High frequency direction finding equipment on Howland - Revision history

Moleski at 13:49, 25 June 2009

2009-06-25T13:49:16Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:49, 25 June 2009
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	Shortly before the first world flight attempt, [[Harry Manning]] and Bureau of Air Commerce consultant [[Bill Miller]] had requested that a [[DF\|direction finder]] (not a [[HFDF\|high frequency direction finder]] [HFDF]) be set up on [[Howland]] "if practicable". At that time the aircraft had a [[trailing wire antenna]], reasonable capability of transmitting on 500 [[kcs]], and a crew member (Manning) who was adept at [[Morse code]]. The request arrived after the Coast Guard cutter tasked with supporting the flight had already sailed, but Dept. of Interior's [[Richard Black]] who was in charge of the expedition knew about it and thought it was a good idea.		Shortly before the first world flight attempt, [[Harry Manning]] and Bureau of Air Commerce consultant [[Bill Miller]] had requested that a [[DF\|direction finder]] (not a [[HFDF\|high frequency direction finder]] [HFDF]) be set up on [[Howland]] "if practicable". At that time the aircraft had a [[trailing wire antenna]], reasonable capability of transmitting on 500 [[kcs]], and a crew member (Manning) who was adept at [[Morse code]]. The request arrived after the Coast Guard cutter tasked with supporting the flight had already sailed, but Dept. of Interior's [[Richard Black]] who was in charge of the expedition knew about it and thought it was a good idea.

	While ''[[Itasca]]'' was in Hawaii preparing to depart for Howland in support of the second world flight attempt, Black was deeply concerned that there had been virtually no communication from Earhart about radio procedures to be used on her upcoming flight to Howland. Black also felt that Itasca's radiomen were too inexperienced and he suggested that they be replaced for this cruise with expert Navy operators. [[Commander Thompson]] had a fit and refused to consider the idea. Black decided to do an end-run around Thompson. He revived the idea of putting a [[DF\|Direction Finder]] (DF) on Howland but he also noted that in press reports Earhart had mentioned only her two higher frequencies, 3105 and 6210. He enlisted the help of Army Air Corps [[Lt. Dan Cooper]] who arranged for the loan of an experimental [[HFDF\|High Frequency Direction Finder]] from the Navy.		While ''[[Itasca]]'' was in Hawaii preparing to depart for Howland in support of the second world flight attempt, Black was deeply concerned that there had been virtually no communication from Earhart about radio procedures to be used on her upcoming flight to Howland. Black also felt that Itasca's radiomen were too inexperienced and he suggested that they be replaced for this cruise with expert Navy operators. [[Commander Thompson]] had a fit and refused to consider the idea. Black decided to do an end-run around [[Thompson]]. He revived the idea of putting a [[DF\|Direction Finder]] (DF) on Howland but he also noted that in press reports Earhart had mentioned only her two higher frequencies, 3105 and 6210. He enlisted the help of Army Air Corps [[Lt. Dan Cooper]] who arranged for the loan of an experimental [[HFDF\|High Frequency Direction Finder]] from the Navy.

	Knowing that Thompson wouldn't accept a Navy operator, Black tried to recruit a highly experienced Coast Guard operator from the crew of USCG Taney which was laid up for refit, but the guy he wanted was sick. The best Black could do was a Radioman 2nd Class by the name of [[Frank Ciprianni]].		Knowing that [[Commander Thompson]] wouldn't accept a Navy operator, Black tried to recruit a highly experienced Coast Guard operator from the crew of USCG Taney which was laid up for refit, but the guy he wanted was sick. The best Black could do was a Radioman 2nd Class by the name of [[Frank Ciprianni]].

	Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae to Nightfall\|Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the [[HFDF]].		[[Thompson]] still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae to Nightfall\|Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the [[HFDF]].

