Critiquing the Competion
Thursday, 25 February 2010 09:36
In 2006, and again in 2009, the Waitt Institute for Discovery (WID) tested the hypothesis that the Earhart Electra went down at sea in the general vicinity of Howland Island sometime between 2013 GMT and 2100 GMT on July 2, 1937. Specific search areas were identified based on analyses of a wide range of data including navigation, fuel consumption, weather, radio reports, and Earhart’s performance on previous legs of the world flight. The search of the sea floor was carried out using technology provided by Harbor Branch Oceanographic Institute and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. Although coverage of the target area was impressively thorough, the aircraft was not found.
Until recently the Waitt Institute’s efforts to find the Earhart Electra were kept strictly secret. To the institute’s credit, having concluded its search, it has now made its data public so that “the area explored can be eliminated from future searches.” The WID website www.searchforamelia.org presents a detailed, if somewhat scattered, review of the organization’s search operations and the research upon which they were based. TIGHAR is pleased to accept the Waitt Institute's invitation for comment.
A Fundamental Flaw
Let us acknowledge from the start that no one knows what became of the Earhart Electra. In the absence of indications that something else happened, the intuitive default explanation would be that the flight simply missed a tiny island in a big ocean, ran out of gas, and went down at sea. The Waitt Institute chose to test the hypothesis that the Electra is on the bottom of the ocean somewhere near Howland. It is not TIGHAR's purpose here to lay out the case for the airplane being somewhere else but, rather, to look at the Waitt Institute’s choice of where on the ocean bottom to look. The institute conducted an excellent search but the plane wasn’t there. If we accept that the Electra, or some identifiable part of it, still exists, we must conclude that the reasoning that put it in the now-eliminated areas was somehow flawed.
From the information presented on the WID website, one flaw is apparent and fundamental. The WID hypothesis contradicts the WID’s own data. Simply put – the WID hypothesis has the airplane running out of fuel more than an hour before the WID’s own research says it should.
The WID hypothesis holds that the aircraft ran out of gas sometime in the 47 minutes between 2013 GMT and 2100 GMT History>Final Flight http://searchforamelia.org/final-flight. Crucial to the hypothesis is the estimated amount of fuel remaining at 1912 GMT when Earhart said, “We must be on you but cannot see you, but gas is running low.” As stated in Research>Appendix 1>Fuel Remaining http://searchforamelia.org/app-fuel-remaining, “The amount of fuel remaining in the Electra at 1912 GMT is important because it determines how long the aircraft could stay airborne, and how far it could fly, before fuel exhaustion.”
WID’s research, as detailed in Research>Appendix 1>Fuel Remaining http://searchforamelia.org/app-fuel-remaining, reaches the amazingly precise conclusion that the aircraft probably had 3 hours and 4 minutes of gas left at 1912 GMT - enough to remain aloft until 2216. Why then, does the hypothesis postulate fuel exhaustion less than 2 hours later (by 2100)?
Say What?
The only explanation is offered in Overview>Introduction
http://searchforamelia.org/intro
“According to famous researchers, Elgen M. and Marie K. Long, ‘There is no uncharted island, rock, shoal, reef, sandbar or water less than 30 feet deep within 350 miles of Howland Island. The inescapable conclusion is that shortly after 0843 IST [2013 GMT], Earhart was forced to ditch the plane somewhere within 100 miles of Howland Island.”
Long’s statement is a non sequitur. How does the absence of land within 350 miles of Howland lead to an inescapable conclusion that Earhart was forced to ditch the plane somewhere within 100 miles of Howland Island shortly after 2013 GMT? Why couldn’t she ditch at some other time and at some other distance? Why the fixation on 2013 GMT?
Inspecting the Foundation
The answer, of course, is that 2013 GMT (08:43 Itasca time) is the generally accepted time of the last in-flight transmission from Earhart heard by Itasca. The assumption that the 2013 GMT transmission and the silence that followed it are indications of the flight’s immediate termination is the foundation upon which the entire Waitt Institute investigation was based. Given the amount of work that went into speculation about why the aircraft ran out of fuel too soon and the millions of dollars spent searching the ocean bottom on the assumption that it did, it is surprising that the WID website includes no examination of the 2013 GMT message beyond a garbled mention in Radio Call Log http://searchforamelia.org/radio-call-log.
