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[william patterson]

It is reported Radioman Cipriani ran down the batteries on the high frequency radio directional finder rendering it useless when Earhart was closing in on Howland.

Last night, re-reading the events it is clear that AE was counting on that receiver to "bring her home"
She had nothing but trouble with her own radio, it was fixed, broke, fixed, broke, and in fact there is a report Noonan sent his wife a letter in Dakar saying the radio was useless.
He subsequently used sight maps going over Africa after that.
I can find only one reference any maintenance personnel even looked at the radio transmitter after Dakar.
Clearly his confidence in the Bendix was shot, he knew he missed Dakar by 66 miles, so for him to get in that plane which had malfunction after malfunction, and try to hit Howland was going to be a challenge.
I doubt he was gambling with his life on that Bendix RDF. Yet the paradox is he didn't seem worried in his writings.
It seems clear that since AE and GP requested back in March for the Navy to supply a directional finder, they were counting on it. Maybe that explains the lack of worry on Noonan's part.
I have heard others state that the Navy/Coast guard were not responsible for "bringing them in",
but my impression is both AE and FN thought otherwise.
(Amelia asking for some help by whistling or humming)

What is the consensus on Cipriani's actions? Was he negligent and if so should have had faced disciplinary actions for his failure to insure the howland RDF was operational?
In my view it seems like he really dropped the ball, almost to the point of manslaughter(well maybe harsh but clearly he screwed up and 2 people died)
Did the Navy take any blame in the after reports for Radioman Cipriani's actions or inactions?
I would say he was at least half to blame, though I hate to use the word, yet his name is never mentioned in general analysis I have read about.
What are the opinions here? In another thread a poll about factors in the demise, Cipriani's actions was not even mentioned. Mostly it was blamed on Earharts and Noonans "devil may care" attitude.
Maybe they were not so careless, but did not get the help they 100% expected?

[Ric Gillespie]

Cipriani's role in the whole debacle is complex and interesting.  I'm glad you've raised the question but you have some misconceptions.
• Earhart's plan, as expressed to the CG, was for her to do the DFing.  All they had to do was provide a signal for her to home on.  It came as a surprise to Itasca when, as she approached Howland, she began asking for them to take a bearing on her.
• The High Frequency DF on Howland was Richard Black's idea.  He borrowed it from the Navy.
• Except for Chief Radioman Leo Bellarts, all of Itasca's regular radio operators were Radiomen 3rd Class. Black originally wanted experienced Navy radio men to man all of the radios but Itasca's CO wouldn't hear of it.  Black then asked for a Coast Guard Radioman 1st Class to run the borrowed HF DF but there wasn't one available.  The best they could do was Radioman 2nd Class Frank Cipriani who was available because his assigned ship, USCG Roger B. Taney, was in dry dock.
• Because Cipriani was not part of Itasca's regular crew he was treated as something of an outsider.
• There is no evidence that Earhart knew anything about the High Frequency DF.
• To judge fairly whether Cipriani was negligent in his operation of the HFDF we need to carefully reconstruct the events of that night and morning from the available documents.

[william patterson]

I could have misperceptions, because I have read different versions.
In Elgen Long's book on page 197 it states-
"In march, Earhart had requested that a high frequency radio direction-finder be set up on Howland Island.
Black, along with Lt.Daniel Cooper US Army Air Corps, arranged for an experienced U.S.Navy Radioman to
accompany the Navy high frequency radio directional finder to Howland island, to operate the direction finder during the
Earhart Flight.
When Captain Thompson learned of this arrangement, he overruled it for the reason that the coast guard had sufficient
radiomen to perform the work."

Then subsequently in Long's book he does go into detail on the serviceman chosen, and how Capt.Thompson was prepared with a High frequency set up on Howland.

So is Elgen Long incorrect? because he clearly states " Earhart Requested" .....

Perhaps Earhart naturally believed Mr.Black had fully informed everyone of her request and expected the Navy to have a working system? Even if it was Black's idea, and Long is incorrect about Earhart asking for it, surely Mr.Black didn't go through the trouble of ordering a High Freq. RDF and not tell Earhart about it.
There may not be anything in writing saying she was aware of it, but clearly she was aware since she tried to use it.

