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Don M Casillas

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Noonan Navigation Error
« on: May 28, 2011, 11:47:31 PM »

I want to know why the flight was so far south? Noonan was an "expert navigator" and was very professional in his work. So How could he have been so far off? Unless in the late 30's that was considered accureate navigating?
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Martin X. Moleski, SJ

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #1 on: May 29, 2011, 12:03:51 AM »

I want to know why the flight was so far south? Noonan was an "expert navigator" and was very professional in his work. So How could he have been so far off? Unless in the late 30's that was considered accurate navigating?

Randy Jacobson's article on his Monte Carlo Simulation discusses why he thinks ending up SSW of Howland at the time of the last transmission is the most probable outcome for the flight.

The plan for the flight was for Noonan to get close enough for Radio Direction Finding to guide them to Howland.  He did an excellent job doing so.  They did not succeed because there were many failures in communication.

See also "Air Navigation: State of the Art in 1937" and the articles to which it links.
LTM,

           Marty
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h.a.c. van asten

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #2 on: May 29, 2011, 01:51:33 AM »

Moles. All  o/b of A/c forces available were set in to reach Howland , why is it that certain researches (like ´Monte Carlo´) always state or predict that nevertheless , the aircraft arrived at positions far away from the destination those forces were directed to ? If the pilot announces to be on destination , whereas she would be a couple of hundred miles (SSW) off , she must late or early have her navigator knocked cold.
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Gary LaPook

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #3 on: May 29, 2011, 03:51:01 AM »

I want to know why the flight was so far south? Noonan was an "expert navigator" and was very professional in his work. So How could he have been so far off? Unless in the late 30's that was considered accurate navigating?

Randy Jacobson's article on his Monte Carlo Simulation discusses why he thinks ending up SSW of Howland at the time of the last transmission is the most probable outcome for the flight.

The plan for the flight was for Noonan to get close enough for Radio Direction Finding to guide them to Howland.  He did an excellent job doing so.  They did not succeed because there were many failures in communication.

See also "Air Navigation: State of the Art in 1937" and the articles to which it links.

-----------------------------------------

No, they didn't plan to rely solely on the radio to find the island but planned on having two separate redundant methods either one of which, all by itself, was capable of taking them to a safe landing at Howland.

When you jump out of an airplane you have two separate, independent parachutes attached to
your harness. If the first one fails then the other one will get you back to earth safely. This is the
principal of redundancy. No one jumps with just one and-a-half parachutes.

This principle of redundancy has been well known in aviation forever. We pilots want dual
everything, dual navigation radios, dual communication radios, aircraft engines have two
separate ignition systems with two spark plugs in each cylinder, two engines each with two fuel
pumps with each fuel pump powered by a separate power source, two different sets of flight
instruments each also powered by a different power source, a second method for lowering  the
landing gear, etc., etc.

It certainly makes sense that they planned to use their on board RDF to home in on the Itasca’s
transmissions when they came within range since it is a very convenient way to navigate and it
gets more accurate as you get closer to the transmitter. Ric points out that there is no proof that
Noonan ever used the landfall method for finding an island when flying for Pan Am. So What?
Flying a landfall takes you out of the way and adds time to the flight so if on the Pan Am flights they were receiving
radio bearings as they approached their destination then there would be no reason that Noonan
would then go out of his way to do the landfall. There is also no proof that I have ever used a fire
extinguisher (because I never have) but I sure know how to do it and I would use a fire
extinguisher if the need ever arose.   Noonan knew the technique and would have used it if he needed to.
Earhart and Noonan must have appreciated the very real
possibility that their radio would not be working at that point based on the unreliability of radios
in 1937 in general and their own experience with their own radios which failed them on many
occasions while flying around he world.

I think this logic applies to Earhart and Noonan’s planning to find Howland, they planned to have
two separate, independent, redundant methods with which they could find the island, radio
bearings and celestial.  Either method, by itself, would have been good enough to lead them
safely to Howland. You don't want to put all of your eggs in one basket.

So what proof do we have that they believed that celestial was good enough, by itself, to get them
to Howland so that it provided a redundant method to the use of the unreliable radio? We can
break this down into separate questions.