Although it’s a bit like examining the latch on the barn door after the horse is gone, a close look at the 2013 GMT message would seem to be in order.
The final in-flight transmission heard by Itasca is described in one of the two radio logs being kept at the time. The 08:43 (2013 GMT) entry in the original log kept by Radioman 2nd Class William Galten, complete with numerous cross-outs and re-typings, is an important record of the confusion and anxiety that reigned in the radio room that morning. The other log kept by Radioman 2nd Class Thomas O’Hare makes no mention of the call.
According to Galten’s log, the call began at 08:43, almost exactly at Earhart’s scheduled transmission time of forty-five minutes past the hour. Earhart did not say she was running out of fuel. She gave her position as best she knew it – “WE ARE ON THE LINE 157 337” - and she said she would send the message again on her other frequency -“WILL REPEAT MESSAGE. WE WILL REPEAT THIS ON 6210 KILOCYCLES.” - then she said “WAIT.” At that point there was apparently a pause because Galten made the notations he customarily made at the end of a call – “3105 (the frequency), A3 (meaning “voice transmission”), S5 (meaning the signal was at maximum strength). But then, on the same line, he added a second message from Earhart “ (?/KHAQQ XMISION WE ARE RUNNING ON LINE N ES S” meaning “Questionable Earhart transmission, We are running on line north and south.”
The log entry raises some interesting questions:
- After saying she would repeat the message on 6210 and asking Itasca to “wait,” the next thing Itasca heard was a different message on 3105. How long was the “wait?” The answer seems to be twelve minutes. Three contemporary written sources – Itasca’s commanding officer Warner Thompson, and the two wire service reporters who were on the cruise, James Carey and Howard Hanzlick – reported that the final in-flight call from Earhart was heard at 08:55 (2025 GMT). For a detailed discussion see Final Words http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Research/Bulletins/49_LastWords/49_LastWords.html
- Why didn’t Earhart repeat the message on 6210 as she said she would? Maybe she did. Twelve minutes is plenty of time to switch to 6210, repeat the message, receive no response, and come back to 3105 with additional information, “We are running on line north and south.”
- Why didn’t Itasca hear her if she transmitted on 6210? No one knows, but almost every pilot has had the experience of being unable to contact a ground station on a perfectly good frequency with a perfectly good radio. When that happens you simply return to the previous frequency – as it appears Earhart did.
- Why didn’t Itasca hear anything on either frequency after 08:55 (20:25 GMT)? Again, no one can say for sure, but it seems entirely plausible that having failed repeatedly to establish communication on either frequency she simply stopped trying. There is also the point that Itasca did hear signals on 3105 later that evening and over the next several nights.
Perhaps the Electra did abruptly and inexplicably run out of fuel more than an hour before WID’s calculations say it should have, but there is nothing in the last in-flight transmission heard by Itasca to suggest that happened. When last heard from at 20:25 GMT Earhart was still trying to find Howland Island.
Misinformation
Apparently uncomfortable with basing a hypothesis on Long’s assumption that the aircraft ran out of fuel so quickly after 2013 GMT that there was no time to make a “Mayday” call, the WID hypothesis expands the window 47 minutes to 2100 GMT (even though WID calculates that the plane should have been able to remain aloft until at least 2216 GMT). The rationale for extending the time to 2100 GMT without a distress call is explained in Final flight (http://searchforamelia.org/final-flight):
“While continuing to search for a sign of Howland, Earhart’s tanks ran dry between 2013 GMT and 2100 GMT. The left engine likely quit first – it powered the only generator on the aircraft–and the radios required this generator to transmit and receive.”
