TIGHAR
Amelia Earhart Search Forum => General discussion => Topic started by: JNev on March 28, 2012, 02:22:54 PM
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"200 miles out" could have included the off-set Gary speaks of. He and I don't particularly agree on where we believe the flight terminated, but he certainly knows his navigation details very well and I respect his opinion. Maybe he could speak to that better than I can, but I can see that 200 out might have included an offset - 200 miles of total flight, closer by the crow's flight (as FN and AE may have believed it to be).
As to the conditions - 3/10's coverage typically involves detached (broken) clouds - I don't get 'solid' like overcast over part of the sky - from these messages, but broken coverage to the WNW, and clearer conditions to east and south. At least that's my sum take-away from it. By that it seems hard to believe the flight ever got close, else someone aboard either the plane or on the island or Itasca would have seen or heard something. Between smoke and land, and more open skies (apparently, as I read the report) in immediate vicinity, the flight should have been able to spot the island if in the open skies thereabouts.
It surely seems that something put FN and AE further from that place in reality than our logic today does, unless they really were incredibly close, and all concerned incredibly never heard or saw the right cues. Whether it was an instrument error (damaged octant, etc.) or some other event like winds against hours of dead reckoning that led to that we'll never likely know. But 'should be on you' as reported and what actually happened over the next minutes / hour(s) wound up being worlds apart.
I can't explain that. If FN had been able to shoot the sun and moon, and his octant was reasonably accurate, and he flew the box pattern Gary suggests, then I'm at a complete loss as to how they missed so badly. Respectfully, it just does not add up for me that FN was able to accurately shoot moon and sun, for whatever reason. If he had, we shouldn't be here.
LTM -
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Yep, that's it exactly.
I think with more altitude it's a bit easier for me. Did you notice the monochromatic color of the water because of the angle of refraction I think is the correct term; and of course the way the cloud shadows mimic a flat land mass. When at greater altitude it is much easier to see the differing colors of water, lighter blue being shallower water. Even though one must look "through the clouds" more, for me, the land also was easier to spot when viewed from a higher altitude.
I will never forget the deepest blue I ever saw, on the west side of Grand Cayman. I haven't dived it, but I think there is a wall there that goes straight down several thousand feet under water... but I digress. :)
Howland was a near impossible target to hit. They could easily have been within 20 miles or less and not been able to see it. If the Itaska had blown smoke much earlier, in my opinion, we would be celebrating her wonderful achievement, rather than looking for their bones.
I guess in hind sight there are so many simple things that could have improved the odds for the flyers; station a second ship say 200-300 miles out like a stepping stone to Howland. Or, at least building a great big bonfire on Howland a couple of hours before they were due and keeping it going for a while. Some wood, some old tires, would have made spotting the island a breeze. Guess they didn't consider radio problems as a possibility. With the benefit of hindsight and 70+ years... I do so hope the 10 is found if nothing else, they deserve it I think. Some closure for all.
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Howland was a near impossible target to hit. They could easily have been within 20 miles or less and not been able to see it. If the Itaska had blown smoke much earlier, in my opinion, we would be celebrating her wonderful achievement, rather than looking for their bones.
According to the deck log the Itasca starting making smoke at 1745 Z or very shortly after that. 1745 Z is also the time that Earhart radioed that she was 200 miles out so making smoke earlier would not have made a difference since there is no way that Earhart could have seen the smoke from 200 miles away.
gl
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According to the deck log the Itasca starting making smoke at 1745 Z or very shortly after that. 1745 Z is also the time that Earhart radioed that she was 200 miles out so making smoke earlier would not have made a difference since there is no way that Earhart could have seen the smoke from 200 miles away.
It could have made a difference if they were short of Howland making North / South passes after they thought they had arrived at Howland. Even if they passed to the North, not short of Howland but out of the visible range of Howland, they might have been able to spot the end of the smoke trail had it extended out and additional say 20SM. If they passed to the South, this may or may not have had any difference in the outcome.
With the winds at 8 to 13MPG (average of 10.5) they smoke trail would have extended out about 15SM at 19:12GMT. Had they started the smoke a couple hours earlier, it would have stretched out about 36SM (assuming it would not have dissipated). If they were in clear skies near the end of the smoke trail at 1000ft, they might have been able to spot it from an additional 28SM (reported visibility of 25NM that morning) or even up to 42SM (theoretical visibility range at 1000ft).
They might have been too far to the North or South for it to have made a difference, we can only speculate.
If they would have arrived prior to dawn, the lights both on the Itasca and on the Electra would have been much more effective at long distances.
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I like your idea Gary. I am going to Fiji next year on vacation. I should make sure you work with the airline to get me there safely. :D
Arriving during night conditions with Itasca casting a beacon may in fact have been the best solution. Nice thinking out of the box.
And Earhart had been told that Itasca would be shining a searchlight at night and making smoke during the day. But they didn't plan a night time arrival on the planned flight from Hawaii so they apparently didn't think they need a searchlight for them to find Howland.
gl
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I wanted to start a new thread discussing the black smoke making of the USCGC Itasca, at the invitation of Mr. Thomas. I read several comments in the Celestial Choir section regarding the black smoke the Itasca made. These comments were made in links regarding navigation and would be better in its own thread in my opinion. For example: https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,383.msg5135/topicseen.html#msg5135
I would caution anyone reading Mr. LaPook's comments regarding the naval rank of the source that the rank does not make one an expert. The fact that Mr. LaPook's source is an Admiral, while the other source is a Commander is not dispositive. The Navy has a lot of specialties, and it is not uncommon for someone of flag rank to be a specialist in only one area, but be in charge of matters that encompass other specialties. For example, the first commanding officer of our ship was a naval aviator, with experience flying the SH-3 Sea King. He had experience and technical ability regarding flying and anti-submarine warfare, but he was no expert when it came to running the ship's engines. I remember him coming down to the engine room on one occasion and remarking "These are dinosaur bones!" The distinction should really be based on whether or not the officer quoted as a source has experience as an Engineering Office of the Watch (EOOW) on a steam plant.
