The USS Lexington
and accompanying destroyers had the advantage of meeting with COM14 staff
and obtaining the most up-to-date information regarding Earhart’s disappearance,
as well as the most time to prepare for a search with the most assets
yet available. In the Earhart Search Report portion submitted by J. W.
Dowell, Commander, Destroyer Squadron Two, is a lengthy document of known
facts, probabilities based upon rumor or reasonable assumptions, conditions
determined from the Sailing Directions or by experience, possibilities
arising from rumor and reports, and a detailed discussion of courses of
action open to Earhart at the end of her flight. In addition, the Lexington
search group was constrained by fuel, possible weather considerations,
and areas to search. While many of the documented facts presented in this
report are now disputed, overall the judgment of the search plan was sound
and reasonable. Since the Colorado search of the Phoenix Islands
had concluded that the plane was not on any of these islands, eliminating
the possibility of landfall of Earhart's plane and subsequent radio transmissions,
the Lexington sought to search the area immediately westward of
Howland, based upon 0.5 to 2 knot currents and the most probable area
the plane or raft would be found. Use of the planes aboard the Lexington
for water searches would be the most efficient, reserving the Swan
and Itasca to search the Gilbert Islands themselves for any signs
of wreckage. The Lexington had 62 planes of various varieties,
and had settled on two basic search plans: using all 62 planes and another
based upon 42 planes, leaving reserve planes for maintenance. Two of the
destroyers would shadow the Lexington at 60 miles range both left
and right of the carrier, whereas the third destroyer would be immediately
behind the Lexington, all acting as plane guards. The planes would
fly out at two mile separation to the 90 miles, then fly parallel to
the base track, then head back in parallel to the base track of the Lexington.
Use of 62 planes permitted an 80 mile by 180 mile area to be searched,
whereas 42 planes would work a 60 by 180 mile area.
A short description
is probably necessary to describe the command structure of the Lexington
search group. Prior to WWII, the aircraft aboard carriers were to be mainly
used as scouting forces for battleships, destroyers and cruisers, and
thus carriers were not considered the capital ships they are today. The
overall command of the destroyer group was the Commander, Destroyer Squadron
2 (COMDESRON2), Capt. J. S. Dowell, who carried his pennant aboard the
Lexington, probably due to more spacious accommodations. Beneath
him was nominally the Destroyer Squadron Divisions 3 (Drayton,
flag, and Lamson) and Division 4 (Cushing, flag, and Perkins).
The Commander of DESDIV3, CDR Webb Trammel, was aboard the Drayton,
as was the commanding officer of the Drayton, CDR. R. G. Pennoyer.
Similarly, COMDESDIV4, CDR. J. A. Logan, was aboard the Cushing,
as was the commanding officer, CDR. E. T. Short. Dowell also had the Lexington
under his control during this mission, and that ship was commanded by
Capt. Leigh Noyes. The commanding officer of the whole search group did
not actually have command of an individual ship, nor did the destroyer
divisions.
(All times GMT unless otherwise noted.)
July 7
|
0752
|
The
Lexington group was approaching Hawaii from California, and
requested extensive stores to reprovision the ships due to their urgent
departure from California. The CG San Francisco office relayed the
results from discussions from personnel familiar with Fred Noonan's
navigational abilities, and stated that he would correct course by
infrequent fixes, planning to take a fix just before dawn, and correct
course for destination, and measure a line of position near the end
of the run after dawn. If he was short of gas, he would follow the
LOP to the nearest point of land.1
(TIGHAR's analysis of Noonan's procedures generally concurs with this
theory.) |
1350
|
CNO
issued a priority restricted message to the Commander, Destroyer
Squadron 2 (COMDESRON2, in charge of the Lexington Group)
that fuel economy necessitated a speed of 25 knots or less, except
in emergencies.2 It turns out
that a standard dispatch prior stated a cruising speed to Honolulu
of 23 knots, but a radio operator between Hawaii and the mainland
mis-keyed this message to read 33 knots. This was the message received
in Washington, DC. The radio transcripts have a number of these
typos/mis-keying events, which created annoyance and confusion for
all involved.
