TIGHAR
Amelia Earhart Search Forum => Radio Reflections => Topic started by: Heath Smith on February 12, 2012, 11:21:58 AM
-
On the Transmission heard from 16020 page:
17:47 GMT : Howland Island states: "Picked up Earhart (using long antenna, S3, hardly any carrier. Seemed overmodulated. Switched over to loop for Bearing, S1 - 0. She stopped Transmission). Bearing Nil. 3105."
This was 5 minutes after her 17:42 GMT transmission where she stated that she was 200 Miles out. The units are presumed to be nautical miles for the report.
Because Howland was fiddling with the radio, switching from voice to the DF, they probably missed what was said. I believe the Itasca log states it was "Working Howland, Passing on the dope" around this time so they probably missed this transmission as well.
What is interesting, if my calculations are correct, the sun would have just peaked over the horizon if the the Electra had not yet descended from 10,000ft. From what I understand, there were recommendations to start the descent at about 150NM out, so it would make sense if they were still at 10,000ft.
Running the numbers for sunrise at a 1,000ft altitude, this event would have not happened until approximately 17:51 GMT.
If she was trying to report seeing the sunrise, this would have validated that they were accurately tracking their speed and distances at least longitudinally as they made their approach to Howland.
It is really unfortunate that they decided to fiddle with the radio on Howland right at that moment as we will never know what she was actually attempting to communicate.
I do however think it is a plausible explanation as to why she popped in on the radio after her 17:42 GMT report.
-
according to this radio message they dropped from 10,000ft to 7000ft at 3pm due to cumulus clouds
next message was at 5pm an they were at 7000ft makeing 150 knots
-
Richie,
I am not sure how the reports outside of Lae relate to being at 10,000ft on approach to Howland. I believe that Johnson had recommended 10,000ft for the later portion of the trip.
-
I had another thought about AE witnessing the sunrise on approach and basically flight almost directly toward the sunrise (10 degrees to the port side) for an hour and a half (until 19:12GMT), I am wondering if she suffered from what is called Disability Glare or another form called Scotomatic glare that causes temporary "blind spots" in your vision and also affects your ability to pick up subtle contrast.
Even if she had sunglasses on board, depending on the quality of the lenses, the effect of the sunlight might have impaired her vision especially over a prolonged period of time. While wearing sunglasses, this probably would have impaired her ability to monitor her gauges that we probably only dimly illuminated. This might have reduced the frequency that she was checking on her gauges and especially the compass(es).
I did find some references on the forum (dated back to 2004 and earlier) that she was carrying various types of sunglasses on the Electra at times. Do we have any evidence that she had a pair on her 2nd world attempt? Are there any photos of her wearing a pair before she departed Lae? This would seem to be an important detail.
If she did not have a pair of sunglasses when she departed Lae this probably would have had a major impact on her ability to make the final approach to Howland.
A couple of interesting links:
http://www.ideafinder.com/history/inventions/sunglasses.htm (http://www.ideafinder.com/history/inventions/sunglasses.htm)
http://www.visioninaviation.com/sunglasses-aircrew-pg-7 (http://www.visioninaviation.com/sunglasses-aircrew-pg-7)
-
Another reason to believe that FN planned an offset approach to Howland, either from the NNW on the 337/157 sunline LOP( sun rising off the Port wing) or from the SSE on the 157/337 sunline LOP(sun ising off the Starboard wing)
-
Harry,
If I understood Gary's comments about the rising sun, reliable readings could not be taken at sunrise but rather you had to wait a full hour after sunrise.
Is there any sort of collection of photos taken from Howland that morning? I saw one black and white photo taken from shore toward the Itasca, I am not sure what time, and the sky appeared to be quite overcast.
Despite the fact that they were flying a 157/337 heading an hour after arrival to where they thought Howland should have been perhaps they were unable to take a fix using the sun to determine longitude.
