The captain of the Itasca, Commander Walter
K. Thompson was quite anxious about Earhart not communicating well with
the ship and her inability to find Howland. By 1956GMT (8:26 local Itasca
time), Thompson had initiated a recall of the landing party, obviously
concerned that the ship might have to immediately depart for search and
rescue. This was approximately 20 minutes prior to Earhart’s last radio
message. This message largely reinforced Thompson’s notion that Earhart
was in deep trouble, as she stated she was switching frequencies and would
repeat that message on 6210kHz, but despite listening on that frequency,
nothing further was heard in the Itasca radio room. The silence,
together with Thompson's mistaken belief that Earhart said a half-hour’s
gas was remaining at 1912GMT, make clearer Thompson’s mind-set and actions.
Commander
Walter K. Thompson decided fairly early that Earhart must have run out
of fuel and that she landed the aircraft at sea shortly after the 08:43
(20:13 GMT) transmission received by Itasca. Curiously, Thompson
sent a radio message to Naval authorities at American Samoa and Hawaii
at 2138GMT (9:08 local time) that although he believes that Earhart has
enough fuel to stay aloft until noon, local time, the Itasca would
depart by then to search northwest of Howland if she has not arrived by
then. Thompson must have changed his mind, because at 10:40 (22:10 GMT),
he ordered his ship to leave Howland Island and begin searching the ocean
to the northwest.1 Thus began what would be
called “the greatest organized effort ever undertaken in behalf of
a lost flier.”2 Over the next seventeen
days a total of seven U. S. government vessels searched an estimated 262,281
square miles of ocean for anything from the flight which might be afloat.3
Sixty-two aircraft from the U. S. S. Lexington (CV-2) flew 1,591.1
hours and covered 151,556 square miles of the Pacific.4
In addition, three aircraft from the U. S. S. Colorado spent 2
days (two flights each day) searching the eight islands of the Phoenix
Group,5 spending an estimated 15 minutes over
each island. In short, 99.996% of the U. S. Navy’s aerial search for Amelia
Earhart was devoted to inspecting the surface of the open ocean. At no
time, throughout the entire operation, was a ground search conducted anywhere
by anyone.
Because the search
was prejudiced so heavily upon the assumption that the airplane came down
at sea, and because, despite the wide area covered, not one scrap of debris
was found, a close inspection of the evidence upon which Thompson based
his conclusion is warranted.
It
is clear from a message he sent to USCG San Francisco Division filed at
10:15 (21:45 GMT) that Thompson originally believed that Earhart had enough
fuel to remain aloft until local noon (23:30 GMT).6
Given the aircraft’s 00:00 GCT takeoff, he therefore thought that the
aircraft could remain aloft for 23 hours and 30 minutes. The available
evidence certainly indicates that this was a sound estimate:
- Applying Kelly
Johnson’s fuel consumption figures to Earhart's assumed fuel load of
1,100 U. S. gallons gives the airplane an expected endurance of 24 hours
and 9 minutes.
- If
we accept that Earhart expected to reach Howland after approximately
20 hours of flying, as indicated by her choice of takeoff time and her
1912 GMT message “… We must be on you but cannot see you …,”
the 24+ hours endurance figure gives her roughly a four-hour or 20% reserve.
This is entirely consistent with her comment in Last Flight referring
to the earlier trip from Oakland to Honolulu: “... we arrived at Hawaii
with more than four hours’ supply of gasoline remaining, which would
have given us over 600 miles of additional flying, a satisfactory safety
margin.”7
- The figure also
matches a guideline mentioned in Air Corps Lt. Cooper’s comments on
the flight, “Note that 20% gas reserve is usually required.”8
Lt. Cooper returned to the Itasca about 2042GMT, and was available
to advise Thompson.
- Thompson states
in his radio transcripts that Cooper indicated in his report only a
fuel reserve of 7%,9 an obvious mis-citation,
but perhaps deliberately misquoted to strengthen his written argument
for leaving Howland prior to noon.