So it seems from her actions she was expecting help to guide her in,  and Capt.Thompson, and/or Cipriani failed.
That could be why Noonan wasn't worried in his letters, he felt he had the US Navy to guide him home.

[Ric Gillespie]

So is Elgen Long incorrect? because he clearly states " Earhart Requested" .....

Does he cite the source ? 

Perhaps Earhart naturally believed Mr.Black had fully informed everyone of her request and expected the Navy to have a working system? Even if it was Black's idea, and Long is incorrect about Earhart asking for it, surely Mr.Black didn't go through the trouble of ordering a High Freq. RDF and not tell Earhart about it.

If Earhart was informed there should be a record of it.

There may not be anything in writing saying she was aware of it, but clearly she was aware since she tried to use it.

The fact that she asked Itasca to take a bearing on her high frequency signal doe not mean that she was knew about the high frequency DF on Howland.

So it seems from her actions she was expecting help to guide her in,  and Capt.Thompson, and/or Cipriani failed.

Well, I don't think there's any doubt that she was expecting help to guide her in, nor is there any doubt that she didn't get enough help. There's plenty of blame to go around.

That could be why Noonan wasn't worried in his letters, he felt he had the US Navy to guide him home.

That would be a strange expectation given that the Navy had almost nothing to do with the flight.

[william patterson]

 Elgen long footnoted the reference as follows-

"Message 8013/1320, March 13, 1937, from COMSFDIV To USS SHOSHONE and COMHWSEC. National achives San Bruno Ca."

I cannot find that in the Database, so not sure of content/text when Long states Earhart requested the High frequency finder. Long obviously believed Earhart requested it and I would like to read the text of that message.

 Of course there is also the united press transcript of June 27 mentioning a High frequency direction finder installed on Howland capable of tracking Earhart's course based on her signal. This alone doesn't prove Earhart was aware of the DF, but it is a second reference along with Long's fore mentioned communication.
It does show the Press knew about it, Adm. Richard Black knew about it, the coast guard knew of it because they were working it.
I think it fairly strong evidence in itself that Earhart knew of it. Unless Black kept it a secret from Earhart for purposes unknown, however even if Black kept it from Earhart her husband probably would have known from United Press reporters. It was his job to manage PR.
Those connections and communications along with Earhart's asking for RDF on her signal in flight is strong indication to me she was aware of it being available if needed.

http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Research/JacobsonDatabase/RADIOMES/MSG7.PDF

As Rear Admiral Black worked with various departments of the government from equatorial islands to commerce, as well as various branches of this armed forces to supervise this flight, including the chief of naval operations, and Navy Admiral Leahy, I would say it is inaccurate to state the Navy was not involved in the operation. The coast guard obviously had control but was working under the direction of a Navy officer consulting with the Navy and Coast Guard. So perhaps coast guard and Navy, to which Richard Black belonged should share partial blame for the poor planning and action.

[Bruce Thomas]

...
It does show the Press knew about it, Adm. Richard Black knew about it, the coast guard knew of it because they were working it.
...As Rear Admiral Black worked with various departments of the government from equatorial islands to commerce, as well as various branches of this armed forces to supervise this flight, including the chief of naval operations, and Navy Admiral Leahy, I would say it is inaccurate to state the Navy was not involved in the operation. The coast guard obviously had control but was working under the direction of a Navy officer consulting with the Navy and Coast Guard. So perhaps coast guard and Navy, to which Richard Black belonged should share partial blame for the poor planning and action.

Richard Black was not a member of the Navy at the time of the disappearance of Amelia and Fred.  Therefore, it is disingenuous to keep referring to him as "Rear Admiral Black" in an attempt to claim that his work at Howland meant that the Navy was heavily involved in the support of Amelia's flight. 

Richard Black was a trained civil engineer in his mid-thirties at that time, working for the Department of the Interior, and did not become a member of the Navy until the next year, 1938, when he joined the Naval Reserves.  It is clearly untrue that the Coast Guard was "working under the direction of a Navy officer consulting with the Navy and Coast Guard." 

