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Thompson's cruise report, page 5 says ceiling unlimited within 40 miles of Itasca and the sun rose "clear." Thompson's transcript report on page 47 said the weather was "clear" at the time.
I just read the deck log...
And don't forget that Itasca was making thick black smoke that made a ten mile long streak that should have been easily distinguishable from cloud shadows.
gl
"Thompson's cruise report, page 5 says ceiling unlimited within 40 miles of Itasca and the sun rose "clear." Thompson's transcript report on page 47 said the weather was "clear" at the time." -
Excepting Thompson's later report references to 'clear at the time' (what time - and which may be in conflict with the deck logs if he is referring to the same 'time' as in the logs for the times we are speaking of), 'ceiling unlimited' and 'sun rose "clear"' can easily be entirely consistent with clouds less-than 5/10s coverage. In weather terms there is no 'ceiling' unless you have 5/10s or more sky coverage; it does not take a complete overcast to make a ceiling.
"Sun rose clear" is also entirely consistent with "s-cu" clouds in Itasca's vicinity at 7 a.m., building to cu 4 at 8, etc. Consider: the sun rose to the east - opposite direction from which AE would approach, and earlier than when she would have been looking...
"I just read the deck log and from 7 to 11 am it notates "bc" which indicates some clouds and the type is given as "cu," cumulus, except at 7 am when the type is given as "s-cu," strato-cumulus. The sky coverage was 4/10ths at 8 am, "blank" at 9 am, 2/10ths at 10 am and 3/10ths at 11 am. The 9 am observation is the most critical as it is closest in time to Earhart's final messages. How do we interpret the "blank?" Examining he rest of the deck log shows that there is at least a "1" entered in conjunction with every other "bc" notation. So one of these entries is in error since there is a contradiction. If the "bc" notation was correct then there shouldn't be a "blank." If the blank is correct then there shouldn't be a "bc" but instead it should have been a "b." My resolution of this contradiction is to go with the "bc" being the error at 9 am based on the Thompson reports as it is fairly certain that he would have gone out on deck during this period and observed the sky conditions for himself while looking for the plane." -
One way to 'interpret' the blank is that it is simply a "blank" - more of an omission than 'inconsistency'.
Another way to reasonably consider the blank, or 'interpret' the blank, is to note the obvious - 9 a.m. is nestled half-way between recorded times when there were between 4/10s and 2/10s coverage (8 and 10 a.m.) so 'bc' was likely; the question then is 'how much bc / cu'? I believe my analysis is rather pale compared to one already well-made by TIGHAR.
Perhaps whomever was writing the log failed to get an opinion from another observer as to the amount of coverage - it is one yeoman thing to record in a log - and even to see the obvious 'bc' conditions, but somewhat more of an experienced call to make as to type (s-cu / cu, etc.) and percentage of cover. We can probably agree that Thompson and others were rather busy around that time. I doubt weather observations were foremost on his mind if there was blue sky and clouds present; sky coverage type and percentage may have therefore easily have taken a back burner around 9 a.m.
It can also be noted that coverage increased by 11 a.m. to 3/10s - that only further suggests clouds in the area most of the morning. Thus, 'bc' noted at 9 a.m., even with the attending 'blank' you mentioned, becomes rather well bracketed - and increases the likelihood that AE would have found shadows on the ocean when she was in the area...
"And don't forget that Itasca was making thick black smoke that made a ten mile long streak that should have been easily distinguishable from cloud shadows." -
That has been rather thoroughly challenged and debunked as Thompson making his best personal case for cover - one more reason for me to question much that was reported by that gentleman after the search. Whatever smoke Itasca may have laid down was probably premature, starting at 0614 hours. It is highly unlikely that Itasca did or even could have done such a thing - very detrimental to her boilers to have laid down that much 'black smoke', but it certainly adds poignant irony to the story.
Of course we're all stuck with 'interpretations' based on what we've found, and neither of our arguments can be 'proven' today. We also can never really know just how close AE even got to Howland and whether these factors applied directly or not, so one is of course most welcome to his or her own interpretations.
That said, had AE gotten close, it seems to remain a fair consideration that her ability to 'spot' Howland island may well have been visually compromised by cloud shadows. Compare it with Niku from the air: that big, blue lagoon and fringing reef makes it a whole different consideration - which is quite consistent with the notion of her having found it later that morning.
LTM -
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1. Actually it took 6/10ths coverage to have a ceiling, not 5/10ths. Now that we have switched to the METAR format we have also switched to "octas" so now it takes 5/8ths coverage to constitute a ceiling.
2. They would have been approaching fom the northwest on the LOP at least for the final part of the flight when they couldn't get any radio bearings.
3. But even if there were clouds in the area, cloud shadows may look like islands but they do not look like ships, especially white ships making black smoke. By radiogram, Earhart had been informed that Itasca would be making smoke during the day and shining spotlights at night so she would have known to look for the smoke.