But
sometime in the next few minutes Thompson changed his mind and became convinced
that Earhart was not still aloft but was, in fact, already down at sea.
At 10:40 (22:10 GCT) he abandoned his station at Howland (after having just
told San Francisco he would stay there until noon) and steamed off to the
northwest. He indicates in his Radio Transcripts that this was the only
area within visual range of the Itasca that had any cloud cover,
and would be the most likely place for Earhart to be, as she could not see
either the island or Itasca. He sent no further message until over
two and a half hours later and even then he implied that he had done what
he had said he would do, saying at 13:15 (00:45 GMT), “Earhart unreported
Howland at 1200 believe down shortly after 0915 AM searching probable area
and will continue.”10 What caused Thompson
to change his plan, cover up the change, and then announce that he thought
Earhart had gone down “shortly after 0915?”
Thompson’s actions
apparently were based upon his conviction that Earhart had said, at 07:42
(1912 GMT), that she only had half an hour of fuel left. Because there
is no land other than Howland and its sister island Baker which could
possibly be reached within that fuel limitation, the conclusion that
the airplane went down at sea is inescapable. If the quote is accurate
Thompson was certainly correct in beginning the search rather than sitting
at Howland waiting for an airplane that was already in the water. Where
does the quotation come from? The only source is what Thompson calls
the “Other
Log” which he quotes in his July 19th report as saying “Earhart on
now says running out of gas only 1/2 hour left.” The entry was made by Radioman
3rd Class O’Hare who had been on watch since 02:00. Evidence that the
phrase was not said includes:
- Radioman
3rd Class Galten’s entry in the Itasca’s radio log,
“KHAQQ calling
Itasca. We must be on you but cannot see you but gas is running
low. Been unable reach you by radio. We are flying at a 1,000 feet.”11
- An entry in the
Itasca’s deck log by Lt. (jg) W. J. Sevarstan, “0742 Planes
position reported as near the island and gas running low.”
- Lt. Cooper’s report,
“0741. Earhart. We must be on you but cannot see you but gas is running
low...”12 However, this is a second-hand
report, as Cooper was still on Howland Island.
- The July 4th press
release sent by Itasca, “0730 Quote we must be on you but cannot
see you but gas is running low...”13
- At 08:43 (2013
GMT), a full hour after Earhart supposedly said she had “only 1/2 hour
gas left,” Earhart was still aloft and transmitting.
- Not once in the
three messages received by Itasca after the 07:42 message did
Earhart repeat her concern over fuel.
- In Thompson’s
typed report the quote from the “Other Log” is followed by the parenthetical
comment “(unverified as heard by other witnesses)” but the “un” in “unverified”
has been lined through by hand.14 However,
it is impossible to determine when this line-out occurred and/or whether
it was there when originally delivered to the Coast Guard.
The available evidence
argues strongly that the phrase “½ hour gas left” was never said. It
may, in fact, have been a simple misunderstanding. In three of the nine transmissions
heard by Itasca, including the next message received 16 minutes later,
the ship’s radio log recorded Earhart’s use of the phrase “half
hour,” but
always in reference to the radio schedule, never to fuel.