Richard Black was called to active duty with the Navy in August 1941 with the rank of lieutenant commander.  By the time that WWII ended, he had been promoted to the rank of commander.  He did eventually retire from the Naval Reserves in 1962 with the rank of rear admiral, and passed away in 1992, according to his obituary published in The New York Times. 

[william patterson]

...
It does show the Press knew about it, Adm. Richard Black knew about it, the coast guard knew of it because they were working it.
...As Rear Admiral Black worked with various departments of the government from equatorial islands to commerce, as well as various branches of this armed forces to supervise this flight, including the chief of naval operations, and Navy Admiral Leahy, I would say it is inaccurate to state the Navy was not involved in the operation. The coast guard obviously had control but was working under the direction of a Navy officer consulting with the Navy and Coast Guard. So perhaps coast guard and Navy, to which Richard Black belonged should share partial blame for the poor planning and action.

Richard Black was not a member of the Navy at the time of the disappearance of Amelia and Fred.  Therefore, it is disingenuous to keep referring to him as "Rear Admiral Black" in an attempt to claim that his work at Howland meant that the Navy was heavily involved in the support of Amelia's flight. 

Richard Black was a trained civil engineer in his mid-thirties at that time, working for the Department of the Interior, and did not become a member of the Navy until the next year, 1938, when he joined the Naval Reserves.  It is clearly untrue that the Coast Guard was "working under the direction of a Navy officer consulting with the Navy and Coast Guard." 

Richard Black was called to active duty with the Navy in August 1941 with the rank of lieutenant commander.  By the time that WWII ended, he had been promoted to the rank of commander.  He did eventually retire from the Naval Reserves in 1962 with the rank of rear admiral, and passed away in 1992, according to his obituary published in The New York Times.

I will call him a Rear Admiral and a hero and deserves the title.  To make a point that he didn't technically enter ROTC until 1938 is to me sad.  He obviously worked as a civilian with the Navy for years before the flight and was awarded a Navy medal in 1935 for his contributions to the expeditions to Adm. Byrd. While under charge of the Earhart flight, and as in Charge of islands of the Interior department, yes he was a civilian.
He also had the full support of the Navy and Coast guard and there is numerous correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations of the United States Navy and Admiral Leahy and others of the United states Navy showing Richard Black's authority and whatever he needed including directing Navy and coast guard personnel.

For more of his resume, Black then went into the service a year later as mentioned, fought WWII and earned a medal for his activities. He then rose to the rank of Rear Admiral.

 The coast guard, by US code a branch of the Navy during war, and at other times in such close coordination it is the civilian Navy, was the primary branch responsible, no one disputes that, nor am I sure why it was ever mentioned at all in reply to Noonan expecting more support.
Maybe I should have said Noonan expected more COAST GUARD SUPPORT to guide him home.
Better?

Perhaps the pilots allowed too much to be done by the Coast Guard, because in my view the military let down the Putnams and Noonans, not 100% to blame by any means,
but there is some startling incompetence it seems, from breaking transmitters to a High Freq. DF that was dead by dawn. THAT was the point of the thread, to generate any interest in examining this area and whether Earhart was expecting the High freq DF.
The point was not Not Adm Richard Black and his title, that was brought up to show there was Navy involvement, however it is clear from hundreds of correspondence, the Navy was involved with this flight.
I will leave it at that.

[Martin X. Moleski, SJ]

Elgen long footnoted the reference as follows-

"Message 8013/1320, March 13, 1937, from COMSFDIV To USS SHOSHONE and COMHWSEC. National achives San Bruno Ca."

I cannot find that in the Database, so not sure of content/text when Long states Earhart requested the High frequency finder. Long obviously believed Earhart requested it and I would like to read the text of that message.

The March 13 traffic that we have readily available in is the Jacobson Database, 4th group.

Please note that the March 13 traffic deals with the first round-the-world attempt, not the second.

