Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 09:09:47 From: Alfred Hendrickson Subject: Re: Radio transmission For Alan: I think your friend was right. I, like your friend, opine that if she was gonna proceed towards the Phoenix Islands, in a southeasterly direction, whilst looking for Howland, she could have just said so. But hey, perhaps she did say so, and it was not ever heard. And there's the rub. We know a few things that were heard. But we don't know that that was all she said. > There was no big search armada as later appeared nor could she have > known one would materialize. Who knows what she could have known? I believe she would have thought that someone would come looking for her, but I agree, she could not have known how many people, planes, boats, or clairvoyants it would be. > She couldn't say where she was going if she didn't know where she was > or whether she could get there. She could have said anything she thought would increase the chances that she'd be found. If she was attempting to find Howland, with the Phoenix group as a fallback, she could have stated just that, as in, "Headed SSE towards Phoenix Islands - Hope to either find Howland or landfall in Phoenix Islands Group. Look for us please. Love to mother." Nonetheless, I, like you, think that if she told Itasca "I don't know where I am", they could not do much with that information other than reply, "You are lost." > I think you are expecting the impossible. If Earhart had usable > information and could reasonably expect a response that would be of > help I am sure she would have broadcast it. It is clear she had no > information that would fit that criteria. She didn't know where she > was or where she was going or if she could get there. And you want > her to broadcast that to the world? I don't think so. It is? Really? I disagree. It is not clear at all to me that she had no information fitting your criteria. What is clear is that we do not have evidence right now that she broadcast anything indicating her intentions other than the 157/337 message. You understand her pretty well, though: tell me why she said, "we must be on you but cannot see you"? What was a person like Amelia, not given to idle chatter, doing making a broadcast like that? What was Itasca supposed to do with that usable piece of information? LTM, her guess is as good as mine, Alfred #2583 ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 09:10:16 From: Herman De Wulf Subject: Re: Radio transmissions I agree AE did not provide position reports during her whole flight because in 1937 there was no ATC to listen, at least not in those parts of the world where she was flying. The only useful information she eventually gave was the message to Itasca that she was flying along the 157/337 line. Even that was too vague to launch a rescue operation because she did not add where along that line she was. And last but not least there were no ships about to go and search along that line, something AE must have been aware of. Why else was that ocean called Pacific? In my view the only "position report" she gave was the post-loss message in which she mentioned "New York City" (which we eventually decided must have been the wrecked ship on the Gardner Island beach. At the time it wasn't much of a clue either. Still the 157/337 message was enough for the Navy to send the USS Colorado to the Phoenix islands and have them searched by its seaplanes. LTM ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 09:10:56 From: Gary LaPook Subject: Re: Island spotting Not so primitive, the exact same techniques and instruments were used by thousands of navigators on probably millions of flights just a few years later during W.W.II. The exact same techniques and only slightly better instrument were use routinely by civil aviation through the 1970s, by our air force through the '90s and are still in use by some air force planes today. Gary LaPook > From Alfred Hendrickson: > > An interesting forum lately, very helpful to the understanding of the way > things were back then. Thanks, everyone. It is so difficult to take one's > mindset away from the current state of aviation and put it into aviation as > it existed in 1937. Primitive instruments and navigation techniques, a tiny > target, poor communications, hubris perhaps, and no doubt fatigue with the > attendant decline in mental capacity. ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 09:11:34 From: Gary LaPook Subject: Re: Island spotting I think you got the 11¡ per hour value of gyro drift from your experience of flying in the U.S. but this is not correct for the rest of the earth. The gyro maintains its axis rigid in space and as the earth turns under it it appears to precess or turn in the opposite direction to the rotation of the earth even though it is maintaining its exact direction in space. This is called apparent precession. (You can see this for yourself by observing the Foucault pendulums swinging in the Pantheon in Paris and in the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago. The Pendulum swings in a plane fixed in space and the earth turns under it. Foucault used this pendulum in 1851 to prove that the earth actually rotated and he went on to invent the gyroscope! See http://www.calacademy.org/products/pendulum/) In addition to this apparent precession, if the gyro is in an airplane moving east or west, then this additional movement of the gyro over the face of the earth also causes the gyro to appear to precess even more, even though it is still maintaining its original orientation in space. This is called transport precession. The earth turns towards the east 15¡ per hour (actually 15.04¡ but 15¡ is close enough) so the gyro would appear to precess 15¡ per hour in the opposite direction if it were at the north pole. For gyros at lower latitudes the apparent precession is 15¡ per hour times the sin of the latitude. For planes flying in the U.S., say near the latitude of Chicago, 42¡ north, the sine is .67 so the apparent precession would be 10¡ per hour. A degree of longitude at this latitude is about 45 NM so an airplane traveling towards the east at 90 knots would cover an additional 2¡ of longitude per hour causing transport precession. This 2¡ times the sin of the latitude (.67) would cause an additional transport precession of 1.3¡ for a total of about 11¡ as you stated. Another way to do this computation is to add the number of degrees of longitude crossed in one hour to the 15 ¡ rate of the earth's turning and multiply the total by the sin of the latitude, e.g. 15¡ + 2¡ = 17¡ * .67 = 11.3¡, the same answer. At the latitude AE was flying a degree of longitude is 60 NM so if she were flying east at approximately 120 knots she would also cross two degrees of longitude per hour as in the previous example for a total of 17 ¡ degrees. BUT, the sine of the latitude, zero degrees (the equator), is ZERO. So zero times 17¡ per hour equals zero degrees of gyro drift! Some gyros also have additional drift due to friction in the bearings but this is usually much smaller than the total of apparent and transport precession described above. We have probably all had some experience with defective or failing gyros which can precess very rapidly but there is no reason to believe that AE would fly with such a defective instrument. Anyway, cross checking the gyro with the compass is second nature to pilots so there is no reason to believe that AE wouldn't be checking it regularly. In addition, I believe Fred had a compass mounted at his navigation station so he could check the headings himself and ensure AE was staying on heading. Gary LaPook ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 09:39:39 From: Marty Moleski Subject: Re: Island spotting > Not so primitive, the exact same techniques and instruments were > used by thousands of navigators on probably millions of flights > just a few years later during W.W.II. ... I'm impressed by the way the search planes took off, flew around several search areas, and returned to the ship using essentially similar navigation tools. The aborted flight from Hawaii did, too. The problem was not with the technology, but--alas!--with our heroes. :o( LTM. ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 09:58:22 From: Chin Koon Fun Subject: Re: Radio transmissions For Alan I fully agree with you. The fact that they had "arrived" on paper but the destination was nowhere to be seen might be a shock to them. I don't know if they anticipated such a scenario and had a contingency plan to deal with it. I doubt so. Couple that with the problem with their radio - for all intents and purposes the world seem to have fallen silent to their transmission. This could be a second shock to them that no one seems to be talking back. So what could they say except that "we are here but can't see you" which is a precise statement of fact on their predicament hoping someone was listening, help determine where they were and go looking for them. Declaring that they were lost adds no value other than being redundant. The fuel situation was probably in their mind but I expect their immediate priority was to determined what happened, where they were and what to do next taking into account their fuel situation. The had a crisis at hand and they reacted by action instead of wasting time telling the world information that might not be of any help besides the fact that no one might be hearing them (at least from their perspective). What they might or had done (rightly or wrongly) during that critical few hours after their last transmission had been debated at length at this forum. And the rest like they said is history............ Chin Koon Fun ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 12:17:52 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Radio transmission > She could have said anything she thought would increase the chances > that she'd be found. Such as what? Considering she didn't know where she was I can't think of anything that would have directed the Itasca to any particular point. If she said she was heading SE she could have been way north when she said it. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 12:18:24 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Radio transmission > You understand her pretty well, though: tell me why she said, "we > must be on > you but cannot see you"? What was a person like Amelia, not given > to idle > chatter, doing making a broadcast like that? What was Itasca supposed > to do with that usable piece of information? I think she said that because Noonan believed he had good fixes and a good ground speed that had put them right over Howland. I don't know what Itasca could do other than look up and see if they could be seen. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 12:18:56 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Radio transmissions > The fuel situation was probably in their mind but I expect their > immediate priority was to determined what happened, where they were > and what to do next taking into account their fuel situation. The had > a crisis at hand and they reacted by action instead of wasting time > telling the world information that might not be of any help besides > the fact that no one might be hearing them (at least from their > perspective). That's probably the most insightful statement I have read about this issue. They just had more important problems than chatting idly on the radio to someone who could not do anything to help. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 12:20:24 From: Ron Bright Subject: Re: Island spotting For Tom S. In view of your interest in the Colorado's mission and role, I am asking the Univ of WAshington Alumni, or ROTC folks , who were aboard if they (if still alive) recall any aspects of the cruise. The U of Washington President was also aboard. Ron Bright --------------------------------------- You can also take a look at http://www.tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Documents/ColoradoLookout/ Lookout.html Pat ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 12:21:01 From: Marcus Lind Subject: Fred Noonan As far as i remember, a few years ago it was quite an actively discussed topic on this Forum about different aspects connected with Fred Noonan's personality, life story, and character. I always considered it as important - as Fred was really a very important "team member" in that flight... and - always admring and respecting AE a lot, and for good factual reasons i believe - I still never wanted Fred to be a "forgotten man" of the story. As it seems, one of discussed aspects was that alleged Fred's "problem" about alcohol. If i remember Ric's position correctly, he said then that this problem looks rather mythical, or at least not supported by any credible evidence. It was an access that I considered as reasonable, too. Today i received a quite interesting link from a friend, that includes some point about this alleged "problem". Please see: http://www.historyforsale.com/html/prodetails.asp?documentid=171209&start=1 Please, i would like to ask Ric's opinion about this document... Can we consider it as a "credible evidence" that Fred had some problem of this kind? Or it is still rather must be considered as anecdotal, quite common, and generally not much conclusive statement? I just would like to know Ric's opinion. Thank you! LTM - sincerely, Marcus Lind ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 12:56:08 From: Alfred Hendrickson Subject: Re: Radio messages "The fuel situation was