	;[[Ric Gillespie]] 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]]		;[[Ric Gillespie]] 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]]

Moleski at 12:34, 25 June 2009

2009-06-25T12:34:19Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:34, 25 June 2009
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	Shortly before the first world flight attempt, [[Harry Manning]] and Bureau of Air Commerce consultant [[Bill Miller]] had requested that a [[DF\|direction finder]] (not a [[HFDF\|high frequency direction finder]] [HFDF]) be set up on [[Howland]] "if practicable". At that time the aircraft had a [[trailing wire antenna]], reasonable capability of transmitting on 500 [[kcs]], and a crew member (Manning) who was adept at [[Morse code]]. The request arrived after the Coast Guard cutter tasked with supporting the flight had already sailed, but Dept. of Interior's [[Richard Black]] who was in charge of the expedition knew about it and thought it was a good idea.		Shortly before the first world flight attempt, [[Harry Manning]] and Bureau of Air Commerce consultant [[Bill Miller]] had requested that a [[DF\|direction finder]] (not a [[HFDF\|high frequency direction finder]] [HFDF]) be set up on [[Howland]] "if practicable". At that time the aircraft had a [[trailing wire antenna]], reasonable capability of transmitting on 500 [[kcs]], and a crew member (Manning) who was adept at [[Morse code]]. The request arrived after the Coast Guard cutter tasked with supporting the flight had already sailed, but Dept. of Interior's [[Richard Black]] who was in charge of the expedition knew about it and thought it was a good idea.

	While ''[[Itasca]]'' was in Hawaii preparing to depart for Howland in support of the second world flight attempt, Black was deeply concerned that there had been virtually no communication from Earhart about radio procedures to be used on her upcoming flight to Howland. Black also felt that Itasca's radiomen were too inexperienced and he suggested that they be replaced for this cruise with expert Navy operators. [[Commander Thompson]] had a fit and refused to consider the idea. Black decided to do an end-run around Thompson. He revived the idea of putting a DF on Howland but he also noted that in press reports Earhart had mentioned only her two higher frequencies, 3105 and 6210. He enlisted the help of Army Air Corps [[Lt. Dan Cooper]] who arranged for the loan of an experimental HFDF from the Navy.		While ''[[Itasca]]'' was in Hawaii preparing to depart for Howland in support of the second world flight attempt, Black was deeply concerned that there had been virtually no communication from Earhart about radio procedures to be used on her upcoming flight to Howland. Black also felt that Itasca's radiomen were too inexperienced and he suggested that they be replaced for this cruise with expert Navy operators. [[Commander Thompson]] had a fit and refused to consider the idea. Black decided to do an end-run around Thompson. He revived the idea of putting a [[DF\|Direction Finder]] (DF) on Howland but he also noted that in press reports Earhart had mentioned only her two higher frequencies, 3105 and 6210. He enlisted the help of Army Air Corps [[Lt. Dan Cooper]] who arranged for the loan of an experimental [[HFDF\|High Frequency Direction Finder]] from the Navy.

	Knowing that Thompson wouldn't accept a Navy operator, Black tried to recruit a highly experienced Coast Guard operator from the crew of USCG Taney which was laid up for refit, but the guy he wanted was sick. The best Black could do was a Radioman 2nd Class by the name of [[Frank Ciprianni]].		Knowing that Thompson wouldn't accept a Navy operator, Black tried to recruit a highly experienced Coast Guard operator from the crew of USCG Taney which was laid up for refit, but the guy he wanted was sick. The best Black could do was a Radioman 2nd Class by the name of [[Frank Ciprianni]].

	Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae to Nightfall\|Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.		Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae to Nightfall\|Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the [[HFDF]].

	;[[Ric Gillespie]] 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]]		;[[Ric Gillespie]] 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]]

Moleski at 12:32, 25 June 2009

2009-06-25T12:32:07Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:32, 25 June 2009
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	Knowing that Thompson wouldn't accept a Navy operator, Black tried to recruit a highly experienced Coast Guard operator from the crew of USCG Taney which was laid up for refit, but the guy he wanted was sick. The best Black could do was a Radioman 2nd Class by the name of [[Frank Ciprianni]].		Knowing that Thompson wouldn't accept a Navy operator, Black tried to recruit a highly experienced Coast Guard operator from the crew of USCG Taney which was laid up for refit, but the guy he wanted was sick. The best Black could do was a Radioman 2nd Class by the name of [[Frank Ciprianni]].

	Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.		Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae to Nightfall\|Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.