Available fuel
was a major constraint for all search vessels. The accompanying
destroyers for the Lexington had to be refueled at Hawaii,
as did the Lexington. In addition, the Lexington needed
aviation gasoline. No aircraft carrier had ever entered Pearl Harbor,
and it was unknown whether it could do so. Arrangements were made
for the Lexington to stand off of Lahaina, Maui (Lahaina
Roads), and be refueled by barge and by the Avocet for the
avgas. Ship fuel was obtained from the oiler Ramapo, intercepted
from its west coast to the Far East. The destroyers could come into
Pearl Harbor for their fuel.
|
July 8
|
0010
|
The
Lexington asked Fleet Air Base, Pearl Harbor (FABPH) to provide
air transport at 1400 local time, July 9, from Lahaina Roads to Pearl
Harbor to bring Capt. Noyes, Commander, Destroyer Squadron 2, plus
two officers for a meeting with COM14 and his staff.3 |
2135
|
COMDESRON2
informed the accompanying destroyers that upon return to Lahaina after
refueling they should conduct a calibration of the radio direction
finder units.4 These RDF units were presumably
used to help track the Lexington planes while they were in
the air. The purpose of the destroyers is to act as plane guards and
to rescue any pilot that was forced down into the water. |
2210
|
The
Lexington arrived off Lahaina, and received aviation gasoline
from the Avocet starting at 2339GMT. |
July 9
|
0020
|
The
FAB plane arrived at Lahaina Roads at 1350 local time to pick up Captain
Noyes, the commanding officer of the USS Lexington; Capt. Dowell,
commanding officer of Destroyer Squadron 2 (COMDESRON2); his aide,
Lt. W. L. Pryor, and one other person for the conference with COM14
personnel in Pearl Harbor.5 The plane left
at 0042GMT. The meeting was with representatives of COM14, Commander,
Mine Battle Force (the senior officer present afloat in Hawaii), Capt.
Ken Whiting, Commander, Fleet Air Base, Pearl Harbor, and Commander,
Destroyer Division 3 (CDR. Webb Trammel from the Drayton).6 |
0655
|
The
Avocet arrived alongside the Lexington and transferred
aviation gasoline. |
1658
|
The
Ramapo arrived alongside the Lexington, and began the
transfer of fuel oil for the ship itself. The destroyers, having finished
their refueling in Pearl Harbor, departed beginning at 0456 to 0724GMT
and proceeded to Lahaina Roads to rejoin the Lexington, arriving
at 1145GMT, although the Cushing arrived at 1300 GMT.7
The Lamson carried COMDESRON2 and Capt. Noyes, and their aides,
who transferred back to the Lexington upon arrival at Lahaina
Roads.8 |
2309
|
The
destroyers departed Lahaina Roads to conduct a radio direction finding
calibration procedure. |
July 10
|
0100
|
The destroyers finished their radio D/F calibration,
and at 0145GMT, the Lexington departed Lahaina Roads with the
destroyers for the Howland Island area.9 |
July 11
|
0140
|
The
Lexington requested from the Itasca information regarding
surface winds it had encountered since July 2.10
Presumably, this was to help determine speed and direction for the
Lexington to launch and recover its planes, and to facilitate
search patterns to account for winds. |
July 12
|
0528
|
COMDESRON2
told COM14 that it could not release the Swan or Itasca
until further developments.11 The search
group needed the Swan and Itasca to search areas that
the planes could not search effectively, and didn't want to divert
assets for lower priority search areas. |
0640
|
The
CG station in San Francisco reiterated previous information about
the radio amateurs in the Los Angeles area; related Noonan’s wife’s
opinion that he would turn back if in doubt; and restated that radio
transmissions could not come from a downed plane at sea.12 |
0915, 0920
|
COMDESRON2
provided new orders to Swan and Itasca, respectively,
to steam at economical speed to Onotoa and Arorai Islands in the Gilbert
group.13 |
1840
|
The
Colorado rendezvoused with the Lexington group. At 1902GMT,
the Cushing began refueling from the Colorado, and completed
that operation at 2034GMT.14 The Lamson
refueled from 2113 to 2322GMT, and the Drayton from 0032GMT
July 13 to 0259GMT. Meanwhile,
a representative from CNO's office contacted the State Department
regarding the Lexington possibly searching the Gilberts.15 |
1900
|
A
