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Amelia Earhart Search Forum => General discussion => Topic started by: jgf1944 on May 04, 2014, 02:23:15 PM

Title: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: jgf1944 on May 04, 2014, 02:23:15 PM
Greetings TIGHAR archive foragers;
    I have combed the archives for informaton about the failed 1937 flight that is explicitly psychological in nature. I thought it might be useful to share a working bibliography with other foragers and researchers interested in the human aspects of that historic event (and the Niku hypothesis in general). The information I found pertains to two aspects of the flight.
    En Route to Howland. AE's voice was put on loudspeaker in the Itasca radio shack, and three listeners later described their perceptions of the quality of her voice. The descriptions suggest that AE was responding to the threat of failing to see Itasca and Howland when she expected to (probably at 07:42); namely, the listeners all reported perceiving fear (e.g., increased pitch) in AE's voice. These reports were in the Forum subject board "Did Earhart Panic" that appeared in early 2012 (URL given below per Thompson report). The reports constitute what precious little is known about AE during the flight other than her words as logged by the Itasca radio personnel. ●The Bellarts (chief radioman) report: Finding Amelia, page 100. (Caveat: report made in 1973, but it is descriptively in line with the two contemporaneous reports.) ●The Thompson (Itasca captain) report: Thompson Report (https://tighar.org/smf/index.php?topic=606.0) (click on the no panic.pdf attachment). (This is the second report--see Finding Amelia, p. 100 for parts of the first; the second is, IMO, more psychologically detailed.) ●The Kenner (Itasca XO) report: Kenner Report (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Documents/Letters/Kenner.pdf).
   Unprepared to Fly. Not being an aviator, I take on trust the prevalent belief that AE was apparently not cognitively ready for the 1937 flight. Specifically, she did not know Morse code sufficiently to use it effectively as a communication and navigational tool; and she did not seem to understand adequately what Ric calls "the capabilities and limitations" of the Electra radio. This is a useful source regarding the code feature ● Morse code (http://tighar.org/wiki/Morse_code). There are three sources regarding AE and her lack of preparedness to use the radio effectively. ● Joe Gurr on teaching (http://tighar.org/wiki/Modifications_by_Joe_Gurr) pulls up a lengthy document but keep hunting because Mr. Gurr's comments about AE's lack of radio preperation and his attempt to teach her are, if assumed reliable, psychologically revealing. Also, give attention to AE apparently avoiding taking the radio test as part of the renewal of her pilot's license before the world flight. Dr. Jacobson Randall (● Randall on avoidance (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Research/ResearchPapers/Worldflight/prepdepart.html)) was of the opinion that AE's apparent desire to avoid that test was “probably the first contributing factor to Earhart’s failure to reach Howland in July.” Last, Ric Gillespie (●  Gillespie on radio (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Research/ResearchPapers/Earhart.html)) paints the big picture about AE and the radio, “The fundamental cause of the flight’s failure to reach Howland seems to be Earhart’s failure to adequately understand the capabilities and limitations of her radio equipment."
   Allow me to cast the psych dice by suggesting that there is a common element to AE being unprepared as per code and the Electra radio. Self-discipline refers to completing something that is difficult or something one does not want to do. It is a facet of a major psychological trait called Conscientiousness (diligence as a synonym). IMO, AE was short on conscientiousness in the aviation domain--there are other instances of that in AE's psychological history.
   If you are aware of more psychological (or behavioral or psychiatric) sources pertinent to the Niku hypothesis--I have bookmarked Noonan's injury and Betty's Notebook and read Butler and Lovell--I would appreciate you sharing them.
   Ciao, Guthrie
(JGF is a retired research psychologist)
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Tim Gard on May 05, 2014, 12:09:57 AM
Amelia was a stick and rudder, dead reckoning type pilot who knew that she was largely on her own after departure. Radio was a complication that guaranteed nothing, but which could also be a comfort as when she first flew the Pacific in her Vega.

Amelia wrote about her anxieties and expressed the view that no-one should be concerned if things turned badly for her, because she would have made that flight anyway.

Anxiety would dominate anyone after 20 hours of flight only to reveal the sight of endless water where land had been expected, but that experience is part of the career of aviating. Lots of aircraft were lost over the Pacific subsequent to the Amelia tragedy.

One form of aviating anxiety is *not* making the flight, which has in itself the basis for causing accidents as you have mentioned. The pressure of being landlocked by weather, financial pressure or the feeling that remaining one day longer might induce yet another set back, perhaps mechanical, is part of the pressure of the career. Earlier in the world flight Amelia had departed under less than ideal weather and subsequently had to return.