-
Heath---my point exactly--
-
Harry,
If I understood Gary's comments about the rising sun, reliable readings could not be taken at sunrise but rather you had to wait a full hour after sunrise.
Is there any sort of collection of photos taken from Howland that morning? I saw one black and white photo taken from shore toward the Itasca, I am not sure what time, and the sky appeared to be quite overcast.
Despite the fact that they were flying a 157/337 heading an hour after arrival to where they thought Howland should have been perhaps they were unable to take a fix using the sun to determine longitude.
I think Gary's point was that you cannot get a reliable 'at sunrise' shot - too much error, but that you can establish a sun line during the first hour of sunrise.
I don't think you can establish a position north or south based on observation of the sun at that time - only by a shot when sun is at the meridian (highest point in day where you are) - that would have been hours too late. That leaves the flight constrained to DR for north-south placement.
But Gary also did also explain how a second line could have been derived from the moon - thus perhaps a means of establishing within tolerances of some miles what 'point' of the globe you were on (by where the two LOP cross).
If FN managed to get all those things done, something else must have happened because it obviously didn't work out so well...
If it was overcast where NR16020 happened to be, then those shots would have been pretty tough to make, to say the least.
If it was undercast where NR16020 happened to be, then spotting an island might have been pretty tough, too.
So much we don't know - and it's been illustrated here by the 17:47 prospect that we (from Itasca and Howland records) may not know all the calls that AE actually made, and will never know if there were more. If calls were made but not heard, they could have included much other crucial information - clues we'll never have. We can proceed only on what we do know.
LTM -
-
I think Gary's point was that you cannot get a reliable 'at sunrise' shot - too much error, but that you can establish a sun line during the first hour of sunrise.
I believe he was saying that FN could not take an accurate reading until the sun was 6 degrees above the horizon (http://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,533.msg7676.html#msg7676).
He also stated that FN would need to wait at least one half hour to take a reading and that an optimal reading would require waiting a full hour before attempting to do so.
If it was overcast an hour after they arrived and they were maintaining the 1,000ft altitude as they had upon arrival, it is possible that they could not take either a reading using the sun or the moon. Perhaps the intent was to fly the 157/337 heading until they could take a reading but that appears to have not worked out.
-
simple mistake's seem to be main concern by radio man of itasca
i am gunna quote what i think it shud say
KHAQQ TO ITASCA WE ARE ON THE LINE 157 337 WE WILL REPT MSG, WE WILL REPT THIS ON 6210 KCS WAIT 3105 /A3 S5
KHAQQ XMISION WE ARE RUNNING ON N ES S, LSNIN 6210 KCS
THE RADIO MAN THEN GOES ON TO SAY PLZ STAY ON 3105 KCS DO NOT HR U ON 6210
OBVIOUSLY HE DONT BECAUSE SHE IS LSNIN ON 6210 KCS NOT TALKIN
or av i got that wrong ???
on attached image
-
an if am right they are trying to communicate with her on 3105 when she is listerning on 6210 kcs
so is amelia at fault because she was speaking on 3105 then changeing to 6210 to listern for reply ?
even thou she wouldnt hear them anyway
-
Wasn't the observation window for FN on the right side of the aircraft? If so, wouldn't it make sense for AE/FN to turn to the North in order to get that last sun shot? If these ideas are correct wouldn't a South offset be the logical assumption?
Ted Campbell
-
Wasn't the observation window for FN on the right side of the aircraft? If so, wouldn't it make sense for AE/FN to turn to the North in order to get that last sun shot? If these ideas are correct wouldn't a South offset be the logical assumption?
Ted Campbell
There were windows on both sides so observations could be made on either side as was done on the flight to Hawaii. I read on TIGHAR that a special window has been installed on the left side made out of special flat glass so that observations to the left side could be a little more accurate than in other directions but I don't know where this information comes from, Ric? If this is true, then this is one more reason to intercept to the north-northwest which would place the sun out on the left wingtip. Either way, sights were taken on all bearings.
gl
-
I think Gary's point was that you cannot get a reliable 'at sunrise' shot - too much error, but that you can establish a sun line during the first hour of sunrise.