From:  CNO

Action:  COM12

Date: 03/13/37

Text:  IF PRACTICAL TRACK EARHART PLANE BY HIGH FREQUENCY DIRECTION FINDERS AVAILABLE PURPOSE OF THIS TRACKING FOR FURTHER COMPARATIVE TESTS NAVY AND PAA EQUIPMENT

Dztzf   193703131810CNO

Source: RG80   Copyno: 0   Record No: 2199


From:  COMFRANDIV

Action:  SHOSHONE   Info1:  COM12

Action2:  COMHAWSEC   Info2:  CNO

Date: 03/13/37

Text:  AMELIA EARHART PLANE RADIO CALL KHAQQ WILL TRANSMIT ON 500 COMMA 3105 COMMA AND 6210 KCS USING CONTINUOUS WAVE TELEGRAPHY AND VOICE PERIOD PLANE HAS DIRECTION FINDER COVERING 200 TO 1430 KCS WITH ALL WAVE RECEIVER FOR TELEGRAPHY PERIOD SHOSHONE WORK PLANE ON 500 COMMA 3105 COMMA AND 6210 KCS IF POSSIBLE OTHERWISE NOTIFY PLANE OR SHIFT TO 2670 KCS PERIOD PLANE SUGGESTS DIRECTION FINDER BE SET UP ON ISLAND IF PRACTICABLE PERIOD IN MAKING MO FOR BEARING ON 500 KCS TRANSMIT LONG DASHES NO REPEAT NO AMATEUR CONTACTS WILL BE MADE AND ALL TRANSMISSIONS WILL BE ON FREQUENCIES LISTED PERIOD SHOSHONE CONTACT WITH COAST COMMERCIAL STATIONS WILL BE ON 8455 OR 12600 KCS ON SCHEDULE TO BE ARRANGED LATER PERIOD SPEED OF TRANSMISSIONS TO PLANE NOT TO EXCEED FIFTEEN WORDS PER MINUTE ARRANGEMENTS FOR RADIO AT NEW GUINEA WILL BE MADE AT HONOLULU PERIOD SHOSHONE REPORT WHEN TRANSMITTERS ARE READY ON PLANE FREQUENCIES PERIOD DISTRIBUTION COLON CAPTAIN MANNING AND MR MILLER

Record No: 1185

The first message, neither from nor to Earhart, does refer to "high frequency direction finders" The second does not.

Neither applies directly to the case of what Frank Cipriani did or could have done on the second attempt in July of 1937.

[Ric Gillespie]

Elgen long footnoted the reference as follows-

"Message 8013/1320, March 13, 1937, from COMSFDIV To USS SHOSHONE and COMHWSEC. National achives San Bruno Ca."

I cannot find that in the Database, so not sure of content/text when Long states Earhart requested the High frequency finder. Long obviously believed Earhart requested it and I would like to read the text of that message.

Marty has posted the contents of that message.  (Thanks Marty)

The message was sent on March 13, 1937.  At that time AE is in Oakland preparing for the planned departure of her first world flight attempt on March 16 (they didn't get off until the 17th).  Her technical adviser, Paul Mantz, has only recently figured out that Earhart's navigator, Harry Manning, although an accomplished nautical navigator, couldn't do celestial navigation from an airplane.  On March 13 AE and GP announced that Fred Noonan would join the team.

The message in question is from the Commander of the Coast Guard's San Francisco Division to USCG Shoshone, then on station at Howland Island.  The message says nothing about a high frequency direction finder.  It does say that "Plane suggests direction finder be set up on island."  "Plane" obviously refers to Earhart but she knows that the cutter is already at Howland so she can't be asking for equipment they don't already have with them.   I hope you can see that when Elgen Long wrote, "In March, Earhart had requested that a high frequency radio direction-finder be set up on Howland Island." he was flat wrong.

Of course there is also the united press transcript of June 27 mentioning a High frequency direction finder installed on Howland capable of tracking Earhart's course based on her signal. This alone doesn't prove Earhart was aware of the DF, but it is a second reference along with Long's fore mentioned communication.

Hanzlick's June 27 press release from Itasca does say, in part, "high frequency radio direction finder installed yesterday Howland."  For Earhart, on the other side of the dateline, the date was June 28. She's in Darwin, Australia. For her to know the contents of Hanzlick's press release she would have to read a UP newspaper story based on the message.  Such a story can't appear in American papers until June 28 (June 29 for AE).  On the morning of June 29 she and FN took off for Lae, New Guinea. That same day - June 28 for Itasca, June 29 for AE - Itasca sent a message to her in Lae: "...Itasca direction finder frequency range 550 to 270 Kcs..."  No mention of the high frequency DF on Howland.