Ric commented about Amelia's over confidence in the Finding Amelia video wherein he says that Amelia suffered from "acquired situational narcissism" or believing her own press. In order to fly the routes that Amelia did, involved a level of courage most mortals simply lacked and for which she was revered. Whether that trait was denial, a dreamy separation from reality or pure escapism in equal parts is individual to the piloting experience.

Essentially this last promotion of her own career by performing a world flight had everything riding on it financially and having told everyone it was going to happen now positioned Amelia on the horns of a dilemma - make the flight or lose credibility.


Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: JNev on May 07, 2014, 11:59:36 AM
Interesting prospect and summary, both of you (and I am woefully unqualified to judge in matters of formal psychology).

What does a situational narcissist do when confronted with the dare of her career, especially having left a fatalistic note (if I kick, no tears - I would have done this flight come hell or high water) approaching that of a suicidal's farewell?  She believes in her own press release and flies into the sun (apologies to Icarus). 

Makes total sense to me - and you two have illustrated the case very nicely.

What does Gary LaPook do when given a small single engine Cessna, a large gas-tank, a big ocean and an octant?  He delivers it overseas - to the right airport. 

What does Jeff do given same?  Stays home and thanks someone for the nice octant, which he couldn't use on firm ground.

Is Gary braver than Jeff?  Maybe well so - and then again, Jeff's not necessarily chicken - he's recognizing his own limitations, which are significantly greater than Gary's when it comes to celestial navigation getting his airborne behind out of a trans-oceanic crack.  I have no compelling notion about being the first woman to equatorially circumnavigate the earth and make Purdue and others proud of all they had invested in me, I'm more concerned about commuting safely to an office job for the rest of my career. 

Earhart was riding what amounted to a prairie schooner - 'Frisco or bust.  She does seem to have had deep faith in her native basics and apparently did not fully appreciate, by what we observe of treatment of radio, etc., the need of that subset of long-range aviation skills involving airwaves, etc.  Instead she seems to have placed Noonan there as a sort of 'preventer' and thought little more of it.

That leaves me as curious about Fred's mind-state as Amelia's - what was he thinking?  Was it lost on him just how short Earhart was on radio skills and coordination?  He doesn't seem to appear in the traffic regarding radio preparations and testing - so it is suggested to me that he was largely, and happily, ignorant of Earhart's ignorance - at least in sufficient degree to also become a lost person with her.

In sum it seems now that 1937 trans-Pacific aviation was just too dangerous for those having such blinders on - and the tragic motivations behind each individual are fairly clearly laid out: both were eager for success to come in the wake of having made this trip happen, each in their own way.  Well, motivations aren't necessarily tragic in of themselves - but the blind pursuit of them may well be, and so it may well have been - others may judge. 

Nowadays we fly oceans with nothing but the silent buzz of electrons pointing the way - it can be nearly mundane.  Little of the heroism attaches anymore.  Status has to do with risk, and risk has to do with loss; we have so much less of either today, thanks be.  Therefore most people fly oceans for relatively mundane reasons, not to become heroic pioneers. 

It then seems that cause celeb then is a great treasure to some - and it follows that it must raise a great risk, rational or not.  As such, it will often be taken up by those bent to have it.  Some of those who seek it will always fall into the literal or figurative ocean and disappear because 'no matter what' they'd 'do that flight', and being human - and driven, they can be strangely blind to the consequences of ignorance.

To this layman, it does seem radio wasn't important enough to rock Earhart's thinking before the flight because she did believe primarily in her own native abilities.  She'd by then flown to Hawaii with a  great team, but what was the big risk?  Noonan may well have fit the role of 'preventer' in her mind - a back-up to that which she took for granted - a radio that couldn't be that hard to handle, or Manning couldn't have done it (after all, she was the leader of this experiment, and therefore the smartest... as she might have seen it).  She did reveal a 'hell or high-water' mentality as I see it.

And here we are still looking for the most colossally lost flight of the 20th century... I wonder, what does that say of our own psychology?
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Monty Fowler on May 07, 2014, 12:07:26 PM
Dirty Harry summed it up very succinctly: "A man's got to know his limitations."

LTM, who knows his for the most part,
Monty Fowler, TIGHAR No. 2189 CER
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: JNev on May 07, 2014, 12:10:29 PM
Dirty Harry summed it up very succinctly: "A man's got to know his limitations."

LTM, who knows his for the most part,
Monty Fowler, TIGHAR No. 2189 CER

Well put - and it may be noted that Harry was a thinking man with a dirty job, not a starry-eyed dreamer.
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Friend Weller on May 08, 2014, 05:24:51 PM
Well put - and it may be noted that Harry was a thinking man with a dirty job, not a starry-eyed dreamer.

Nag, nag, nag....   ;D
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Tim Gard on May 09, 2014, 01:48:05 AM
For an insight into the aviator's psychology I've never been disappointed by Len Morgan's masterful Saturday Evening Post style. Within one sentence he could put me in the left seat of aircraft I'd never even flown ...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Len_Morgan

I read his articles in Flying magazine every month for years.