================================================

1. Is celestial navigation accurate enough to find Howland?

Proof and evidence:

 A. )I just used this method three weeks ago and it worked perfectly. I have also used it many times in the
past and it has always worked for me. See http://www.fer3.com/arc/m2.aspx?i=116311&y=201104

 B.) Every flight navigation manual teaches this method.

“Landfall the safest way get to destination”

I have posted excerpts from eleven flight navigation manuals that prove this point here:

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/topics/landfall-procedure



 C.) Pelegreno’s navigator, Bill Polhemus, used a landfall and it brought them to Howland.

====================================================
2. Was Noonan aware of this technique?

Proof and evidence:

 A.) The technique was used in 1922 by Gago Coutinho to find several small islands on the first flight
across the South Atlantic. Admiral Coutinho had an audience with the Pope about his
accomplishment and it was well publicised world wide.

 B.) Sir Francis Chichester also used the technique to find two small islands when he crossed the
Tasman Sea in 1931 and he extensively publicised his flight in his 1933 book, “Seaplane Solo.”


 C.) A well developed methodolgy for this technique was printed in “Flight Navigation” 1938 ed. by
Noonan’s friend, Philip Van Horn Weems.

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/weems

 D.) Noonan was in very frequent contact with Weems sharing their knowledge of flight navigation so
it would be hard to believe that Noonan had not discussed this technique with Weems.


 E.) Noonan expected that his celestial navigation was accurate
all by itself for them to find Howland if the radio did not work. Since we know that the radio did
not work we know that Noonan was forced to use the celestial which would have taken them a
bit out of the way but should have gotten them to Howland. It was more reliable than the
unreliable radio but for some reason something went wrong with both of the redundant methods
that they had to complete the flight.



==============================================================
3. How do we know they didn’t just plan to use radio to find Howland?

Proof and evidence:

 A.) They delayed their departure from Lae for two days so that Noonan could check his
chronometers. This would not have been necessary if they did not plan to use celestial to actually
find the island.  Accurate time is only necessary for determining longitude it is not necessary for
determining latitude. If they were only planning to get close enough to Howland to pick up the
radio signal from Itasca then they didn’t need to accurately know their longitude. Since they were
flying toward the east they only needed to know their latitude accurately enough to make sure
that they did not pass Howland too far to the north or south to pick up the radio signal and the
radio signals could be heard for hundreds of miles. If Noonan’s chronometer was wrong by an
entire week their latitude would only be in error by 15 miles so they would certainly pass close
enough to Itasca to hear the radio signal. This error in latitude would be caused by the change in
the sun’s declination, its location north and south equivelent to the sun’s latitude. You can see
the change in the sun’s declination in the 1937 Nautical Almanac, page 22:

https://sites.google.com/site/fredienoonan/resources/nautical-almanac-1937

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 B.) If Earhart planned on relying only on radio to find the island then she didn’t need a navigator since
dead reckoning all the way from Lae was accurate enough to get her within radio range of Itasca
The range of the RDF in the plane that Earhart planned to use to home in on Itasca’s signals was
at least 250 NM.

 C.) I know this based on my own experience.  Many times I have homed on WLS in Chicago all the way
from Florida, a distance of a thousand NM. Two months ago while I was on Kauai Hawaii I used a small
portable radio to measure a bearing on  radio station KFI in Los Angles which, by coincidence, was
2222 NM away, exactly the same distance as from Lae to Howland. So we know that low frequency
signals can travel this far, however the station I was listening to put our 50,000 watts which is a hundred
times more than Itasca's radio which only put out 500 watts. But the range of a ground wave, in general,
varies with the square root of the power output. KFI's signal was a hundred times as powerful as Itasca's
so its range should be ten times greater, or to put it another way, we can expect Itasca's signal to go one-tenth
as far as KFI's or 222 NM

 D.) I also have an old  chart showing a fix I got on a radio beacon on the island of Flores in the Azores. I
crossed the radio bearing with a sun line and the fix was 230 NM west of Flores. I know I had
been receiving the radio signal for a long time before I took the sun line so I know that I could
receive that signal at least 300 NM from the transmitter.