probably in their mind ... " I'll bet it was. I'm sure it was white knuckle stuff. Do you suppose there was a point where they decided that they had to sort of forget about anyone helping them, because basically no one could? No more radio talk until we conjure up a game plan. LTM, Alfred Hendrickson #2583 ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 12:56:31 From: Herman De Wulf Subject: Re: Radio transmissions Alfred Hendrickson replied to Alan Caldwell: "Nonetheless, I, like you, think that if she told Itasca "I don't know where I am", they could not do much with that information other than reply "You are lost." I agree. He went on saying : "Tell me why she said: "We must be on you but cannot see you"? What was a person like Amelia, not given to idle chatter, doing making a broadcast like that? What was Itasca supposed to do with that usable piece of information?" Maybe she hoped someone on the Itasca would help her by firing a flare, make smoke or even better: give her a course to steer ? Why didn't she say so ? LTM (whose guess is as good as ours) ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 13:28:40 From: Ric Subject: Re: Fred Noonan Marcus Lind asks, > Please, i would like to ask Ric's opinion about this document... > Can we consider it as a "credible evidence" that Fred had some > problem of this kind? Van Dusen's letter was written in 1974, 37 years after Noonan disappeared. Regardless of what he believed he remembered, it must be considered to be no more than a recollection. Maybe his memory is accurate, maybe it's not. Unfortunately, lacking some kind of contemporary corroboration (a diary, a letter written at the time, company records or correspondence) there's no way to know. No document has ever surfaced to explain Noonan's departure from Pan American - no letter of resignation, no company memorandum, nothing. I deal with what is known about Noonan's career (and quite a bit is known) in Chapter 4 of my book. As a TIGHAR member you should have had a chance to read the draft version as published in TIGHAR Tracks. The important thing to remember - and I can't stress this too often or too strongly - is that ALL anecdotal recollections, whether spoken in interviews or written in articles and letters; whether they support or refute your favorite theory; are, at best, clues that may lead to the discovery of genuine hard evidence. Otherwise, they are just stories. Ric ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 14:14:02 From: Gary LaPook Subject: Re: Radio transmissions How about AE adding: " we think we are near Howland and will continue to search around here for 30 ? more minutes. If we are unsuccessful we will follow the LOP to the southeast hoping to find the Phoenix islands, or; we will fly west to the Gilberts, or; we will fly 281 to the Marshalls. We estimate that we have X minutes of fuel remaining until tanks dry and we will have to ditch then." This type of information would assist Itasca in rescuing her if necessary. And she had unlimited minutes on her phone so it wouldn't have cost her anything extra to make such transmissions. Gary LaPook ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 14:57:44 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Fred Noonan > http://www.historyforsale.com/html/prodetails.asp? > documentid=171209&start=1 I went to the URL but did not see anything about Fred Noonan. What did I miss? Alan ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 15:23:56 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Radio messages I think that is exactly right, Alfred. Until they knew where they were no one could help. > This type > of information would assist Itasca in rescuing her if necessary. Gary, as Captain of the Itasca what would be your response? Where would you direct your ship to go and when would you do that? The Itasca DID charge up to the northwest on a futile attempt. Where would you charge next and why? Alan ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 16:15:35 From: Alfred Hendrickson Subject: Re: Radio messages Alan asks: > as Captain of the Itasca what would be your response? Where > would you direct your ship to go and when would you do that? The > Itasca DID charge up to the northwest on a futile attempt. Where would you > charge next and why? If AE broadcast her intentions in the way I suggested, or in the way Gary LaPook suggested, and I were charged with searching for her, I'd look first at Howland (nope, nothing there), then I'd head towards the Phoenix Islands, looking all along the way, then I'd search the Phoenix Islands thoroughly; more thoroughly than Lambrecht did. :-) Itasca couldn't know where she was, and that is why they'd go looking for her. If I understand what you are driving at, Alan, your point seems to be that no should look for any lost thing if they don't know where it is. Heck, when I lose my car keys, I look all over until I find them. I have done that with little or no knowledge of where they are. I look until I find them. (Actually, I'm still missing one of the sets to the Yukon!) What would you do? LTM, Alfred Hendrickson #2583 ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 16:16:35 From: Gary LaPook Subject: Re: Radio messages > From Alan Caldwell > > Gary, as Captain of the Itasca what would be your response? Where > would you direct your ship to go and when would you do that? The > Itasca DID charge up to the northwest on a futile attempt. Where > would you charge next and why? Sure, If she had said she would be tanks dry in 30 minutes Itasca would know that she was down then and he would up anchor and start his search at that time. Just like the FAA initiates search procedures when the time runs out in the "fuel on board" block on the FAA flight plan form. Based on what she had said about her intentions, Itasca would have searched towards the Gilberts, the Marshalls or the Phoenixs. Gary LaPook ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 17:10:18 From: Bill Leary Subject: Re: Fred Noonan > From Alan Caldwell > >> http://www.historyforsale.com/html/prodetails.asp? >> documentid=171209&start=1 > > I went to the URL but did not see anything about Fred Noonan. What > did I miss? If you cut/paste this into your browser, you'll end up with two or three spaces between "...asp?" and "docu..." If you take out the space, it's a one page description of a document for sale. The sale is titled "WILLIAM VAN DUSEN - TYPED LETTER SIGNED 01/14/1974 - DOCUMENT 171209" The link specifically takes you to the second page displayed in the sale. The first also appears. These are two of ten pages, according to the description. The page shown seems to say that he lost his job with Pan American due to a drinking problem. - Bill #2229 ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 17:35:22 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Radio messages > If AE broadcast her intentions in the way I suggested, or in the way > Gary La Pook suggested, Ah but you are begging the question. Itasca doesn't know where they are in a circle around Howland that could extend hundreds of miles. Just because she said she was heading SE doesn't tell Itasca where in the circle she is. She could be north of Howland and steaming toward the Phoenix Islands will be as rewarding as heading WNW 281 degrees. What would I do? Hold my position. At least Earhart would know where Itasca was. You can't just go charging off without more information. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 18:08:34 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: radio Messages > Sure, If she had said she would be tanks dry in 30 minutes Actually some folks think she DID say that but was still airborne an hour later. Considering she could be anywhere 360 degrees for a couple hundred miles Itasca would have 126,000 square miles to search. How would you go about that and how long do you think that would take? You cannot decide she must be in a certain area as folks have put her all over the map so far. Bill, I found the page on a better computer. My laptop didn't show the page correctly. Van Dusen was just a PR man for Pan Am so I would wonder how privy he was to personnel issues. His letter was written nearly four decades after the fact and the drinking story had already circulated. I would put no stock in it at all. I have seen other writings suggesting the reason he left Pan Am was job assignment. Who knows. My Air Force outfit was a tough, hard drinking group and it never affected our ocean crossings. I think it's a non issue even if true. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 18:09:07 From: Alfred Hendrickson Subject: Re: Radio messages Alan writes > What would I do? Hold my position. At least Earhart would know > where Itasca was. You can't just go charging off without more > information. If I were lost, Alan, there's a point right in here somewhere where I'd want Gary, or a like-minded individual heading up my rescue effort! He'd be looking while you'd be presumably awaiting GPS data, or something! ;-) LTM, Alfred #2583 ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 20:50:21 From: Rusty Metty Subject: Re: Radio messages However they end up on Gardner, it makes little sense to me to do anything other than what Alan suggested. Hold. Alan writes >> What would I do? Hold my position. At least Earhart would know >> where Itasca was. You can't just go charging off without more >> information. ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 21:45:15 From: Ted Campbell Subject: Let's go back to island spotting The recent discussion regarding AE/FN's LOP, how it was established, the purpose of it, etc. has caused me to go back into time regarding the radio messages received by the Itasca - go to the TIGHAR web site and review the "radio logs." If FN had calculated a LOP at sunup (I am assuming around 0600 hrs) and it was a line along the 157/337 track, what could have been the purpose of requesting a DF bearing at around 0600 hours that morning of 2 July 1937? If FN had calculated a northerly or southerly offset to his LOP would a properly received response to their request for a DF bearing be used as verification of their estimated position and FN's estimated time of arrival? When AE made the request for a DF bearing she indicated that they were some 200 miles out. If general opinion is correct in assuming that FN could hit his target within 10 miles why would he ask for a DF bearing that far out (200 miles) unless he was aiming for a straight in (no offset) approach? Wouldn't this be the tactic that Pan Am would use when they were confident that there was a ADF at the landing site? When you look at the time difference between the DF bearing request at 200 miles out and the "we must be on you .." transmission would there have been enough time to fly a "standard - what ever that might be" offset approach to Howland? In summary, from what I have read about LOP's by the experts here on the forum and by re reviewing the recorded transmissions by AE when she was getting close to Howland I come to the conclusion that they were flying a DR approach home. Having said that, the winds aloft could very well have drifted them far enough south to miss Howland and Baker even with a subsequent northerly track looking for them. I am sure this message is going to create a stir but it's better than spinning in tight little circles. ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 10:06:48 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Radio messages Neither of you have told me how and where you were going to search all that ocean. rusty, I'm little different than Alfred and Gary. I would be chomping at the bit to do something. The problem is what and where. you notice they disagree with me but they haven't offered how they would search 126 thousand square miles of ocean or where they would start. What I suspect is they will try to argue the search area is far from that size and they only need to search 50 miles to the SE but we know that won't cut it. Thompson got bit once with the 281 event. He wasn't going to be stupid again. Ted, I believe AE was flying straight in. Asking for the DF is one indicator. Saying they must be right on Howland is another. If they flew to their LOP on an offset then turned down the LOP to Howland they would no know when they reached Howland to make that call. The 200 mile out call came at 0615 which is when sunup was at Howland. Think about that for a while. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 10:07:41 From: Adam Marsland Subject: Re: Radio transmissions It's worth noting that I and others have gone through the seemingly random serious of numbers in Betty's notebook and a number of them, when read aloud, are numbers one degree off the line of position. In at least one place they're right there together in sequence. It is possible then that she tried to give her position based on the LOP and Norwich City, which might be all she had to give to locate her. ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 10:08:08 From: Marcus Lind Subject: Re: Fred Noonan Thank you very much for your comment - it is exactly what i wanted: just to know your certain opinion about this. For Bill Leary: Many thanks for helping Alan about my link! - i would do it myself of course, but you reacted more quickly. Thanks! LTM - best regards, Marcus Lind ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 10:08:29 From: Chin Koon Fun Subject: Re: Radio messages Yes I think so. Probably after transmitting their msg. that they were on the line 157 337, repeated it again at 6210 kcs and not getting any response. At that point they probably realised that they were completely on their own and had to figure a way out by themselves real quick before the fuel runs out and they have to take a chance at ditching the plane at sea. After they survived the landing, they had the time and was in a better position to go through the charts, appraise their situation and maybe took a another look at their radio. I expect their priority then was to try to transmit as much information as possible on where they thought they had landed (battery power permitting) to their rescuers and at the time try to conserve whatever fuel that is remaining in the tanks. That would explain the surge in post loss msgs. and why I asked earlier whether there were any periodicity in those post loss msgs. after we have adjusted them to Gardner's localdate and time. I must confess all this is pure conjecture. I don't have an iota of fact to either back or refute them. Chin Koon Fun ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 10:09:11 From: Chin Koon Fun Subject: Re: Fred Noonan I am not sure if anyone has done this but I had the opportunity of knowing a hand writing analyst and I casually showed him a sample of FN's hand writing (from a post card that he sent from Java) without telling him anything about the writer. I asked for his assessment of the writer's emotional and character make up and then probe about this "drinking problem". He told me that based on his assessment this person does not come across as one who will habitually drink himself to a stupor. However he did not discount the possibility that extreme anxiety or stress might trigger such a response. I did not have the opportunity to cross check this with another analyst so I can't tell how credible was that comment though it sounded very much cliche and like a motherhood statement. Chin Koon Fun ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 10:34:06 From: Alfred Hendrickson Subject: Re: Radio messages Alan wrote: "you notice they disagree with me but they haven't offered how they would search 126 thousand square miles of ocean or where they would start." What I notice, Alan, is that the 126 thousand mile figure is your own, and that, as usual, you did not read what I wrote. I also notice that you did not respond to many of my questions. That's okay, though. The entire exercise is pretty academic! LTM, Alfred #2583 ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 12:28:30 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Radio messages Alfred, if I missed any of your questions please repeat them. I don't intentionally fail to answer anyone. Yes the 126,000 square miles is my own figure. It is simply based on the possibility they were two hundred miles from Howland in some direction. we have various estimates of how far off they could have been from Howland based on their radio calls. That figure suggested was 80 miles. Other estimates have been as far as 120 miles and some even more. Add to that they flew around for an hour. I don't think anyone could rationally argue it was not possible for them to be 200 miles away. If anyone does I would be interested in how they determined that. Now, the square mileage in a circle that size is a few miles under 126,000 square miles. they were lost. They could have been anywhere. some put them back near the Gilbert's, some NW toward the Marshall's, some have them overshooting Howland and some have them either SE or SW. I don't think my suggested area of possibility is assailable. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 12:33:22 From: Ron Bright Subject: A Place to Look: Saffords Splashdown Pt. For Alan and Friends An other expert's view comes from Capt Laurance Safford,USN (Ret),who wrote "Flight into Yesterday" (edited by Cameron Warren and Robert R. Payne). He is a DF expert and well known in Earhart research circles. Warren is a frequent contributor to the Tighar forum. Safford believed that Noonan's course into Howland was 67 or 68 degrees MAGNETIC ."When Noonan thought the plane had overshot Howland, he had AE circle for a few minutes and then fly at right angles to the original track on north-south courses, or 157-337 magnetic, to be exact." He discounts the 157-337 as a sunline LOP, saying that at sunrise near Howland the sunline would have been 148-328 magnetic as AE was steering a magnetic course into Howland. Based on a number of factors,e.g., radio signal strength, weather, wind, and Howland's inability to get a D/F bearings, Safford estimated the splashdown of the Electra about 325 miles west of Howland, or at least within a 100 miles of that point. Roughly 1 degree of latitude north, longitude 178 east. This puts the Electra down about halfway between Howland and the Gilberts.[1]. I have a hard time figuring out his evaluation of radio signals received/sent, skip zones, lack of drift bombs, etc., and would like to see our forum navigator's comment on Saffords work, if known. Namely, what are the criticisms of Saffords work? LTM, Ron Bright [1] "Flight" (Research Edition) 10-10 - 10-13. ***************************************** From Pat A small correction. Cam Warren is not a contributor to the Forum as he is not a TIGHAR member. ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 12:33:38 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Radio Messages Alfred, I reread all your messages back through the 27th but did not see any question I didn't respond to but obviously I must have missed some. I read all your postings very carefully as you have good incite into all this. I DO have trouble figuring out what the Itasca should have done with the information or lack thereof available to them. I also have difficulty figuring out something Earhart could have said that Itasca could have used to pin down a search area. You can see what result some arbitrary action could do. While we think she was possibly SE and flying SE toward Gardner the Itasca was steaming WNW on the 281 message. I'll stand by my position. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 15:21:08 From: Ron Bright Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma Alan has an interesting dilemma for the Itasca. After she was down, which way to search? But when was she down for sure? She was heard at 0843. "Hold" , says Alan. But for how long? Wait for another radio signal from AE? By 1200 pm , Itasca was sure she was down, and thus Thompson must have felt he would have to do something rather than float around Howland. Which way to go? And we all know which way he guessed. I bought his rationale based on what he knew at the time. Holding the Itasca at Howland for 3-4 hours ,I think, was also argued by Black and Kenner, but Thompson got an itchy keel. A terrible predicament by 1030. I have often thought that if they thought any signals were real, ITASCA should have spent more time looking in the island groups, first Phoenix , then Gilberts, then Marshalls. Ron B. ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 20:00:27 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: A Place to Look: Saffords Splashdown Pt. Ron Bright wrote: > Safford believed that Noonan's course into Howland was 67 or > 68 degrees MAGNETIC ."When Noonan thought the plane had overshot > Howland, he had AE circle for a few minutes and then fly at right > angles to the original track on north-south courses, or 157-337 > magnetic, to be exact." He discounts the 157-337 as a sunline LOP, > saying that at sunrise near Howland the sunline would have been > 148-328 magnetic as AE was steering a magnetic course into Howland. Ron, Safford's beliefs are not supportable. they are merely his opinion. No one knows what the Electra's inbound track was. Nor does anyone, including Safford, know they over shot Howland, circled or flew at right angles to any track. The magnetic variation at Howland on July 2, 1937 WAS -9.5 degrees. The LOP has no relationship to the inbound course. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 20:00:58 From: Dan Postellon Subject: Re: Fred Noonan Unfortunately, handwriting analysts rarely agree with each other. If you want a control, get handwriting samples from known alcoholics and ones from known abstainers, and see if your analyst can say which is in which group, at a better than chance level. It would be best if they all wrote the same text. Dan Postellon TIGHAR 2263 ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 20:01:23 From: Tom Strang Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma For Ron Bright, I believe the Itasca moved off station at Howland Island about 1040 Howland time, is that correct? Why do you think Commander Thompson made the decision to move Itasca off station at 1040 and Mr. Black and Commander Kenner argued against that decision? Respectfully, Tom Strang # 2559 ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 20:01:58 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma Ron Bright wrote: > A terrible predicament by 1030. I have often thought that if they > thought any signals were real, ITASCA should have spent more time > looking in the island groups, first Phoenix , then Gilberts, then > Marshalls. You're right, Ron, a terrible dilemma. Searching ocean could not really be accomplished by ships. It required airplanes. Of course they got planes there finally. How long to just sit there? I would hate to have had to make that decision. I suppose until I had additional useful information and until it was no longer possible for them to wander upon Howland. As to the latter how would Thompson know? He didn't know how much fuel they had and as you have seen there are all kinds of guesses. Not knowing where she was or what she was doing he was almost bound to remain on station in case she eventually made it. To that end, you guys are right if she said I'm going some place else it would have released the Itasca. Unfortunately she might have been north when she said she was going SE heading for the Phoenix Islands and STILL stumbled upon Howland. If they could ever know she wasn't coming to Howland I agree they needed to search the islands and the area between them and Howland. That was futile but at least they all tried. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 20:07:04 From: Tom Strang Subject: Re: Island spotting For Ron Bright and Pat, Ron , thanks for the offer of assistance, but I have already traveled that road a few years back. An adventure through "False Memory Syndrome" for the most part. USS Colorado's ( BB-45 ) involvement highlights more of what could have been rather than what was known by the search parties involved at the time. Another interesting side story to the Earhart saga we chase. Pat,yes I've studied the Tighar Document you mentioned along with others. Speaking of documents, in "Friedell's Report", was CUSHING spelled with a G in the orignal copy of the report or is that a transcription error? You'll find the spelling in ! the entry of the report pertaining to notification of Destroyer Squadron Two's participation in the search. Respectfully, Tom Strang # 2559 ******************************************* From Pat > You'll find the spelling in the entry of the report pertaining to > notification of Destroyer Squadron Two's participation in the search. Not any more you won't. Nice catch, thanks. Transcription error. Pat ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 20:07:44 From: Ted Campbell Subject: Re: Radio messages To: Alan Caldwell Alan, I agree with your comments. However, you said to think about the 0615 sunrise at Howland and the "fact" that AE/FN reported they were 200 miles West of Howland (in the dark I assume) at that time. The point that you suggest thinking about brings about some questions doesn't it?: Was; 1) AE/FN East of - or adjacent to - Howland when she made her request?, or 2) AE/FN definitely on a DR track and they weren't sure of their location East or West of Howland at the time of the request (explains how they covered so much ground between the "200 and 100 miles out" report in a time that exceeds the speed of the airplane)?, or 3) AE/FN on a DR approach but did not know if they were North or South of a direct heading to Howland. ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 20:25:30 From: Eric Beheim Subject: Re: Friedell and Lambrecht reports For Tom Strang and Ron Bright Your recent postings about the Friedell and Lambrecht reports did not mention that Friedell endorsed (and we must presume read) Lambrecht's report before it was sent along to the Bureau. (If Freidell endorsed but did NOT read Lambrecht's account before he forwarded it, he was a fool, and it is hard to comprehend that a fool would be given command of a battleship.) So we must assume that Friedell was aware of Lambrecht's claim of having seen "signs of recent habitation" on Gardner Island and either chose to ignore this direct contradiction to his own version of events, or hoped that no one would ever compare his report to Lambrecht's. It has long been my "educated guess" that someone in the Navy who was involved in some way with the Earhart search and who reviewed all of the relevant reports DID notice the discrepancy between the Freidell and Lambrecht reports. The fact that nothing was ever brought out publicly does not rule out the possibility that some sort of internal reexamination of the evidence took place, either at the Fourteenth Naval District or in Washington. If the conclusion was that Friedell should have landed a search party on Gardner Island but didn't, than a CYA might well have come into play. LTM (who never had to resort to a CYA) Eric ======================================================================== Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 11:55:37 From: Ron Bright Subject: Re: Friedell and Lambrecht reports For Eric Beheim, Here is my guess, and a guess only, but a reasonable one about the discrepancy between Capt Friedells report and Lt Lambrechts 'article" to BuAir. I think that Lambrecht and his observers and the other pilots all sat down with the Capt or at least the XO, whose name I don't know off hand, and discussed their observations. This was a critical, specific search for Amelia and they wanted the report to accurately reflect the results. Lambrecht described what he saw on all the Phoenix Islands and when he mentions the "signs of recent habitation", the issue would have been clarified regarding whether there was an indication of AEs presence in the last few weeks, namely fresh signs, so forth. Answering in the negative, Lt Lambrecht observations of "no signs of AE" were then incorporated into the final official report. Why report signs of walls, old copra production huts, etc., if they weren't relevant to AE. Now that is my opinion and a guess. Lt Lambrecht, as we well know, retold the story to Fred Goerner but noone specifically asked him about the two versions. In my opinion ,if Capt Friedell believed for a second there were credible signs of AE at Gardner island, he would have commenced a search. LTM, Ron Bright ======================================================================== Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 12:12:18 From: Ron Bright Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma For Tom Strang, Alan Caldwell provided a nice summary of the problems facing Capt Thompson . But you do bring up what has always been a interesting concern for me regarding Capt Thompson decsions. In his 19 July report to the SF Coast Guard, he described all the facts ,etc and concluded "ITASCA was PURPOSELY CONSERVATIVE in assuming Earhart down. Every indication from the radio was that there was something wrong with the receiving equipment but that with Noonan's navigating ability the plane would SECURE A FIX AND TELL ITASCA OR YET MAKE HOWLAND". (Italics added by me). Thompson however sent a msg to Commandant 14th Naval Dist on 2 July that at "0843 the plane reported as being on line 157-337 and running north and south..." Then at 0900 Thompson orders the shore party to return because by that time" fears were felt that the Earhart plane had probably landed wide of the island'. Wow, 17 minutes after her last, Thompson is ready to go! Later at 1040, "it was definately assumed that the plane was down so got underway at full speed in the area which at that time seemed most logical". So one hour and forty minutes later, after he thought she was down, he starts the search. Sort of confusing over this delay. Maybe the others argued against leaving at 0912,when the shore party returned. For the reasons Capt Thompson gave for commencing the search northwest , as he puts it, "in a circle between 40 miles and 200 miles off of Howland Island and between bearings 337-and 45 True from that island", see pp. 249-254 , "Amelia , My Courageos Sister", by Osborne and Morrisey, quoting the Thompson report. What are your thoughts on Capt Thompsons actions here? LTM, Ron B ======================================================================== Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 13:38:31 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: The Captain's Dilemma Ron, although you didn't ask me specifically I'll give my two cents if that is OK. Ric has often talked about a book just on Thompson but no doubt on the shelf at the moment. It is obvious to many of us I think that Thompson was somewhat short of great brilliance. You could easily write a book second guessing him and pointing out various short comings. Personally I think he was ill prepared for the task at hand but in all fairness may not have been adequately supervised in the planning stage OR the actual operations. To mention a few things : The generator on Howland Their DF equipment His lack of coordination with Earhart Laying smoke Not knowing enough about the Electra Leaving his station Pulling folks off Howland prematurely. I fault him for the 281 incident but that was the result of his other failures. The blame does not rest entirely on Thompson's shoulders, however. The entire reception plan was sadly lacking. Placing one single ship at Howland was utter incompetent. There should have been several ships fanning out over the approach. Communications was totally lacking and should have been better planned and tested. Better coordination should have occurred with Earhart and they should have known about and mitigated her short comings. It should have been obvious early in the flight there was a communication problem. We can see there was never two way radio communications during the entire flight. They had all kinds of time to get other ships and planes into the area to help. Lae knew her DF was not OK She knew it was not OK. Thompson apparently didn't check his own equipment or coordinate properly with Earhart. Lae, Ontario, Myrtlebank, Ocean Island and Itasca all knew there was no two way communication and did nothing about it. Sorry, I was getting wound up in frustration. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 15:17:03 From: Dennis McGee Subject: Itasca departure Alan Caldwell said: "To that end, you guys are right if she said I'm going some place else it would have released the Itasca." So why does it matter when the Itasca departed Howland? They couldn't hear her and she couldn't use the DF, so both parties were making guesses as to their others' next move. It makes no difference whether or not the Itasca is bobbing at anchor when she gets there. Once she has visual of the island the Itasca's job is done. Whether or not the Itasca is there, she can still land. She may have to pump her own gas, but what the heck. :-) LTM, who appreciates self-serve gas stations Dennis O. McGee #0149EC ======================================================================== Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 16:19:31 From: Rusty Metty Subject: Re: The Captain's dilemma Makes you think he may have thought the entire assignment was total nonsense in the first place. ======================================================================== Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 16:19:47 From: Ron Bright Subject: Re: The Captain's dilemma For Alan C. Yes your evaluation of Capt Thompson and the Navy is right on! But as I recall Thompson received a "letter of commendation" of sort for his brillant assistance at Howland. I have never seen it published. REB ======================================================================== Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 19:46:48 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Itasca departure I don't know what specific support Itasca could give her once she got there, Dennis. I imagine quite a bit. Communication facilities for one and don't laugh. Provisions, a good hot meal, quarters on the ship for the night. Cold beer for Fred, etc. Alan *********************************** Well, she was there to "support the flight" -- including having a flight lieutenant from the AAC along, Dan Cooper, to give her a hand if she needed it. I think Itasca's orders would have precluded leaving Howland before Earhart made a safe take-off on her way to Hawaii. Pat ======================================================================== Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 19:47:27 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: The Captain's dilemma Ron Bright wrote: > I recall Thompson received a "letter of commendation" of sort for his > brillant assistance at Howland. I have never seen it published. Ron, that's the good ole boy stuff. I knew of a couple of Lt/COLs who were promoted by a board who recognized their names but not why. the reason was they had crashed a B-47. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 19:47:59 From: Randy Jacobson Subject: Re: Friedell and Lambrecht reports Capt. Friedell of the Colorado did endorse Lambrecht's report on July 17, 1937. His was the first of many endorsements as the report wound through the bureaucracy. Lambrecht's report was also dated the 17th, and stated it was from Pearl Harbor. Friedell, in his endorsement, stated nothing of interest...merely passing it up the chain. ======================================================================== Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2006 08:00:00 From: Ron Bright Subject: Re: Friedell and Lambrecht reports For Randy J. Lambrechts report is dated 16 July 37, not 17th. The Lambrecht report is sent via the CO USS COLORADO (Capt Friedell) and the Commander Battle Force, U.S. Fleet. You must have the forwarding cover letter from CO Colorado and Commander Battle Force , U.S Fleet with the signed endorsements on the bottom indicating they were merely sent up without comment. Is there original signatures of these endorsements. Who was the Commander Battle Force, US Fleet? Ron Bright. ======================================================================== Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2006 08:00:40 From: Tom Strang Subject: Re: Friedell and Lambrecht reports For Eric Beheim, I can appreciate your interest with regards to both Captain Friedell's and Lt Lambrecht's reports and the ambiguity that has ensued with the phrase "signs of recent habitation". Did Captain Friedell endorse Lt. Lambrecht's report? I believe he did. Did Captain Friedell read Lt. Lambrechts report? Maybe yes maybe no, due to his up coming "Change of Command" ceremony scheduled for 23 July 1937, he most likely endosed the report after being briefed by say the ship's Admin Officer or possibly even the XO. Was Captain Friedell a fool, that is for history to judge. Keep in mind Captain Friedell was in command of USS Colorado during her search for NR16020 a! nd it's crew. From the vantage point of experience in searching for lost folks in blue water environments I guestion his judgment at times during the search effort. I'll illustrate that point with following example. On 7 July 1937 at 1629 hours USS Colorado ( BB-45 ) crossed the equator at longitude 174' west, the equator crossing celebration ( Neptunus Rex and Court ) normally held was delayed due to the on going search for Earhart and crew. On 9 July 1937 while Lt. Lambrecht and his flight are searching McKean Island, Gardener Island, Carondelet Reef and possibly Hull Island, Neptunus Rex and Court paid a delayed visit to USS Colorado ( BB-45 ) and purged several hundred pollywogs from the ship's ranks. I'll let you educate a guess as to the implications as to possible conflicts with regards to the search for Earhart and crew. CYA"s love the term, a real attention getter. Any one in a position of authority has written a cya memo or two, just a fact of life. "Signs of recent habitation", appears to have been a popular phrase used by several participants on the USS Colorado ( BB-45 ) during and after the search. Which suggest to me not to hang too many hats on that single phase. Opinions are they not great? Brings to mind the old western proverb "no two cowpokes see the landscape the same". Respectfully, Tom Strang # 2559 ======================================================================== Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2006 18:13:41 From: Randy Jacobson Subject: Re: Friedell and Lambrecht reports For Ron Bright, I have a copy of Lambrecht's original report. I was the first person to find the original in the National Archives, and have provided a copy of my copy to TIGHAR. All other copies are carbon copies. It is, in fact, dated July 16, not 17 as you state. It was sent via the CO of the Colorado to the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics via the Commander Battle Force, US Fleet as the first endorsement. The second endorsement was sent from the CO of the Battle Force to the Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet, with a reference to CinCus restricted dispatch 0026-1349 (which I do not have). In this second endorsement, it is stated that the letter of Lambrecht's properly should be under the cognizance of the Navy Dept. instead of the Bureau of Aeronatics, so it is being forwarded to CinCUS. "Certain undesirable features of this correspondence, including the undue informality of expression in certain portions, are being taken up with the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Colorado, in separate correspondence." The date is 27 July, from the USS California, docked in Tacoma, Washington. It is signed by C.C. Bloch. I do not have a complete list of personnel in the Naval heirarchy, but I can vouch that CC Bloch, Admiral, was the ComBatForce. Follow-on endorsements basically over-rule the hesitation and dislike of Lambrecht's letter, and eventually it was published by the Bureau of Aeronautics without editing. The follow-on comments are quite interesting, but has nothing to do with "signs of recent habitation"; rather, the style of writing in the letter. ======================================================================== Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2006 21:20:35 From: Ron Bright Subject: Re: Friedell and Lambrecht report For Randy J. Thanks Randy. Typical Navy bureacracy re up the