I believe he was saying that FN could not take an accurate reading until the sun was 6 degrees above the horizon (http://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,533.msg7676.html#msg7676).
He also stated that FN would need to wait at least one half hour to take a reading and that an optimal reading would require waiting a full hour before attempting to do so.
If it was overcast an hour after they arrived and they were maintaining the 1,000ft altitude as they had upon arrival, it is possible that they could not take either a reading using the sun or the moon. Perhaps the intent was to fly the 157/337 heading until they could take a reading but that appears to have not worked out.
He had to wait 25 minutes for the sun to climb above six degrees because his computation tables were limited to higher altitudes, see attached refraction table from Noonan's navigation tables. Also see further discussion available here (https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/discussions/the-myth-of-the-sunrise-lop).
The sun rose at 1745 Z in the vicinity of Howland island. The sun climbed to six degrees at 1810 Z. The sun's azimuth changed to 066° at 1847 Z which would change the LOP to 156° - 336° so we know that Noonan did his calculations for the period prior to 1847 Z leaving about a half hour for the observations.
gl
-
if am right they are trying to communicate with her on 3105 when she is listerning on 6210 kcs
Richie,
I believe the radio guy was quickly trying to talk to her hoping that she was still listening when he asked her not to go to 6210 Khz. The reason he did this was because the Itasca did not have voice capability on that frequency, they could only send her Morse code on that frequency that neither AE or FN were proficient at. This would have limited any information that Itasca could send to her since it had to be transmitted very slowly for them to understand it. Even then, they might not have been able to properly decode.
-
The sun rose at 1745 Z in the vicinity of Howland island. The sun climbed to six degrees at 1810 Z. The sun's azimuth changed to 066° at 1847 Z which would change the LOP to 156° - 336° so we know that Noonan did his calculations for the period prior to 1847 Z leaving about a half hour for the observations.
The NW intercept does make a lot of sense if that was the original plan. Perhaps the detour after leaving Lae threw a wrench in to those plans. I believe that cost them roughly about an hour and a half to bypass the storm.
Looking at the timeline for approach, when she stated that they were 200NM out at 17:42GMT, and they thought they had arrived at Howland at 19:12GMT, the speed of approach would have been roughly 150MPH. If they were already on the line, headed South taking readings, the should have already been on the line at 200NM out.
If you believe that they saw the Ontario at 10:30GMT and they were already on the line at 17:42GMT ("200 miles out") the ground speed achieved would have been about 153 knots versus 130 knots if they came straight in. Assuming a 23 knot headwind as reported by AE from the ENE, this would put their air speed at roughly 170 knots or 196 MPH. This speed would have required maximum fuel consumption. Of course if you do not believe that the Ontario was seen there is a possibility that the numbers would work out differently.
Perhaps FN had some other motivation for using the 157/337 line as an advanced line of position? He probably spent a considerable amount of time poring over the details of the flight before he left Lae. Other than seen Baker on the way, is there any other advantage to being on that heading regardless of your ETA?
Unless they were already on the line as you suggested, it does not make a lot of sense to stick to the line an hour later. They must have been following a magnetic heading at 20:13GMT. If FN was such a capable guy, why would they have not taken more readings after 19:12GMT that would have put them on a different heading? To me this would almost suggest that further readings were not possible due to the sky conditions.
The one advantage perhaps of stating that you were on the line was that they would know where to start looking for you had you told them that you were North or South of Howland. Because they did not include this information it was a toss up as to whether you looked toward the North or South. They chose North and did not find them.
-
I think she saw the Myrtle Bank, which was between Nauru and the Ontario. So her course was a little further north. I say that because, the Captain of the MB sated he heard a plane overhead, and the Ontario didnt report anything. So that tells me she was flying over the MB, south of Nauru Island, and north of the Ontario.