One of Len's quotes that stuck with me pertained to pre-flight checks and whether or not the aircraft could be rolled (forward or backward) to reveal the state of any hidden part of a tyre.

Len said ..

"I only worried about the bit I couldn't see."

 
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Tim Gard on May 09, 2014, 01:53:36 AM
Well put - and it may be noted that Harry was a thinking man with a dirty job, not a starry-eyed dreamer.

Nag, nag, nag....   ;D

LOL. The Gauntlet.
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: JNev on May 09, 2014, 08:08:21 AM
 ;D
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: manjeet aujla on May 09, 2014, 09:24:54 AM
There does seem to be a prevalent opinion that she was overconfident or unprepared (no expertise in morse code etc.). And it takes a small detail (lost antenna at lae, which was not her fault, etc.) to bring tragedy, and a brave woman is lost. The greeks knew it as 'hubris', and icarus did not listen when he was told not to fly too close to the sun. And yet, maybe  another impulse in him dared to fly closer to the sun, even though he knew that a price may have to be paid. Call it bravery, thrill-seeking, but it pushes all limits of knowledge further. And we owe it to people like AE.

imho.
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Tim Gard on May 09, 2014, 11:25:17 AM
There does seem to be a prevalent opinion that she was overconfident

I would have found both the Vega and the Electra to have been powerfully seductive aircraft. They would make heading out over an ocean seem a temptation rather than a concern. Position any newcomer at the controls and let them experience the power of those big radials and I'm sure they'd be back for more.

After all, no airframe or powerplant failure with either the Vega or the Electra was ultimately responsible for Amelia's loss, only the loss of an antenna which did not keep the Electra from flying.

 
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: JNev on May 12, 2014, 06:58:13 AM
There does seem to be a prevalent opinion that she was overconfident

I would have found both the Vega and the Electra to have been powerfully seductive aircraft. They would make heading out over an ocean seem a temptation rather than a concern. Position any newcomer at the controls and let them experience the power of those big radials and I'm sure they'd be back for more.

After all, no airframe or powerplant failure with either the Vega or the Electra was ultimately responsible for Amelia's loss, only the loss of an antenna which did not keep the Electra from flying.

You nailed it.  The old Lockheeds offered pure sex when it came to Golden Age aviation - none had better lines or beckoned for adventure more strongly in my view either, Tim.

Which is all part of the persona and therefore psychology of this whole thing, in my view.  The Electra was not some gawky will-fit / can-do solution, it was a streamlined beauty that looked like it was at cruising speed when sitting on the ramp and with a forward-looking attitude in its frontal features.  It was a reflecton of man's quest of the time - certainly the woman Amelia's. 

Can you imagine her doing the trip in a Boeing 247D?  Great bird, but not nearly the same thing.
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Monty Fowler on May 30, 2014, 06:55:47 PM
I'll be interested to see how the world feels when it turns out she wasn't "lost at sea" - she was lost on an island located on the navigational bearing given by her toward the end of the flight, and died of starvation waiting.

Leon - I, too, will be interested to see the reaction of The Earhart Conspiracy Theories Industrial Complex (TECTIC for short). I rather suspect that for some of them, the true facts, once established, will make absolutely no difference.

The intellectually honest ones will admit they weren't right, and rally behind TIGHAR as we go on to our next great challenge - finding the White Bird.

LTM, who has enough complexes of his own,
Monty Fowler, TIGHAR No. 2189 ECSP
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Kent Beuchert on June 11, 2014, 11:52:29 AM
“The fundamental cause of the flight’s failure to reach Howland seems to be Earhart’s failure to adequately understand the capabilities and limitations of her radio equipment."
   Allow me to cast the psych dice by suggesting that there is a common element to AE being unprepared as per code and the Electra radio. Self-discipline refers to completing something that is difficult or something one does not want to do. It is a facet of a major psychological trait called Conscientiousness (diligence as a synonym). IMO, AE was short on conscientiousness in the aviation domain--there are other instances of that in AE's psychological history.