But that’s not true. The radios on the Electra did not require the generator to transmit or receive. Joe Gurr, who worked on Earhart’s radios, sent a telegram to Putnam on July 5, 1937 saying, “Not necessary have motor running for operation radio on Earhart plane stop two batteries carried will permit operation independent of charging generator mounted on motors.” For the complete telegram see http://earchives.lib.purdue.edu/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/earhart&CISOPTR=2013&CISOBOX=1&REC=1
As explained by TIGHAR's radio expert, LCDR Bob Brandenburg, USN (ret):
"The radios, like every other electrical device on the aircraft, got their power via the dynamotor under the pilot’s seat which boosted the voltage provided by the 12-volt main electrical bus which drew from either of the two batteries – the main battery under the floor in the center section and the auxiliary battery in the rear cabin. The generator charged the batteries.
It was impossible to operate the transmitter from the generator alone because the generator output was limited to 50 amps by the generator control unit, and keying the transmitter would start up the dynamotor, which drew 60 amps. Therefore, it was necessary to have at least one of the batteries on the bus, to provide the additional current required during transmission. When the transmitter was in standby, the battery would receive charge from the generator.
However, given the battery capacity, it was possible to transmit on battery power alone for a combined total of about 2 hours, if both batteries were fully charged at the outset."
So we’re back to both the engines going silent within a couple minutes of 2013 GMT even though Earhart seems to have been aloft and talking at 2025 GMT and, by WID’s own calculations, the airplane should have been able to continue aloft for another two hours or more.
Misrepresentation
In his book Amelia Earhart – the Mystery Solved, Elgen Long got the engines to quit before they should have by alleging that Earhart mismanaged her power settings to overcome headwinds he imagined that she encountered. The WID Hypothesis gets rid of the unwanted fuel by postulating a failure of the Cambridge Exhaust Gas Analyzer (referred to by WID as the Cambridge Fuel Analyzer or CFA). The justification for the proposed failure is offered in Research>Navigation Paths>Detailed Fuel Consumption Analysis http://searchforamelia.org/fuel-analysis, “Apparently the CFA was also somewhat fragile, as it was frequently being repaired throughout the World Flight, at many of AE’s intermediate stops where maintenance was available.”
It was? Research>Navigation Paths>Detailed Fuel Consumption Analysis http://searchforamelia.org/fuel-analysis notes that the analyzer failed en route to Karachi. The plan was for repairs to be made in Calcutta or possibly Singapore, but the only mention of repairs actually being made was in Bandoeng. The analyzer may also have been the instrument that required a return to Bandoeng from Surabaya because it didn’t stay fixed. That’s one failure and possibly two fixes. In Lae, a “new cartridge” was fitted to the analyzer on the starboard engine. See The Chater Report http://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Documents/Chater_Report.html. To say that the Cambridge Exhaust Gas Analyzer was “frequently being repaired throughout the World Flight, at many of AE’s intermediate stops where maintenance was available.” is simply not accurate. Maybe the analyzer failed en route to Howland, but there's absolutely no evidence that it did.
Flawed Science, Great Technology
The WID hypothesis was based on a single pre-conceived conclusion - that the supposed failure of Itasca to hear anything further from the Earhart aircraft after 2013 GMT was due to premature fuel exhaustion. When WID's analysis of the airplane’s fuel consumption resulted in too much gas, events were imagined that would bring the data in line with the pre-ordained moment of crisis. Rather than change the hypothesis to fit the data, the data are skewed to conform with the hypothesis. This inversion of the scientific method is a systemic problem that runs through the entire selection of where to search. The search itself, by contrast, appears to have been well executed. The Waitt Institute is to be commended for valuable experience gained in the application of deep sea technologies.
Until there is proof that something else happened, it remains possible that the Earhart aircraft ran out of gas and went down somewhere in the open ocean. With the mounting evidence that something else did happen, that possibility grows increasingly remote.
Ric Gillespie
Executive Director
TIGHAR
Correction
Thursday, 14 January 2010 21:34
Lest anyone think that there ain't nobody in here but us TIGHARS:
Michael Dessner, the Director of Operation at the Waitt Institute for Discovery, has been kind enough to point out a couple of errors in my post which I hasten to correct.
The institute was formed in May 2005, not 2007. I also got the length of the 2009 expedition wrong. It was the 2006 trip with Nauticos that was 38 days. The 2009 voyage was a whopping 90 days with 72 days of survey time during which they covered 2200 square miles with high-resolution side scan sonar. An amazing achievement.