-
I think she saw the Myrtle Bank, which was between Nauru and the Ontario. So her course was a little further north. I say that because, the Captain of the MB sated he heard a plane overhead, and the Ontario didnt report anything. So that tells me she was flying over the MB, south of Nauru Island, and north of the Ontario.
It is also possible that she saw the Ontario at 10:30GMT and the deck hand on the Myrtle Bank did hear the plan sometime later. The position of the Myrtle Bank at the time is very sketchy. The deck hand also reported the time to be around 10:30pm (local time, whatever local time he was using).
-
Heath's two lines "...They must have been following a magnetic heading at 20:13GMT." and "...The one advantage perhaps of stating that you were on the line..." may imply to some folks that following a line of position is somehow different from flying a compass heading. You don't/can't follow a fixed line on the map, you can only follow compass headings, allowing for winds. You still maintain a fixed compass heading while you "fly the line".
Sunrise can give you a known line of position, but not a known point of position. We believe Fred was likely to have precalculated this line. Knowing their airspeed, and in real time, he could recalculate the flying time and distance to a parallel line that ran through Howland. They then "only" needed to fly that calculated distance ("the line"), then turn to the compass heading he figures will take them to Howland, and then fly that compass heading. It's ded-reckoning, with help from the sun-line to reduce error on one axis. Somewhere in there their navigational error grew big enough they missed the island.
-
John,
The reason I mentioned the 20:13GMT and the heading is because as Gary pointed out, they would not have been on a 157/337 if they had obtained a new celestial observation using the sun. This sort of implies a new fix was not possible.
-
Heath,
thanks for the clarification. You also made a good point that " perhaps ...stating that you were on the line was that they would know where to start looking for you...". This makes sense to me, but the point seems to have been missed by the Captain of the Itasca. He did not steam up and down "the line" looking for the aircraft. That makes me think that even he didn't appreciate the significance of the "157/337" line.
-
Commander Thompson prolly didn't have anymore info then than we have now, 200 miles out, 100 miles out, miust be on you, running on line,circling, running NesS and maybe only half hour of fuell left. Was she flying NNW 337 or SSE157? He guessed NW. 50/50.
Did anyone even think about alternate Plan B? and look at a chart and ask themselves which way theymight fly to hit land after they missed Howland? Closest land wasn't NW it was 40 nm away to the SE Baker Island. But... Just a dimple in the ocean.
That's what happens when ya put all your eggs in the "success" basket and don't ask "What If" we (They) miss Howland?
-
Heath
When she reported "200 miles out" was she reporting statute miles or nautical miles?
Half an hour later she reported "100 miles out" If we are to believe thhis then she was flying 200 statute miles per hour in the first instance or 200 knots (230 mph) in the second instance. The never exceed speed for the Electra was 202 mph. In the first case she was burning fuel like crazy at a time when she could ill afford to. Likewise in the second case and also prolly burning up the engines.
Do we know anything aboit her reporting habits, statute miles and mph or nautical miles and knots or did she even have any consistent reporting habits?
-
Harry,
Initially I was under the assumption that the units were statute miles. After asking around on the forum and checking several books on the subject, all agree that it must have been in nautical miles. I am not sure if she had made similar statements on the radio during other approaches but that would be interesting to attempt to verify.