It does show the Press knew about it, Adm. Richard Black knew about it, the coast guard knew of it because they were working it.
I think it fairly strong evidence in itself that Earhart knew of it.

The press knew about it, Black knew about it, the CG knew about it, but there is no evidence whatsoever that AE knew about it and no clear opportunity for her to know about it.

Unless Black kept it a secret from Earhart for purposes unknown, however even if Black kept it from Earhart her husband probably would have known from United Press reporters. It was his job to manage PR.

Black's communications with Earhart are well documented.  He never mentioned it.  Putnam could have found out about it from UP stories on July 28 - if the stories mentioned it - but I can't find any mention of the HFDF in the press stories before the flight.  If Putnam did learn about it there is no record of him telling AE about it.

Those connections and communications along with Earhart's asking for RDF on her signal in flight is strong indication to me she was aware of it being available if needed.

There appears to be no evidence that the connections and communications you refer to ever happened. 

As Rear Admiral Black worked with various departments of the government from equatorial islands to commerce, as well as various branches of this armed forces to supervise this flight, including the chief of naval operations, and Navy Admiral Leahy, I would say it is inaccurate to state the Navy was not involved in the operation.

The Navy was involved but, prior to the disappearance and search, its role was minor and peripheral.

The coast guard obviously had control but was working under the direction of a Navy officer consulting with the Navy and Coast Guard. So perhaps coast guard and Navy, to which Richard Black belonged should share partial blame for the poor planning and action.

Black was not, at that time, a Navy officer. He did not, in any way, belong to either the Coast Guard or the Navy. 
Your misunderstanding of the relationship between the various personnel and agencies involved in supporting the Earhart's flight is rather complete.  At the risk of sounding self-serving, I suggest you get a copy of my book "Finding Amelia - The True Story of the Earhart Disappearance."

[william patterson]

Thanks Marty for the text of that message! I really enjoy reading the inner workings of the island preparations.
It does seem like Long combined two difference messages, one from the first proposed trip, and one from the second
in making the statement "Earhart requested.."
I still think Earhart expected a direction finder to help her, especially since the press reported it was installed on Howland.
Yes, she was on the other side of the world when the press released that info, but Putnam's job was to get his wife there and report on progress at Howland.
Now do I have 100% proof she knew about the HF DF? No.
I can say by her actions requesting guidance, she seems to have thought that capability was there, and it was there.
It just did not work.

Did she rely on the capabilities of the Coast Guard/Navy, when she should have worried more about herself and her equipment?
Probably so.
Did Thompson have the direction finder ready and working? Nope. Ultimately as the Commander of personnel and equipment which turned out to be vital, Thompson has to have some accountability in my opinion.
Especially if he turned down the Navy operator, insisting his men could handle it.

[Martin X. Moleski, SJ]

Did Thompson have the direction finder ready and working? Nope. Ultimately as the Commander of personnel and equipment which turned out to be vital, Thompson has to have some accountability in my opinion.
Especially if he turned down the Navy operator, insisting his men could handle it.

There are at least two different sets of equipment that we are talking about:

• The Itasca had its own Radio Direction Finding (RDF) equipment.  This was onboard the ship, was manned by adequately qualified Coast Guard operators, and did not suffer any electro-mechanical failures.
• The High Frequency Direction Finder (HFDF) placed on Howland Island was somewhat experimental, ran on batteries, may have been turned on too soon, and had severe mechanical problems either because of design flaws or misuse.

On 2040GMT, June 28, Itasca sent this message to Earhart : "Itasca transmitters calibrated 7500, 6210, 3105, 500 and 425 kHz CW and last three either CW or MCW. Itasca direction finder range 550 to 270 kHz."

It would seem that within five days of the fatal flight, the Itasca did not know that Earhart did not have--or, perhaps, did not want to use--the capacity to transmit on 500 kHz (kcs).  The trailing wire antenna that would have put out the best signal for RDF was not reinstalled after the Luke Field Crash.  There are also reasons to think that she did not have a CW (Morse Code) key on board.