I served as an EOOW onboard the USS Duluth (LPD 6.) I was one of the few officers to qualify and actually stand watches. Many officers concentrated on other matters, and avoided the engine room at all costs.
The Duluth was equipped with two (2) Babcock & Wilcox 600 lb boilers. (The term 600 lb refers to the steam pressure, and not the weight of the boilers.) These were water tube, D type, meaning that the feedwater to be boiled into steam was inside the tubes, and the tubes were shaped in a backward capital D. There are other types of boilers, such as fire tube boilers, which means the fire is actually inside the tubes, and the water is outside in a drum. (I think the older rail locomotives used these.)
We produced fire for the boiler by burning DFM, which stood for Distillate Fuel Marine. Older fuel that had been phased out was called NSFO. I recall that NSFO was used from about World War II until the Vietnam era. Prior to World War II, the fuel was referred to as bunker oil. It was thick nasty stuff. One of my senior chiefs found an old publication that explained how to use the older fuel. It had to be heated first, and then atomized. When using DFM, we did not have to heat it, but we had to atomize it. (My chief drove that point home one day by putting a cigarette out in a can of the stuff.)
Our DFM was atomized using compressed air at light off. Once sufficient steam pressure was achieved, atomization was switched to steam, which atomized it and heated it. Each boiler had a furnace front containing 4 burners. The burner tubes were removable, and consisted of a tube within a tube. The inner tube contained the atomization source (such as air or steam) and the outer tube carried the fuel. The fuel and atomizer was sprayed through a burner tip which was inside the firebox, and sprayed it in a whirling pattern. Fire was never sprayed against the tubes, but rather against the rear boiler refractory, surrounded by the tubes. Exhaust gases were vented out a stack.
The boilers were equipped with periscopes for the boiler technicians (BT's) to observe the quality of the combustion gases. Sometime in 1995, an electric stack gas analyzer was added while we were in the shipyard. This operated similar to an oxygen sensor on an automobile today. Obviously the Itasca did not have a stack gas analyzer. As a back up, signalmen on the signal bridge (flag shack) were required to keep an eye on the type of smoke we were emitting.
Two types of smoke were of concern. The first type was white smoke. White smoke meant actual fuel was going up the stack and was an immediate emergency because it could explode in an atomized state and destroy the boiler and kill or injure personnel. White smoke generally meant too much fuel, not enough air. The signalmen had to be specially trained for this. That was because boiler safety valves and auxiliary steam exhaust also vented up the stack. It was not uncommon for a new signalmen to report in a panic that we were producing white smoke when it was just aux exhaust lazily venting to the sky.
Black smoke was the other concern. Generally black smoke was a result of low air feeding the boiler from the forced draft blowers. There were a variety of ways of producing black smoke (my guys could amaze me with their ability to get anything running in a weird way.) The main way was to swing the vanes with a louver from the air box into the burner front. (Like a set of venetian blinds.)
Black smoke was a concern for the following reasons:
1) Damage: Black smoke meant that unburned fuel was building up on the tube sheets. While the BT's that worked for me did not like cleaning firesides, there was also a danger. DFM and other fuels contain sulfur, and we were always told that unburned fuel has a way of rapidly creating sulfuric acid at that temperature, very quickly. Sulfuric acid would rapidly corrode and eat at the tubes, which could lead to a loss of steam pressure, boiler damage, or even worse, a boiler explosion.
2) Environmental: Obviously, this was not a concern in 1937. Today, however, the Navy is very uptight about the environmental damage it does, and there are laws governing what the Navy can and cannot do. Bilge water and oil must never be pumped over the side while in port, or a commanding officer can expect to get relieved. Sewage is never pumped over the side in port or immediately off the coast. Garbage must be weighted and dumped outside certain limits and it must never contain plastic. Air pollution is also a concern. Black smoke is very visible when a ship is in port, such as San Diego, and the Navy gets complaints and must cooperate with local air controls. I got some hell from our CO because my guys thought it would be cute to "smoke" the Golden Gate Bridge when leaving San Francisco.
3) Economy: Making black smoke means the ship is not being run economically, because hydrocarbons are going up the stack and are wasted. More fuel has to be burned to make black smoke. Again, this is more of a concern today through the Navy's energy usage policies, but I imagine in 1937, the Itasca would not want to be wasting too much fuel.
4) Filth: Black smoke is filthy. When black smoke is being made, it tends to settle out over the ship, especially when the ship is not making way and generating apparent wind. The ship's deck force has to clean this up, and I've seen fist fights erupt over smoke made from our stacks. Looking at pictures of the Itasca, I see that it was white. Black smoke falling on a white ship is a recipe for ugliness.
I must also point out that there is a difference between black smoke making and soot blowing. Mr. LaPook refers to soot blowing in several of his references. On board the Duluth, each boiler contained one soot blower assembly. The soot blower was a long pipe in one of the tube bundles, that could be cranked with a chain. When soot blowing was done, a valve was opened that admitted steam to the pipe. The pipe was rotated and steam sprayed from holes in the pipe to spray the boiler tubes.
Soot blowing was not done on every 4 hour watch. Soot blowing was never done in port, and for a very good reason that may be relevant to the Itasca. Soot blowing requires a certain load on the boilers to ensure that the fires are not extinguished by the steam, and the ship must be moving through the water at a sufficient speed in a direction that causes the relative winds to carry the soot particles off the ship. Soot blowing always required permission from the Officer of the Deck, while underway, and was conducted once every 24 hours if operations permitted. (You never did soot blowing if the ship was engaged in flight operations, unless you wanted to end your career early.)