telegram was sent from the State Department to the American Embassy
in London requesting permission to search the Gilberts for Earhart,
should that become necessary.16 |
2015
|
COM14
reminded COMDESRON2 that care should be taken with regards to the
Itasca and Swan to ensure that sufficient fuel remained
for those ships to return to Pearl Harbor.17 |
2150
|
COM14
requested a clarification of the previous message from COM11 regarding
whether “miles” are statute or nautical, and what was the basis
for a 24.5 hour duration of Earhart's plane in the air.18 |
July 13
|
0055
|
COM11
replied that the miles are statute, and the fact that Earhart’s plane
was in the air for 24.5 hours was erroneous information.19 |
0200
|
COMDESRON2
reminded Swan and Itasca to use best economical speed
to conserve fuel.20 |
0350 &
0730
|
COM14
again asked CNO regarding the status of permission to search the Gilberts,
as the Itasca would be at Arorai Island the next day. CNO’s
office replied at 0444GMT, stating that they have initiated action
with the State Department.21
Indeed, a letter to that effect was written by Adm. William Leahy,
Acting Secretary of the Navy, to the Secretary of State on this date.22 |
0650
|
The
Colorado informed COM14 that since the destroyers took less
fuel than anticipated, it would not be necessary to refuel the ship
in Pearl Harbor.23 |
1200
|
The
American Embassy in London relayed information that the British Government
had granted permission to the US to search the Gilbert Islands. 24 |
1700
|
CNO
relayed this information to COM14 and COMDESRON2.25 |
July 13
|
1747
|
The
Lexington launched its first set of 60 planes to search an
area bounded by 2.5 to 0.9°N and 178.1 to 176.6°W, an area
just to the northwest of Howland, as the Lexington headed directly
south. At 02147, the last of the planes landed without sighting anything.
|
1830,
1840
|
COMDESRON2
issued orders to the Itasca and Swan, respectively,
regarding their search plans for the Gilberts. The Itasca was
to search Arorai, Tamana, and Onotoa, then proceed northwest and north
on the west side of the Gilberts, investigating Nonuti, Kuria and
Maina, Tarawa, then Apia, Taritari, and Maraki. When completed, the
Itasca was to rendezvous with the Lexington for refueling.
The Swan was ordered to proceed to Nukunau, then Tapeteouea
or Drummand, Nonuti, and then rendezvous with the Lexington
for refueling.26 |
2035
|
The
Itasca reached Arorai, found no useful information on Earhart,
and left at 2230GMT. |
July 14
|
0034
|
Either
20 or 27 planes were launched (depending upon the source) off the
Lexington, but were recovered by 0140GMT, due to heavy rains
obscuring visibility. The area reported searched was between 0.85
and 0.15°N and 176.8 and 177.15°W, or immediately west of
Howland. Again, nothing was sighted. |
0145
|
The
Itasca sighted Tamana Island, and the native magistrate came
aboard. The officers and the magistrate then went to the island to
interview the natives about the disappearance of Earhart. By 0730GMT,
the officers had returned with reports that there had been no sighting
of wreckage or a plane flying overhead by any of the natives.27 |
0625
|
COMDESRON2
gave the Swan updated orders to search Nukunau, Peru, Onotoa,
Tapatueuea, and Monutie completely by Friday afternoon and to make
the search as thorough as necessary of the inhabited islands, and
any others. COMDESRON2 also wanted to know if Swan were detached
from the search by Saturday, July 17th, did she have enough fuel to
reach Pearl Harbor?28 |
0640
|
A
similar message was sent to the Itasca, directing it to search
Kuria, Apamana group, then northward through uninhabited islands for
a more complete search, and arriving Taritari on the 16th. The question
of fuel was also raised for Itasca.29
Apparently, COMDESRON2 was unaware that all of the islands in the
Gilberts were inhabited – in fact, overpopulated. |
0800
|
The
Itasca responded that it could go to Pearl Harbor on available
fuel reserves.30 Also at this
time, the Itasca told the Howland Island radio watch that it
could discontinue its guard on Earhart’s frequency. Howland had been
monitoring 3105 kHz since the disappearance, and had noted several
instances of Japanese music on this frequency. |
1830
|
