Hi Ric

Thanks for the feedback. 

• A fuel tank was not taken out during repairs.

That is correct, my mistake. The fuel system was modified during the repairs, but the 13th tank had been removed the previous year. 

• Howland is not an atoll.

In Wikipedia, Howland is described as an island and an atoll. Howland is an island with a fringing coral reef, therefore an atoll, but does not have a central lagoon.

• Manning was not the radio operator.

I said that both Manning and Noonan were navigators. However, Manning was the only crew member competent on Morse code, hence ‘the radio operator’. His absence as a radio operator and the deletion of the Morse keys was crucial to the outcome of the flight.

• The Navy weather forecast was not received the evening before the departure from Lae.

I did not say the forecast was received, I said it was prepared the previous evening. The time stamp on the message was 2250 (GMT according to Chater). So, somebody’s evening, but it took hours to relay the message to Lae, arriving in the morning.

My premise is that the flight plan depended on the forecast, but the execution of the flight depended on ALL available navigation techniques which were substantially foiled by the adverse weather.

• The fuel in Lae was 80 octane, not 87 octane.

I said 80 octane.

• Sunrise at Howland was at 06:15 local time, not 05:45.  You Google "Sunrise at Howland Island on July 2" you get "05:46 (GMT -12)", but Itasca was using GMT -11.5.

Sunrise at Howland was 05:45 Howland Local Time which was 06:15 Itasca Local Time when Itasca was in the vicinity. Both are correct and equally confusing.

• You explanation for Earhart's obviously erroneous position report to Lae at 3:19pm, “height 10000 feet position 150.7 east 7.3 south, cumulus clouds, everything okay" makes no sense.  Noonan cannot get a precise lat/long position in daylight without a visual checkpoint on the ground. 
The most likely explanation is that Earhart reported her position as 157 east, 7.3 south. That would put her 600 nautical miles from Lae on the coast of Choiseul Island in the Solomons, 130 nautical miles south of her planned course. Noonan could get the latitude/longitude by noting their position on the Choiseul coastline. He could then plot a correction to put them back on course for the next visual landmark, the Nukumanu Islands (which you, for some reason, call the "Numanu" islands).

My explanation makes complete sense based on known facts. The Chater report is unambiguous: she reported 150.7 east 7.3 south at 03:19pm. That position was a dead reckoning position based on standard navigational techniques for avoiding weather, but the time makes no sense. They must have been SOMEWHERE at 03:19pm; we both agree there is a missing position at about 600miles. I am offering a plausible explanation without changing the facts to suit a theory. Noonan may well have made observations based on seeing islands through gaps in the cloud. Numanu and Nukamanu are names on different charts for the same group of islands.

One valid point out of seven. I suppose you could call that a bad review!

I've always felt the metal in that artifact is too thin to be a cylinder wall.  Could it be from the water cooling jacket around the cylinder wall?  (Assuming it had such a thing.)

Hi Ric

I am willing to correct any errors. What are they?

Colin

In Part One:

• A fuel tank was not taken out during repairs.

• Howland is not an atoll.

• Manning was not the radio operator. He was the sole navigator until 3 days before the March 17 departure for Hawaii.

• The Navy weather forecast was not received the evening before the departure from Lae.

Guinea Airways manager Eric Chater, in a letter written three weeks later, recalled that the forecast had come in via Samoa at 7:30 the morning of Thursday, July 1 (Lae time).  U.S. Navy records contradict Chater and show that Lt. True’s forecast was not transmitted from Hawaii until more than an hour after that time. Messages relayed through Samoa were taking a minimum of three and a half hours to reach Lae, if they got there at all, so True's forecast probably arrived in Lae around 11:00.
Whenever the forecast actually reached New Guinea, the picture it painted of the weather to be expected along the route was typical for the region:
" Earhart, Lae. Forecast Thursday:
   Lae to Ontario – Partly clouded. Rain squalls 250 miles east Lae. Wind, east south east, 12 to 15.
   Ontario to longitude 175 – Partly cloudy, cumulus clouds about ten thousand feet. [Visibility] mostly unlimited. Wind, east north east, 18.
   Thence to Howland – partly cloudy. Scattered heavy showers. Wind, east north east, 15.
   Avoid towering cumulus and squalls by detours as centers frequently dangerous.
––Fleet Air Base, Pearl Harbor."
 
The forecast was for “Thursday,” but who's Thursday? True had sent the forecast at 12:20 Hawaiian time on Wednesday, June 30. Across the International Date Line in Lae, New Guinea, at that moment, it was 8:50 A.M. on Thursday, July 1. Was this a forecast for Earhart’s today or for True’s tomorrow? Unclear as the intended day may have been, the prognostication was so typical of the region that it did not much matter.
Your premise assumes that Noonan's navigation relied entirely upon an ambiguous forecast that was well-over a full day old.

• The fuel in Lae was 80 octane, not 87 octane.

• Sunrise at Howland was at 06:15 local time, not 05:45.  You Google "Sunrise at Howland Island on July 2" you get "05:46 (GMT -12)", but Itasca was using GMT -11.5.

• You explanation for Earhart's obviously erroneous position report to Lae at 3:19pm, “height 10000 feet position 150.7 east 7.3 south, cumulus clouds, everything okay" makes no sense.  Noonan cannot get a precise lat/long position in daylight without a visual checkpoint on the ground. 
The most likely explanation is that Earhart reported her position as 157 east, 7.3 south. That would put her 600 nautical miles from Lae on the coast of Choiseul Island in the Solomons, 130 nautical miles south of her planned course. Noonan could get the latitude/longitude by noting their position on the Choiseul coastline. He could then plot a correction to put them back on course for the next visual landmark, the Nukumanu Islands (which you, for some reason, call the "Numanu" islands).

All of your conclusions in Part One are unwarranted assumptions based on sloppy research and bad data.  I don't have the time or the stomach for Part 2.

 

 

Hi Ric

I am willing to correct any errors. What are they?

Colin

Welcome to the club.  Sooner or later, everyone gets to post a Youtube video about what really happened to Amelia Earhart.

I started watching Part 1 but after two factual errors in first few minutes, I gave up.

Hi Everybody

I have made a video called The Last Flight of Amelia Earhart.

It is in two parts on YouTube and here are the links:

https://youtu.be/O9YQHkNXbZI

https://youtu.be/WPDOcWvOQn8

Take a look and tell me what you think.

Cheers
Colin

Thanks Marty.  Interesting video. They use a very brief clip of TIGHAR footage.  It qualifies as "fair use."  No problem.

Agreed.


I do wish, as a kindness, that they had given some kudos to TIGHAR.


That's life on the internet!

I've connected with the Steel Institute.  The guy I talked to was fascinated by our project.  He'll try to find out when 12L14 steel was first used and call me back.

Thanks Marty.  Interesting video. They use a very brief clip of TIGHAR footage.  It qualifies as "fair use."  No problem.

"Why Don’t They Eat Millions of Coconut Crabs in Japan?"

This video twice uses the time-lapse video of the taphonomy experiment carried out on Niku in 2007.

Taphonomy experiments

I didn't have time to finish watching the video nor to read the comments section to see whether they gave TIGHAR credit.  They do talk about the Niku hypothesis and show a map of the island briefly.