As I see it, the Itasca was underway, but she was not making way. That meant that she was drifting to the side of Howland Island, and as the Officer of the Deck would notice her drifting on the current, he would order an ahead on the ship's engine telegraph to put the ship back in the area of where she was supposed to wait. Soot blowing would not have been permitted, or even used. But I can agree that there would be a limit to black smoking, to prevent damage, for economy, and to prevent filth in that position.
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Good explanation. Thanks Anthony.
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just been reading about itasca smoke
click on link an scroll down an read what the rest of newspaper say's
http://www.ebay.co.uk/itm/AMELIA-EARHART-Pacific-Ocean-Airplane-Flight-Disappears-LOST-1937-Old-Newspaper-/390437833778?_trksid=p5197.m1992&_trkparms=aid%3D111000%26algo%3DREC.CURRENT%26ao%3D1%26asc%3D14%26meid%3D495475381319237144%26pid%3D100015%26prg%3D1006%26rk%3D3%26#ht_10371wt_952
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I wanted to start a new thread discussing the black smoke making of the USCGC Itasca, at the invitation of Mr. Thomas. I read several comments in the Celestial Choir section regarding the black smoke the Itasca made. These comments were made in links regarding navigation and would be better in its own thread in my opinion. For example: https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,383.msg5135/topicseen.html#msg5135 (https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,383.msg5135/topicseen.html#msg5135)
I would caution anyone reading Mr. LaPook's comments regarding the naval rank of the source that the rank does not make one an expert. The fact that Mr. LaPook's source is an Admiral, while the other source is a Commander is not dispositive. The Navy has a lot of specialties, and it is not uncommon for someone of flag rank to be a specialist in only one area, but be in charge of matters that encompass other specialties. For example, the first commanding officer of our ship was a naval aviator, with experience flying the SH-3 Sea King. He had experience and technical ability regarding flying and anti-submarine warfare, but he was no expert when it came to running the ship's engines. I remember him coming down to the engine room on one occasion and remarking "These are dinosaur bones!" The distinction should really be based on whether or not the officer quoted as a source has experience as an Engineering Office of the Watch (EOOW) on a steam plant.
I served as an EOOW onboard the USS Duluth (LPD 6.) I was one of the few officers to qualify and actually stand watches. Many officers concentrated on other matters, and avoided the engine room at all costs.
The Duluth was equipped with two (2) Babcock & Wilcox 600 lb boilers. (The term 600 lb refers to the steam pressure, and not the weight of the boilers.) These were water tube, D type, meaning that the feedwater to be boiled into steam was inside the tubes, and the tubes were shaped in a backward capital D. There are other types of boilers, such as fire tube boilers, which means the fire is actually inside the tubes, and the water is outside in a drum. (I think the older rail locomotives used these.)
We produced fire for the boiler by burning DFM, which stood for Distillate Fuel Marine. Older fuel that had been phased out was called NSFO. I recall that NSFO was used from about World War II until the Vietnam era. Prior to World War II, the fuel was referred to as bunker oil. It was thick nasty stuff. One of my senior chiefs found an old publication that explained how to use the older fuel. It had to be heated first, and then atomized. When using DFM, we did not have to heat it, but we had to atomize it. (My chief drove that point home one day by putting a cigarette out in a can of the stuff.)
Our DFM was atomized using compressed air at light off. Once sufficient steam pressure was achieved, atomization was switched to steam, which atomized it and heated it. Each boiler had a furnace front containing 4 burners. The burner tubes were removable, and consisted of a tube within a tube. The inner tube contained the atomization source (such as air or steam) and the outer tube carried the fuel. The fuel and atomizer was sprayed through a burner tip which was inside the firebox, and sprayed it in a whirling pattern. Fire was never sprayed against the tubes, but rather against the rear boiler refractory, surrounded by the tubes. Exhaust gases were vented out a stack.
The boilers were equipped with periscopes for the boiler technicians (BT's) to observe the quality of the combustion gases. Sometime in 1995, an electric stack gas analyzer was added while we were in the shipyard. This operated similar to an oxygen sensor on an automobile today. Obviously the Itasca did not have a stack gas analyzer. As a back up, signalmen on the signal bridge (flag shack) were required to keep an eye on the type of smoke we were emitting.
Two types of smoke were of concern. The first type was white smoke. White smoke meant actual fuel was going up the stack and was an immediate emergency because it could explode in an atomized state and destroy the boiler and kill or injure personnel. White smoke generally meant too much fuel, not enough air. The signalmen had to be specially trained for this. That was because boiler safety valves and auxiliary steam exhaust also vented up the stack. It was not uncommon for a new signalmen to report in a panic that we were producing white smoke when it was just aux exhaust lazily venting to the sky.
Black smoke was the other concern. Generally black smoke was a result of low air feeding the boiler from the forced draft blowers. There were a variety of ways of producing black smoke (my guys could amaze me with their ability to get anything running in a weird way.) The main way was to swing the vanes with a louver from the air box into the burner front. (Like a set of venetian blinds.)
Black smoke was a concern for the following reasons:
1) Damage: Black smoke meant that unburned fuel was building up on the tube sheets. While the BT's that worked for me did not like cleaning firesides, there was also a danger. DFM and other fuels contain sulfur, and we were always told that unburned fuel has a way of rapidly creating sulfuric acid at that temperature, very quickly. Sulfuric acid would rapidly corrode and eat at the tubes, which could lead to a loss of steam pressure, boiler damage, or even worse, a boiler explosion.
2) Environmental: Obviously, this was not a concern in 1937. Today, however, the Navy is very uptight about the environmental damage it does, and there are laws governing what the Navy can and cannot do. Bilge water and oil must never be pumped over the side while in port, or a commanding officer can expect to get relieved. Sewage is never pumped over the side in port or immediately off the coast. Garbage must be weighted and dumped outside certain limits and it must never contain plastic. Air pollution is also a concern. Black smoke is very visible when a ship is in port, such as San Diego, and the Navy gets complaints and must cooperate with local air controls. I got some hell from our CO because my guys thought it would be cute to "smoke" the Golden Gate Bridge when leaving San Francisco.