Command.Style not substance. More on the Colorado. In Donahues book, p. 68, he cites another "in house" newspaper aboard the Colorado dated circa end of July 1937. The article, author not identified, talks about how well the 3980 miles search went for AE and that they were the first to put planes into the air for the search for AE. Two paragraphs were of interest. "There is the further fact that it was the Colorado which conducted the swift but CAREFUL (SIC) aerial search of the Phoenix group, regarded as the likeliest place to find the fliers". "The search of the Phoenix group, disappointingly negative nevertheless eliminated those islands from further consideration and narrowed the field to be covered by the Lexington and the Destroyer squadron". I guess they thought the did a :"heck of job" . I haven't seen it and Donahue didn't publish it. Ron Bright ======================================================================== Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2006 11:45:10 From: Paige Miller Subject: Radio messages On 26Feb06, Alan Caldwell writes: > Paige, in order for our heroes to be ON the "LOP" but so far south > as to not see Baker if they searched NW they had to be over 120 > miles off course. THAT is not reasonable. Possible but to claim > Noonan was that bad is too much of a stretch. On 02Mar06, Alan Caldwell writes: > Yes the 126,000 square miles is my own figure. It is simply based > on the possibility they were two hundred miles from Howland in > some direction. we have various estimates of how far off they > could have been from Howland based on their radio calls. That > figure suggested was 80 miles. Other estimates have been as far as > 120 miles and some even more. Add to that they flew around for an > hour. I don't think anyone could rationally argue it was not > possible for them to be 200 miles away. If anyone does I would be > interested in how they determined that. Your second statement seems to contradict your first statement. Could you please clarify? Regarding what Amelia should have said into the radio, regarding her position and her eventual destination, here I agree completely with Alan Caldwell. They could not state a position because they didn't know their position. They couldn't state they were heading for the Phoenix Islands because at the time of their last broadcast heard by Itasca, they were still looking for Howland. So when Alfred Hendrickson says: > I, like your friend, opine that if she was > gonna proceed towards the Phoenix Islands, in a southeasterly direction, > whilst looking for Howland, she could have just said so. During her last known broadcast, she didn't mention the Phoenix Islands because she was still, in her mind, looking for Howland! But maybe, as Alfred said, a later unheard broadcast mentions where she plans to go. AE further had a tendency to speak "conversationally" into her microphone, not providing useful information. In an earlier broadcast, I believe heard at Lae, she reports a wind speed, but not a wind direction. What possible use is it to report a wind speed without reporting a wind direction? She must have known the wind direction, and for some reason, she didn't report it. So for her to say "We must be on you..." seems to fit with her style. -- Paige Miller #2565 LTM ======================================================================== Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2006 11:46:03 From: Monty Fowler Subject: How shiny was the Electra? Off topic, yes, but since I do not and never will own an airplane, a question for those of you who have/do since I am getting ready to tackle a model of Amelia's 10-E: Just how shiny would the aluminum skin be on July 2, 1937, after umpteen thousand miles of very hard flying? I'm thinking of using a product called Bare Metal Foil to cover the model, and it comes in two shades - Chrome (really, really shiny) or Aluminum (just shiny). LTM, who really liked The Shining, Monty Fowler, No. 2189CE ======================================================================== Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2006 12:07:28 From: Eric Beheim Subject: Re: Lambrecht's account Has any evidence come to light that indicates that Rear Admiral Orin G. Murfin (Commandant of the 14th Naval District in 1937) ever read or was made aware of LT. Lambrecht's account after it was publishedin the Bureau of Aeronautics Weekly Newletter? Just curious. LTM Eric ======================================================================== Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2006 12:07:53 From: Jackie Tharp Subject: Re: Friedell and Lambrecht report To: Ron Bright The two paragraphs you quoted are part of another article in the same publication as Lambrecht's article. Its on a different page. Jackie #2440 ======================================================================== Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2006 12:26:00 From: Ken Leggett Subject: Re: How shiny was the Electra? To: Monty Fowler I am also starting on a model of Amelia's 10-E and have decided to use Testor's Aluminum 1781 for the exterior. I would think that if you want the finish as it would have been on July 2, 1937, it would be fairly dull. Aluminum has to be polished regularly to keeps it shine. I would be interested in other opinions on this. LTM who never polishes anything, Ken Leggett #2690 ======================================================================== Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2006 12:41:17 From: Randy Jacobson Subject: Re: Lambrecht's report I am not aware that Lambrecht's letter was ever made available to the 14th Naval District; certainly not in time for the final report, written approx. July 31, 1937. ======================================================================== Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2006 12:51:11 From: Ron Bright Subject: Re: Friedell and Lambrecht report For Jackie Tharp, Althought Donahue didn't date the newspaper article citing the efforts of the Colorado's search for AE, it must have been on 16 July, the same date as Lambrechts article? I thought his report was separate from the Colorados newspaper? Thanks, REB ********************************* The Colorado Lookout and the Lambrecht report are both on the TIGHAR website in the Earhart Project Documents section. ======================================================================== Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2006 19:08:55 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Radio messages Paige the first statement only deals with how far SE they would have to be to then head NW for about 30 minutes yet still be far enough SE to not see Howland. I said it was, in my opinion unreasonable because I thought it unlikely Noonan could be THAT bad of a navigator. The second statement simply deals with the possibility that their circle around Howland could have had a radius of 200 miles. Not that Noonan arrived in the Howland area 200 miles off but that by 08:43 local they could have been that far from Howland adding their original error and the fact they had flown an additional hour. As to the wind speed she reported you would expect her to report a head or tail wind component not the actual wind vector and speed which she likely did not know. Noonan may not have known that exactly but was simply telling her the difference between her TAS and actual ground speed based on his fixes. Reporting a wind of 123 degrees at 17 knows would have been meaningless to the listener. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2006 19:09:19 From: Tom Strang Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma For Ron Bright, Ron, a couple of days ago you asked what were my thoughts in regards to CDR Thompson's actions as CO of Coast Guard Cutter Itasca? Good question, hopefully more forum members will consider this question and contribute their thoughts on this subject. A discussion I feel is long overdue. I'll preface my comment with the four primary perceptions I have at the present time regarding CDR Thompson himself. FRUSTRATION, on CDR Thompson's part from the get go of provisioning out at Pearl to possibly the end of his short life. PRE-PLANNING, specifically the lack of it or if there was a plan the failure on his part to implement the plan. INDECISIVE, appearance of lack of decision making skills. SCAPEGOAT, appears to be the ideal fall guy for the failure of others. With that said and the research material I've seen regarding CDR Thompson's actions or those attributed to him suggests to me, action by committee. It is more believable to me that other folks were equally or more involved in the response to Earhart and Noonan's flight into immortality. This suspected involvement I believe may have exerted undue influence on CDR Thompson's descisions and actions, both before and after 2 July 1937. Now another question on this subject to you Ron. We know at least CDR Thompson had positional authority as CO of Itasca, but who among the players at Howland was senior man present? LTM. Speak well of the dead, for you'll be joining them sooner or later and no one likes a critic! Tom Strang # 2559 ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 07:57:00 From: John Harsh Subject: Re: How shiny was the Electra? For Ken Leggett and Monty Fowler Aircraft are tough to keep clean in perfect conditions, and I have to think the Electra lacked frequent washings. The upper surfaces would probably have dulled in the sun and salt air. The leading edges would be a little shinier, due to abrasion from airflow and rain. Engine areas would be better preserved as those radials threw a lot of oil. For some reason, the tires on my airplane stay clean, while the wheels are always grimy. And a conscientious pilot would keep the windows clean. My 2 cents. LTM, who paints her models with a big fat brush. - JMH ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 07:57:51 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma > Now another question on this subject to you Ron. We know at > least CDR Thompson had positional authority as CO of Itasca, but who > among the players at Howland was senior man present? Tom, Richard Black was State but Thompson was commander of his ship. The Itasca was his command and if he let anyone else over ride his authority he should have been court martialed. As to my opinion of Thompson I look at this as a military man. I know what command and responsibility is. I wrote to a friend that Thompson was Earhart's only connection to the end of this leg of her flight. He was her lifeline to a successful completion of the Lae to Howland flight. He had the only radio. He had all of her needed supplies. Thompson, his crew and his equipment was her only survival. He had an awesome responsibility and all he did was sit on his ass. We can put equal blame on Earhart as she was "commander" of her "mission." It was equally if not more so her responsibility to have planned and ensured the proper safe execution of the flight. she failed as miserably as did Thompson. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 07:58:36 From: Ron Bright Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma For Tom Strang, You last question of whom had "positional " authority aboard the ITASCA is an excellent one. Of course the CO was in command, but most likely subject to influence by his XO, the Chief Radioman's opinion, SF Coast Guard, SEC Morganthau, etc. But I personally have had the sneaking hunch that Richard Black, a "field agent for the Dept of Interior at Hawaii, and Putnam's hand selected "personal representative aboard" the ship, had a lot of power and influence. He later became an Admiral in Naval Intelligence, as I recall, and I believe he may have been in the Navy reserves at the time. (Something you have prompted me to look into). He may have had more influence in the search than we know. He was ashore on Howland when AE was to arrive. A researcher friend, J. Gordon Vaeth, later interviewed Black in the late 60s in Washington DC about his role. Black became independently weathly living on the Potomac. Supposedly had a piece of the original HMS Bounty. Vaeth interviewed him many times and became good friends.