	;[[Ric Gillespie]] 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]]		;[[Ric Gillespie]] 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]]

Moleski at 12:26, 25 June 2009

2009-06-25T12:26:27Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:26, 25 June 2009
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	[[Ric Gillespie]], 23 February 2009, [[AESF\| Forum]].		[[Ric Gillespie]], 23 February 2009, [[AESF\| Forum]].

	Shortly before the first world flight attempt, [[Harry Manning]] and Bureau of Air Commerce consultant [[Bill Miller]] had requested that a [[DF\|direction finder]] (not a [[high frequency direction finder]] [HFDF]) be set up on [[Howland]] "if practicable". At that time the aircraft had a [[trailing wire antenna]], reasonable capability of transmitting on 500 [[kcs]], and a crew member (Manning) who was adept at [[Morse code]]. The request arrived after the Coast Guard cutter tasked with supporting the flight had already sailed, but Dept. of Interior's [[Richard Black]] who was in charge of the expedition knew about it and thought it was a good idea.		Shortly before the first world flight attempt, [[Harry Manning]] and Bureau of Air Commerce consultant [[Bill Miller]] had requested that a [[DF\|direction finder]] (not a [[HFDF\|high frequency direction finder]] [HFDF]) be set up on [[Howland]] "if practicable". At that time the aircraft had a [[trailing wire antenna]], reasonable capability of transmitting on 500 [[kcs]], and a crew member (Manning) who was adept at [[Morse code]]. The request arrived after the Coast Guard cutter tasked with supporting the flight had already sailed, but Dept. of Interior's [[Richard Black]] who was in charge of the expedition knew about it and thought it was a good idea.

	While ''[[Itasca]]'' was in Hawaii preparing to depart for Howland in support of the second world flight attempt, Black was deeply concerned that there had been virtually no communication from Earhart about radio procedures to be used on her upcoming flight to Howland. Black also felt that Itasca's radiomen were too inexperienced and he suggested that they be replaced for this cruise with expert Navy operators. [[Commander Thompson]] had a fit and refused to consider the idea. Black decided to do an end-run around Thompson. He revived the idea of putting a DF on Howland but he also noted that in press reports Earhart had mentioned only her two higher frequencies, 3105 and 6210. He enlisted the help of Army Air Corps [[Lt. Dan Cooper]] who arranged for the loan of an experimental HFDF from the Navy.		While ''[[Itasca]]'' was in Hawaii preparing to depart for Howland in support of the second world flight attempt, Black was deeply concerned that there had been virtually no communication from Earhart about radio procedures to be used on her upcoming flight to Howland. Black also felt that Itasca's radiomen were too inexperienced and he suggested that they be replaced for this cruise with expert Navy operators. [[Commander Thompson]] had a fit and refused to consider the idea. Black decided to do an end-run around Thompson. He revived the idea of putting a DF on Howland but he also noted that in press reports Earhart had mentioned only her two higher frequencies, 3105 and 6210. He enlisted the help of Army Air Corps [[Lt. Dan Cooper]] who arranged for the loan of an experimental HFDF from the Navy.
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	:The same question could be asked of the entire Coast Guard/Navy search but, in fairness, it was never the Coast Guard's job to give her bearings. Earhart's announced plan was to do her own DFing using her loop. Black, with Cooper's help, took it upon himself to provide some kind of HFDF capability as a backup. After the debacle in Hawaii in March, Black was under no illusions about Earhart's competence and he was desperately afraid that things would not go as planned. [[Frank Ciprianni]] is the guy who screwed up and had the Howland HFDF running long before it needed to be, but who was responsible for managing Ciprianni? As a Coast Guard serviceman he was technically under the authority of Commander Thompson, but Thompson took no interest at all in the HFDF arrangements on Howland. Black and Cooper slept aboard Itasca that night, so they weren't ashore during the night to manage Ciprianni.		:The same question could be asked of the entire Coast Guard/Navy search but, in fairness, it was never the Coast Guard's job to give her bearings. Earhart's announced plan was to do her own DFing using her loop. Black, with Cooper's help, took it upon himself to provide some kind of HFDF capability as a backup. After the debacle in Hawaii in March, Black was under no illusions about Earhart's competence and he was desperately afraid that things would not go as planned. [[Frank Ciprianni]] is the guy who screwed up and had the Howland HFDF running long before it needed to be, but who was responsible for managing Ciprianni? As a Coast Guard serviceman he was technically under the authority of Commander Thompson, but Thompson took no interest at all in the HFDF arrangements on Howland. Black and Cooper slept aboard Itasca that night, so they weren't ashore during the night to manage Ciprianni.