3) Economy: Making black smoke means the ship is not being run economically, because hydrocarbons are going up the stack and are wasted. More fuel has to be burned to make black smoke. Again, this is more of a concern today through the Navy's energy usage policies, but I imagine in 1937, the Itasca would not want to be wasting too much fuel.
4) Filth: Black smoke is filthy. When black smoke is being made, it tends to settle out over the ship, especially when the ship is not making way and generating apparent wind. The ship's deck force has to clean this up, and I've seen fist fights erupt over smoke made from our stacks. Looking at pictures of the Itasca, I see that it was white. Black smoke falling on a white ship is a recipe for ugliness.
I must also point out that there is a difference between black smoke making and soot blowing. Mr. LaPook refers to soot blowing in several of his references. On board the Duluth, each boiler contained one soot blower assembly. The soot blower was a long pipe in one of the tube bundles, that could be cranked with a chain. When soot blowing was done, a valve was opened that admitted steam to the pipe. The pipe was rotated and steam sprayed from holes in the pipe to spray the boiler tubes.
Soot blowing was not done on every 4 hour watch. Soot blowing was never done in port, and for a very good reason that may be relevant to the Itasca. Soot blowing requires a certain load on the boilers to ensure that the fires are not extinguished by the steam, and the ship must be moving through the water at a sufficient speed in a direction that causes the relative winds to carry the soot particles off the ship. Soot blowing always required permission from the Officer of the Deck, while underway, and was conducted once every 24 hours if operations permitted. (You never did soot blowing if the ship was engaged in flight operations, unless you wanted to end your career early.)
As I see it, the Itasca was underway, but she was not making way. That meant that she was drifting to the side of Howland Island, and as the Officer of the Deck would notice her drifting on the current, he would order an ahead on the ship's engine telegraph to put the ship back in the area of where she was supposed to wait. Soot blowing would not have been permitted, or even used. But I can agree that there would be a limit to black smoking, to prevent damage, for economy, and to prevent filth in that position.
"Different ships, different long splices."
Thanks for your detailed explanation of your experience on the Duluth and it is obvious that you would normally want to avoid black smoke, but acting as a navigation aid for Earhart was not a normal operation. I doubt that Admiral Knight wrote every word in Knight's Modern Seamanship, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austin_M._Knight) 13 ed. (1960) that I quoted since he died in 1927. The first edition was published in 1901 and has been a standard reference work at Annapolis and King's Point for a century, I'm surprised that you never ran across it yourself. My edition was revised by a team of naval officers varying in rank from Lieutenant to Captain so hopefully, between them, they had more detailed knowledge of boiler operation. If you think they are too far removed from boiler operations to know about blowing soot then perhaps the boilermen have such hands on knowledge. I have attached an excerpt of the Navy Training Manual for Boilerman 3 &2 that also states that the soot should be blown at least every watch while underway. Maybe you didn't do that on your ship (and you weren't using bunker oil) but, as I said, "different ships, different long splices."
Please read my original post about this located here. (https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,383.msg4989.html#msg4989) and the excerpt of Knights Modern Seamanship (https://tighar.org/smf/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=383.0;attach=116)
The question was whether Itasca was making smoke and Brandenburg claimed that they couldn't. But we don't have look at this in a theoretical way since there were too many independent witnesses there that stated that Itasca did make smoke for a protracted period. I wrote:
"But this is all a theoretical discussion and we do not have to even consider it since there are all the contemporary eye witness accounts and documents saying that the smoke screen was there for hours, it stretched more than ten miles down wind and would have been visible for 40 miles. Elgin Long even includes a photograph of the Itasca making smoke and you can see the quality of the smoke for yourself. If you have Morrissey's book look at pages 257, 258, 260 and 291 for various descriptions of the smoke being made by Itasca. The quote on 257-258 is from the Commanding officer of the Lexington saying that the "Itasca was laying a heavy smoke screen which hung for hours." He also says as printed on page 260 that "the Itasca's smoke plume could have been seen 40 miles or more." Now the captain of the Lexington was not there at the time so he was relying on reports from others but the captain of the Lexington would know the capabilities and characteristics of smoke made by ships in 1937 better than Mr. Brandenburg so could evaluate these reports.
Safford publishes Itasca's log for July 2nd. It contains the entry: "0614 Vessel began laying down heavy smoke to assist Miss Earhart." There was no log entry saying when they stopped making smoke so does this mean that they never stopped and they are still making smoke to this very day? Or does it mean that they only made smoke for 30 minutes (as Brandenburg would have us believe) or for more than two hours or until they started their search, and then stopped without making a log entry? which scenario makes the most sense? Safford also publishes the Itasca radio message sent to COMHAWSEC the higher commander at 1402 on July 2nd, just 7 hours after AE failed to arrive stating in part that Earhart passed the island and "missed it in the glare of the rising sun though we were smoking heavily at that time period." Itasca was at that time searching northwest of Howland with every expectation of rescuing AE so Captain Thompson would not have been in CYA mode yet. In addition to the coast guard personnel on the ship there were two wire service reporters who had no reason to cover up anything, their butts did not need to be covered so they would have reported that no smoke was being made if, in fact, it wasn't. The Hawaiians on Howland also reported that smoke was being made, see James Kamakaiwi diary."
gl
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Knight's Seamanship is a required text at the Naval Academy. But it is only a introductory generalized text that is used Plebe year. I can dig around, but I probably don't have mine anymore because it is too generalized. The Naval Academy produces officers that enter specialties, such as aviation, submarines, Navy SEALS, supply corps, surface warfare, and even the Marine Corps. The instruction in boilers at the Naval Academy was limited to boiler water feed water chemistry as a lab to the course on Chemistry, and basic layout of boilers in Naval Science courses.