Worth the Waitt
Tuesday, 12 January 2010 13:17
Which is it? Did she crash and sink, or did she die as a castaway?
Nobody yet knows for sure, but which case is stronger?
New information on a new website may make it easier to decide. The website is called "Search for Amelia" and it presents the findings of the Waitt Institute for Discovery. Mr. Ted Waitt is an extraordinarily wealthy individual and a devotee of the Crashed & Sank theory of Earhart's disappearance advanced by author and long-time Earhart researcher Elgen Long in his 1999 book "Amelia Earhart - The Mystery Solved." In 2006, Waitt secretly funded a deep sea search for the Earhart Electra by the underwater technology company Nauticos. That search of the ocean floor near Howland Island was unsuccessful.
About that time, Waitt decided to start a motion picture production company called Avalon Pictures. It's one film so far is the 2009 Hollywood biopic "Amelia" starring Hilary Swank. (For my two-part review of the film see http://tighar.org/news/)
In 2007, Waitt formed a nonprofit organization called the "Waitt Institute for Discovery" and in early 2009 mounted another strictly secret deep sea search for the Earhart plane using sophisticated Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (UAV) technology from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. That 38-day search of the waters near Howland Island was also unsuccessful.
The Waitt Institute for Discovery has recently decided to go public with a website that presents the results of its multi-million dollar searches and the research upon which they were based. See http://searchforamelia.org/
We applaud the Waitt Institute's decision to follow TIGHAR's long-standing example and share its research. We'll take a close look at their work (as we hope they do ours) and offer them our observations. We'll share those observations with you here on the Facebook Earhart Project Group and on the TIGHAR website.
Is it likely that Amelia Earhart went down at sea as the Waitt Institute contends, or is the TIGHAR Institute's hypothesis that she ended her days on Nikumaroro the stronger possibility? Now that both sides have laid their cards on the table we can, at last, make a fair comparison.
As always, your questions and comments will be more than welcome. This should be an interesting exercise. Don't be selfish. Invite your friends to join the group. The more brains the better.
Part 2 of Ric's Review of "Amelia"
Monday, 26 October 2009 10:10
Dissecting the Disappearance
Hollywood films are entertainment, not history, but visual portrayals are powerful and artistic misrepresentations of persons and events often trump historical fact in the public consciousness. Thanks to Mel Gibson’s Braveheart, most people now think that the 13th century Scottish hero William Wallace was a kilted highlander who used pointed sticks to stop the English at Stirling. It’s not a new problem. Shakespeare permanently trashed the reputation of a fair and equable 11th century king known to his subjects as Mac Bethad.
Amelia’s portrayal of Earhart’s ill-fated attempt to fly around the world and the events leading to her disappearance is a confusing cocktail of fact and falsehood that deserves to be dissected for those who are genuinely interested in one of the great mysteries of the 20th century. Let’s go through the film’s assertions and see how they stack up.
In Amelia:
Earhart’s original intention is to cross the Pacific by refueling in mid-air. Gene Vidal objects that she doesn’t have the flying skills and suggests that she land and refuel at tiny Howland Island.
True – Although events are greatly simplified and shortened in the film, Earhart’s initial plan was to fly nonstop from Hawaii to Tokyo, refueling en route from a U.S. Navy flying boat over Midway Island. Aerial refueling was in its infancy and the Navy complained that Earhart would need extensive, and expensive, training. Vidal, at that time Director of the Bureau of Air Commerce, suggested that an airfield could be built on one of three Central Pacific islands – Jarvis, Baker, and Howland – recently claimed and occupied by the U.S. for the purpose of supporting anticipated commercial air travel from Hawaii to New Zealand and Australia. Earhart’s use of an island airfield would validate the concept. Bureau plans called for an airfield to be built on Jarvis Island but Howland was more in line with Earhart’s desired route from Hawaii to New Guinea.
In Amelia:
Vidal warns Earhart that, “If you miss that island you’ll be out of fuel with 2,000 miles to go.”