If you read the transcripts or carefully Earhart stated that she "will" transmit at 100 miles out. She never said "we are" 100 miles out. It appears that most witnesses on the Itasca assumed she meant that she "was" 100 miles out. For example at 18:12 GMT we find "Itasca bridge log states: "Miss Earhart reported position 100 miles from island reception fair.". See Transmissions heard from NR16020. (http://tighar.org/wiki/Transmissions_heard_from_NR16020)
For myself, I believe they were approaching at about 150 MPH (130 knots). With that assumption at the time of the 18:12 GMT transmission they would have been about 132 NM out (150 SM). Again using the 150 MPH assumption, the actual "100 miles" out message should have been received around 18:28 GMT however this was never received. What is interesting is that they also did not hear from Earhart at 18:45 GMT which would have been on her normal schedule. From 18:12 GMT to 19:10 - 19:12 GMT, nothing was heard from the Electra. Perhaps Earhart slipped up as they were approaching after such a long flight. It is also possible that Itasca or Howland was transmitting at the time walking over her transmission as was the case at 17:47 GMT. If the Itasca and Howland were listening, they should have picked up a signal even if very weak but there was nothing in the logs that I can find.
-
I can remember reading somewhat that AE stated that if she had trouble finding Howland, that she would fly back to the Gilberts. That certainly would have put her at fuel exhaustion. Noonan had the pacific charts, and knew that the Phoenix gro was SSE of Howland. If they missed Howland, fly SSE to see Baker, then possibly Jarvis. Gardner and McKean are further south, but one of the reefs (Winslow?) is between the 2.
Am I correct :o tht at 1000 feet altitude you have visibility of about 40 miles in clear weather? That would be 80 total miles in either east to west visibility, and 40 in the direction of flight. (No point in looking backwards). Now spotting an island at 40 miles and 1000 feet would be tough.
Perhaps if it were possible for her to gain some altitude it would help. Gradual climb wouldnt effect the fuel burn too much, but at, say 3500 feet, there would be a better chance of seeing an island in the blue water, AND if necessary more glide time if needed.
Just a thought-
-
Tom
Remember that in a climb you are trading forward speed for altitude , and using more fuel to lift the plane up to a higher altitude and extending the time to get there because of the reduced speed. Obviously a trade off to extend your visibility by the square root of the increased altitude.
Decisions, decesions, decisions.
-
harry ---I menat to say a gradual climb--maybe 200-300 feet /minute. Slightly aft wheel, but not changing the engine profile alot. Yes it would take a awile to go to the extra 2000 feet----10 min-15 mins---but the extra visiblilty would be worth it as long as the winds aloft, and clod cover didnt ruin the plan. I would thik that the electra might glide farther from 3000 ft than at 1000 feet.
Unless of course, it glides like boulder---
-
Tom
Yes it would glide farther and longer time-wise from 3000 than 1000.
The plane would have an optimum rate of descent for maximum glide distance. I don't know what was for the Electra
Since there is no free lunch, even at 200 ft/min you would have to increase power to climb. It's still a trade off but maybe the increased visibility would be worth it.
-
The Electra's props didn't feather. Planes with props that don't feather tend to glide like really efficient bricks. It helps if the props can be stopped, but that also loses airspeed and altitude, both of which are precious. A pilot thinking ahead would land with engines idling, given the option. That would tend to guarantee at least a little fuel left in the tanks.
-
The Electra's props didn't feather. Planes with props that don't feather tend to glide like really efficient bricks. It helps if the props can be stopped, but that also loses airspeed and altitude, both of which are precious. A pilot thinking ahead would land with engines idling, given the option. That would tend to guarantee at least a little fuel left in the tanks.
Even though the props don't feather you still pull them back all the way which reduces drag and improves the glide performance.
gl
-
"... improves the glide performance."
Gary, do you have any estimate of the expected descent rate with both engines out and both props in "low drag" position?
-
John
Been a long time but I think my Piper Warrior PA 28-160 had a fixed prop and a glide ratio approaching 10 to 1 Hardly a brick.
-
"... improves the glide performance."
Gary, do you have any estimate of the expected descent rate with both engines out and both props in "low drag" position?