Once you graduate and are commissioned you head to surface warfare, you go to a specialized school called Surface Warfare Officers Division Officer's Course (SWOSDOC). SWOSDOC contains more in depth training and towards the end of the schooling, the particular officers go through engineering training that is tailored to the type of propulsion plants for their first command. I was put in the steam pipeline and the system we were first trained on was the 1200 lb steam plant for the Knox class frigate. The work becomes more technical, and the students are introduced to Naval Ship's Technical Manuals (NSTM). By this point in my career, Knight's Seamanship was a charming generalized text that could serve as a paper weight, a nice conversational piece on the coffee table or tucked in a box in the attic somewhere.
Running a boiler in a black smoke condition is a very dangerous condition. http://books.google.com/books?id=hzhj3fGmCDkC&pg=PA88&lpg=PA88&dq=U.S.+navy+boiler+white+smoke+black+smoke&source=bl&ots=VGOlIRJqH2&sig=UktmX03mjfSEY6ebhGl68eg-5ys&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SFf8T6PhG-OC2AXo1OmVCg&ved=0CFkQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=U.S.%20navy%20boiler%20white%20smoke%20black%20smoke&f=false
The fact that black smoke/ white smoke is a danger is reflected today. Page 2-2-15 of this reference: http://dcfpnavymil.org/Library/sftm/3540.3A%20EDORM.pdf
There's a big difference between soot and black smoke making. The soot blowing in your reference assumes normal build up of carbon particles on the boiler tubes through normal operation. Normal operation means not making black smoke. When you make black smoke for prolonged periods of time, you are not just putting carbon on the tubes, but other products from the fuel, including sulfur. That contributes to sulfuric acid production which will eat at the tubes. The carbon buildup is much more rapid with prolonged black smoke making, which contributes to uneven heating and cooling of the boiler tubes. I actually laughed when I read one of the references that said you could soot blow tubes while in port. There's no way that would be allowed in the fleet, either then or now.
I'm not surprised the deck log of the Itasca had a start time for black smoke making, but no end time. It is not uncommon for engineering events to not be recorded in the deck log. The friction between black gang and topside is reflected very well in "The Sand Pebbles." To truly know how long and when the Itasca was making black smoke, I would want to look at the engineering logs.
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To truly know how long and when the Itasca was making black smoke, I would want to look at the engineering logs.
Any chance of those surviving somewhere?
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That's a really good question that I don't have the answer to off hand. I know our engineering logs would be reviewed by the Chief Engineer on a daily basis. They would be kept in the log room, and over time older logs would be sent off ship for storage.
I'm not sure what the procedure was for the Coast Guard, but wouldn't be surprised if it was similar. Those records may be archived somewhere, if they weren't destroyed.
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Interestingly, Wikipedia (for what its worth) lists the propulsion equipment on board the Itasca as two (2) oil fueled Babcock & Wilcox boilers. Those apparently produced steam for a Curtis turbine generator. The cutter had one screw and one shaft, that was not directly powered by steam, but rather an electric motor that received electrical power from the generator.
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Knight's Seamanship is a required text at the Naval Academy. But it is only a introductory generalized text that is used Plebe year. I can dig around, but I probably don't have mine anymore because it is too generalized. The Naval Academy produces officers that enter specialties, such as aviation, submarines, Navy SEALS, supply corps, surface warfare, and even the Marine Corps. The instruction in boilers at the Naval Academy was limited to boiler water feed water chemistry as a lab to the course on Chemistry, and basic layout of boilers in Naval Science courses.
Once you graduate and are commissioned you head to surface warfare, you go to a specialized school called Surface Warfare Officers Division Officer's Course (SWOSDOC). SWOSDOC contains more in depth training and towards the end of the schooling, the particular officers go through engineering training that is tailored to the type of propulsion plants for their first command. I was put in the steam pipeline and the system we were first trained on was the 1200 lb steam plant for the Knox class frigate. The work becomes more technical, and the students are introduced to Naval Ship's Technical Manuals (NSTM). By this point in my career, Knight's Seamanship was a charming generalized text that could serve as a paper weight, a nice conversational piece on the coffee table or tucked in a box in the attic somewhere.
Running a boiler in a black smoke condition is a very dangerous condition. http://books.google.com/books?id=hzhj3fGmCDkC&pg=PA88&lpg=PA88&dq=U.S.+navy+boiler+white+smoke+black+smoke&source=bl&ots=VGOlIRJqH2&sig=UktmX03mjfSEY6ebhGl68eg-5ys&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SFf8T6PhG-OC2AXo1OmVCg&ved=0CFkQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=U.S.%20navy%20boiler%20white%20smoke%20black%20smoke&f=false (http://books.google.com/books?id=hzhj3fGmCDkC&pg=PA88&lpg=PA88&dq=U.S.+navy+boiler+white+smoke+black+smoke&source=bl&ots=VGOlIRJqH2&sig=UktmX03mjfSEY6ebhGl68eg-5ys&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SFf8T6PhG-OC2AXo1OmVCg&ved=0CFkQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=U.S.%20navy%20boiler%20white%20smoke%20black%20smoke&f=false)
Thanks for that link, the book makes interesting reading. Scroll up to page 76~78 where it discusses blowing the tubes, it states that they should be blown once a week which apparently conforms to your experience. It also states that the tubes need to be blown "any time the ship makes heavy black smoke." Page 85 states that they have used DFM since 1975 so you do not have experience with the procedures used when the fuel was bunker oil. Boilerman 3 & 2 (1956) (http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?view=image;size=100;id=uc1.b317351;page=root;seq=305;num=291) agrees with Knight that the tubes should be blown at least every watch so it makes a lot of sense that the soot needed to be removed much more frequently with that much dirtier fuel.