Not True – A 20% fuel reserve was standard for long distance flights. Baker Island is 40 nautical miles from Howland. McKean Island is 300 nautical miles from Howland. Gardner Island (now Nikumaroro) is 350 nautical miles from Howland.
In Amelia:
An on-screen caption announces that the world flight has reached “Karachi, Pakistan.”
Not True – You would think that a film-maker who was born in India would know that Pakistan didn’t exist until 1947. Earhart and Noonan landed in Karachi, India.
In Amelia:
The night before her fateful departure from Lae, New Guinea, Amelia has an intimate last conversation with her husband in California via radio.
Not True – Amelia did not talk to her husband from Lae. She did telephone a travelogue story to the New York Herald Tribune, as she had from nearly every stop on the world flight. Putnam was in California and communicating with his wife by telegram.
In Amelia:
As the flight approaches Howland Island, Earhart is unable to hear radio transmissions sent by the Coast Guard cutter Itasca except for a brief snippit of one voice message. She is unable to hear code because she left her code receiver behind.
Not True – The Electra’s radio was capable of receiving both voice and code, but Earhart heard no voice messages from Itasca. The one transmission she did acknowledge hearing was in code. Earhart had asked the Coast Guard to send only voice messages because neither she nor Noonan knew Morse code.
In Amelia:
The radio direction finder on Howland Island is unable to take a bearing on Earhart’s signals because the set was left on all night and the battery was dead.
True – Radioman 2nd Class Frank Cipriani was in charge of the battery-powered high-frequency direction finder set up on Howland Island. He began listening for Earhart at 9:00 PM local time the night before. In the early morning he heard Earhart’s transmissions as the plane came within range. Cipriani attempted to take bearings but her signals were too short and too weak. By 7:42 AM when the plane was apparently closest to Howland, the batteries were dead.
In Amelia:
When Earhart is unable to locate Howland Island, she circles the plane.
Not True – The persistent myth that Earhart said she was “circling” is based on the Itasca radio log entry for 7:58 AM: “We are circling but cannot hear you.” The original log clearly shows that the initial entry was “We are drifting but cannot hear you.” The word “drifting” was subsequently, but incompletely, erased and the word “circling” was typed over the erasure. Clearly, the operator was unsure what she said. Neither drifting nor circling makes sense. Earhart almost certainly said, “We are listening but cannot hear you.”
In Amelia:
As the flight and the film reach the climactic moment of crisis, with the plane low on fuel and Howland nowhere in sight, Amelia remains calm and contemplative while Noonan, back in the cabin, breaks down in tears and terror.
Not True – Earhart’s last in-flight transmission heard by Itasca was later described by the ship’s captain who heard it as “hurried, frantic, and apparently incomplete.” Another officer present wrote, “I heard her last broadcasts myself. She realized too late that she was in trouble, then she went to pieces, her voice clearly indicated that fact, by the desperate note in her transmissions.” It’s regrettable that Noonan is portrayed as paralyzed with fear when, in all probability, he was working like mad to find a way to save their lives. TIGHAR has found abundant evidence to suggest that he succeeded.
In Amelia:
We are left with the impression that Earhart and Noonan were the victims of a radio malfunction, a missing “code receiver,” and a Coast Guardsman’s negligence.
Not True – There is no indication of a radio malfunction. There is photographic evidence that an antenna normally used to receive voice communications was lost during the takeoff from Lae but it is also clear that the aircraft’s radio receiver and direction finding antenna remained operative. There was no missing “code receiver.” Cipriani was, indeed, negligent in not conserving the batteries for the high-frequency direction finder on Howland but Earhart’s transmissions were too short to permit a bearing anyway.
Like most aircraft accidents, the failure of the Earhart/Noonan flight was the result of a number of errors and mishaps – some attributable to Earhart, some to the Coast Guard – and as with most accidents, the primary responsibility for the loss rests with the pilot in command.