With most twins you don't lose both engines at exactly the same time
because the engines are being fed from two separate tanks and they don't
hit empty at exactly the same time. Earhart's plane was different and
the fuel system did supply both engines from the same tank so AE would
lose both engines at the same time when she ran out of fuel. From repoort 487
I computed that her max L/D ratio was 11.89 which would be approximately her
glide ratio but it would be something less, due to the drag of the windmilling
propellers so a ratio of 10 to 1 is reasonable to assume. At her empty
weight, the best glide speed would be about 100 mph so this means she
would be going down at a rate of 10 mph which is 14.7 feet per second.
One thousand feet divided by 14.7 feet per second means the airplane
would splash down in 68 seconds. Different reasonable assumptions for
glide ratio and best glide speed won't make a big difference in the time
to splash.
Every book that discusses ditching recommend making a controlled
ditching prior to using the last drop of fuel. With power still
available you can choose the best heading that is parallel to the swells
and you can adjust your touch down point to avoid hitting the face of a
wave and can land on top of the swells which gives you the best chance
for survival. According to AFM 64-6, Aircraft Emergency Procedures Over
Water, with winds less than 25 knots you do not try to land into the
wind but land parallel to the swells. If the swells are not
perpendicular to the wind then choose the heading that is parallel to
the swells and has the larger headwind component. Only with a wind speed
greater than 35 knots should you select a heading directly into the
wind. Between 25 and 35 knots you choose an intermediate heading.
gl
-
"so AE would lose both engines at the same time when she ran out of fuel."
That's an assumption, Mr. LaPook. You weren't there. Neither was anyone else who participates on these discussion boards (that we are aware of) - so flatly making statements about what the final moments of her flight were like are, at best, idle speculation. And so are any scenarios derived from same, without hard evidence to back them up.
LTM,
Monty Fowler,
TIGHAR No. 2189 CER
-
Actually, no disrespect Monty, I think Gary is correct on this. If both engines are drawing from the same tank, they would both lose power at the same time, or very nearly so. The only differences between which goes first would be due to a fairly significant difference in the mixture settings and a greater length of plumbing of the fuel lines. I don't think, given the rate of fuel burn, that the length of lines is going to provide enough extra fuel to keep one engine turning much longer than the other. Essentially, they are both going to lose power close enough to the same time to say it is. As a non-pilot, why would you want both engines drawing from one source? Seems to me if you encounter a fuel problem in a twin, you would at least have some time to sort it out if one engine remains on line. Where all Electras plumbed to draw from one tank for both engines or was that due to the additional tanks in this Electra? LTM- John
-
John,
Yes, Gary's more or less correct in the narrow technical sense - IF AE got to that point.
However - and with no disrespect to you or Mr. LaPook, what I see in Monty's post that I strongly agree with is that here Gary is slipping flame-out and ditch-n-sink into the '17:47 GMT Transmission' thread - as if a statement of fact. What, pray tell, would have led to this predicament?
There was ample fuel remaining at this point according to all we know about NR16020's capacities and endurance capabilities. How odd that we've been led to 'splash-n-sink' so quickly from a humble review of the rising sun and it's import on the flight's placement...
LTM -
-
John Joseph
Aircraft designer/builders have learned not to put all there fuell eggs in one basket so to speak and present twins don't draw from one tank.
Also pilots are trained to alternate fuel usage from fuel in one wing tank to the other for reasons of balance. We're also taught to draw from fuel from both tanks during critical times in the flight, like takeoffs, climbs, landings, etc.
You may rmember the John Denver fatal crash. The plane he had just bought was a home-built that had the fuel tank selector valve controller in a non-standard location (behind his left shoulder) and it required a tool (pliers, channel locks) to operate it.
I hope I have the salient facts right, but Gary LaPook can correct me, he was an attorney in the law case. When the fuel was exhausted in one wing tank and he was, pesumably, trying to switch to the other wing tank the engine stopped turning, as engines are want to do without fuel, and he went into the water.
Unevaluted CHANGE can lead to unexpected and undesirable CONSEQUENCES.