The
Lexington launched 42 planes for its third search mission,
and had the planes back aboard by 2237GMT. The area searched ran from
0.3 to 1.7°S and from 178.5E to 178.5°W, straddling the International
Date Line. Again, nothing was found of interest. |
July 15
|
0117
|
42
planes were launched off the Lexington to search the area bounded
by 0.3S to 1.0°N and 178.5E to 178.5°W, covering the International
Date Line and the Equator. (This was probably the first instance of
a plane searching this area of the world.) By 0529GMT, all the planes
had been recovered with no sighting of anything significant. As a
side note, there is a plotting sheet of this particular flight in
the Earhart Search Report (Appendix E), showing positions of planes
at moments in time where radio direction finders have located them,
but the times are off by one hour; the sighting times by the Drayton
of the planes flying overhead don't match the Drayton bridge
logs, etc.31 It is probably the
most vexing contemporaneous document TIGHAR researchers have encountered,
defying our efforts to reconcile the discrepancies. |
0310
|
The
Itasca had arrived at Nanouki Island at 0100, but no one greeted
the ship. There were no English speakers among the residents, so the
Itasca left for Kuria, arriving at 0410GMT. The native magistrate
came near in a boat, and told them that nothing was known of Earhart
from Kuria, Manouki and Apamana Islands. At 0510GMT, Itasca
resumed its search.32 |
0326
|
The
Swan arrived at Nukamau Island. The local magistrate came aboard
but had no useful information, and left the Swan at 0332GMT.[33] |
Later
|
Back
in Washington, DC, a memo for the record was filed regarding Lambrecht’s
landing in the lagoon of Hull, and that State Department was notified
of the incident and declined to pursue the matter with the British.34
Another letter signed by the Secretary of the Navy to the State Department
was in regards to a closer inspection of the Gilbertese Islands by
the Swan and Itasca, and that the British authorities
should be made aware of these facts.35
OPNAV branch 38, Operations, began to piece together the costs associated
with the Earhart cruise, and estimated the cost of fuel alone to run
between $45,000 and $119,000 (depending upon lines drawn about performance
of ships and planes beyond base duty), arriving at a daily cost of
fuel alone of $4,500.36 (To arrive
at today’s dollars, multiply these numbers by a factor of ten.) |
0628
|
COMDESRON2
ordered all ships to perform searchlight drills from 2000 to 2400
local time, and to sweep with searchlights for five minutes during
the following two watches until further orders.37
At about 0630GMT, COMDESRON2 sent a telegram to Ocean and Tarawa Islands,
requesting that any information regarding the Earhart disappearance
that could be given to US vessels would be greatly appreciated.38 |
0945
|
The
Swan arrived at Beru, communicating by searchlight and by radio
at 600m wavelength. Beru was in constant communication with Tarawa
and Butaritari. Two ships had recentlybeen in the area, and one of
these had a radio.39 By 1130GMT,
Swan left Beru. |
1846
|
The
first of 42 planes was launched by the Lexington for the fifth
round of searching; all were recovered by 2224GMT. The area searched
was bounded by 2.33 and 1°N and 178.5E to 178.5°W, although
significant gaps in coverage was due to the presence of squalls. Nothing
was sighted. |
2020
|
The Itasca arrived off Tarawa, and went ashore
to meet with the resident commissioner. He stated that he knew of
no reason nor permission for the US to be in the Gilberts, and knew
nothing of Earhart that could help in the search, despite the British
searching the Gilbert Islands themselves.40 |
2200
|
The
State Department told its Embassy in London that the Swan and
Itasca were searching the Gilbert Islands, and asking if that
had the approval of the British government.41 |
2218
|
The
Swan arrived at Onatoa Island. Having found no useful information,
the Swan departed at 0032GMT, July 16th.42 |
July 16
|
0126
|
The Lexington launched the first of 42 planes to continue the
search; all were back aboard by 0440GMT. The area covered runs from
2.3 to 3.0°N and from 178.7°E to 178.7°W. |
0230
|
The