Contrary to legend, the navigational challenges presented by the flight were not unprecedented. For nearly a year, Pan American Airways had been safely carrying paying passengers across the Pacific via long over-ocean flights to tiny islands. Those routes and techniques had been pioneered by Fred Noonan. As Earhart’s navigator for the Lae/Howland flight, Noonan’s task was to use his celestial and dead-reckoning navigational skills to get the aircraft within radio range of Howland. At that point, Earhart was to use radio direction finding to fine-tune their approach. Noonan appears to have done his job with his usual skill but Earhart clearly lacked the knowledge and proficiency to bring the flight to its intended destination. Her pre-flight planning, training, and coordination with the Coast Guard were woefully inadequate. If Earhart was a victim it was of her own hubris.
Ric reviews Amelia, Part 1
Friday, 23 October 2009 22:00
Amelia – a film by Mira Nair starring Hilary Swank as Amelia Earhart and Richard Gere as George Palmer Putnam
Let’s start with an acknowledgement of the obvious. Hollywood films about famous people are entertainment, not history. Sadly, Amelia comes up short on both counts.
From an historical perspective, the film exaggerates Earhart’s abilities and accomplishments. In an early scene we see Amelia rolling and spinning a pre-war German biplane in Swiss markings (go figure), but Earhart was strictly a straight-and-level flyer who disliked even a steep bank. Later she departs alone from Teterboro, New Jersey for her solo 1932 Atlantic crossing. In truth, Earhart rode as a passenger in her own airplane behind hired pilot Bernt Balchen for the first thousand miles to Newfoundland. Earhart famously took First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt for a night time airplane ride over Washington, DC. They rode as passengers in a twin-engine Eastern Airlines Curtis Condor and the captain briefly let AE, who was not yet multi-engine qualified, handle the controls. In the film, the aircraft is a Ford tri-motor and Hilary Swank’s Amelia is the pilot (in evening gown) who briefly lets Mrs. Roosevelt handle the controls. When Amelia’s Amelia announces her intention to fly around the world at the equator, lover Gene Vidal (Ewan McGregor) exclaims “It can’t be done!” By 1937 international air travel had become common enough that he might better have said, as did many, “Why bother?”
The flying scenes are beautifully done but, ironically, the only accurate aircraft in the film are the phony ones. The non-flying replica Fokker FVII “Friendship” is correct, as is the non-flying replica Lockheed Vega. The special effects magicians used a combination of live action, models, and Computer Generated Imagery (CGI) to create convincing action. The Fokker’s overloaded takeoff from Trepassey Bay, in particular, is masterful illusion.
The film makes extensive use of genuine period aircraft but all of the types Amelia flies are close-but-no-cigar. A deHavilland Tiger Moth stands in for her Avro Avian. Her mount in the Powder Puff Derby is a Waco Taperwing instead of her Lockheed Vega. Standing in for Earhart’s Lockheed “Electra” Model 10E Special are two Lockheed “Electra Junior” Model 12As. Both aircraft are correctly painted and polished to resemble NR16020 but the Model 12 is a smaller airplane than the Model 10 and has a distinctly different profile. The substitution is understandable. The number of airworthy Model 10s can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Serviceable “Juniors” are less rare. What is more difficult to fathom is why the Model 12 that is spectacularly wrecked in the Luke Field accident has the iconic loop antenna correctly mounted over the cockpit while the airplane used in all the flying scenes has a loop under the nose and a huge modern blade antenna on top of the rear fuselage.
Such continuity gaffes plague the entire film. We hear the sound of the Fokker’s engine idling as the prop first starts to move. When the voice of an announcer is describing Earhart's intention to fly the Atlantic solo we see newsreel images of her triumphant arrival. As the camera cuts back and forth between AE and GP in a close conversation, the collar on Putnam’s jacket can’t make up its mind whether it turned back or not. That’s just sloppy film making.
Some of the editing choices are downright baffling. As AE fights to regain control of her Vega as it spins toward the storm-tossed Atlantic we flash on images of a youthful Amelia on horseback gleefully racing the takeoff roll of 1910 Bleriot monoplane. Later, Earhart is being honored at an event where she appears alone on stage in front of an immense American flag that fills the entire frame. For about three seconds we have the opening scene from Patton and then it’s gone – no explanation.