-
. As a non-pilot, why would you want both engines drawing from one source? Seems to me if you encounter a fuel problem in a twin, you would at least have some time to sort it out if one engine remains on line. Where all Electras plumbed to draw from one tank for both engines or was that due to the additional tanks in this Electra? LTM- John
Yes, as hard as it is to believe today, the standard fuel system on Electras had both engines fed from the same tank. There were two selector valves in series mounted low on the instrument panel as shown on Amelia's plane. The first one selected one of the four wing tanks and the second valve selected the engines to be fed from that tank. An Earhart's plane they add a fifth position on the tank selector valve that then went to the cabin tanks. Today's regulations would not allow such a fuel system.
gl
-
Gary was an attorney in the John Denver case? Is that correct Gary? ----
HUM
-
That's right Gary. Rules in 1937 were different than today. It has been mistakes made in history that guide us today. Mechanical and electronic components have improved. New aids developed. Procedures improved. But people don't change. Just their training. AE and FN would have used their heads when they didn't find Howland. They would have used their training and nav skills to come up with a plan Or did they really just stick with trying to find Howland with searches until they ran out of fuel. No other plan?
-
Jeff
Assuming that AE had only a half hour of fuel at 2025 GCT, 0843 Itasca, and Thompson knew she was flying N&S on 157/337, why didn't he put in a launch to search N and go S with the Itasca? Tunnel Vision, a military failing?
-
One good point from all the fuel talk drift here - the Electra did have a fairly simple fuel system. I don't see evidence in what we know of the system being mishandled and causing an early loss of the flight. I think that is unlikely to have happened.
LTM -
All very good points Jeff. Your last point above reminds me that IF there was a mechanical issue with fuel consumption or excessive burn rate then the fuel gauge would have shown there was an issue. AE and FN would likely be matching fuel consumption to distance flown and realize there was an issue. I would think they would have returned to Lae if this rapid fuel consumption was detected before the point of no return. I speculate that IF there was a fuel consumption problem the it was after the point of no return and AE would have likely made some reference to it. Why make a reference? A decent sized ship is waiting for them. No other task but to support AE. IF she had a fuel problem past the point of no return then call for help and ask Itasca to come to your assistance before you possibly run out of fuel. Easier and safer to ditch beside the cutter instead of on your own with no survival gear including Very pistol.
But why no mention of this? Because we already know the Electra had enough fuel.
So Harry, if you're down to a half hours fuel wouldn't you be trying to get Itasca, idly sitting at anchor waiting for you, to come to you? Even though she had poor radio contact she still transmitted as though people could hear her. If she thought she was going to ditch Gary then why not attempt to get Itasca to come to her. At least send a message on all radio channels she had saying "ditching now...position is xx yy".
-
IRV
My comment about the "launch" was just a comment on Thompson's actions in steaming off to the NW.
I personally don't believe the "pnly half hour fuel " entry. I believe she had 5, perhaps more hours left after the 0855 transmission
-
Harry. In my book you're listed as a true TIGHAR believer. I should also clarify that since there was no message from AE, Thompson should have done as much as he could to search for her. That's his job. He did leave some people on Howland. I presume in case AE actually, miraculously, landed there. I don't know the range of his ships boats but I believe the sea state was relatively calm and he could have launched his boats in other directions. But hindsight is what we are using here. I feel some sadness for Thompson because he is all alone out there and he probably felt some responsibility for AE not getting to Howland. Not because of what he did or didn't do but because his ship couldn't make radio contact or help AE in any significant way. Plus he has his crew to keep safe. Now he has to go find her and he can only make educated guesses based on what info he has. Tough call.
-
Gary was an attorney in the John Denver case? Is that correct Gary? ----
HUM
Yes.
gl
-
One good point from all the fuel talk drift here - the Electra did have a fairly simple fuel system. I don't see evidence in what we know of the system being mishandled and causing an early loss of the flight. I think that is unlikely to have happened.