Itasca got underway from Tarawa to resume its search. Itasca
reported to COMDESRON2 that all of the Gilbert islands were thickly
inhabited and communication was frequent between them. Based upon this
information, the Itasca believed that further investigation
of this portion of the Gilberts was unnecessary and in view of the
fuel situation requested that she be allowed to return to Howland.43
|
0440
|
COMDESRON2
approved the recommendation and the Itasca proceeded to Howland
Island.44 |
0735
|
Largely
unheard from for a number of days, George Putnam requested that COM14
and the AE search group search the area surrounding 9′N, 170°E,
a good 600 miles distance from the current location.45
Anecdotal evidence, uncorroborated, suggests that Putnam was very
distraught at this time, and was receiving advice from a number of
psychics, which may account for this seemingly bizarre search point.
This begins an awkward series of messages lasting until the 18th between
Putnam, COM14, CNO, and the San Francisco Coast Guard station. |
about
0900
|
Lae
radio finally responded to Radio Tutuila regarding its communication
with Earhart after departure. The last weather forecast was sent three
times by radiophone at 1022, 1122, and 1222 local time to Earhart.
“Also message containing weather report from Nauro [sic] which
Earhart was anxious get stop. Have reason believe Earhart receives
these although her replies were jammed.”46
This last statement is most curious, suggesting an inability of Lae
to either establish two-way communication or an inability to understand
Earhart while she was in the air. |
1000
|
The Itasca asked the CG Hawaiian Sector to
determine if the Itasca could refuel in Samoa from commercial
sources, then proceed to Jarvis Island before returning to Pearl Harbor.
The alternative would be to make a second trip from Pearl Harbor.47 |
1755
|
CNO
asked COM14 for the release date of the Lexington group and
their subsequent itinerary. 48 |
1820
|
The
Swan arrives at Onotoa Island, and maneuvered for anchorage.
the vessel left Onotoa six hours later, apparently with no significant
news.49 |
1831
|
The
first of another set of 42 planes was launched from the Lexington
to search the seventh area, bounded by 5.6 to 3.35°N and roughly
178.5 to 177.1°E. The planes were back aboard by 2213GMT, and
saw one vessel during this series of flights. |
2020
|
A message was sent out from CNO to COM14 informing
them that the Secretary of the Treasury and his family were sailing
from San Francisco to Hawaii, expecting to arrive at Honolulu on the
29th of July, and that all courtesies should be extended to them.50
The Secretary of the Treasury oversaw the Coast Guard at this time,
but this was to be a vacation of sorts for Henry Morgenthau, and not
an official visit. |
2025
|
COM14 asked COMDESRON2 if they were finished with
the Itasca, her fuel status, and similarly of Swan?51 |
2040
|
COMDESRON2
asked the Itasca “assuming that Earhart plane or rubber
boat still afloat please submit your estimate as of noon today most probable
position first of plane secondly of rubber boat.”52
This message is in some sense extraordinary, as this question should
have been asked days earlier prior to determining search areas. It
wasn’t asked until the search was almost completed! |
2120
|
Putnam asked if COM14 and the Lexington group
could not search the area 1°N, 170°E, could it send the Itasca?53 |
2330
|
The
Itasca responded that the most probable area was between
2°N 179.3°E to 5oN, 178.15°E to 5°N, 175.45°E
and 2°N, 177.5°E,54 all
well to the north and now far to the west of Howland. These estimates
were based upon the heavy cloud bank 50 miles visible north and
west of Howland and a drift rate of 1 knot due west. This is the
first time that Thompson reveals why he thought Earhart went down
northwest of Howland (i.e. the cloud bank there), and why he searched
that quadrant first. |
July 17
|
On
July 17th, a personal letter was written to Bill Miller of the Bureau
of Air Commerce, but it has no signature or other means of identifying
who is the author. We suspect that the letter is from LCDR Kenner
of the USCG aboard the Itasca.55
It offers some unique insights into what the feelings were aboard
the Itasca, so it will be quoted extensively.