The fact that black smoke/ white smoke is a danger is reflected today. Page 2-2-15 of this reference: http://dcfpnavymil.org/Library/sftm/3540.3A%20EDORM.pdf (http://dcfpnavymil.org/Library/sftm/3540.3A%20EDORM.pdf)
There's a big difference between soot and black smoke making. The soot blowing in your reference assumes normal build up of carbon particles on the boiler tubes through normal operation. Normal operation means not making black smoke. When you make black smoke for prolonged periods of time, you are not just putting carbon on the tubes, but other products from the fuel, including sulfur. That contributes to sulfuric acid production which will eat at the tubes. The carbon buildup is much more rapid with prolonged black smoke making, which contributes to uneven heating and cooling of the boiler tubes. I actually laughed when I read one of the references that said you could soot blow tubes while in port. There's no way that would be allowed in the fleet, either then or now.
Not allowed under normal operations but this was a far from normal operation. Itasca was sent out there by the former Secretary of the Navy who was the then President of the United States to support the operations of Amelia Earhart, the flight instructor and personal friend of his wife Eleanor Roosevelt and who had spent much time at the White House. Itasca sent a radiogram informing Earhart that smoke would be made during the day and spot lights at night. Under these circumstances I'll bet the captain told his black gang that they were to make smoke and do whatever was necessary to make it possible such as blowing the tubes as frequently as necessary. (You did notice that the government built a whole airport on Howland just for her.) Do you claim that one couldn't blow the tubes more frequently than once a week, your experience, or more than once a watch, Knight and Boilerman 3 &2 says at least once a watch? Is it your position that once you have made black smoke the boilers are ruined forever and the the deleterious effect of the black smoke can't be ameliorated by blowing the tubes at frequent intervals?
What do you mean by "prolonged," five minutes, 30 minutes, two hours, 24 hours?
As to blowing tubes in port here is a link to a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that confirms what you said.
I'm not surprised the deck log of the Itasca had a start time for black smoke making, but no end time. It is not uncommon for engineering events to not be recorded in the deck log. The friction between black gang and topside is reflected very well in "The Sand Pebbles." To truly know how long and when the Itasca was making black smoke, I would want to look at the engineering logs.
Of course this is just a theoretical discussion of boiler operations because there were too many witnessed to the fact that Itasca was making smoke at the time, it was even published in the newspapers before she went missing that Itasca was supposed to make smoke. Not making smoke with all of this emphasis would be like trying to sneak a sunrise past a rooster.
gl
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Actually I also have experience burning both DFM and JP-5. Thanks to my relationship with the air department on board, I always welcomed it when the aviators had to get rid of JP-5 that no longer met the quality requirements. It would be "struck down" and transferred to our fuel tanks. It ran much cleaner than DFM, and would help burn off carbon buildup on the tubes. My BT's were always happiest when I did that, because it reduced the work they had to do when cleaning firesides.
I never burned NSFO or bunker oil in our boilers. But I was trained to use it if the need arose. We had technical information on board for it. I've taken fuel from weird places in my time. NSFO would be thicker and even nastier. Bunker oil would be the worst, as far as boiler tubes are concerned. So I'm not surprised that older publications indicated more frequent soot blowing was required. But it also means the tube carbon and sulfur buildup would be much faster. I can actually visualize the pit snipes on the Itasca getting nervous.
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Fascinating stuff about which I have no expertise and applaud the reasoned debate. I do have an input though, once again in regards to atmospherics. I think we all visualize the nice tall column of black smoke but the reality could be much different. We often had fires in the Everglades caused by lightning or other sources. Sometimes it was light smoke sometimes darker. With the normal summer heating convection that produces first a haze layer ~1500-2000 feet then CU (we called puffies...looks like popcorn) the smoke would get caught up in that layer and just add to the haze. From down wind, down sun it just looked like dark haze. Up wind and up sun you could distinctly see the source and the fire but it was obscured from the other direction. Wind that morning at Howland was easterly and sun was low in the E so it is very possible the smoke plume became just a dark haze layer vice a nice distinct column of dark black looking from the west. All the clouds in that direction would look dark on the backside (looking at them from the west) due to shadow. It may not have been the distinct marker you would expect to see from real far away. Also as I have stated the perspective from standing on the ground (or a ship) can be far different than from an airplane several thousand feet up. I still remeber the first time I went to be range officer at the bombing range. I had been there thousands of times in the air but on the ground nothing looked the same.
JB
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"... the smoke would get caught up in that layer and just add to the haze."
I agree. In my experience funnel smoke from a ship a sea tends to get flattened down and dispersed into a haze if the surface winds are strong.
I would say that three factors affect the column of smoke from a boiler.
1) The pressure of the air feeding the furnace, through forced draft blowers.
2) The geometry of the stack and the presence of equipment in the smoke path, such as tube bundles, superheaters, waste heat boilers, economizers, spark screens, baffles, and piping etc.
3) The wind condition at the top of the stack, including strength and direction.
Smoke making can look great to observers on the ground and the ship, because they are in proximity to it. I don't know how it would look to an aviator, but I do know from reading a lot of history that enemy warships have often been sighted by their haze they make.
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How would the altitude of the aircraft searching for the smoke affect the probability of seeing it Anthony?
1000 ft the best altitude?
Higher?
Lower?
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"How would the altitude of the aircraft searching for the smoke affect the probability of seeing it Anthony?"
It's hard for me to say. My experience in naval aircraft was always as a passenger, and I cannot remember any time when I looked out the window and saw smoke. The first time that I flew with the Navy, I was a passenger as a midshipman in a SH-60 Seahawk. We took off from the USS Halyburton (FFG-40) in the Caribbean and overflew some of the Virgin Islands. On the way back, I was struck for the first time how vast the sea was, and how tiny the ship was. (Halyburton was a Oliver Perry Hazard Class frigate, with a length of about 450 feet.) The Halyburton used LM2500 gas turbine engines, so she did not produce any visible smoke. As I recall, the pilots can rely on the ship's beacon, plus their radar to return home to the ship.