Nitpicking such trivia is as fun as it is pointless. More important is how the film portrays its central characters – and here Amelia crashes and sinks. Major players in Earhart’s story are completely missing. Not only do we never see George Putnam’s wife Dorothy, we’re never told that George is married while he’s courting Amelia, nor do we know that the thoroughly plastic Gene Vidal too has a wife at home while he and his son Gore are hanging with AE. (My favorite part of the film is where young Gore shouts in alarm, “TIGHAR! TIGHAR!” – but I digress.) Technical adviser Paul Mantz is nowhere to be found and navigator/radio operator Harry Manning is not aboard for the crash in Hawaii (which would have been fine with Harry).
Richard Gere’s George Putnam is, of course, infinitely better looking and more charming than the notoriously abrasive GP, but Gere’s performance is, by far, the best in the film. In some ways this is more Putnam’s story than Earhart’s. He is Pygmalion. In love with his own creation, he remains passionately faithful despite her cruelty and, in the end, wins her love only to lose her.
Swank’s physical resemblance to Earhart is striking. She also succeeds in capturing AE’s distinctive, slightly affected speech patterns except when she drifts into channeling Katherine Hepburn. But Swank, under Nair’s direction, accomplishes the amazing feat of making one of the most complex, passionate, ferociously ambitious, and successful women of the 20th century seem shallow, weepy, and rather dull.
The film’s portrayal of the world flight and the events of July 2, 1937 is so shot through with errors, myths and misrepresentations that it merits its own review. Stay tuned.
Ric
Gillespie/Thurman Radio Interview
Friday, 16 October 2009 14:46
On October 15, 2009 Minnesota Public Radio’s Kerri Miller interviewed TIGHAR’s Ric Gillespie and Judith Thurman, whose article “Missing Woman – the Flight of Amelia Earhart” appeared in the September 14, 2009 issue of The New Yorker. Listen to the interview.
Thirteen Bones
Thursday, 24 September 2009 20:19
Thirteen Bones
By Tom King
Tom King’s new novel, Thirteen Bones, is due out in a little over a week. It will be available through Amazon, Barnes and Noble, and other major websites. In very brief, it examines the impact of the discovery of the bones on Nikumaroro on the village, through the eyes of two young I-Kiribati boys. An excellent read and heartily recommended.
Proceeds from sales of the book will benefit TIGHAR and the Phoenix Islands Protected Area.
Sponsor Team Members
Sunday, 26 July 2009 19:41

Sponsor Team Members
Sponsor Team Members have been an essential and successful part of TIGHAR’s many expeditions to Nikumaroro. Funding for the Niku VI expeditions in May/June 2010 will come, in part, from a limited number of Sponsor Team Members.
What is a Sponsor Team Member?
Sponsor Team Members participate in the expedition as members of the TIGHAR archaeological team in consideration of a $50,000 contribution to help fund the project. The contribution covers all expenses Los Angeles to Los Angeles.
Is the $50,000 tax deductible?
TIGHAR is a 501(c)(3) public charity. If you are a U.S. citizen your contribution is tax deductible to the full extent of the law minus an amount equal to your pro rata share of the actual cost of the trip.
How long would I be away?
The entire Niku VI expedition will run from May 18 to June 14, 2010 but you don’t have to be away for that long. Halfway through the trip there will be an opportunity for team members to leave or join the expedition so you can participate in the first segment (May 18 to 31) or the second segment (June 1 to 14) or participate in the entire expedition. Your choice, but the sponsorship requirement is the same.
What would it be like?
You’d fly from Los Angeles to Apia, Samoa where you would board the expedition ship Nai’a for the two and half day voyage to Nikumaroro (“Niku” for short). During the expedition you would share a cabin aboard Nai’a with another team member – perhaps another Sponsor Team Member, perhaps a regular Project Team Member. Once you’re on the team, you’re on the team. No special privileges. All team members sign liability releases, model releases (giving TIGHAR permission to use your photograph), and assignments. (There is no souvenir hunting. Anything we find is held in trust by TIGHAR for the Republic of Kiribati which owns Nikumaroro.)