Nevertheless,
Thompson treated the phrase as fact. His estimate that the airplane went
down “shortly after 09:15” may have been the result of transposing
the supposed “½ hour gas left” phrase from the 07:42 message
onto the 08:43 message. By 20:15 (07:45 July 3rd GMT), when he sent a
long message to San Francisco Division describing the events of the day,
he had decided that “...Earhart apparently had barely enough fuel under
the conditions to make Howland.”15 The
commander of the Lexington
Group would later, in his justification of the search carried out by the
aircraft carrier and its three accompanying destroyers, list the “one
half hour fuel” quote as one of 26 “Known Facts” about the flight.16
It is abundantly clear from the historical record that, far from being
a “known fact,” this phrase became one of the largest single contributions
to mythology surrounding the Earhart disappearance, possibly biasing the
entire search mission of the Coast Guard and US Navy. Thompson was firmly
convinced at this time that the Lockheed Electra could float for some
time and that an emergency radio was available.17
When
the Itasca left Howland, leaving behind Radioman 2nd Class Frank
Cipriani along with the Department of Interior colonists from Hawaii,
the ship took a course of 337 degrees true towards the “cloud bank” noticed
by the Itasca crew. Putting a number of men on visual look-out,
Thompson claims that the Itasca could search for 7 miles on either
side of the ship during daylight hours.18
Based upon today’s standards, the visual search front from a ship is well
below this swath width, and the probability of sighting rapidly decreases
away from the ship. Most intriguing is that Thompson never stated to anyone
outside of the Itasca crew as to why he chose the NW until July
16, when the US Navy search leader asked Itasca about probable
drift patterns and where plane was most likely to have come down.19
The reason was that visibility was clear in all directions, except to
the north and west at approximately 50 nm range, near the limits of Itasca’s
observations.20 Thompson’s assumption was that
Earhart did not come down within 40nm of Howland.21
He wanted to search a sector of a circle between 40 and 200 nm from Howland,
between 337° and 45°.22 The
Itasca searched out to a range of about 65 nm, then turned to 80°
true at 0130GMT, searching for another 120nm.
Chronology
(All times GMT unless otherwise noted.) |
July
3 (July 2 local time)
|
0031 |
Commander,
Hawaiian CG Section suggested that the Itasca send an “all
ships” message to be on the look-out for the plane.23
|
0040 |
The
Chief of Naval Operation’s (CNO) office heard of the search effort,
and directed the Commandant, 14th Naval District (COM14, Admiral Orrin
Murfin) to use all practical assets to assist in the search.24 |
0042 |
A
message from George Putnam was sent from the USCG office in San Francisco,
stating that technicians familiar with the plane believe it can float
almost indefinitely; a ditch a sea is possible if the seas are calm.
25 |
0045 |
Itasca
stated to its CG superiors that Earhart was unreported at Howland
by noon-time, and that it is believed she was downed shortly after
9:15 local time (2045GMT), and Itasca was now searching the
most probable area, without stating what that area is.26 |
0103 |
Itasca
sent out its first all ships, all stations broadcast on 500kHz: “Earhart
is unreported since 2045GMT and apparently down at sea, am searching
the NW quadrant. Request ships listen/monitor 50kHz for any of her
signals.”27 This message was sent
at 1333 local time, and at 1418, 1610, 1700, 1820, 1905, 1925, 2026,2200,
and 2312 local time.28 Of course, anyone
listening in to 500kHz could pick up this transmission, as could
almost all of the Navy traffic, should the radio listener know what
frequencies to listen to. However, 500kHz is the international emergency
frequency, and most radio operators do listen to it, including the
ham amateurs. From this point on, amateur reports of Earhart signals
could be suspect.