			:Like almost everything else about the Lae/Howland flight, the HFDF on Howland seems to have been half-assed arrangement. It was apparently experimental but not classified (or the Navy wouldn't have released it to an Air Corps Lieutenant and a civilian for use by a Coastie). We know it had no built-in compass rose for taking bearings because Ciprianni had to use a "pocket compass" on the one occasion when he was able to take a bearing. According to [[Leo Bellarts]]' later recollections, the loop had no stop on it and when Ciprianni brought it back on board Itasca its insides were a tangled mess from the loop having been rotated too far.


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	[[Category:Radio considerations]]		[[Category:Radio considerations]]

Moleski at 12:23, 25 June 2009

2009-06-25T12:23:40Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:23, 25 June 2009
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	Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.		Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.

	;[[Ric Gillespie]] 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]		;[[Ric Gillespie]] 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]]

	:The Howland DF was not an Adcock system. It was basically just a loop on a box.		:The Howland DF was not an Adcock system. It was basically just a loop on a box.

	:The same question could be asked of the entire Coast Guard/Navy search but, in fairness, it was never the Coast Guard's job to give her bearings. Earhart's announced plan was to do her own DFing using her loop. Black, with Cooper's help, took it upon himself to provide some kind of HFDF capability as a backup. After the debacle in Hawaii in March, Black was under no illusions about Earhart's competence and he was desperately afraid that things would not go as planned. Frank Ciprianni is the guy who screwed up and had the Howland HFDF running long before it needed to be, but who was responsible for managing Ciprianni? As a Coast Guard serviceman he was technically under the authority of Commander Thompson, but Thompson took no interest at all in the HFDF arrangements on Howland. Black and Cooper slept aboard Itasca that night, so they weren't ashore during the night to manage Ciprianni.		:The same question could be asked of the entire Coast Guard/Navy search but, in fairness, it was never the Coast Guard's job to give her bearings. Earhart's announced plan was to do her own DFing using her loop. Black, with Cooper's help, took it upon himself to provide some kind of HFDF capability as a backup. After the debacle in Hawaii in March, Black was under no illusions about Earhart's competence and he was desperately afraid that things would not go as planned. [[Frank Ciprianni]] is the guy who screwed up and had the Howland HFDF running long before it needed to be, but who was responsible for managing Ciprianni? As a Coast Guard serviceman he was technically under the authority of Commander Thompson, but Thompson took no interest at all in the HFDF arrangements on Howland. Black and Cooper slept aboard Itasca that night, so they weren't ashore during the night to manage Ciprianni.

	<!-- Please leave this category marker at the bottom. You may add this article to other categories if you wish -->		<!-- Please leave this category marker at the bottom. You may add this article to other categories if you wish -->
	[[Category:Radio considerations]]		[[Category:Radio considerations]]

Moleski at 02:28, 27 February 2009

2009-02-27T02:28:04Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 02:28, 27 February 2009
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	Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.		Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.

	; ~~Hue Miller,~~ 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]		;[[Ric Gillespie]] 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]
	:~~... the~~ Howland ~~equipment,~~ an Adcock system (of ~~vertical antennas)~~ was ~~not subject~~ to ~~the same directional problems and errors that a~~ loop ~~antenna~~, ~~such~~ as in AE's ~~plane,~~ was. ~~"IF" they~~ had ~~been up & working "AND" AE able~~ to ~~hear~~, ~~they could have given her pretty accurate bearing info. No spare battery~~? ~~- i thought you always had to have one~~ in ~~use, one charging or charged - standby~~. ~~How hard was it~~, to ~~do their job right?~~
			:The Howland DF was not an Adcock system. It was basically just a loop on a box.