It seems to me that the altitude of the observer would increase the distance. In navigation and ship handling tasks, we found that the height of eye of the observer was important. The ballpark estimate for an observer on the ocean's surface in excellent conditions is that the horizon is 11 nautical miles away. Increasing the height of the observer increases this distance. The height of the object to be detected is also a factor. Ships are large, and the higher a ship's funnels are, the greater the distance you are going to see her. The Electra was tiny compared to a ship, and I would expect that observers at Howland would hear the plane before they actually saw it. If anyone was going to be first, I would say that Amelia Earhart should have seen Howland and Itasca first, and not the other way around.
An observer at 1000 feet is off my tables. I have altitude correction tables for up to 149 feet above the surface. But I imagine that a 1000 foot elevation would have given her the ability to see Itasca and Howland at a greater range, assuming of course that her visibility was not obscured by clouds.
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Thanks Anthony. I am trying to visualise what we have so far
An airplane at 1000ft
Circling, so covering all points of the compass and degrees of a circle
A White ship on a blue background putting out smoke
An island
And clouds!
Itasca didn't hear anything or see anything
AE and FN didn't see anything
Were they even as close as they and Itasca theorised? The previous observations would suggest not.
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Just to be clear on my thoughts, I think Commander Thompson ordered smoke making a little too early. My thoughts are based on some facts, some experience, and of course the speculation that always creeps in.
At 0614 (local time) Itasca receives and logs the following message from Earhart: "WANTS BEARING ON 3105 KCS // ON HOUR // WILL WHISTLE IN MIC ABOUT 200 MILES OUT// APPX// WHISTLING." I imagine her estimated range from Howland is based on the DR line that Fred Noonan is keeping, based on their last fix during the night. (Which we don't know or have anyway of knowing.)
The deck log of the Itasca indicates "Vessel began laying down heavy smoke to assist Miss Earhart." This entry appears immediately after the 0614 radio message, and the similar information regarding the 200 mile distance appears in the deck log with a local time of 0614.
Commander Thompson orders the fireroom to produce black smoke. This was most likely done by increasing fuel supply of bunker oil to the burner fronts, and throttling back the air registers to the boiler. (The whereabouts and contents of the engineroom logs are not known to me right now.) There is probably a delay of only a couple of minutes before the fireroom begins making smoke. The local wind on the surface is strong, so the term "laying down" smoke is pretty accurate. The local wind is flattening the smoke and dispersing it as it drifts away from the ship, streaming it into a horizontal smudgy haze and eventually dissipating altogether.
The fireroom makes smoke for about 30 minutes. At some point, the senior watch stander in the engineroom is getting concerned about the safe operation of the boiler with so much bunker oil being burned in a black smoke condition. He probably called the bridge and requested permission to stop. The commanding officer or Officer of the Deck would either grant it or refuse. If ceasing smoke was refused, at some point the Chief Engineer is going to want to talk to Commander Thompson and point out the dangers by continued smoke making, and Commander Thompson has to make a decision between helping Amelia Earhart find Howland Island, and endangering the Itasca.
Meanwhile, the radio room is struggling to get contact with the Electra. The ship is packed with reporters and various civilian guests, and the watchstanders on the bridge of the Itasca are concerned with topside operations such as monitoring Itasca's position westward of Howland Island, and the boats that were launched carrying the landing parties to Howland. It's not surprising that the deck log omits any reference of when the smoke making stopped.
I don't know whether a compromise was reached with Commander Thompson as to smoke making. Perhaps he ordered it intermittently, or perhaps it ceased altogether. The engineering logs would help.
At 0645, around the time the Engineering Department would want to stop making so much black smoke, the Itasca radio personnel log the following: "PSE (please) TAKE BEARING ON US AND REPORT IN HALF HOUR -- I WILL MAKE NOISE IN MIC -- ABT 100 MILES OUT."
Again, I think this estimate of range from Howland is based on the DR. (I do find it hard to believe that the Electra has covered 100 miles in half an hour. This reflects that Amelia is bad at putting times on her fixes and estimated positions.)
James Kamakaiwi later reports that the Itasca was making huge clouds of smoke. That tells us that smoke was being made, but not when or how long. A reporter later notes that when the Itasca leaves Howland to search, she is making smoke. But that would be typical, because boilers in those days did not have the automatic controls that we have today. As the ship began ordering speed, the Itasca would drain current on the electric motor powering the ship's screw. This would increase steam demand on the turbine generator, which would in turn increase demand on the boiler. The fireroom personnel must then increase feedwater flow to the boiler, and increase fuel and air to the burners. The ship would make smoke during acceleration, until the fireroom was able to get the water, air, and fuel flowing at a rate to meet the demand. Then the smoke would taper off.
At 0742, Radioman Galten's radio log has the following: "KHAQQ CLNG ITASCA WE MUST BE ON YOU BUT CANNOT SEE U BUT GAS IS RUNNING LOW BEEN UNABLE TO REACH YOU BY RADIO WE ARE FLYING AT A 1000 FEET." Of course, we don't know when Amelia Earhart descended to 1000 feet, or what her altitude was at the 0614 transmission of her being 200 miles out.
This is almost an hour and a half after the deck log indicates smoke making began. From all of that, my conclusion is that Commander Thompson started smoke making early. He should have started at 0730, not 0614, but I can understand his decision given the amount of confusion over when Amelia left Lae, where she was, her confusing estimates of her distance from the island, and logical assumptions (which were probably erroneous) that the Electra was travelling faster than it actually was.
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At 0614 (local time) Itasca receives and logs the following message from Earhart: "WANTS BEARING ON 3105 KCS // ON HOUR // WILL WHISTLE IN MIC ABOUT 200 MILES OUT// APPX// WHISTLING." I imagine her estimated range from Howland is based on the DR line that Fred Noonan is keeping, based on their last fix during the night. (Which we don't know or have anyway of knowing.)
