
Given what celnav can to (latitude and longitude placement) I am left considering whether NR16020 really did arrive more closely than some of us think - but never saw the smoke from Itasca or the island due to glare, haze, shadows - or some combination. If they were low, below a cloud deck, it seems a silhoutte of Itasca might be visible, if not the low-lying island. 1000 feet was mentioned at some point, if memory serves, but that might be a few hundred too high for that kind of sighting.
No one on Itasca or Howland saw or heard the plane either, obviously.
Confound it. Despite what FN should have been able to do with his celnav, NR16020 just somehow doesn't get near to Howland after all, and for some reason if a reliable LOP was defined, it doesn't look like they located a particular latitude along that line either - until perhaps further 'down' the LOP. Otherwise it seems that FN should have been able to get them much closer to Howland after all. Maybe the sun just wasn't high enough during the time they should have been near Howland to determine latitude, and that only followed after time passed and the flight was further toward the Phoenix group, along the LOP.
I am taken back to
Hooven's report and note the thing he and TIGHAR seem to hold in common: arrival at the Phoenix islands. Where Hooven departs is in trying to understand how the navy could have possibly missed the pair - he goes the Japanese capture route. That almost seems bizarre to me - and could almost make me walk away from Hooven's view, except for one thing (in addition to his scholarly ability and approach): he was trying very hard to answer how the two came to be missing from the few places they might have made landfall. In his understanding, they had simply been made to disappear. That is a very haunting question for all of us who believe they landed at Gardner, but Hooven never had the information we have today from TIGHAR's findings on Niku.
I largely share Hooven's belief as to where the flight could have gone; I don't share his explanation for the disappearance of the survivors and their plane. I can only imagine that it was just enough of a bad day for FN as he was trying to find Howland, had none of the DF steer he was hoping for, and for AE as she was trying to fly to it and spot it, that laying eyes on Howland just couldn't happen. I am left seeing how perhaps FN was able to eventually help her find the Phoenix group, and that the Electra likely ended-up there by flying a heading along that LOP.
Thanks, Gary, for the explanation on celnav. As I've said, it's 'confounding' to me that FN didn't somehow still find Howland, but that's what we're stuck with at a base level.
LTM -