4. And just how do cloud shadows "compromise" Earhart's ability to spot Howland and the Itasca? The shadows do not obliterate the actual island or the ship. The only way they could cause a problem is if Noonan allowed Earhart to turn off the LOP to chase after a cloud shadow instead of staying on the LOP until positive identification of the island and the ship and the smoke, not very likely since none of the cloud shadows had a white ship standing just off shore making black smoke. I don't know about you, but I have flown over many islands and cloud shadows and I always managed to stay on course until I positively identified the island.
5. Since
you seem concerned about cloud shadows in the vicinity of Howland, what about cloud shadows near Niku? There is no reason to believe that they knew what any of the Phoenix islands looked like so they could have been fooled by shadows in that area. And, possibly even more important, what about cloud shadows on the way to Niku? When near Howland they were not low on fuel, according to Ric, so no reason to go chasing after cloud shadows, they could calmly stay on their course and ignore such shadows. But later, on the proposed route to Niku, fuel would have been getting low, even using the most optimistic estimates, so it is very likely that desperation would have been growing in the plane tempting them to follow the Sirens' song and turn off course to chase those same shadows which were holding out the hope of saving their lives especially since they were not aiming for a particular island in the Phoenix group. They could have been zig-zagging all over the Pacific making it more likely that they used up their limited fuel before getting as far as Niku and making it more unlikely that they would find it after wandering in many directions off course.
6. I read Brandenburg's article and he comes up with all kinds of speculative horrors if smoke is made for too long a period of time. Well from 0614 until AE's last transmission at 0842 is only two and a half hours, not very long. He conjures up scare stories about what would happen if soot is allowed to build up too thickly on the boilers' water tubes. The normal practice is to blow the tubes every watch (a four hour period) while underway and twice a day when in harbor. (Blowing the tubes entails opening the steam valves that direct steam through perforated tubes located next to the water tubes and the steam blows out the accumulated soot making huge belching clouds of very black smoke as the soot is expelled with the stack gases.) If the boilermen were concerned that soot was being accumulated at a faster rate than normal due to having a too rich mixture necessary for laying down a smoke screen then they could blow the tubes more often and not wait the full four hour period. The boilermen and the engineering officer knew their jobs.
Brandenburg correctly points out that Itasca was using heavy bunker oil and then compares it with more modern fuel oil called NSFO. He then states: "
Even NSFO smoke screens are not very durable. In anything more than a light breeze, say 5 knots or so, the smoke is pushed rapidly down onto the surface where it flattens and thins out within three to five miles. This results in rapid vertical thinning of the smoke, thus drastically reducing its visual contrast with respect to the sea surface." That is not a surprise that lighter oil would make a lighter, shorter lived smoke screen than the actual smoke screen being made by Itasca using heavy bunker oil.
But this is all a theoretical discussion and we do not have to even consider it since there are all the contemporary eye witness accounts and documents saying that the smoke screen was there for hours, it stretched more than ten miles down wind and would have been visible for 40 miles. Elgin Long even includes a photograph of the Itasca making smoke and you can see the quality of the smoke for yourself. If you have Morrissey's book look at pages 257, 258, 260 and 291 for various descriptions of the smoke being made by Itasca. The quote on 257-258 is from the Commanding officer of the Lexington saying that the "Itasca was laying a heavy smoke screen which hung for hours." He also says as printed on page 260 that "the Itasca's smoke plume could have been seen 40 miles or more." Now the captain of the Lexington was not there at the time so he was relying on reports from others but the captain of the Lexington would know the capabilities and characteristics of smoke made by ships in 1937 better than Mr. Brandenburg so could evaluate these reports.
Safford publishes Itasca's log for July 2nd. It contains the entry: "0614 Vessel began laying down heavy smoke to assist Miss Earhart." There was no log entry saying when they stopped making smoke so does this mean that they never stopped and they are still making smoke to this very day? Or does it mean that they only made smoke for 30 minutes (as Brandenburg would have us believe) or for more than two hours or until they started their search, and then stopped without making a log entry? which scenario makes the most sense? Safford also publishes the Itasca radio message sent to COMHAWSEC the higher commander at 1402 on July 2nd, just 7 hours after AE failed to arrive stating in part that Earhart passed the island and "missed it in the glare of the rising sun though we were smoking heavily at that time period." Itasca was at that time searching northwest of Howland with every expectation of rescuing AE so Captain Thompson would not have been in CYA mode yet. In addition to the coast guard personnel on the ship there were two wire service reporters who had no reason to cover up anything, their butts did not need to be covered so they would have reported that no smoke was being made if, in fact, it wasn't. The Hawaiians on Howland also reported that smoke was being made, see James Kamakaiwi diary.
Look at Black's cruise report, page 10.