Earhart asked for a transmission way above the capabilities of her own onboard system.  She could hear the letter "A" being transmitted on 7500 kHz (kcs), but her RDF was designed to operate on lower frequencies: "Following information from Earhart this date quote homing device covers from 200 to 1500 and 2400 to 4800 kHz any frequencies not repeat not near ends of bands suitable unquote." No one knows what made her think her equipment could cover two bands, but, even if it could, 7500 kHz (kcs) is far above 4800 kHz (kcs). Her request was exactly backwards of the optimum band to use: low-frequency transmissions provide more reliable information than high-frequency transmissions, all else being equal.

The men on board the Itasca did their best to get a bearing on Earhart's transmissions, but she did not understand that she had to give the men long transmissions to give them time to find a null and deduce the bearing of the aircraft from the RDF unit.  She thought she had to "make noise in the mic," but all she needed to do was to hold the transmitter key for a minute or two.  None of her transmissions were long enough, not even when she was whistling into the mic.

Even if Cipriani had saved his batteries, even if the equipment had been set up and operated flawlessly, this last point probably means that it wouldn't have saved Earhart and Noonan.

[Jeff Lange]

To me one of the most baffling parts of Earharts' attempts at circumnavigating the globe was what appears to be her total lack of learning everything she possibly could about her radio equipment and its' capabilities and proper usage. Espescially after the repeated failures of her radio equipment, I would have made damn sure I knew how to use it when it came down to the last legs where precise navigation and communication were going to literally mean life or death, as was to be proven. The mis-communication about which frequencies she could use, that the Itasca could use, and which procedures to be followed just astounds me. It seems to me very unusual that Fred Noonan didn't speak up more about the sorry state of affairs as far as the communications plans were going. He had to be informed, and it was his life depending on them too. I feel that if she had paid more attention to the radio details prior to the flight she may have been able to diagnose the problems enroute to Howland before the point of no return and turn back if necessary.

[Martin X. Moleski, SJ]

To me one of the most baffling parts of Earharts' attempts at circumnavigating the globe was what appears to be her total lack of learning everything she possibly could about her radio equipment and its capabilities and proper usage.

Agreed.

This, for me, is the mystery inside the mystery.

Even if the remnants of the airframe are found, we won't get an answer to this question.

It's a classic SNAFU.  She thought the Itasca would take a bearing on the Electra and guide it in.  They thought she would take a bearing on them instead.  She should have known that the best frequency of the three available on her transmitter (500 kHz, 3105 kHz, and 6210 kHz) was 500 kHz (kcs).  She should have asked for a transmission within the limits of her onboard equipment (variously reported in HER telegrams as topping out at 1400 kHz or 4800 kHz).

The only time she seems to have heard a transmission from the Itasca was at 1930 Z on 7500 kHz.  It seems to me that if she and Fred had been fresh and on top of their game, they might have realized that the Itasca was hearing them and responding to their transmissions; if she had then simply requested voice transmissions on 3105 kHz, using the same setup by which she heard the transmission on 7500 kHz, they might have been able to work things out.  In other words, configuring the system to activate the direction finding antenna seems to have solved their reception problem, but they apparently didn't recognize that as a breakthrough.

So sad!

[Alan Harris]

The men on board the Itasca did their best to get a bearing on Earhart's transmissions, but she did not understand that she had to give the men long transmissions to give them time to find a null and deduce the bearing of the aircraft from the RDF unit.  She thought she had to "make noise in the mic," but all she needed to do was to hold the transmitter key for a minute or two.  None of her transmissions were long enough, not even when she was whistling into the mic.

For the Itasca to find a null, Earhart would have also had to have made those long transmissions on a frequency between 550 and 270 KHz.  Just for my own clarification, do we know if she ever made any attempt at transmission on 500 KHz?

[Ric Gillespie]

For the Itasca to find a null, Earhart would have also had to have made those long transmissions on a frequency between 550 and 270 KHz.  Just for my own clarification, do we know if she ever made any attempt at transmission on 500 KHz?

I can't think of any way we'd know whether Earhart made an attempt to transmit on 500 KHz but the Itasca radio logs make no mention of any signal received on 500 KHz.