... I thought you might
be interested in knowing some of the details of Amelia's last
hours and maybe you can supply some answers to the questions that
are gnawing at our curiosity. Will try to give them as near as
possible as all the logs are locked in the safe...
To begin with --- Earhart
never contested the C.O. of the ship direct but once in the formulation
of her plans. Everything was through Black and not any too definite.
She gave us the frequencies on which she would work, namely 500,
[sic - Earhart never mentioned 500 kHz in her telegrams to the
Itasca] 3105,
6210 (approx.) and 7500 kcs. She told us she would home in on
us, notify us just what frequency she would use, that she would
broadcast on the quarter past and quarter to the hour, would not
communicate with anyone during flight. We calibrated all our sets,
had them checked with San Francisco and got an OK check on all
of them. We told her we would broadcast the weather every half
hour on the hour and half hour as she requested. As you know she
was delayed at Lae. Finally she took off 2 July her date, 1 July
ours. We received no word from her that she had taken off. First
news came to us through the pres, finally word from Lae. We heard
her around 3:00 a.m. plainly, faintly shortly after 2 a.m. We
broadcast weather and asked her to acknowledge its receipt on
next broadcast. This she never did. Then in mid air flight she
announces that she will broadcast on the half hour and hour, on
3105 [Interesting, this never shows up anywhere else!].
Why she changed her schedule, we do not know. She reported cloudy
weather, overcast during early part of flight. We were anxious
to know if she was getting our broadcasts and asked her to acknowledge
them, but she never did. Toward five she was coming in loud and
clear. She apparently only worked one frequency at that time 3105.
At six she reported two hundred miles off Howland. Also asked
for bearing on 3105. At 6:45 she reported as "being about 100
miles out" and wanted us to take a bearing on her. We could not
take bearings on her on that frequency, she had been so advised
prior her departure. We asked her to shift to 500 and we would
take a bearing of her. We repeatedly asked her to acknowledge
our transmissions, but she never did. We never heard her on 500
at all. We kept calling her and listening for her on all frequencies
but received no answer. At 0741 she called us and said "we must
be on you but cannot see you gas is running low, have only half
hour fuel left, have been unable to reach you by radio. We are
flying at a thousand feet." By this time we figures[sic]
she was having trouble.
Her transmission was loud and clear, voice firm but tense. She
talked so rapidly that it was hard to copy her messages. At 7:57
Earhart called the Itasca with the following: "We are circling
but can not see the island. Cannot hear you, go ahead on 7500
with a long count either now or on the schedule time on half hour."
We did as she requested, not only on 7500 but 3105 and 6210, both
key and voice. At 0803 she sent the following: "We received your
signals but unable to get a minimum. Please take bearings on us
and answer on 3105 with voice." She made long dashes on 3105.