Allow me to recast your dice throw and suggest that "lack of self discipline" had nothing whatsoever to do with Earhart's failure to successfully reach Howand Island.  The avoidance of learning Morse code, which in
the context of her original plans, would have been a complete waste of time, time better spent doing the crucial  things that would allow her flight. This was to be Amelia's last flight, so why on earth would she learn Morse code, which she would never have any further use for, and besides, when she not only had a capable radio operator onboard, but , more importantly, never had needed it before. Morse code was old school.. voice communication was the future. No one would ever have imagined that the success of her world flight would come down to her, of all people, having to know Morse code. That only happened because of a long, unpredictable string of events, most of which were out of her ability to control, which others here can enumerate. To imply that she, or anyone, could ever have anticipated what actually happened is simply not correct. So the claim that she "avoided doing what needed to be done" is simply not correct as well. Her central (and only) problems were that her navigator was unable to deliver her  plane to within sighting distance of Howland, and her directional finder would not work. One can point to Earhart's failure to adequately nail down the reason for her DF test failure at Lae as the critical failure. She therorized (wrongly) the reason for the failure. She should have tested her theory (too close, signal too powerfull) that's true, but I doubt that there was any obvious way she could have found anyone sufficiently knowledgeable to correct her wrong assumptions. Even the radio expert at Lae apparently wasn't knowledgeable enough. And she did, after all, actually perform a DF test at Lae. So complaints that she wasn't prepared lack substance. I'm sure she considered herself fully prepared It's also true that she had had communications with plenty of others about how she planned to use the direction finder and no one had offered any objection, which would tend to give anyone in her position confidence that all would work as planned.  So outside of being able to freely converse with an engineer at the radio factory about the characteristics of her DF  (which originally was not even her job), it's not clear that she had the opportunity to do otherwise with respect to her failed test. As we can all see, there is nothing in Earhart's failures that suggest any lack of self discipline. And not learning Morse code I do not  consider a fatal error, or even relevant in the context of her situation.  After all, she was in command of this flight and if she (or anybody associated with the fight) actually considered knowledge of Morse code a critical skill, she would have either carried a radio operator onboard, or had Noonan learn Morse code. After all, Noonan was a navigator, so why didn't he know  Morse code? Certainly there is no record of anyone demanding that a Morse code operator be onboard Earhart's plane. Or even a key. It's quite easy to understand why Amelia would have considered Morse code knowledge and a key useless baggage.
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: JNev on June 17, 2014, 04:35:47 PM
“The fundamental cause of the flight’s failure to reach Howland seems to be Earhart’s failure to adequately understand the capabilities and limitations of her radio equipment."
   Allow me to cast the psych dice by suggesting that there is a common element to AE being unprepared as per code and the Electra radio. Self-discipline refers to completing something that is difficult or something one does not want to do. It is a facet of a major psychological trait called Conscientiousness (diligence as a synonym). IMO, AE was short on conscientiousness in the aviation domain--there are other instances of that in AE's psychological history.

Allow me to recast your dice throw and suggest that "lack of self discipline" had nothing whatsoever to do with Earhart's failure to successfully reach Howand Island.  The avoidance of learning Morse code, which in
the context of her original plans, would have been a complete waste of time, time better spent doing the crucial  things that would allow her flight. This was to be Amelia's last flight, so why on earth would she learn Morse code, which she would never have any further use for, and besides, when she not only had a capable radio operator onboard, but , more importantly, never had needed it before. Morse code was old school.. voice communication was the future. No one would ever have imagined that the success of her world flight would come down to her, of all people, having to know Morse code. That only happened because of a long, unpredictable string of events, most of which were out of her ability to control, which others here can enumerate. To imply that she, or anyone, could ever have anticipated what actually happened is simply not correct. So the claim that she "avoided doing what needed to be done" is simply not correct as well. Her central (and only) problems were that her navigator was unable to deliver her  plane to within sighting distance of Howland, and her directional finder would not work. One can point to Earhart's failure to adequately nail down the reason for her DF test failure at Lae as the critical failure. She therorized (wrongly) the reason for the failure. She should have tested her theory (too close, signal too powerfull) that's true, but I doubt that there was any obvious way she could have found anyone sufficiently knowledgeable to correct her wrong assumptions. Even the radio expert at Lae apparently wasn't knowledgeable enough. And she did, after all, actually perform a DF test at Lae. So complaints that she wasn't prepared lack substance. I'm sure she considered herself fully prepared It's also true that she had had communications with plenty of others about how she planned to use the direction finder and no one had offered any objection, which would tend to give anyone in her position confidence that all would work as planned.  So outside of being able to freely converse with an engineer at the radio factory about the characteristics of her DF  (which originally was not even her job), it's not clear that she had the opportunity to do otherwise with respect to her failed test. As we can all see, there is nothing in Earhart's failures that suggest any lack of self discipline. And not learning Morse code I do not  consider a fatal error, or even relevant in the context of her situation.  After all, she was in command of this flight and if she (or anybody associated with the fight) actually considered knowledge of Morse code a critical skill, she would have either carried a radio operator onboard, or had Noonan learn Morse code. After all, Noonan was a navigator, so why didn't he know  Morse code? Certainly there is no record of anyone demanding that a Morse code operator be onboard Earhart's plane. Or even a key. It's quite easy to understand why Amelia would have considered Morse code knowledge and a key useless baggage.