|
0132 |
Itasca
told its CG superiors that it received no position, speed, or courses
from Earhart except for a suspected Line of Position without a reference
point. She gave no bearings to help in Itasca’s search,
but it is believed she passed to the north and west of the island
about 0800 local time (1930GMT) and missed the island due to sun
glare, despite Itasca’s smoking its engines.29 |
0145 |
Fleet
Air Base, Pearl Harbor (FABPH) said it was “prepared to send out
a PBY to help in the search at 0430GMT; operations must be in the lee
of the island as there is no anchorage and may well have to land on Howland
due to refueling constraints; can only operate in ideal conditions; only
one plane can be sent due to lack of tendering facilities (i.e. the Swan);
very hazardous mission.”30 |
0200 |
PAA
Honolulu was notified that Earhart had been confirmed to be down at
sea. 31 |
0245 |
CG
radio station San Francisco issued an all ships, station broadcast
that Earhart was down.32 |
0310 |
CG
San Francisco told Itasca that Earhart might attempt to use
the radio on water as the radio and antenna could be placed on the
wing; that the aircraft could remain afloat for a long time; that
an emergency raft and rations were carried on the plane – all according
to George Putnam.33 Once again, Putnam
is issuing erroneous information that is seriously biasing the conduct
of the search. |
0330 |
COM14
informed the CNO that no other facilities were available to search
for Earhart, except perhaps the battleship Colorado, which
has scout planes, and is currently on an ROTC cruise.34 Approval to make the Colorado available was
sent at 0612.35 |
0420 |
Putnam
got into the act again by requesting that CG units get in touch with
Mr. Coll of KGU radio, Honolulu, who might be able to offer assistance
by broadcasting to Earhart.36 |
0517 |
PAA
radio station in Honolulu opened up its radio guard, and heard carrier
and tests, but no modulation on 3105 kHz.37
|
0525 |
FABPH
directed the Swan to proceed to Howland at best economical
speed, as there would be a PBY plane departing Honolulu at 0545GMT,
and to guard 355, 4235kHz series.38 While
there was great hope for the PBY to assist in the search, it will
be seen shortly that not only did it return back to Honolulu due to
bad weather, it also prevented the Itasca from maintaining
a complete radio watch for Earhart during the night hours, when radio
propagation is much better than during the day. In fact, at 0530GMT,
the Itasca picked up S1 signals on 3105 kHz with a weak voice,
but nothing readable. Itasca immediately responded on 3105
kHz in Morse code to reply. |
0553 |
The
PBY left Honolulu with Lt. W.W. Harvey as pilot, along with LTJG W.
M. Drane, E. S. Lytle, and cadets P. W. Smith, W. C. Curry, C. L.
English, radiomen E. J. McCormick and F. M. Williams.39 |
0555 |
Itasca
heard a voice, very weak and unreadable, on 3105kHz, and responded
accordingly. |
0604 |
Itasca
heard a signal on 3105 kHz, described like a generator start and stop,
and responded accordingly. Three and a half minutes later, the Itasca
heard the word Earhart on 3105 kHz, responds in voice and key, and
heard a return call, but it was distorted and unreadable. By 0611GMT,
the radiomen concluded that the signals were not from Earhart after
all.40 |
0613 |
The
Itasca caught snippets of a radio communication between two
stations on 3105 kHz. These stations, QZ5 and KACA, are not listed
in the Berne List of international ship and shore stations, and are
probably either hoaxes or unauthorized radio stations. Itasca
attempted to call Earhart on 3105 kHz, and heard an immediate response,
but it was QZ5 calling KCWR, another station not identifiable. These
transmissions are described by the HMS Achilles, and were thought
by many at the time to be from Earhart. The Achilles described
the transmission as “unknown station heard to make ‘please give us
a few dashes if you get us,’ both heard at good strength, on 3105
kHz; first station made ‘KHAQQ KHAQQ’ then disappeared.