E.) I have also flown on route A-17 from Bimini to Grand Turk, a distance of 518 NM,  on the way to Puerto Rico and was able to hear the radio
beacons on those islands at least 258 NM away. Grand Turk only puts out 400 watts, Itasca put out 500 watts so
its range should be even longer.


F.) But it is not just my experience to rely on, the government agency that impemented route A-17 also had to test to be
assured that the radio signals could be heard at the middle of the leg which is 258 NM from each island
radio beacon.


 G.) Since the leg from Lae to Howland is 2222 NM and the common estimate
of DR accuracy is 10% of the distance flown then one could expect to
fly the distance from Lae to Howland solely by dead reckoning and
still be confident of coming within 222 NM of Itasca and so be
close enough to pick up the radio signal and track inbound to Howland.
So if AE had been willing to rely only on radio she didn't need Fred. But
obviously they wouldn't just rely on radio.
-----------------------------------------------------------

It is hard for young people today who have grown up with cell phones,
the internet, TV, satellite dishes and IPODs to have any gut feeling
for the unreliability of radio equipment in the 1930s. Modern
equipment and systems are so reliable people don't even think about it
anymore. But in the '30s comparing the reliability and trust in
complicated pieces of electronic equipment with resistors, capacitors,
and tubes that burned out without warning in your own equipment and in
the transmitting equipment that was not under your control to the
proven reliability of a simple sextant, a book of tables and a clock
(or two clocks for redundancy) and celestial won hands down. That was
why AE hauled Fred's butt all the way around the world.

gl
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Martin X. Moleski, SJ

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #4 on: May 29, 2011, 07:08:53 AM »

Moles. All  o/b of A/c forces available were set in to reach Howland , why is it that certain researches (like ´Monte Carlo´) always state or predict that nevertheless , the aircraft arrived at positions far away from the destination those forces were directed to ? If the pilot announces to be on destination , whereas she would be a couple of hundred miles (SSW) off , she must late or early have her navigator knocked cold.

You place the flight 85 nautical miles NNW of Howland.

Randy Jacobson places it 100 nm SSW.

"Finally, when Earhart believed she was at Howland, the plane was actually somewhere about 100 to 135nm to the SW of Howland. Caution must be used, however, as it was assumed that Earhart did not have a single celestial fix to update her flight, and that her entire Expected Path was based solely on dead reckoning."

You both agree Noonan missed Howland.  You disagree about the reasons for the miss.
LTM,

           Marty
           TIGHAR #2359A
 
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Martin X. Moleski, SJ

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #5 on: May 29, 2011, 07:11:29 AM »

No, they didn't plan to rely solely on the radio to find the island but planned on having two separate redundant methods either one of which, all by itself, was capable of taking them to a safe landing at Howland.

I don't buy your argument that AE could have flown without navigating to within RDF range of Howland, but I accept the idea that Fred did provide a backup system of sorts.

The RDF systems we know about are three: Itasca, Howland Island, and the plane.  All three failed.
LTM,

           Marty
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Gary LaPook

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #6 on: May 29, 2011, 12:54:49 PM »

No, they didn't plan to rely solely on the radio to find the island but planned on having two separate redundant methods either one of which, all by itself, was capable of taking them to a safe landing at Howland.

I don't buy your argument that AE could have flown without navigating to within RDF range of Howland, but I accept the idea that Fred did provide a backup system of sorts.

The RDF systems we know about are three: Itasca, Howland Island, and the plane.  All three failed.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Some more evidence to convince you:

On the flight from Oakland to Hawaii they were able to get radio bearings on stations that were more than 600 NM away.

Pilots ferrying small planes across the Pacific and the Atlantic back in the 1970's, before the advent of LORAN C or GPS, universally did exactly that,  they DRed all the way with only an ADF for terminal guidance, relying on DR to be able to get them within the range of the radio beacon at the destination. (I only know of two exceptions to this, one is Ken Gebhart, who now owns the company CELESTAIRE which sells navigation equipment, and myself, we both used celestial navigation.) (see: http://www.celestaire.com/ ) Of course, in the '70s, radio was much more reliable but the range was still the same, the physics of radio propagation had not changed.