We could not get bearings on her on that frequency. We had a high
frequency direction finder on Howland but they were unable to
pick her up. We then called her repeatedly telling her by broadcast
that we could not get bearings of her on that frequency but to
shift to 500 so we could. We asked her to please answer, and tell
us if she heard us. On the latter broadcast she talked very rapidly,
voice was loud and clear but she sounded pretty desperate. The
fact that she talked so fast, made it impossible to copy exactly
her words. We heard nothing more from her until 0844. Meanwhile
we were getting ready for a fast search. We had everybody on the
beach standing by to come on board. At 0844, she come on the air
again. This time her voice was excited and garbled --- she sent:
"We are on line of position 137-337, will repeat this message,
we will repeat this message on 6210 kcs. Wait, we are running
north and south." The signal strength of this message was
five. This was the last we ever heard of her. We called her repeatedly
until after nine then started off to search. We stood double radio
watches until the Navy took over. We ran at full speed for five
days then we were out of fuel. The Colorado filled us up,
then we operated as part of the Navy. Meanwhile we kept a watch
on Howland with the direction finder. When the search was over
(today, the 18th), we had covered practically all the surrounding
area to within 600 miles of Howland, had visited the Phoenix Group
and the Gilbert Islands. The planes from the Colorado and
the Lexington covered a huge area, new and all that we
had previously scouted. The Navy abandoned the search today and
we have just fuel enough to get to Honolulu. We can not even finish
the cruise, as yet have not visited Jarvis or Fanning....
To sum up the whole
tragedy, there are many questions unanswered. Where was Noonan?
Why did she shift her schedules in flight? Why would not she answer
our calls? Why her policy of no communication with any one? Did
she check her radio sets prior to departure? Did she hear us all
the time, if not why no attempt to establish communication on
other frequencies. Was her D.F. working? Where did all her fuel
go? She was only in the air about 22 hours. All of us would give
a million to know what happened those last hours. Maybe you can
answer some of them. I heard her last broadcast. I know that all
of her frequencies were covered. It all seemed so casual at the
start. Early in her flight she reported overcast and cloudy skys
[sic], so that can explain her being out on the navigation.
But from daylight on at Howland, the ceiling was unlimited, clear,
sunny. Far to the west of us was a cloud bank. She may have gotten
in that and missed the island in the morning sun. We layed [sic]
down a smoke screen that could have been seen for a tremendous
distance. Why did she circle? To our minds, that is a poor policy,
because one soon loses their reckoning when running circles. This
is just a letter from me to you. I am just speaking for myself.
Truly regrettable. I am firmly convinced that she crashed upon
going down and went right to the bottom, but by this time we should
have found her if she had floated at all.
On
July 17th, the State Department sent a letter to the Secretary of
the Navy, informing them that authorization for searching the Gilbert
Islands by planes has been granted by the British government.56
A letter from the Japanese Embassy to the State Department was sent
on this date and expressed concern about the status of the search.57
Also
on this date, a letter from Congressman Byron N. Scott from Long
Beach to Rear Admiral Russell Waesche of the US Coast Guard was
sent requesting an informal resume of the connection which the CG
had with the Earhart search, both before and after her loss, and
how this interfered with normal duties of the CG.58 |
0024
|
The
Lexington launched 40 planes, and all were recovered by 0401GMT.
The area covered included 2°24′N to 5°12′N and from 175°40′E
to 177°E. |
0045
|
The Colorado arrived back at Honolulu. |
0220
|
The
Swan anchored off Nonuti Island in the Gilberts.59
Putnam telegraphed
the CNO to find out if a search could be made just slightly north
of the equator at 170°E “ … because peculiar intimate
nature alleged information this is a confidential personal request
to you.”60
|
0235
|
COMDESRON2
released the Swan and Itasca from Earhart Search Duty,
freeing them up to report to COM14.61 |
0259
thru
0530
|
Itasca officially reported to COM14 for duty,62
and at 0336, COM14 released the Itasca to the Coast Guard Hawaiian
Sector.63 At 0352, the Coast Guard
ordered the Itasca to return to Honolulu.64
At 0342, the Swan was released from further search duty by
COM14 and told to return to Pearl Harbor.65