Nothing more heard of either at 0620Z.”41 While
the
Itasca logs don’t exactly match what was quoted at 0620GMT,
it seems clear that the Itasca is identifiable as Station 1,
and QZ5 or KCWR was station 2, which was not directly responding to
the Itasca. Itasca continued to broadcast until 0635
on various frequencies to Earhart, then heard QZ5 again at 0650GMT. |
0710 |
Itasca
sent out its first detailed message regarding what had happened to
its immediate CG superiors in Hawaii and San Francisco. Ten minutes
later, COM14 directs Itasca to Howland to act as the PBY plane
guard and to arrive by dawn; to communicate directly with the plane
on 355 and 4245kHz and to provide tender services; the plane will
report position hourly; the ship should advise plane of Itasca’s
position when the plane is within 500 miles of Howland; and the ship
is to provide radio bearings to the plane and radio procedures to
be followed.42 This message was not received
by the Itasca until 0915GMT, according to the radio logs, and
at 1003GMT, the Itasca changed course to Howland. |
0727 |
The
first independent report of someone other than the Itasca hearing
Earhart was reported by Fort Shafter army radio station in Hawaii,
which heard dashes on 3105 kHz.43 Commander,
CG Hawaiian Sector confirmed this report, and also reported that it
heard 6210 kHz signals of long dashes and voice as well at 0800GMT. |
0730 |
The
PBY plane sents its first position report back to FABPH.44
In fact, there are records of the PBY plane position and sighting
reports by the Swan during its entire flight, allowing for
careful reconstruction of its flight path. This is in dramatic contrast
to Earhart’s radio messages, which are nearly useless for detailed
information as to progress. Indeed, the PBY demonstrated to both the
US Navy and Itasca personnel just how a plane can communicate
successfully during a long over water mission. However, the PBY had
several crewmen aboard, including a dedicated radioman, and was able
to use Morse code which allowed greater readability than voice over
large distances. It appears that the PBY was also monitoring 3105
kHz and attempting to establish communication with Earhart.45 |
0745 |
The
Colorado was directed by COM14 to get underway as soon as possible
with its scout planes.46 |
0831 |
Nauru
radio heard a voice, similar to Earhart's the previous night, on 6210kHz.47
Two minutes later, Itasca heard an unreadable signal on 3105
kHz, and replied at 0835GMT. |
0837 |
Itasca
again heard a weak, unreadable voice on 3105 kHz, and at the same
time, Nauru heard what it thinks are Earhart voice signals on 6210
kHz. At 0854GMT, Nauru reported a third set of voice signals on 6210
kHz. Itasca heard weak voice signals on 3105 kHz at 0900GMT.
Itasca continued to occasionally broadcast to these 3105 kHz
signals, asking Earhart to reply in key or code. At 1000GMT, Sydney
radio heard voices, frequency unknown.48
Shortly afterward, Itasca intercepted a radio message from
KPH, Radiomarine Corporation of America, Bolimas, CA to CG radio San
Francisco describing the Nauru reports.49
The Itasca attempted to call Nauru on 600kHz at 1033GMT but
without success until 1127GMT.50 |
1057 |
The
Commander, Hawaiian Sector of the Coast Guard reported a series of
long dashes heard on 3105 kHz for 22 seconds, but no identifying call.51 In
a follow-up message three minutes later, the Hawaiian CG provided the
first information regarding Earhart’s flight progress by providing the
0918GMT/2 position report received at Lae, New Guinea.52 |
1145 |
The
first amateur radio reports from Earhart arrived via the CG station
in San Francisco, relayed to the Itasca: "Los Angeles men report
hearing position report from KHAQQ eleven thirty but as quote 1.6
179 unquote."53 This was undoubtedly Walter
McMenamy who later claimed that it was at 18:00 (02:00 GMT/3) that
he heard the first of a series of distress calls from the missing
aircraft.54 As reported the next morning,
McMenamy
...recognized
the voice he heard during the night distinctly as that of Miss Earhart.
McMenamy said the voice said: "SOS, SOS, SOS, KHAQQ, SOS, SOS -- "55
And for the Oakland
Tribune he elaborated:
"It
was Miss Earhart all right," he said. "I know her voice very well.
She just kept repeating that over and over again. Once she said
something else but I couldn't make it out. ... The calls are coming
every (15) minutes," said McMenamy. "About every third time they
are signed by the call letters KHAQQ. No position is given. Regularly
by my watch we hear an SOS every 15 minutes. It's just a single
SOS each time. They are apparently conserving their batteries."56
McMenamy was only
the start of what was to become a deluge of calls from people claiming
to have heard Earhart (TIGHAR has catalogued 148 separate reports
of radio distress calls from the missing plane). None of these reports
proved to have any credible information behind them, yet they did
change the course of the search and rescue operations by the Itasca.