LTM -
So Harry, if you're down to a half hours fuel wouldn't you be trying to get Itasca, idly sitting at anchor waiting for you, to come to you? Even though she had poor radio contact she still transmitted as though people could hear her. If she thought she was going to ditch Gary then why not attempt to get Itasca to come to her. At least send a message on all radio channels she had saying "ditching now...position is xx yy".
Yep, and why didn't she say she was abandoning searching for Howland and that she would proceed to the south east to look for the Phoenix Islands?
gl
-
IRV
My comment about the "launch" was just a comment on Thompson's actions in steaming off to the NW.
I personally don't believe the "pnly half hour fuel " entry. I believe she had 5, perhaps more hours left after the 0855 transmission
So don't believe anything you want but those words were logged at the time and Thompson included those words in a message he sent out only one and a half hours after her last transmission. The transcript also notes that they were verified by others in the radio shack.
gl
-
Good point Gary. There are a number of forum threads that discuss this. Let's go over to those and discuss this. Cut down on thread drift.
-
So Harry, if you're down to a half hours fuel wouldn't you be trying to get Itasca, idly sitting at anchor waiting for you, to come to you? Even though she had poor radio contact she still transmitted as though people could hear her. If she thought she was going to ditch Gary then why not attempt to get Itasca to come to her. At least send a message on all radio channels she had saying "ditching now...position is xx yy".
Yep, and why didn't she say she was abandoning searching for Howland and that she would proceed to the south east to look for the Phoenix Islands?
gl
Good point Gary. There are a number of forum threads that discuss this. Let's go over to those and discuss this. Cut down on thread drift.
And the absence of either of these two possible radio messages do not carry equal weight. If the engines have stopped because she was out of fuel, or she had another emergency, then she would be busy actually ditching the plane and would not have much time to adjust her radio controls (if necessary) and send out a ditching message. There is an old flight instructor adage, "don't drop the airplane in order to pick up the microphone." To the contrary, if she decided to fly to the Phoenix islands then she had all the leisure in the world to sent that message many times over.
gl
-
Gary
"That" message.
Perhaps the radio wasn't working after she tried to CHANGE frequencies from 3105 to 6210 as she said she was gonna do?
-
Gary. Try this thread in the forum
http://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,333.msg3198.html#msg3198
Good stuff there on the lack of radio messages.
You're post about ditching.... You now think it suddenly happened? She wasn't watching her fuel gauges, as inaccurate as they were? You suggest in other posts that they had time to search. While searching she could be transmitting, if the radio is working. No radio messages then either. But now it's sudden. When do you think this surprise happened?
Can you reply to my post about FN being an adaptable navigator? You still insist on crashed and sank. Ok but disproving TIGHAR's hypothesis doesn't prove yours.
-
Gary was an attorney in the John Denver case? Is that correct Gary? ----
HUM
Yes and I provided a lot of detail about it on this thread (https://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,563.msg7925.html#msg7925).
gl
-
last of my thread drifts---
Gary---good for for defending ACS.
-
Did AE wear reading glasses? I caught a clip the other day, she was flying, and she appeared to put on a pair of reading glasses. They sure did not appear to be sun glasses.
Did she have an issue with her near vision? That might have ruled out the use of sun glasses on her approach that morning.
-
(cross-posted at the "parachute" thread, sorry for thread drift):
AE tried to use her DF on approach to Howland, according to the radio log. She said she could not get a minimum, meaning she could not determine what direction the signal was coming from. This also tells us the DF loop and receiver worked well enough to receive, if not capable of telling direction on 7500, the frequency she was listening to from Itasca at that moment. The unsuccessful Lae test was on 6540, which was also too high. She obviously didn't understand the loop's frequency limitation.
I think it is important to keep in mind that she could only receive on one frequency at a time, and that it took some time to change frequencies. When she reports that she hears Itasca, she's transmitting on 3105, and listening on 7500.
Had she switched her transmitter to 500, Itasca might have been able to get a DF bearing. She could transmit on 500, 3105 and 6210.