The longest leg on the Pacific crossing is California to Hawaii and is about 2100 NM depending on which airport you leave from which is insignificantly shorter than the leg from Lae to Howland. See:  http://www.fer3.com/arc/m2.aspx?i=108664&y=200906


So it would not have been unreasonable for Earhart, by herself, alone in the airplane, to rely solely on DR and then trust the radio for terminal guidance, to fly the leg from Lae to Howland if she had been content to have no redundancy, no second independent navigation method that was capable, by itself, to get her all the way to Howland. To have this second, redundant, navigation system on board she need Noonan.

In the end, both systems failed, stuff happens. Similarly, sometimes a skydiver's reserve parachute fails too and he gets killed. Even redundant systems cannot guarantee success.

BTW, the Itasca's radio direction finder did not fail. The Itasca's RDF was not capable of taking bearings on the frequencies that Earhart transmitted on. Since it was limited to 270 to 550 kcs  she could have transmitted on 3105 and 6210 kcs until the cows came home and they could not have taken a bearing on her. Itasca informed Earhart of the frequency range of their RDF by radiogram on June 28th and this document is available on the Purdue archive website.

Gary LaPook
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Martin X. Moleski, SJ

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #7 on: May 29, 2011, 02:01:13 PM »

So it would not have been unreasonable for Earhart, by herself, alone in the airplane, to rely solely on DR and then trust the radio for terminal guidance, to fly the leg from Lae to Howland if she had been content to have no redundancy, no second independent navigation method that was capable, by itself, to get her all the way to Howland. To have this second, redundant, navigation system on board she needed Noonan.

OK.  I'll take your word for it.

Quote
BTW, the Itasca's radio direction finder did not fail. The Itasca's RDF was not capable of taking bearings on the frequencies that Earhart transmitted on. Since it was limited to 270 to 550 kcs  she could have transmitted on 3105 and 6210 kcs until the cows came home and they could not have taken a bearing on her. Itasca informed Earhart of the frequency range of their RDF by radiogram on June 28th and this document is available on the Purdue archive website.

True enough.  I was composing on my way out the door for a 10:00 AM Mass half-an-hour away from here.
Actually, only one of the three systems "failed"--the one on Howland.  AE's did, at least, pick up a signal,
albeit on a frequency that was too high for her to find a null (7500 kcs).

I've got the story of the mismatched frequencies both for her set and for Itasca (including the 28 June telegram) in the "Failure to Communicate" article.
LTM,

           Marty
           TIGHAR #2359A
 
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h.a.c. van asten

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #8 on: June 10, 2011, 03:17:12 PM »

GLpk. To mr Collopy of Lae Aero mr.Noonan  , thereupon ,  replied positively when asked for being able to find Howland without difficulty ; for such answer you must have your own plans ready , this being a set of precomputations concerning the entire journey , with the possibility , of course , that necessary adaptations must be made . You can not a priori make statement that the island will be " easily" detected  by RDF , especially not since you know that the o/b 500 kc installation has been rendered unservicable. It can be safely assumed that the priority list contained : 1 . Celnav , 2 . (RDF) , with the brackets.
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Monty Fowler

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #9 on: June 14, 2011, 11:13:25 AM »

Mr. Van Asten -  ???
Ex-TIGHAR member No. 2189 E C R SP, 1998-2016
 
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Gary LaPook

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #10 on: July 29, 2011, 02:26:46 AM »

No, they didn't plan to rely solely on the radio to find the island but planned on having two separate redundant methods either one of which, all by itself, was capable of taking them to a safe landing at Howland.

I don't buy your argument that AE could have flown without navigating to within RDF range of Howland, but I accept the idea that Fred did provide a backup system of sorts.

The RDF systems we know about are three: Itasca, Howland Island, and the plane.  All three failed.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Some more evidence to convince you:

On the flight from Oakland to Hawaii they were able to get radio bearings on stations that were more than 600 NM away.

Pilots ferrying small planes across the Pacific and the Atlantic back in the 1970's, before the advent of LORAN C or GPS, universally did exactly that,  they DRed all the way with only an ADF for terminal guidance, relying on DR to be able to get them within the range of the radio beacon at the destination. (I only know of two exceptions to this, one is Ken Gebhart, who now owns the company CELESTAIRE which sells navigation equipment, and myself, we both used celestial navigation.) (see: http://www.celestaire.com/ ) Of course, in the '70s, radio was much more reliable but the range was still the same, the physics of radio propagation had not changed.