			:The same question could be asked of the entire Coast Guard/Navy search but, in fairness, it was never the Coast Guard's job to give her bearings. Earhart's announced plan was to do her own DFing using her loop. Black, with Cooper's help, took it upon himself to provide some kind of HFDF capability as a backup. After the debacle in Hawaii in March, Black was under no illusions about Earhart's competence and he was desperately afraid that things would not go as planned. Frank Ciprianni is the guy who screwed up and had the Howland HFDF running long before it needed to be, but who was responsible for managing Ciprianni? As a Coast Guard serviceman he was technically under the authority of Commander Thompson, but Thompson took no interest at all in the HFDF arrangements on Howland. Black and Cooper slept aboard Itasca that night, so they weren't ashore during the night to manage Ciprianni.

	<!-- Please leave this category marker at the bottom. You may add this article to other categories if you wish -->		<!-- Please leave this category marker at the bottom. You may add this article to other categories if you wish -->
	[[Category:Radio considerations]]		[[Category:Radio considerations]]

Moleski at 02:08, 27 February 2009

2009-02-27T02:08:30Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 02:08, 27 February 2009
Line 10:		Line 10:

	Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.		Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.

			; Hue Miller, 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]
			:... the Howland equipment, an Adcock system (of vertical antennas) was not subject to the same directional problems and errors that a loop antenna, such as in AE's plane, was. "IF" they had been up & working "AND" AE able to hear, they could have given her pretty accurate bearing info. No spare battery? - i thought you always had to have one in use, one charging or charged - standby. How hard was it, to do their job right?

	<!-- Please leave this category marker at the bottom. You may add this article to other categories if you wish -->		<!-- Please leave this category marker at the bottom. You may add this article to other categories if you wish -->
	[[Category:Radio considerations]]		[[Category:Radio considerations]]

Moleski at 01:38, 24 February 2009

2009-02-24T01:38:51Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 01:38, 24 February 2009
Line 10:		Line 10:

	Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.		Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.

			<!-- Please leave this category marker at the bottom. You may add this article to other categories if you wish -->
			[[Category:Radio considerations]]

Moleski: New page: For the whole story, see ''Finding Amelia'' page 51-2. Ric Gillespie, 23 February 2009, Forum. Shortly before the first world flight attempt, Harry Manning and Bure...

2009-02-23T17:18:18Z

New page: For the whole story, see ''Finding Amelia'' page 51-2. Ric Gillespie, 23 February 2009, Forum. Shortly before the first world flight attempt, Harry Manning and Bure...

New page

For the whole story, see ''[[Finding Amelia]]'' page 51-2.

[[Ric Gillespie]], 23 February 2009, [[AESF| Forum]].

Shortly before the first world flight attempt, [[Harry Manning]] and Bureau of Air Commerce consultant [[Bill Miller]] had requested that a [[DF|direction finder]] (not a [[high frequency direction finder]] [HFDF]) be set up on [[Howland]] "if practicable". At that time the aircraft had a [[trailing wire antenna]], reasonable capability of transmitting on 500 [[kcs]], and a crew member (Manning) who was adept at [[Morse code]]. The request arrived after the Coast Guard cutter tasked with supporting the flight had already sailed, but Dept. of Interior's [[Richard Black]] who was in charge of the expedition knew about it and thought it was a good idea.

While ''[[Itasca]]'' was in Hawaii preparing to depart for Howland in support of the second world flight attempt, Black was deeply concerned that there had been virtually no communication from Earhart about radio procedures to be used on her upcoming flight to Howland. Black also felt that Itasca's radiomen were too inexperienced and he suggested that they be replaced for this cruise with expert Navy operators. [[Commander Thompson]] had a fit and refused to consider the idea. Black decided to do an end-run around Thompson. He revived the idea of putting a DF on Howland but he also noted that in press reports Earhart had mentioned only her two higher frequencies, 3105 and 6210. He enlisted the help of Army Air Corps [[Lt. Dan Cooper]] who arranged for the loan of an experimental HFDF from the Navy.

Knowing that Thompson wouldn't accept a Navy operator, Black tried to recruit a highly experienced Coast Guard operator from the crew of USCG Taney which was laid up for refit, but the guy he wanted was sick. The best Black could do was a Radioman 2nd Class by the name of [[Frank Ciprianni]].

Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the HFDF.