I dunno, Kent, as much as I admire Earhart, I'm not as certain about her judgment or self-discipline as you seem to hold for a number of reasons.  I was also not aware that this was to have been her 'last flight' (although events did overtake any different intent on her part...).  So if the dice are tumbled again -

I'm sure it's been covered ad nauseam, but Earhart and her team had clearly identified the need for a radio operator as part of the original plan.  After the Luke Field incident, Manning left (Earhart's radio operator).  Earhart then, for whatever reason, seems to have gone against her own initial plan and decided that she didn't need a radio operator after all.

Might that decision and action be considered as the root of the loss?  Consider that she had two and a half months to hire a new radio expert, or to learn about the technical aspects of radio direction finding herself.  Hooven himself was appropriately critical of Earhart's lack of attention here (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Documents/Hooven_Report/HoovenReport.html).  She also could have learned Morse code easily enough, as those I've inquired of assure me that while it takes time to have a confident, fast key, it's not that hard to learn for basic life-saving use (and in fact simply holding the key down apparently provides a more reliable signal for DF efforts, if on the appropriate frequency).

Never mind not having learned Morse code, however.  It really seems to have been more her apparent utter lack of understanding about much to do with radio.  Had she known more, even without key / Morse, then she would not likely have specified a homing frequency (7,500 kcs) that was beyond the capability of her radio direction finder.  She might then also have known enough to realize that the failed test in Lae showed that the RDF was not working on high frequency.  She might have then also sent out a signal on 500 kcs (if she had understood the importance of that standard frequency and had not removed her trailing antenna).  This the Itasca could have taken a bearing on even if she couldn't send or receive a Morse message.

BTW, the oft-claimed hassle of reeling the 500 Kcs antenna in and out may be questionable, but in any case it would only have been needed in the unlikely and apparently not expected event of needing to transmit on that frequency prior to approaching Howland.  If she had only communicated on HF then that antenna would never have been needed.  How ironic - and to me, at least subjectively, how telling of what amounts at the very least to poor foresight on Earhart's part: was it really worth dispensing with that 500 Kcs capability? 

Seems like a lot of trouble she went too to elminate those things - and by my view, it was a lack of disciplined thinking and application of poor judgment that led her there, with all due respect to her otherwise, and to those differing subjectively.  How pitiable too that an arguable case for having a Morse key and at least basic capability to use it went by the wayside. 

But the ironic comedy of tragic errors does add flavor to the whole thing, including this somewhat admittedly subjective point.  Earhart does seem to have added drama to the crap shoot of what did in fact become her 'last flight', that I will grant.

Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Tim Gard on June 17, 2014, 08:56:45 PM
Judging by the number of people who received the post loss signals, Amelia's radio savvy wasn't entirely inadequate. If a 14 year old school girl (Betty) could make things out from an home receiver, how much easier did the Navy and Coast Guard need things to be?

With the newspaper headlines of the day openly reporting Amelia to be broadcasting from the Phoenix Island group, I place the tragic outcome more in the hands of those who ignored the advice from their own radio shacks than on Amelia's failure to arrive at Howland island.


Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Joe Cerniglia on June 18, 2014, 05:24:17 AM
Judging by the number of people who received the post loss signals, Amelia's radio savvy wasn't entirely inadequate. If a 14 year old school girl (Betty) could make things out from an home receiver, how much easier did the Navy and Coast Guard need things to be?

That's an argument the critics make as well.  If it was so easy for the Navy to hear them, as other far more distant listeners claim they did, then by rights everyone should have heard them and the fact the professional searchers did not is evidence the signals must all be illegitimate.

That's not how TIGHAR's Bob Brandenburg, who has extensively researched the radio propagation characteristics of Earhart's radio, has answered your question.

See his paper on harmonic radio frequencies Harmony and Power  (http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Research/ResearchPapers/Brandenburg/HarmonyandPower.htm) for a more technical explanation.  To summarize it, the casual listeners were tuned to higher multiples of the original transmitting frequency, which would have allowed receptions of signals the Navy could not have intercepted. 

All that hearing a harmonic signal requires is a very sensitive receiver, a really good antenna and endless patience.  Few listeners at that time had access to these resources.  Betty had access to all three, and the foresight to preserve for posterity what she heard.


Joe Cerniglia
TIGHAR #3078C

Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Monty Fowler on June 18, 2014, 06:31:57 AM

All that hearing a harmonic signal requires is a very sensitive receiver, a really good antenna and endless patience.  Few listeners at that time had access to these resources.  Betty had access to all three, and the foresight to preserve for posterity what she heard.

Yes, we can be thankful that Betty was amazingly level-headed; I would have sat there like a drooling idiot, hanging on every word and trusting to my memory. And detractos to the contrary, "Betty's notebook" isn't as easy to explain away as some make it out to be. It's easier to just ignore it and pretend it doesn't exist, if it doesn't fit your personal Earhart scenario. But - it does exist.