The longest leg on the Pacific crossing is California to Hawaii and is about 2100 NM depending on which airport you leave from which is insignificantly shorter than the leg from Lae to Howland. See:  http://www.fer3.com/arc/m2.aspx?i=108664&y=200906


So it would not have been unreasonable for Earhart, by herself, alone in the airplane, to rely solely on DR and then trust the radio for terminal guidance, to fly the leg from Lae to Howland if she had been content to have no redundancy, no second independent navigation method that was capable, by itself, to get her all the way to Howland. To have this second, redundant, navigation system on board she need Noonan.

In the end, both systems failed, stuff happens. Similarly, sometimes a skydiver's reserve parachute fails too and he gets killed. Even redundant systems cannot guarantee success.

BTW, the Itasca's radio direction finder did not fail. The Itasca's RDF was not capable of taking bearings on the frequencies that Earhart transmitted on. Since it was limited to 270 to 550 kcs  she could have transmitted on 3105 and 6210 kcs until the cows came home and they could not have taken a bearing on her. Itasca informed Earhart of the frequency range of their RDF by radiogram on June 28th and this document is available on the Purdue archive website.

Gary LaPook

----------------------------------------------------------------------

You may have seen the movie "Mercy Mission: The Rescue of Flight 771" in which a guy ferrying a Cessna Ag Truck (a crop duster) from the U.S. to Australia had a failure of his ADF and was lost over the Pacific on the 1700 SM leg from Pago Pago to Norfolk Island. The captain of a nearby airliner used some basic celestial navigation techniques to locate the lost plane.

This movie is based on a true story. The plane had successfully flown from San Francisco to Honolulu (2400 SM) and on to Pago Pago (2600 SM) before taking off on the 1700 SM leg to Norfolk Island which is about 900 SM east of Australia. Ag Trucks cruise at about 90 knots so these legs each took more than  24 hours. Ag Trucks don't have IFR panels so you have to install a temporary small panel with the IFR instruments (you need a form 337). On the other hand, Ag Trucks are convenient because you plumb the chemical hopper into the fuel line and then fill the hopper with fuel so you don't need to install an additional ferry tank.

This was a common routing to Australia and thousands of single engine planes flown by single pilots flew this route safely so Earhart's flight was nothing out of the ordinary.


I just checked the Australian Aircraft Registry

http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:PWA::pc=PC_90127

and found that there are 3656 Cessna, 1861 Piper and 710 Beech aircraft registered. (These are the three largest manufacturers of small aircraft.) So I was right, there were thousands of small aircraft flown across the Pacific by solo pilots. About 6000 planes flown on three legs of about 2400 SM each makes about 18,000 legs each about the same length as the Earhart flight. Earhart's flight was no longer than these many thousands of flights and she had Fred who could spell her on the controls.

You can see the movie here:

http://www.ovguide.com/movies_tv/mercy_mission_the_rescue_of_flight_771.htm






http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_New_Zealand_Flight_103

http://airodyssey.net/1999/03/01/movie-flt771/

http://www.navworld.com/navcerebrations/mayday.htm

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0107556/

It is available on Netflix:

http://movies.netflix.com/WiSearch?oq=mercy+mission&ac_posn=-1&v1=mercy+mission&search_submit=

gl
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Martin X. Moleski, SJ

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #11 on: July 29, 2011, 07:47:57 AM »

BTW, the Itasca's radio direction finder did not fail. The Itasca's RDF was not capable of taking bearings on the frequencies that Earhart transmitted on. Since it was limited to 270 to 550 kcs  she could have transmitted on 3105 and 6210 kcs until the cows came home and they could not have taken a bearing on her. Itasca informed Earhart of the frequency range of their RDF by radiogram on June 28th and this document is available on the Purdue archive website.