Since everyone believed that Earhart had emergency radio equipment
capable of being operated while down at sea, this obviously meant
that the plane had ditched successfully, was afloat, and she and Noonan
were in dire need of being rescued. Since any land was so far away
from Howland (with the exception of Baker which also had colonists
on the island), it was inconceivable to anyone at the time that Earhart
might have made landfall. |
1210 |
A report from CG San Francisco was provided the Itasca that
the steamer New Zealand heard dashes on 3105 kHz, and the vessel
was 1200 miles from Howland Island.57
No information was provided as to when the steamer heard the signals.
It is but one of several messages provided by the CG station that
are intended to help the Itasca in its search, but for the
most part are merely distractions, as they do not provide any useful
data. |
1243 |
The
PBY plane passed overhead of the Swan, reporting that to both
the Swan and FAB, PH.58 Two minutes
later, the Itasca shut down its radio station monitoring for
Earhart in favor of guarding the PBY plane approaching Howland.59
This was indeed unfortunate, as the night time hours were the best
times to listen to radio signals, should they be coming from Earhart,
and Itasca was in the best position to be listening. For the
next several hours, the Itasca only occasionally listened for
Earhart when there were no radio traffic or schedules to be met. A
similar shut down of Earhart radio watch was conducted by Navy Radio
Wailupe in Hawaii.60 |
1330 |
The
first two press releases were sent by reporters from the Itasca.61 The first erroneously stated that the
last message was received from Earhart at 0855 local time; the second
mentions the cloud bank to the NW. Interestingly, the second message
was bylined by James Kamakaiwi, the leader of the colonists still
on Howland Island. Whether this was written by someone else and ascribed
to Kamakaiwi (who later in life was a press reporter), or provided
to the Itasca before she left Howland or transmitted by radio
is unclear. |
1515 |
The
PBY reported that the weather it is encountering is deteriorating,
with lightning strikes.62 |
1600 |
The
PBY asked the Itasca for a local weather report,63
to which Itasca responded at 1613 GMT with generally favorable
weather conditions.64 |
1740 |
The
weather conditions have deteriorated so badly around the PBY that
it reports back to the Commander, FAB PH, that with the onset of snow,
sleet, rain, and lightning between 2 and 12,000 feet elevation, it
is forced to turn back.65 What the PBY
encountered is typical weather for the Intertropical Convergence Zone,
which is the meteorological “equator” where the southerly and
northerly trade wind systems converge, producing poor weather conditions
throughout the year. While the ITCZ does migrate with seasons north
and south around the Earth’s equator, this “storm” that
the plane was encountered was normal and is not indicative of a emergent
typhoon or hurricane. In fact, each ship that traversed this band of
latitude (roughly 5 degrees north) in search of Earhart experienced
bad weather and choppy seas. If the PBY could not get through this weather
system, one wonders whether Earhart could have done so with a less capable
plane had she made a successful landing on Howland. Of course, this
weather system was completely missed by the FAB meteorologist in all
of his forecasts for Earhart’s track from Howland to Honolulu.
This is not surprising, since this was probably the first time Navy
aircraft had encountered the ITCZ in the Pacific. The return of the
PBY to Honolulu must have been exasperating news for the Itasca crew, since
its weather was ideal, and the Itasca had been diverted from
an important search and rescue mission to guard the plane. |
1840 |
The CG station in San Francisco forwarded to Itasca a report
from a radio amateur who believed he heard Earhart on 3480 kHz, stating
she was 225 miles west of Howland and for Putnam to “go fly a
kite.”66 Unbelievably,
this message was sent in a sincere manner to the Itasca. |
1841 |
The
Itasca sighted Howland Island at an estimated distance of 10
miles, and 10 minutes later, sighted what appeared to be smoke on
the horizon, but later identified it as a water spout. |
1936 |
The
Itasca finally reached Howland Island, and drifted offshore
until 2100GMT, intending to load aviation gas, as per instructions.67 Itasca asked
its superior in Hawaii whether it should load the gas or continue its
search and rescue mission at 1935GMT.68 No reply
was provided until 2207GMT, when permission was granted to continue
the search.69 |
2105 |
Without
waiting, the Itasca left Howland Island on a northerly course
to continue its search for Earhart.70
|
|