Nikumaroro is part of the Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA), the world’s largest marine preserve. TIGHAR expeditions require the permission of the PIPA administrators and a Republic of Kiribati representative accompanies us to verify that we follow the protocols and precautions necessary to preserve the pristine beauty of this incredible island.
The TIGHAR approach to expeditions:
In twenty-five years of conducting aviation archaeological operations all over the world (this will be our tenth trip to Niku), we’ve developed a style that is best expressed in a few bumper-sticker style aphorisms.
- We take the work seriously, but not ourselves. Leave your ego on the dock.
- The team functions as a family. We look out for each other.
- We don’t take unnecessary chances. It’s not worth hurting live people to look for dead ones.
- We’re out there to get the work done, not have an adventure. Adventure is what happens when things go wrong. There’s always plenty of adventure.
A typical day at Niku:
Breakfast at 0600
We live aboard the ship and commute to work ashore. Nai’a is not a big ship but she’s a comfortable ship. Each cabin is individually air-conditioned and has a private head (toilet) and shower. We dine together in the main salon and the food is first class.
First skiff ashore at 0730
Nai’a uses hard-bottomed inflatables known, coincidentally, as Naiads. Boarding and disembarking the skiffs from the ship’s aft dive platform in a choppy sea requires timing, core strength, and agility. A misstep can mean getting crushed between the skiff and the hull. The Black Tips (reef sharks) are always on hand to help should anyone fall overboard. We land on the island via a narrow channel that was blasted through the fringing reef. Climbing in and out of the skiff and transferring bulky gear on slippery footing while standing in the surf is not for the clumsy of body or the faint of heart.
Getting to the archaeological site
Once ashore, we carry the gear, water and food we’ll need for the day’s work along a trail through the coconut jungle to the lagoon shore where we load aboard another skiff for the twenty-minute boat ride down the lagoon to the Seven Site, the area at the remote southeast end of the atoll we believe to be the place where the castaway campsite was discovered in 1940.
Work at the Seven Site
Although a relatively pleasant open forest in 1937, the site is now overgrown with scaevola, dense tropical vegetation that must be cleared before the ground can be archaeologically searched for features and artifacts. Clearing operations are complicated by the need to avoid dragging cut brush over ground we don’t want to disturb. Cutting, carrying, and piling the scaevola is hard physical work. Once an area has been cleared, the exposed surface is a thin layer of dead leaves and other detritus on a base of “coral rubble,” roughly finger-sized chunks of loose coral. Searching for artifacts is hands and knees work, carefully removing the leaf layer and using a trowel to scrape away the coral rubble down to a predetermined level. The removed material is then put through a ¼ inch screen to reveal any objects that were missed during troweling. All of this is done in temperatures that regularly exceed 110°F. (Indiana Jones leather jackets not recommended.) The work requires constant vigilance and attention to detail in conditions that are, frankly, brutal. We take breaks as needed but if you lie still for too long the crabs come to check on you.
Late in the afternoon we secure the site, travel back up the lagoon, cross to the ocean side, board the skiff and are usually back aboard Nai’a by about 17:30. Showers, writing up field notes, uploading digital photos to a central archive, and dinner are followed by a team meeting during which we discuss the events of the day and make any needed adjustments to the plan for the next day.
How to apply to become a Sponsor Team Member
The first step is to email (
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) or phone us (302.994.4410) to express your interest. We’ll put you in touch with a Team Selection Committee member who will interview you by phone or in person to answer your questions and get a sense of whether you’d be a good a fit with the expedition team. Final acceptance of Sponsor Team Member applicants is by the expedition leader, TIGHAR Executive Director Ric Gillespie, after a face-to-face interview.
Once your application is accepted you make a $5,000 non-refundable deposit to reserve your place on the team. Fifty percent of the balance, $22,500, is due November 1, 2009 and the remaining balance must be paid by January 15, 2010. (The due dates are governed by when we must make payments on the ship charter.)
Although not required, it is recommended that Sponsor Team Members attend the TIGHAR Field School in Aviation Archaeology and Historic Preservation in Idaho, September 9 through 13, 2009.
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