At 0530, the Swan left Nonuti Island for Hawaii. |
0548
|
COM14
informed the San Francisco CG station that the Itasca was relieved
of search duty and directed to report to the CG station in Hawaii,
essentially stating that it has no further control over the Itasca.66 |
1825
|
The
Lexington launched 41 planes, and had to perform two emergency
recoveries immediately after launch. Both planes were recovered without
incident. All remaining 39 planes were recovered by 2215GMT, but one
plane did have a barrier crash ending against one of the after turrets.67
The area searched was approximately 0°54′N to 2°24′N and from
175°12′E to 176°35′E. |
1908
|
Putnam telegraphed CNO again,
wondering if the earlier message was received. He also explained that
his request for the search of this area was “… for intimate reasons one cannot rationalize
or wisely make public. …”68 |
2025
|
COM14
informed CNO and other involved parties that the search group has
been ordered to discontinue the search on the evening of the 18th
if flying conditions practicable on the 17th and 18th, otherwise the
search will be discontinued on the 19th. The Lexington is to
go directly to San Diego, while the destroyers are to proceed to Pearl
Harbor for fuel then to San Francisco or San Diego.69 |
2331
|
The Lexington launches another 41 planes, and all are recovered
by 0319 on the 18th. The area searched included the area bounded by 0°12′ to 2°42′N and 176°27′E to 178°48′E,
although the northeastern section of this area was not searched due to
weather. |
2035
|
Putnam
made a request of COM14 and the AE search group through the San Francisco
CG station “… that region requested will be searched also
southern Gilberts especially Beru and islands adjacent.”70 |
2130
|
COM14
replied, saying that all of the Gilbert Islands had been searched.71 |
July
18
|
0212
|
CNO
asked COM14 if a search of the area immediately north of 170°E
was possible.72 |
0845
|
COM14
replied that it would be impractical, as it would involve having to
abandon the present search to conserve fuel.73 |
1812
|
The
Itasca arrived back at Howland, and after loading aviation
gasoline drums and oil onto the ship and picking up radioman Cipriani
and the HF direction finder, left at 2250.74 |
1816
|
The Lexington launched 41 planes, and all are recovered by
2206. The area searched included the area bounded by the rectangle
with approximate positions 3°32′N, 176°28′E, 1°42′N, 178°30′E,
2°38′N, 179°30′E, and 4°42′N, 177°22′E.
This area substantially covered previously searched areas which had contained
gaps in coverage due to weather. |
1910
|
Putnam
telegraphed CNO once again, expressing thanks for the recent message
(which has not been found in the archives), and requesting that a
single plane be sent to search the area just north of 170°E, instead
of the vessels.75 |
1920
|
CNO
sent a message stating that a search by ships in the area requested
would involve abandoning the present search, and that all areas with
reasonable drift were being searched.76 |
2053
|
Putnam
replied that he only requested a single plane, not the entire group
of ships to search. 77 Obviously,
Putnam believed that the message sent at 1920 is in response to his
1910 message, although this is apparently not the case. |
2300
|
CNO
replied once more that all practical areas were being searched.78 |
July 19
|
Rear
Admiral Waesche responded to Congressman Scott, stating that it was
in the purview of the CG to supply the Equatorial Line Islands (Jarvis,
Baker, Howland), and was requested by George Putnam to provide radio
signals for Earhart’s direction finder and other assistance as
necessary during its regular voyage. Total costs of operating the Itasca
during this time amounted to $12,600, including fuel costs of approximately
$2000, which might be considered the extra cost due to searching.
The search duties, however, clearly fell in line with the duties of
the Coast Guard.79 |
0040
|
The Lexington sent out its last group of 40 planes to search
for Earhart, and all were recovered by 0423GMT. The area searched
included the area bounded by 4°42′N, 177°48′E, 2°30′N,
179°33′E, 3°30′N, 179°27′W, and 5°30′N, 178°30′E.
|
0520
|
The
Earhart Search Group departed the search area.80 |
1800
|
The
US State Department sent a telegram to the US Embassy in Tokyo, suggesting
to the Japanese government that any vessels plying the Marshall or
Gilbert Island waters to be on continuous lookout for any traces of
Earhart's plane.81 |
1930
|
CNO requested of COM14 a report containing detailed
information, including all areas searched and dates.82 |
2230
|
COMDESRON2 officially reports for duty to Commander
in Chief, US Forces , completing the official US Government search
for Earhart.83 |
|
|