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:49, 25 June 2009
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	Shortly before the first world flight attempt, [[Harry Manning]] and Bureau of Air Commerce consultant [[Bill Miller]] had requested that a [[DF\|direction finder]] (not a [[HFDF\|high frequency direction finder]] [HFDF]) be set up on [[Howland]] "if practicable". At that time the aircraft had a [[trailing wire antenna]], reasonable capability of transmitting on 500 [[kcs]], and a crew member (Manning) who was adept at [[Morse code]]. The request arrived after the Coast Guard cutter tasked with supporting the flight had already sailed, but Dept. of Interior's [[Richard Black]] who was in charge of the expedition knew about it and thought it was a good idea.		Shortly before the first world flight attempt, [[Harry Manning]] and Bureau of Air Commerce consultant [[Bill Miller]] had requested that a [[DF\|direction finder]] (not a [[HFDF\|high frequency direction finder]] [HFDF]) be set up on [[Howland]] "if practicable". At that time the aircraft had a [[trailing wire antenna]], reasonable capability of transmitting on 500 [[kcs]], and a crew member (Manning) who was adept at [[Morse code]]. The request arrived after the Coast Guard cutter tasked with supporting the flight had already sailed, but Dept. of Interior's [[Richard Black]] who was in charge of the expedition knew about it and thought it was a good idea.

	While ''[[Itasca]]'' was in Hawaii preparing to depart for Howland in support of the second world flight attempt, Black was deeply concerned that there had been virtually no communication from Earhart about radio procedures to be used on her upcoming flight to Howland. Black also felt that Itasca's radiomen were too inexperienced and he suggested that they be replaced for this cruise with expert Navy operators. [[Commander Thompson]] had a fit and refused to consider the idea. Black decided to do an end-run around Thompson. He revived the idea of putting a [[DF\|Direction Finder]] (DF) on Howland but he also noted that in press reports Earhart had mentioned only her two higher frequencies, 3105 and 6210. He enlisted the help of Army Air Corps [[Lt. Dan Cooper]] who arranged for the loan of an experimental [[HFDF\|High Frequency Direction Finder]] from the Navy.		While ''[[Itasca]]'' was in Hawaii preparing to depart for Howland in support of the second world flight attempt, Black was deeply concerned that there had been virtually no communication from Earhart about radio procedures to be used on her upcoming flight to Howland. Black also felt that Itasca's radiomen were too inexperienced and he suggested that they be replaced for this cruise with expert Navy operators. [[Commander Thompson]] had a fit and refused to consider the idea. Black decided to do an end-run around [[Thompson]]. He revived the idea of putting a [[DF\|Direction Finder]] (DF) on Howland but he also noted that in press reports Earhart had mentioned only her two higher frequencies, 3105 and 6210. He enlisted the help of Army Air Corps [[Lt. Dan Cooper]] who arranged for the loan of an experimental [[HFDF\|High Frequency Direction Finder]] from the Navy.

	Knowing that Thompson wouldn't accept a Navy operator, Black tried to recruit a highly experienced Coast Guard operator from the crew of USCG Taney which was laid up for refit, but the guy he wanted was sick. The best Black could do was a Radioman 2nd Class by the name of [[Frank Ciprianni]].		Knowing that [[Commander Thompson]] wouldn't accept a Navy operator, Black tried to recruit a highly experienced Coast Guard operator from the crew of USCG Taney which was laid up for refit, but the guy he wanted was sick. The best Black could do was a Radioman 2nd Class by the name of [[Frank Ciprianni]].

	Thompson still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae to Nightfall\|Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the [[HFDF]].		[[Thompson]] still didn't like the idea but he went along with it. As he later wrote, "Mr. Black and Lieutenant Cooper of the Army had the Navy send a high frequency direction finder on board. The Coast Guard did not request the equipment and did not receipt for it." This all happened on or about June 16 by which time Earhart was in Karachi. She was in touch with [[Putnam]] but neither she nor her husband were communicating with the Coast Guard about radio coordination. When there later was an attempt between Earhart, Putnam and the Coast Guard to establish radio procedures for the [[Lae to Nightfall\|Lae/Howland]] flight, nobody on the Coast Guard end said anything about the [[HFDF]].

	;[[Ric Gillespie]] 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]]		;[[Ric Gillespie]] 26 February 2009 [[AESF\|Forum.]]