AE apparently didn't grasp the importance of transmitting on the right frequency for the right length of time.  As far as we can tell, she didn't understand the limitations of her equipment and of the RDF equipment aboard the Itasca.  The borrowed Navy HFDF rig on Howland failed, too, although the reasons are (in my view) murky: poorly designed, too few batteries, poor power management, unskilled operators (maybe), short transmissions from AE, etc.  I don't think we have the specs on that equipment.  It seems conceivable to me that someone told AE that she could anticipate getting bearings from Itasca on her voice transmissions because they assumed that the borrowed equipment would work in that range.  However, I have seen zero evidence to that effect.  Someone wanted the HFDF available; someone must have known its range; it got to Howland; it didn't work as hoped.

Quote
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_New_Zealand_Flight_103

http://www.navworld.com/navcerebrations/mayday.htm

Wow--what a great story!  Thanks!
LTM,

           Marty
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h.a.c. van asten

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #12 on: July 31, 2011, 01:20:49 AM »

The RDF battery operated HF instrument was possibly a pre-mass production model  that in WW-II was delivered with JAN specifications to the US Navy . I have the documentation of the latter and will search for it in the papers . JAN specifications guaranteed the usefullness in the field .
.
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Martin X. Moleski, SJ

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #13 on: August 02, 2011, 05:33:28 PM »

... she must have used RDF effectively enough at times before. ...
So far as I know, no other flight in her career required RDF.  She may have had a set aboard and may have fooled around with it a bit, but she had lots of other landmarks to help her find her way.  She didn't have or need it for her transatlantic flight.  She may have had it, but didn't much need it for her flight from Hawaii to the mainland.

Quote
Poor creature paid a terrible price for that shortcoming.

Agreed.  Fred, too.
LTM,

           Marty
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Gary LaPook

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Re: Noonan Navigation Error
« Reply #14 on: August 02, 2011, 06:32:06 PM »

The RDF battery operated HF instrument was possibly a pre-mass production model  that in WW-II was delivered with JAN specifications to the US Navy . I have the documentation of the latter and will search for it in the papers . JAN specifications guaranteed the usefullness in the field .
.

'JAN Specifications' - interesting. 

As I recall from "Finding Amelia" and see again in this site, it seems the HFDF set on Howland worked OK, excepting certain tragic limitations: if only -
a) the operator had not expended the batteries] while listening much of the night prior to AE's arrival in the area, and
b) AE had had a grasp of how long to key the mic to allow a minimum, i.e. had only been savvy as to RDF technique beyond whatever elementary use she had apparently experienced during most of her career. 

I say apparently, because the game she found herself in on July 2 seemed to have required actions beyond her knowing, and she must have used RDF effectively enough at times before.  Or, perhaps she was reliant on others for that and the posing for pictures was little more than that - posing as if attentive to the task in a meaningful way.  Poor creature paid a terrible price for that shortcoming.

Thinking along the subject of 'Noonan Navigation Error' and from all I have been able to digest about the flight, it hardly seems fair to presume much of an 'error' on FN's part: seems more likely he performed as well as conditions would allow.  What was ultimately missing was the ablilty to connect the radio-dots, voice and directional, and perhaps finally an utter inability to spot Howland among the cloud shadows on the ocean.

Many of these details will remain a mystery even after NR16020 is found.  They are consistent enough with the Electra finding its way to Niku, but if the airplane is found there it will not prove that all details occurred as we envision them.  We'll never really know who contributed to the loss in what degree and how, unless some record was made of that by either of the only two who could have known and left for us to find; I doubt we'll find that bottle lying in the coral rubble and sands of Nikumaroro. 

LTM -

------------------------------------------------------------

1. The batteries were borrowed from the Itasca where they were normally used to power up the gun mount.

2. The only use of the RDF by Earhart that I know of was Noonan's instruction to her to "keep the Makapuu beacon ten degrees on the starboard bow" as they approached Hawaii. But Manning was working the radio and most likely set up the RDF for her so the only thing she needed to do was to listen for the null as she changed the heading slightly right and left.

3. There were no cloud shadows in the vicinity of Howland on July 2, 1937. Itasca reported the nearest clouds as being 40 NM away. Don't confuse Earhart's  approach with the Pellegrino flight in 1967 or with the movie on the Waitt website.

http://searchforamelia.org/helicopter

gl

gl
« Last Edit: August 02, 2011, 06:37:41 PM by Gary LaPook »
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