LTM, who is pretty sure dry paint can exist in nature,
Monty Fowler, TIGHAR No. 2189 ECSP
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Tim Gard on June 18, 2014, 06:55:00 AM
Judging by the number of people who received the post loss signals, Amelia's radio savvy wasn't entirely inadequate. If a 14 year old school girl (Betty) could make things out from an home receiver, how much easier did the Navy and Coast Guard need things to be?
To summarize it, the casual listeners were tuned to higher multiples of the original transmitting frequency, which would have allowed receptions of signals the Navy could not have intercepted. 

Joe Cerniglia
TIGHAR #3078C

And yet Betty's notebook reveals Amelia to have been running duplex transmission on July 5th 1937 - Amelia responds to Fred that she can be heard, listen. Amelia was transmitting on one frequency and simultaneously receiving responses on another.

Someone was responding to her.

Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Joe Cerniglia on June 18, 2014, 11:07:17 AM



And yet Betty's notebook reveals Amelia to have been running duplex transmission on July 5th 1937 - Amelia responds to Fred that she can be heard, listen.
Someone was responding to her.

Um, respectfully, how do you know that?  Where does it say in Betty's notes that successful two-way communication was established?  Even if Amelia and Fred thought so, said it, and Betty transcribed it, would that verify it?

Joe Cerniglia
TIGHAR 3078C
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Tim Gard on June 18, 2014, 05:21:48 PM
As Rick outlined here ...

"That's certainly possible.  She could have the 6210 crystal selected on her transmitter and tune her receiver to 3105."

http://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,1153.msg24487.html#msg24487
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Joe Cerniglia on June 18, 2014, 06:30:42 PM
Ok.  I understand what you mean by duplex transmission now.  Have one frequency to listen and use another to reply.  Your original point, however, was that the Navy should have heard or could have heard what Betty heard and yet she did and the Navy did not. I understand Bob Brandenburg's premise to be that based on propagation behavior of radio waves in the ionosphere, a harmonic signal receivable by Betty Klenck Brown on her top-of-the-line Zenith Stratosphere in St. Petersburg is qualitatively different than one receivable by the Navy stationed near Howland.

Basically, I'm defending the Navy a bit here.  The situations between Betty and the Itasca and USS Colorado are not as analogous as one might suppose.  Betty was no ordinary teenager with no ordinary radio (http://www.oldradiozone.com/strat_1000Z.html) and no ordinary dad to set up the radio's massive aerial antenna.  The signals receivable at her vantage were exponentially weaker but decipherable.  The signals receivable by the Navy were stronger, but more garbled and distorted, as I am given to understand the characteristics of the various signals.

I understand your original premise to shift some of the perception of inadequate preparation away from Earhart and toward the Navy.  I agree Earhart's deficiencies in preparation can be understood without having to exaggerate them, as they often are exaggerated.  My only real point is that casting the issue as a zero-sum game between Earhart and the Navy seems to me a bit of a stretch, but there is always the possibility I am missing something.



Joe Cerniglia
TIGHAR #3078C
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Tim Gard on June 18, 2014, 07:24:53 PM
My only real point is that casting the issue as a zero-sum game between Earhart and the Navy seems to me a bit of a stretch, but there is always the possibility I am missing something.

Agreed. It can be  challenging to defend a corner before the facts are all gathered.
I understand Betty's neighbour had the same set and could not receive Amelia's transmission, so Betty was not quite so seriously advantaged.



Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Joe Cerniglia on June 18, 2014, 07:57:19 PM
My only real point is that casting the issue as a zero-sum game between Earhart and the Navy seems to me a bit of a stretch, but there is always the possibility I am missing something.

Agreed. It can be  challenging to defend a corner before the facts are all gathered.
I understand Betty's neighbour had the same set and could not receive Amelia's transmission, so Betty was not quite so seriously advantaged.

I had forgotten that point, but if you read the  passage in question (http://books.google.com/books?id=OpgBKqq0GBgC&pg=PA172&lpg=PA172&dq=betty+klenck's+neighbor+had+the+same+radio&source=bl&ots=ZRNBDCzl0Z&sig=4KgOnHE7Ti8Ji5qQQVgZGdXBp70&hl=en&sa=X&ei=qj-iU8WpFdOWyATF24DYBg&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=betty%20klenck's%20neighbor%20had%20the%20same%20radio&f=false) from Finding Amelia by Ric Gillespie closely you will find Russell Rhodes didn't have the aerial that Kenneth Klenck did.  When I spoke with Betty by telephone a few years ago, she made a point of telling me her dad was quite a clever fellow and knew many things about how to set it up so as to maximize the reception quality.  Betty told me she routinely got Asian signals on many nights.  Betty was indeed "seriously advantaged" and a superior antenna was a critical factor in allowing her to hear what she heard.