[ I have posted Vaeths interview of Black previously} One thing was impressive. Black bought a brand new Panama hat to wear when Amelia arrived!! Anyway Blacks role should be reviewed again. Ron B ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 08:00:06 From: Paige Miller Subject: Re: Radio messages Alan C writes: > Paige the first statement only deals with how far SE they would > have to be to then head NW for about 30 minutes yet still be far > enough SE to not see Howland. I said it was, in my opinion > unreasonable because I thought it unlikely Noonan could be THAT > bad of a navigator. The second statement simply deals with the > possibility that their circle around Howland could have had a > radius of 200 miles. Not that Noonan arrived in the Howland area > 200 miles off but that by 08:43 local they could have been that > far from Howland adding their original error and the fact they had > flown an additional hour. Well that certainly makes sense. Thank you for clearing things up. Since Thompson began the search for AE much later than 08:43, then 200 miles might be conservative, since AE could have been flying around two more hours after the 08:43 message, and three hours after the "we must be on you" message. > As to the wind speed she reported you would expect her to report a > head or tail wind component not the actual wind vector and speed > which she likely did not know. Noonan may not have known that > exactly but was simply telling her the difference between her TAS > and actual ground speed based on his fixes. Reporting a wind of > 123 degrees at 17 knows would have been meaningless to the listener. I think that's what I meant to say. Headwind or tailwind or crosswind would have been useful to the listener, but AE didn't mention which it was. Paige Miller #2565 LTM ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 09:35:27 From: Dennis McGee Subject: Re: How shiny was the Electra? Monty Fowler said: "Just how shiny would the aluminum skin be on July 2, 1937, after umpteen thousand miles of very hard flying?" It would've been pretty raunchy by the time she left for Howland, I'd think. To make aluminum shine you have to actually polish it. Not too many people are willing to do that. The "normal" color of aircraft aluminum is a flat light gray resulting from the oxidation of the metal. I'd go with the aluminum foil and then add graduated stains (black to light gray oxidation) around the areas that would be subjected to the heaviest wind action -- rivets, wing roots, cowling etc. etc. Was the Electra flush-riveted? I forget. If not, then there would be a consistent build up of stains downwind from all rivets. Check out some of the model aircraft magazines out there for references regarding the stain patterns. After the foil and the stains, spray it with the dullest clear coat you can find to make the overall surface really, really, dull and flat. Post a pix when you're done. I'm sure Pat and Ric would allow it . . . ah, right Pat? LTM, who's a former modeler, too Dennis O. McGee #0149EC ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 09:35:58 From: Dennis McGee Subject: A budding conspiracy? Tom Strang opined: " . . . . CDR Thompson's actions or those attributed to him suggests to me, action by committee. It is more believable to me that other folks were equally or more involved in the response to Earhart and Noonan's flight into immortality. This suspected involvement I believe may have exerted undue influence on CDR Thompson's descisions and actions, both before and after 2 July 1937." Sniff. Sniff. Do I smell someone cooking up a conspiracy here? The phrases ". . . other folks were equally or more involved . . . ." and "This suspected involvement . . . " are warning signs for me. LTM, who is ever watchful Dennis O. McGee #0149EC ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 11:49:19 From: Dennis McGee Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma Alan Caldwell said" "He had an awesome responsibility and all he did was sit on his ass." Aren't you being a bit harsh? Admittedly, July of 1937 wasn't his finest hour. But at least he did something, acting on the best available information within the context of his original orders and whatever policy procedures existed at the time. And I disagree that "equal" blame can be assigned to AE; if blame needs to be assigned, I'd give AE about 90 percent. Her planning, procedures, communications etc. were sloppy even by the standards of the 1930s. She died because of her own laziness and incompetence. Fred also shares a portion of the blame for not keeping up to date (Morse code) with standard navigation aids of the day. AE, not Thompson, was responsible for getting the airplane to Howland. LTM, who has seen enough laziness and incompetence Dennis O. McGee #0149EC ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 13:31:43 From: William Webster-Garman Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma Dennis McGee wrote, > She died because of her own laziness... Seems so and I tend to speculate three things sealed their fate: 1) It's rather likely a radio antenna snapped off from the Electra on take-off from Lae's bumpy turf airfield. We don't know which one, but given she could transmit vox, it's reasonable to think it could have been attached to a DF or vox receiver. 2) AE and FN were not up to date on either the techniques or theory of aviation radio (DF for one), nor were they proficient in Morse. 3) FN may very well have gotten them within sight of Howland, only for the featureless atoll to be indistinguishable from hundreds of cloud shadows. With a missing antenna, inadequate radio backup skills and a world class navigator, the evidence does indicate they got achingly close to Howland but had no DF, no vox reception and no discernable visual cues. I'd put most of the blame on Amelia's laziness and inattention. These, along with over-confidence, the bane of many talented people, seem to have finally caught up with her. It was her aircraft, so it was AE's responsibility alone to set it down on Howland, one way or another and she doesn't seem to have been adequately prepared for the variables, which were likely radio problems and/or cloud shadows around a tiny island nobody had ever landed an airplane on before, never mind it's been almost 70 years and still no airplane has ever landed there. There's another docking big planning flaw IMO: Howland is a crummy visual target. Think of the Pan AM stop-overs (which FN was so familiar with by the bye)... much brighter features, turquoise lagoons, bigger surface areas... these (like Gardner) were more like fluorescent markers in the ocean than cloud shadows. He may not have fully realized it, but Howland looked remarkably different from the sort of Pacific island Fred was used to spotting from the air. LTM, who couldn't tune in her favourite show and ruined her whole day William Webster-Garman ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 14:10:26 From: Tom Strang Subject: Re: A budding conspiracy? For Dennis McGee, For crying out loud McGee! What I'm suggesting is that the command structure surrounding the Howland ops may have had two or more heads. In laymen terms too many cooks in the kitchen. LTM. Reminds one of a long ago closet drama. Respectfully' Tom Strang # 2559 ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 14:11:09 From: Dave Porter Subject: AE search on TV Anyone see the "Search for Amelia Earhart" that was on the Travel Channel over the weekend? It seemed to be a few years old, since they were presenting Elgin Long's book and Nauticos' renav program as new information. The program presented Long's assumptions and Nauticos' ideas as established fact, as regards to the exact moment the Electra ran out of fuel, and a very narrow underwater search area. No mention, of course, that the RENAV program is only as good as accurate as the input data, and that Long's assumptions are well, long on assumptions. According to the program, based on hard distance data (!) derived from Bellart's log notes on signal strength, AE was flying a ladder search pattern and ran out of gas on the leg that would have brought them to Howland. I ended up yelling at my TV set. LTM, who never yelled, Dave Porter, 2288 ******************************************************** Just yelling? Don't you have a gun? Pat ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 14:29:38 From: Meg Godlewski Subject: Re: Earhart on TV I am glad I am not the only one who yelled at the TV set during that. and what was with the jet noise as they were heading in for the drink? meg ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 14:30:05 From: Ron Bright Subject: More Blame While accessing the blame to various individuals, I am interested in what , if any, the HF/DF, "borrowed " from the Navy(?) had in her inability to DF on Howland. As I recall this revelation found in "Daughters of the Sky" by Briand, shocked Capt L. Safford as he was in charge of all the Navy's HF DF and he had never heard about it.This information stimulated his reasons for writing his book. He reported that Black had borrowed the unit at Pearl in a "hush hush" deal, and "noone in authority knew about the this deal." Apparently it was an experimental unit and of dubious reliability. And FN was relying on DF into Howland, Safford says, but may not have known about the HF/DF on Howland, but relied on the Itasca's. I am not sure if it was resolved whether or not FN/AE really knew that Black was installing a HF/DF on Howland for her benefit or not. Was she relying on this? Thompson did acquiese to Black's insistance of taking the unit to Howland. And the other critical problem is why in the world did they allow the batteries to run out? Poor planning by Black? I think some of the Tighar members can shed further light on this major if not critical error. LTM, Ron Bright ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 14:30:26 From: Ron Bright Subject: AE search on TV Dave Porter, I saw the Travel Channel program, a repeat. Yes they calculated the splashdown about 35 miles northwest in a 500 square mile of the ocean. The actual spot was "secret". Lots of computers in the background adding authenticity. And Jordan is as good looking as Gillespie!! REB ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 16:00:31 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: More blame Ron, my friend, when you pull things out of books you're in trouble. I haven't read a factual book yet other than "Shoes." Don't put down Rockwell Collins, if I have the name correct, too much. They are the most amazing techs on earth. They were able to take written descriptions of radio transmissions and not only get a distance to the source but also the direction. TOTALLY making obsolete any direction finding device. Absolutely amazing. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 16:00:49 From: Tom Strang Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma With all due respects, the blame game is not productive to understanding Earhart and Noonan's flight into immortality. All aircraft losses can be traced to mistakes made by the participants of those losses. Humans are reasoning animals, therefore to understand why folks do a particular thing you have to try and understand their reasoning at the time. What I'm suggesting is we would find it more productive to look at the reasoning behind the actions and comments of the participants in this Earhart saga that we chase rather than assigning blame. LTM. We all live in glass houses. Respectfully, Tom Strang # 2559 ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 20:33:32 From: Gary LaPook Subject: Re: AE search on tv What is a "ladder search pattern?" I've never heard of one. How do you fly it? ======================================================================== Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 20:34:29 From: Mike Zuschlag Subject: Re: How shiny was the Electra? > From Dennis Mcgee > > Monty Fowler said: "Just how shiny would the aluminum skin be on > July 2, 1937, after umpteen thousand miles of very hard flying?" > > It would've been pretty raunchy by the time she left for Howland, I'd think. > To make aluminum shine you have to actually polish it. Not too many > people are willing to do that. The "normal" color of aircraft > aluminum is a flat light gray resulting from the oxidation of the metal. Maybe this *is* relevant.... Flat light gray? Are we talking concrete-flat-light-gray, or something distinctly metallic like you see boarding airliners today? It's just that I noticed from pictures from TIGHAR expeditions that the coral surrounding Niku also looks light gray (e.g., the coral block in http://www.tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/nikuvp/dailies.html). Could a torn-up 10E awash on a rugged reef actually be quite well camouflaged from the air? ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 08:22:47 From: Monty Fowler Subject: What's in a name I like to think I am getting warmer with regards to the Norwich City's construction details, but it did happen a heck of a long time ago. The company that built her no longer exists (big surprise) but I've dispatched letters to several local archival sources that I have been told might have the relevant info. There are also letters en route to several steamship historical organizations. If the Norwich City did have welded sheet steel letters at the bow or stern forming its name, then to me at least, that puts another big check mark next to the overall credibility of Betty's notebook. LTM, who knows the devil is in the details, Monty Fowler, No. 2189CE ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 08:23:09 From: Herman De Wulf Subject: AE residence I have a picture of the Putnam residence where AE lived in 1937 when she left on the world trip. All I see is that the house number seems to be 10045 but I can't find the name of the street. Does anyone know ? Thanks Herman ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 08:24:05 From: Marcus Lind Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma Dear Colleagues - Ladies and Gentlemen.... Actually, we disputed it many, many, many times already. Sorry, but i am definitely disagree with the remark quoted below. WHO of the "critics" was really there - with AE and FN in cabin - for to know for sure why exactly the flight ended with a tragedy?... Please, give me names. WHO was there to see - and make on any factual base such a definite "verdict" that AE really "died because of her own laziness and incompetence"? - Sorry, but we DON'T know how and why exactly she and FN died! And it is why we are having this discussion!... Excuse me please, but I can see again the sad tendency to BLAME - with non-exact, common, rather speculative, and n! ot properly factually substantiated claims, instead of reasonable and careful analysis of what could happen - with this or that reasonable and carefully weighted "degrees of probablities". Also, i still consider that this generally disrespectful attitude to AE is historically unfair - as, by her 16 year flying career, many records set, and other kinds of activities - i think she earned some respect of today's generation. I cannot (and will not) to insist of course that everybody must necessarily share my view... but, since the opposite view is propaganded frequently in such a definite way, i just considered as worthwhile to claim my own alternate opinion too... if even it means to repeat again what was already said not once. And if anybody will want to revitalize this beaten-to death dispute about "how good a pilot AE was" - AGAIN - so here is a challenge: PLEASE - before disputing it again - compose the full listing of the crashes and lost planes - by AE and other pilots of her "caliber"; particularly Colonel Lindbergh (who - just BTW! - lost at least 4 planes in flight...), Elinor Smith (who broke her Vega at landing, but usually prefers to repeat in many interviews how bad a pilot AE as if was...), Ruth Nichols, and others... THEN we will have something factual and really worth to discuss. Sorry for my so definite "demand" ... but i really think we already spent too much time for this "clash of opinion". If somebody want to fight over this topic again, i just really want to make it purely factual. So, just show me please a perfect pilot with angel's shine around the head - who never did any mistake - for to let me understand ! of course how specially poor a pilot AE was. "NOBODY is perfect" - Joe E Brown said ("Some Like It Hot", 1959). I do agree with him. And simply can't understand why one pilots must be "forgotten" for anything, but others must be repeatedly and sharply criticized. I still think that the concept that as if AE's planning and procedures were somehow specially poor, incompetent, etc. is - in a great degree - a result of what i like to call a "post-factum knowledge syndrome". In fact, AE and FN successfully completed the larger part of their flight, - without any serious or dangerous accidents or failures, neither about the crew nor the plane. THIS is a proven FACT - not any specualtion or opinion. And I am absolutely convinced that if they would complete this flight successfully, NOBODY would say that the preparations, planning and procedures were "incompetent", or something like this. All the books and articles would be full of the praise about how perfectly all was dome, and even the doubtful and not optimal solutions would be praised as examples of "smart and reasonable risking", or something like this. Studying the Naval and aviation history for many years, i saw this phenomena many times... "Everybody is here to kick a dead lion"... and i don't think anybody will be able to reconvene me that it is not so in the case of Earhart and Noonan. "Who is absent, is always guilty"... very famialir stuff... and very sad one. Respectfully - Marcus Lind Dennis McGee wrote: > And I disagree that "equal" blame can be assigned to AE; if blame > needs to be assigned, I'd give AE about 90 percent. Her planning, > procedures, communications etc. were sloppy even by the standards of > the 1930s. She died because of her own laziness and incompetence. ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 08:58:26 From: Dennis McGee Subject: Aluminum camouflage Mike Zuschlag said: "Could a torn-up 10E awash on a rugged reef actually be quite well camouflaged from the air?" Good question, my guess is yes and no. Oxidizing aluminum will turn the dusky, flat gray we are familiar with, but on the other hand wave action might also produce a scouring effect that would to a small extent polish it and help keep it clean. Add some sand and other particles to the waves and the scouring would be more pronounced, I'd think. If the plane were on land, the light gray might help camouflage it, but on the other hand the plane's distinct shape would hinder camouflaging it. LTM, who is indecisive today Dennis O. McGee #0149EC ********************************* "...indecisive today." Mother can't type today, either, Dennis, I corrected three typos for you! Very unusual for you.... Pat ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 09:13:33 From: Chin Koon Fun Subject: Re: AE search on tv If they are that accurate, wouldn't they have found and brought up the plane by now? Unless the ocean there is so deep there that nothing can reach it.... ;-) I checked the Nauticos web site. Their last update was like in 2002. Anyone know what is the latest ? Chin Koon Fun > From Ron Bright, > > Dave Porter, > I saw the Travel Channel program, a repeat. Yes they calculated the > splashdown about 35 miles northwest in a 500 square mile of the > ocean. The actual spot was "secret". Lots of computers in the > background adding authenticity. ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 09:16:43 From: Chin Koon Fun Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma Yes we live in glass houses and most of the time have perfect hind sight too..... ;-) I often wonder what will happen if I fit out a 10E exactly like the plane flown by AE, same fuel capacity, engines etc. including all the equipment installed in 1937, charts etc and nothing else. Then train a navigator and pilot who have never flown around that part of the world to only use those equipment and charts, 1937 navigation methods etc and send them off from Lae from the same July morning towards Howland and find out what happens at 7.42 am Howland time the following day. Well sometimes cannot help but fantasize on a wish......... :-) Chin Koon Fun ******************************* FWIW, we do know that re-enactors with modern navigation equipment have had trouble spotting Howland. Shouldn't care to try it myself. Pat ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 09:30:54 From: Marcus Lind Subject: Re: AE residence For Herman De Wulf: I think, the right address must be: 10515 Spring Valley Lane, North Hollywood, CA (Toluca Lake district). Please are you having this picture of the house scanned?... If yes, I would be really very grateful if you would be so kind to share it with me... my research is focused not only on the disappearance but rahter on Earhart "in general" - so this kind of info is of a big value for me... my email is: Many thanks in advance! LTM - sincerely, Marcus ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 10:40:59 From: Tom King Subject: Re: Aluminum camouflage For Dennis McGee and Mike Zuschlag Another thing to consider regarding the visibility of a torn-up Electra is that the reef is quite a variable environment in terms of color and reflection. A chunk of aluminum lying up on the reef flat under quiet-water or low-water conditions would probably be quite easy to see, distinct from the relatively dark background. A chunk of aluminum (even quite a large one) on the reef edge, where the waves are breaking, would be quite a different matter, lying in a much lighter-colored, more reflective, and less stable environment. LTM (who appreciates stable environments) ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 10:53:09 From: William Webster-Garman Subject: Re: Captain's dilemma Chin Koon Fun wrote > I often wonder what will happen if I fit out a 10E exactly like > the plane flown by AE... > Then train a navigator and pilot who have never flown around that > part of the world to only use those equipment and charts... and > send them off from Lae from the same July morning towards Howland... There are too many variables. However, for what it's worth, since there is some evidence they lost an antenna at Lae, I tend to speculate they would have found Howland and the Itasca if their radio gear had been intact. William Webster-Garman ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 10:54:04 From: William Webster-Garman Subject: Re: Aluminum camouflage Dennis McGee wrote > Mike Zuschlag said: "Could a torn-up 10E awashed on a rugged reef > actually be quite well camouflaged from the air?" > Good question, my guess is yes and no. It would indeed depend on the conditions. In air, bare aluminium oxidises to a non-reflective matte grey. From certain angles and especially from the air, pools of water on the reef could have outshone pieces of an Electra (and TIGHAR does have a couple of witness accounts asserting that an airplane wing sat out there for years, apparently known to Gilbertese fishermen but never spotted by a European). Moreover, as many have mentioned here, the reef was cluttered by debris from the Norwich City which would inevitably make other manufactured metal wreckage seem less interesting to a casual observer not actually looking for bits of aluminium from a Lockheed Electra 10-E. William Webster-Garman ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 11:20:36 From: Dennis McGee Subject: Re: Alunimun camoflauge Pat T. said: "Mother can't type today, either, Dennis, I corrected three typos for you! Very unusual for you...." Ric is right! You are an angel, a guardian angel . . . or is that angle . . . I get those two mixed up. J Thanks! LTM, who is editing her spell check Dennis O. McGee ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 12:21:28 From: Ron Bright Subject: Re: AE residence For Marcus LInd, Pat Gaston has photos of the AE house at Toluca Lake taken about two years ago from several angles. If you are interested let me know and I can have Pat send you a post with the photos. We were interested to see if it was a two story house, and we are not certain that the second "story", a tower , was built in 1937 or later. Ron Bright ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 12:36:37 From: Pat Gaston Subject: Re: The blame game I fully agree with those who point out that 98% of the responsibility for Earhart's loss falls on her own frail shoulders. I don't know if "laziness" is the word, but "overconfidence" certainly qualifies. The single biggest mistake, I think, was in failing to replace Harry Manning with another competent radioman. This decision effectively denied her the use of both CW and the 500 kHz band -- the standard means and frequency of long-distance maritime communications (to say nothing of DF) in the 1930s. But as Billy Wilder said, hindsight is always 20/20. Thompson can be faulted here and there, although if AP reporter Howard Hanzlick can be believed, his radio ops took their jobs dead seriously. He wrote of tears running down their faces as they frantically tried to contact the Electra in the minutes and hours after 8:43 am. I do think Thompson's decision to raise anchor at 10:40 am -- 1.5 hours ahead of schedule -- took some real courage. I can't believe he left his station, a potentially career-ending move, absent a firm consensus among officers and crew that Earhart was down. If the primary goal was covering the CO's kiester, then the "safer" move would have been not moving at all: Remaining on station until 12 noon, the estimated limit of Earhart's fuel supply. Suppose the Electra had come lumbering over Howland at 11:15, and no Itasca? Uh- oh. (Parenthetically, this also demonstrates that Itasca took AE at her word when she radioed "low on fuel" at 7:42 am) Since Lt. Lambrecht also has come in for his share of criticism on this Forum, I thought readers might be interested in the following bio from the USS Oriskany website. Keep in mind this covers Lambrecht's career only up to 1952 -- by which time he already had served as a flight instructor, commanded two aircraft carriers and served on the staff of the National War College. Not the sort of guy I would expect to blow off clear signs and signals of a "castaway" presence on Gardner when he was tasked with finding that very "castaway." But to each his own. Pat Gaston *************** CAPTAIN JOHN OSGOOD LAMBRECHT USN [Commander of the attack carrier SS Oriskany] JULY 1951- JULY 1952 Captain John O. Lambrecht USN took command of the Oriskany at Izmir for the second half of the cruise, relieving Captain Percy Lyon USN on Thursday, July 26, 1951. Captain Lambrecht came to the Oriskany from the National War College in Washington. Previously he had had wide experience in highly responsible naval assignments. A member of the Annapolis Class of 1925, he first served in engineering and gunnery on the battleship PENNSYLVANIA and in the Far East. In 1930 he took flight training at San Diego and Pensacola. By 1934 he served as an instructor at Pensacola. After that he spent more than 3 years as an air officer in Asiatic waters. Just before Pearl Harbor he went to Corpus Christi as Operations Officer, leaving that assignment just after he made Captain in July 1943. He became Chief of Staff, ComCarDiv 11, Pacific Fleet. Then he was ordered to NAB Manus as Commandant. In July 1945 he took command of the aircraft carrier MAKASSAR STRAIT. The next year he was assigned to OpNav as Assistant Chief, Committees (Aviation), General Planning Group. In February 1948, Captain Lambrecht joined the Staff, Commander In Chief, US Atlantic Fleet, staying until August 1950. He was Assistant Chief for Plans, and Assistant to the US Representative to the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Group. From there he moved to the National War College, before coming to the Oriskany. ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 14:05:29 From: Russ Matthews Subject: Re: AE residence The actual address is 10042 Valley Spring Lane in Toluca Lake, CA -- on the north edge of the Lakeside Golf Club. As of about 15 years ago (has it really been that long?), when I was researching NBC News Productions' documentary Special "Untold Stories: The Search for Amelia Earhart," the owners were aware of their homes' famous former resident, but not anxious to publicize it (though they did agree to let us shoot a "stand-up" piece on the street outside). The structure was originally built by AE and George, and was indeed one floor (the upper story was added decades later). For the real purists out there, you can find some photos of the house under construction in the Amelia Earhart collection of the Seaver Center for Western History Research at the Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History. LTM, Russ ======================================================================== Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 14:49:20 From: Dennis McGee Subject: Re: The Blame Game Pat Gaston said: "I fully agree with those who point out that 98% of the responsibility for Earhart's loss falls on her own frail shoulders. I don't know if "laziness" is the word, but "overconfidence" certainly qualifies." I have to agree with your disagreement. When I said she was lazy I should have qualified that by adding she avoided learning Morse code and learning more about her radios. This is not to say that this knowledge would've saved her bacon, especially considering her known and suspected antennae problems, but it would have reduced her chances for failure had the antennas been there. LTM, who has well-tuned antennas Dennis O. McGee #0149EC ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2006 08:49:57 From: Marcus Lind Subject: Re: AE residence To Russ Matthews: Thank you very much for your valuable update! You wrote: "The actual address is 10042 Valley Spring Lane in Toluca Lake, CA - on the north edge of the Lakeside Golf Club" - you are right! - but as it seems there is no much "controversy"... BOTH addresses must be "valid", as - accordingly to the bios - AE lived in TWO different houses in North Hollywood area . The first one was that "bungalow" that she rented when moving to California in the autumn of 1934... Accordingly to Doris Rich, its address was: 10515 Valley Spring Rd. Then, after some period of living there, AE and GP started to want their OWN - not rented - house in the area... and bought it in summer of 1935. Please see the Jean Backus' book "Letters From Amelia" - page 177 - AE's letter to her Mom from July 28, 1935: "Today, we bought a small house here..." - it must be this 10042 that you are writing about. Accordingly to Susan Butler's (page 341) and Mary Lovell's (page 219) AE bios, this new house was located at the end of Valley Springs Lane - a square lot, with two side on the golf couse of the Lakeside Country Club. It was small, but AE and GP planned a reconstruction and remodleing, and - accordingly to the bios - the works still continued as late as early 1937, with AE "supevising" it when having some free time. I have no information when all the planned works were finally completed. LTM - best regards, Marcus Lind ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2006 09:09:36 From: Guus Decker Subject: Re: The blame game > When I said she was lazy I should have qualified that by adding she > avoided learning Morse code and learning more about her radios. This > is not to say that this knowledge would've saved her bacon, Dennis McGee, I fully agree. It looks like all the people around AE/FN undervalue the new technics. Even Mantz and people from Bendix who KNOWS she was not able/"qualified" to use the equipment do not take real action. There was no ISO qualilty system ;-0 The interest from all kinds of organisations/companies was too big. Guus Dekker #2527 ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2006 19:13:55 From: Tom Strang Subject: Itasca deck log For Randy Jacobson, Question for you pertaining to entries in the Itasca's Deck Log. How was the CO, Cmdr. Thompson identified in the log? Respectfully, Tom Strang # 255 ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2006 20:19:50 From: Randy Jacobson Subject: Re: Itasca deck log CDR Thompson was listed on the Itasca rolls as W. K. Thompson, with the rank of Cmdr. ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2006 13:20:19 From: Tom King Subject: Another opportunity to hear King yammer Forumites -- I'll be teaching a class in Las Vegas, Nevada on April 4 through 6. If there are organized or disorganized groups in the area who would like to have one of my ever-popular Ameliaschpiels -- 1-2 hour illustrated lecture/discussions on the Nikumaroro Hypothesis and our pursuit thereof -- I'd be happy to provide one if a mutually agreeable place and time can be worked out. You can contact me at tfking106@aol.com. LTM (who says it's a great show, but she's biased) Tom ======================================================================== Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2006 13:32:15 From: Pat Gaston Subject: Re: AE residence To summarize the debate, it appears that 10515 Valley Spring Lane -- the house I photographed last year -- was the "bungalow" rented by the Putnams when they first moved to North Hollywood. Then in 1935 they apparently purchased 10042 Valley Spring Lane and began an extensive remodeling project which was still underway two years later. So my question is, where exactly did AE park her toothbrush during the runup to the World Flight? Did they remain at 10515 during the remodeling work, or move into 10042 and put up with the mess? If the "remodeling and reconstruction" indeed involved adding an entire second floor (it's a two-story house today), my guess is that they stayed in the rental unit. Pat Gaston PS The house at 10515 does not have a second floor. There's a turret of sorts with what appears to be a one-room garret under the eaves, but that's the extent of it. Thanks to Marcus Lind, Hermann deWulf and Russ Matthews for helping sort this out. ======================================================================== Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2006 20:14:28 From: Monty Fowler Subject: The Norwich City's nameboards I got a reply from the reference librarian in the city where the Norwich City was built in 1911. She consulted an expert there, a local author regarded as an authority on all of the Hartlepool shipyards. He told her it was common practice at the time to paint the ship's name on the bow and stern, AND to also include an embossed metal plate on either bridge wing or side of the bridge. I'm trying to get more specific information ... heck, we may luck out and find someone who worked on ships about that time. In the meantime, does anyone have any better (closer) photos of the Norwich City aground in 1937, from the New Zealand expedition? Or know if the ship's name was specifically mentioned in any of their reports? LTM, who picks at details, Monty Fowler, No. 2189CE ======================================================================== Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2006 15:48:59 From: Ron Bright Subject: Richard Black Toward the end of 1938, GP went to the Court to declare AE dead with the statements from Capt Leigh Noyes, (USS Lexington), Richard Black and Charles Palmer, GPs friend.[ Lovell, p 308] I would be interested in Black's statement. Is it available in the archives or elsewhere? ======================================================================== Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2006 22:08:36 From: Randy Jacobson Subject: Re: Richard Black I have not seen any statements from the principal parties for the court case to declare Ms. Earhart dead. Your best bet would be to inquire at the court and their records. ======================================================================== Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2006 22:08:54 From: Alfred Hendrickson Subject: TIGHAR Tracks Thanks Ric, Pat, for a great new issue of Tracks. Keep them chapters coming! LTM, Alfred #2583 ======================================================================== Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2006 12:19:38 From: Rusty Metty Subject: Re: TIGHAR Tracks Speaking of...I don't understand why AE says fuel running low, but Howland reports 1/2 hour left...Where do they get the 1/2 hour from? Is that an opinion on their part? ========================================================================= Date: Sun, 19 Mar 2006 12:15:39 From: Tom Strang Subject: Itasca deck log For Randy Jacobson, Another question for you pertaining to entries in the Itasca's Deck Log. How was Frank T. Kenner identified in the log? Respectfully, Tom Strang # 2559 ========================================================================= Date: Sun, 19 Mar 2006 15:57:31 From: Randy Jacobson Subject: Re: Itasca deck log Frank Kenner was penned in (not typed) as F.T.Kenner, Lt. Comdr. ========================================================================= Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 19:39:20 From: Tom Strang Subject: Re: Itasca deck log For Randy Jacobson, Apreciate your response to my question about Lt. Cmdr. Kenner. I find the answer interesting, which begets another two questions. Was Lt. Cmdr. Kenner the only name penned in the Itasca's Deck Log? Was his entry penned as you wrote it? Respectfully, Tom Strang # 2559 ========================================================================= Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 21:23:26 From: Randy Jacobson Subject: Re: Itasca deck log No, all of the "unofficial guests" of the Itasca were penned in, such as Richard Black, the Hawaiian colonists, etc. The only typescript entries were the ship's crew as of 01 July 37. Kenner's entry was exactly as I represented it. Why are you asking these seemingly arcane questions? Curious minds want to know. ========================================================================= Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 10:03:35 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Itasca deck logs Randy, let me add my voice to the curious. I fail to see the significance of the questions. I don't see where that line is going. Alan ************************************** And welcome back, Alan. P ========================================================================= Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 13:55:47 From: Alan Caldwell Subject: Re: Itasca logs Thanks for the welcome back Pat. I survived another operation to remove a benign bladder tumor and my prostate. I'm coming along a little slower than last time as I wasn't completely recovered from December but doing OK. Alan ======================================================================== Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 12:36:15 From: Blake Herling Subject: Re: How shiny was the Electra? I have been very busy with work & have gotten way behind in reading the forum, however I just came across multiple messages concerning the "shine" of AE's Electra as related to modeling. They were posts by Ken Leggett & Monty Fowler earlier this month. I have done extensive modeling of Pan Am subjects that were flown Trans-Pacific in the mid to late 30's & wanted to pass on to them what information I have, so they could use it for their projects if they so choose. Blake Herling ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 10:01:28 From: Tom Strang Subject: Re: Itasca deck log For Randy Jacobson, I appreciate your responses to my "seemingly arcane questions", which have benefited my knowledge of the Howland melodrama of 2 July 1937. I've asked brief specific questions and you have graciously replied likewise and I thank you. As I stated in a forum post to you a while back, I may find it necessary to ask you questions pertaining to the Itasca's Bridge Log aka Deck Log in which to validate some dated informational material that I was expecting to come in contact with. Would I have caused less difficulties for curious minds if had asked, why did pilots of the "Divine Wind" wear helmets? Respectfully, Tom Strang # 2559 ****************************************** Mysteriouser and mysteriouser..... ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 12:03:58 From: Amanda Dunham Subject: Re: Itasca deck logs > Tom Strang wrote: > Would I have caused less difficulties for curious minds if had > asked, why did pilots of the "Divine Wind" wear helmets? Because it made them look cool. Duh. -- Amanda Dunham #2418CE ======================================================================== Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 19:29:56 From: Randy Jacobson Subject: Re: Itasca deck log A "strang"-er question might be: Why were the Japanese Kamikazi pilots issued helmets? ======================================================================== Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2006 14:52:06 From: Tom Strang Subject: Re: Itasca deck log For Randy Jacobson, Your spin on my "Divine Wind" question was an unexpected insightful light bulb moment, thank you. Respectfully, Tom Strang # 2559 ******************************** We speak in riddles... we balance enigmas on the ends of our noses ... enlightenment happens. Pat ========================================================================= Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2006 19:52:26 From: Pat Thrasher Subject: It's done. The manuscript (well, actually MSWord files via email) went to the Naval Institute Press at 4 p.m. today. Publication is slated for September. We are wiped. See ya Monday. Pat