The deck log of the Itasca indicates "Vessel began laying down heavy smoke to assist Miss Earhart." This entry appears immediately after the 0614 radio message, and the similar information regarding the 200 mile distance appears in the deck log with a local time of 0614.
Commander Thompson orders the fireroom to produce black smoke.
The fireroom makes smoke for about 30 minutes. At some point, the senior watch stander in the engineroom is getting concerned about the safe operation of the boiler with so much bunker oil being burned in a black smoke condition. He probably called the bridge and requested permission to stop. The commanding officer or Officer of the Deck would either grant it or refuse. If ceasing smoke was refused, at some point the Chief Engineer is going to want to talk to Commander Thompson and point out the dangers by continued smoke making, and Commander Thompson has to make a decision between helping Amelia Earhart find Howland Island, and endangering the Itasca.
I imagine that this conversation went something like this:
The engineering officer, Lt (j.g.) Brandenburg, comes onto the bridge.
Er..Sir?
WHAT IS IT NOW, BRANDENBURG?
I'm becoming concerned that if we keep making smoke we might cause damage to the boilers, I believe we should secure from making smoke.
WELL LIEUTENANT, I GUESS YOU DIDN'T NOTICE THAT THE REASON WE ARE HERE IS BECAUSE OF COMMAND EMPHASIS THAT COMES ALL THE WAY FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. WHY DO YOU THINK THEY BUILT A WHOLE AIRPORT FOR HER ON THIS SPECK OF AN ISLAND? I HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO MAKE SMOKE TO GUIDE HER IN AND SHE HAS BEEN NOTIFIED TO LOOK FOR THIS SMOKE AND NOW YOU WANT ME TO DISOBEY MY ORDERS AND STOP MAKING SMOKE? IS THAT WHAT YOU WANT, LIEUTENANT?
Well Sir, that would be the safest thing to do to protect the boilers.
LIEUTENANT, YOU SEE ALL THOSE CIVILIANS OUT THERE ON DECK AND ON THE ISLAND, THEY KNOW WE ARE SUPPOSED TO MAKE SMOKE. IF ANYTHING GOES WRONG, AND SHE DOESN'T MAKE IT, THOSE CIVILIANS WILL RUSH TO PUT THE BLAME ON THE COAST GUARD, THAT MEANS TO PUT THE BLAME ON ME! IT ALREADY LOOKS LIKE THIS OPERATION IS GOING TO HELL IN A HAND BASKET BECAUSE THAT DIZZY DAME DOESN'T KNOW PROPER RADIO PROCEDURE AND SHE JUST ASKED US TO TAKE A BEARING ON HER AND WE HAD INFORMED HER THAT OUR RADIO DIRECTION FINDER DOESN'T HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO WORK HER FREQUENCIES. I'M NOT GOING TO LOSE MY CAREER BECAUSE YOU ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE BOILERS!
SO NO, LIEUTENANT, WE ARE NOT GOING TO SECURE FROM MAKING SMOKE AND YOU ARE GOING TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO KEEP MAKING SMOKE, I DON'T CARE IF YOU PERSONALLY HAVE TO PUT ON AN ASBESTOS SUIT AND GO INTO THE FIREBOX AND SCRUB THE TUBES WITH YOUR OWN TOOTHBRUSH. HAVE I MADE MYSELF CLEAR, LIEUTENANT?
Yes Sir!
NOW GET OUT OF MY SIGHT!
Yes Sir!
gl
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Well, whatever the case really was with the smoke, apparently AE didn't see it.
If it was laid down as heavily as you believe, Gary, where would the search box had to have been to have missed it?
LTM -
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The 'other' direction along the LOP ?
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J. Nevill asked Gary,
"where would the search box had to have been to have missed it?"
Jeff wrote:
The 'other' direction along the LOP ?
That's got my vote! :)
dp
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I imagine that this conversation went something like this:
Confrontations like that may seem campy, but have never been uncommon.
In 1950, the USS Missouri ran hard aground on Thimble Shoals in the Chesapeake. Although the CO was desperately trying to extricate himself from the shoal, the engineers were shutting down equipment and ballasting down. "Hard aground, ballast down." The CO was later relieved, and the Chief Engineer promoted.
In 1996, we pulled into Singapore for a port visit. Our XO, who had good intentions but a lack of technical skills, insisted on going cold iron and plugging our ship's 4 shore power cables into the pier. Our department, from the Chief Engineer to the electricians protested, pointing out that plugging 60 Hz equipment into a 50 Hz source was a very bad idea. The CO deferred to the XO, and we were overruled. Fortunately, when the working party went to plug in our shore power cables, the connecting fittings didn't match. Whoever designed the pier facilities had enough foresight to make it idiot proof for Americans.
These issues happen all the time. A good CO will know when to rely on his technical experience or rely on those who have it. Command at sea carries with it absolute authority, and absolute responsibility.
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Just to be clear on my thoughts, I think Commander Thompson ordered smoke making a little too early. My thoughts are based on some facts, some experience, and of course the speculation that always creeps in.
In the past we have discussed whether Thompson made smoke too LATE since the wind speed was low the smoke would not have had enough time to extend far downwind. ...
gl
N.B.: Obsolete link removed. MXM, SJ
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I have created this FAQ to accumulate, as much as possible, all posts about Itasca's capacity to make smoke, the color of the smoke, the visibility of the smoke, the duration of the smoke, and all other smoke-related questions. If you have other favorite posts on this topic, please place links to those posts and/or threads here.
Thanks.
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Any chance of those surviving somewhere?
I sent an e-mail to the U.S. Coast Guard Historian's Office, inquiring about the Itasca's engineering logs. I received the following reply this morning: "The USCG Historian's Office does not maintain logs. To my knowledge, engineering logs are not permanent record, as such they would have been destroyed."
I'm still looking. :-\