Entry for 8:07:
"...Itasca was laying down smoke screen stretching for ten miles. Smoke remained concentrated and did not thin out much..."
So smoke was being made until at least 8:07.
So I think we have to accept some things as fact and this is one of them unless
everybody was lying.
And I don't know where Brandenburg got this:
"And making heavy black smoke for a protracted period -- more than 30 minutes or so -- was inviting trouble in the form of a tube rupture (caused by uneven heating of the tube surface due to rapid and uneven soot accumulation) which resulted in water and steam spewing into the fire box, dousing the fire and, worse, causing the firebrick lining the inside of the fire box to crack from chill shock and crumble into a pile of rubble in the middle of the firebox. Such an event would require major and expensive shipyard repairs, and avoidance of such a failure was uppermost in the mind of any ship Captain."
Holy crap, Batman!
Contrary to what Brandenburg's claims, what actually concerned the boilermen and the engineering officer about soot on the tubes was not catastrophic damage to the boiler but that "(1) The soot acts as an insulator and slows heat transfer to the water within the tubes. (2) If the soot remains in a boiler when fires are secured, it absorbs moisture from the air; the moisture activates the sulfuric acid in the soot, and this acid in turns attacks the metal of the tubes and boiler drum. (3) If allowed to remain too long, the soot packs into a solid mass and can be removed only by tedious hand cleaning. To maintain maximum boiler efficiency, tubes should be blown, while underway every 4-hour watch and, while in port, twice a day." (Knight's Modern Seamanship, Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U.S. Navy, 13 Ed. , pages 57-58, attached.) The admiral apparently forgot to mention the horrors that Mr. Brandenburg imagines. Maybe Mr. Brandenburg knows more about marine engines and boilers than Admiral Knight. Notice, as long as the tubes are blown regularly, there is no need for hand cleaning every 600 hours as Brandenburg claims. If the engineering officer or the boilermen became concerned with soot building up too rapidly when making a smoke screen they could have simply blown the tubes at more frequent intervals.
Soot is five times more efficient as an insulator than asbestos. A layer of only 1/8 inch of soot results in a heat loss of 47% and an increase in fuel consumption of 8½%. As the layer of soot builds up, the stack temperature rises since the exhaust gasses are not being cooled by the transfer of heat to the water in the boiler. The rise in stack gas temperature is measured and used to determine when the tubes need to be blown.
Also see excerpts from
Boilerman 3 & 2, the U.S. Navy training manual for boilermen 3rd and 2nd class which is attached. BTW, nowhere in this manual or in Knight's Modern Seamanship is there any mention of the horribles that inhabit Brandenburg's fertile imagination.
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For those interested in marine steam engines, the next time you are in California there are several places where you can see one. If in San Diego you can visit the Berkely moored just north of the Star of India. You can visit the boiler room and engine room and see her triple expansion, reciprocating steam engine.
http://www.sdmaritime.com/contentpage.asp?ContentID=49When in San Francisco, you can visit the Jeremiah O'Brien which is a Liberty ship and you can see her boilers and her four cylinder, triple expansion, reciprocating steam engine. (I know it sounds like an oxymoron to have a four cylinder, triple expansion engine but this was a fairly common type. Instead of having one very large low pressure cylinder, these engines have two smaller low pressure cylinders working in unison for the final expansion of the steam.)
http://www.ssjeremiahobrien.org/If in the L.A. area, you can visit the Lane Victory, a victory ship moored in San Pedro harbor near Long Beach. Her engine is not as interesting as those in the other two ships because Victory ships have steam turbine engines rather than reciprocating engines, but still worth the visit.
http://www.lanevictory.org/For you lawyers out there, a case involving blowing the tubes of a ship ended up in the U.S. Supreme Court, see: HURON CEMENT CO. v. DETROIT, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) -- US Supreme Court Cases
STEWART, J., Opinion of the Court
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
362 U.S. 440
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN
No. 86 Argued: February 29, 1960 --- Decided: April 25, 1960
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan draws in question the constitutional validity of certain provisions of Detroit's Smoke Abatement Code as applied to ships owned by the appellant and operated in interstate commerce. [p441]
The appellant is a Michigan corporation, engaged in the manufacture and sale of cement. It maintains a fleet of five vessels which it uses to transport cement from its mill in Alpena, Michigan, to distributing plants located in various states bordering the Great Lakes. Two of the ships, the S.S. Crapo and the S.S. Boardman, are equipped with hand-fired Scotch marine boilers. While these vessels are docked for loading and unloading, it is necessary, in order to operate deck machinery, to keep the boilers fired
and to clean the fires periodically. When the fires are cleaned, the ship's boiler stacks emit smoke which, in density and duration, exceeds the maximum standards allowable under the Detroit Smoke Abatement Code. Structural alterations would be required in order to insure compliance with the Code.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0362_0440_ZO.htmlgl