BTW, it's considered good form in this forum to provide links when you cite a reference so as to make it easier to understand the points advanced.  Here is a link (http://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,127.0.html) that shows how to do that.

Joe Cerniglia
TIGHAR #3078C
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Tim Gard on June 19, 2014, 01:08:27 AM
My only real point is that casting the issue as a zero-sum game between Earhart and the Navy seems to me a bit of a stretch, but there is always the possibility I am missing something.

Agreed. It can be  challenging to defend a corner before the facts are all gathered.
I understand Betty's neighbour had the same set and could not receive Amelia's transmission, so Betty was not quite so seriously advantaged.

I had forgotten that point, but if you read the  passage in question (http://books.google.com/books?id=OpgBKqq0GBgC&pg=PA172&lpg=PA172&dq=betty+klenck's+neighbor+had+the+same+radio&source=bl&ots=ZRNBDCzl0Z&sig=4KgOnHE7Ti8Ji5qQQVgZGdXBp70&hl=en&sa=X&ei=qj-iU8WpFdOWyATF24DYBg&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=betty%20klenck's%20neighbor%20had%20the%20same%20radio&f=false) Betty was indeed "seriously advantaged" and a superior antenna was a critical factor in allowing her to hear what she heard.

BTW, it's considered good form in this forum to provide links when you cite a reference so as to make it easier to understand the points advanced.  Here is a link (http://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,127.0.html) that shows how to do that.

Providing further forum links to those who choose to argue, rather than avail themselves, seems just as pointless as being their reminder service.

Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Joe Cerniglia on June 19, 2014, 03:55:38 AM
I'm deleting my earlier response here in the spirit of a  helpful thread (http://tighar.org/smf/index.php/topic,377.0.html) by Marty. 

I'm going to let this exchange slide and call a truce and simply say, "links are good and links are helpful.  Please link!"

I think my reasoning with regard to radio messages in the past few posts is sound.

Joe Cerniglia
TIGHAR #3078C
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Randy Conrad on June 19, 2014, 04:13:19 AM
In response to your comment Joe about Betty's father being clever...just curious to know if her father's radio setup was like that of a short wave radio?  Reason, I ask that is I have a friend who is in the radio business, and who lived in Quito, Equador for many years working on major transmitters and stuff. One day he had a short wave radio in our church, and laid a small antenna out on the floor. Picked up alot of countries with that small radio. Now granted we've come along ways in technology since those days...but has the same concept. Another close friend of mine bought old old  antique radios. One night he calls me over to show me his new baby, and come to find out it picked up radio transmissions all over the world. So I believe that what Betty heard is true. As for why Itasca never heard her, is the only reason why I think that they were on another frequency due to military reasons, or most likely her battery was going low! Another thing that I think we need to really look at here is timeline. Now I personally, don't know what the time zone is on Niku...and I forgot where Betty lived....but, we have to look at a time change here. What I'm saying...and this may make no sense to people...but its 5AM here in Kansas...Most people are asleep and the internet service is very very slow. Good time to use the internet. Same principle with a radio...If you wanna get through to someone...use it when traffic is not bad. So, if Amelia used her radio late at night...how long would it really take for her voice to get to Betty's father's radio?

Joe...what I think needs to be done here...is to answer the big question....So the next time we are at Niku in 2015...Why don't we put it to the test...by using the same type of radio that Amelia had, and going to where Betty lives or used to live, and using somewhat of the same setup and see if anyone could be heard from Niku!
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Friend Weller on June 19, 2014, 07:33:45 AM
...how long would it really take for her voice to get to Betty's father's radio?

Radio waves travel at 300,000,000 meters per second (the speed of light).  What Betty was hearing was happening in real time.

Why don't we put it to the test...by using the same type of radio that Amelia had, and going to where Betty lives or used to live, and using somewhat of the same setup and see if anyone could be heard from Niku!

As a Certified Broadcast Radio Engineer (or maybe that should read Certifiable! :D) it would be near impossible to recreate this today.  Just as there were many AM signals that had to be filtered through to hear the Electra in 1937 (not AM broadcast stations but amplitude modulated transmissions) not to mention the challenges of picking up a signal on a harmonic of the original carrier, we also have to deal with the propagation characteristics on those frequencies as well as the properties of the antennas, both on the plane and in Florida (or Rock Springs or elsewhere).  Now fast forward to 2014.  The number of RF signal generating devices from regular radio to appliances to computers to industrial applications to retail to cell phones.....it's grown a hundred-fold exponentially since I first got into this business over 30 years ago.  What would have been considered a strong signal in 1938 from a radio station I used to work at (100 watts!) would be lost in the clutter and interference today.  That station recently upgraded from 5000 to 10,000 watts just to stay in check with the electronic noise that has been creeping up over time. 

Here's an easy experiment:  Hop in your car, tune the radio to a decently strong AM signal in your driveway.  Now drive to any nearby gas station and pull up next to the pump.  What do you hear?  The microprocessors in the gas pump radiating an RF signal in the form of noise.  That's why it's referred to as the noise floor.  In 1937 the noise floor worldwide was pretty much limited to fluorescent lights, automobile ignitions, power lines and thunderstorms.  Add in today's electronic lifestyle and industry.  I'm sure you can see why traveling to Niku and trying to experiment with a 50-watt AM transmitter on 3105 kHz to see what we would hear halfway around the world would prove unsuccessful.  Not that that signal couldn't travel that far, but more to that we would not be able to pick it out of the noise floor. 

Cool idea but unfortunately for our theory-proving purposes, the playing field has changed.  Also, as I recall, there are no examples of the transmitter used in the Electra from which to try this experiment which is why Bob Brandenburg and others have so closely scrutinized the characteristics of that particular model of transmitter and the design of the antennas to be able to determine the validity of all the logged radio receptions reports involving the Electra.

Oh to have been a fly on the wall in Betty's (or Randolph's or Mabel's or the other few) homes when those messages came through from so far away!  To observe Amelia's psychological perspective change as the entire chain of events played out would be a fascinating study all by itself.
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Monty Fowler on June 19, 2014, 11:13:20 AM
What Friend said - the best we, or anyone, can do at this date is to play with computer simulations. Are they perfect? Heck, no - EVERY computer program is built on a serious of assumptions (guesses) as far as what data and what variables are input. But at least the propogation program TIGHAR used to evaluate the post-loss radio signals is based on the known physical laws that govern such phenomenon, and are therefore less subject to variance.

LTM,
Monty Fowler, TIGHAR No. 2189 CER
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: matt john barth on June 19, 2014, 11:42:24 AM
I leaned this in my ham radio experience and that is, ground wave works entirely different than bouncing your signal off of the ionosphere. I live about 60 miles north of Denver. When you go out on the eastern plains of Colorado at night you can't hear 50,000 power house KOA transmitting so well near the Kansas border. When you reach the other side of Kansas KOA comes in clear like you are in the denver metro area. So the point is, ground wave is good for a few hundred miles but once you get about 300 miles away the signal is skipping over you. When you get 800 to a 1000 miles away now the signal has made one skip off of the ionosphere and you are right there where it is coming  back to earth where you are so now the station sounds like it is next door. When listening to the same station at night by the kansas border does not have the clearity that you would have at the one skip interval. So KOA can sound louder in Omaha or kansas city that it does at the Colorado/Kansas border. So there is really no telling what happened. Fifty megahertz is the 6 meter band. This is where t.v boadcasts are. This band works entirely different, as it skips during weather events, meteor showers, and solar flares. This band is known as the "Magic Band" because of this characteristic.
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: JNev on June 20, 2014, 08:30:44 AM
...Oh to have been a fly on the wall in Betty's (or Randolph's or Mabel's or the other few) homes when those messages came through from so far away!  To observe Amelia's psychological perspective change as the entire chain of events played out would be a fascinating study all by itself.

Almost too fascinating, perhaps.  Think of the helplessness of observing someone who may have been struggling even as they realized life might have been slipping away.  Not as immediately grim, no doubt, but think of being inside the head of someone who has fallen from the top of a building as they ponder their last nanoseconds before coming to an abrupt end at the ground below - not for the weak of heart, even to contemplate.

It is interesting to consider the psychological aspects of this loss - but I am once more reminded that we are looking into the fate of two human beings who came to some as-yet unknown ending circumstance.  I guess there will always be a sad layer in this effort.  RIP, AE and FN.
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Monty Fowler on June 20, 2014, 10:17:44 AM
I guess there will always be a sad layer in this effort.  RIP, AE and FN.

Indeed, Jeff. And, there is no harder taskmaster than one's self. Regardless of their eventual fate, Amelia was also burdened with the certain knowledge that she had failed in her quest. Better to be a dead mystery than a living failure? Who can say? But I'd be willing to bet hard money she was certainly thinking about that.

LTM, who tries not to think about his thoughts too much,
Monty Fowler, TIGHAR No. 2189 ECSP
Title: Re: 1937 Flight: Psychological perspectives
Post by: Paul March on June 20, 2014, 11:21:37 AM

It is interesting to consider the psychological aspects of this loss - but I am once more reminded that we are looking into the fate of two human beings who came to some as-yet unknown ending circumstance.  I guess there will always be a sad layer in this effort.  RIP, AE and FN.

Precisely why this story deserves an ending.