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| An excerpt from the after action report by the commander of the USS Yorktown Air Group provides a description of the lessons learned at the Battle of the Coral Sea and some cautions that were to prove tragically prophetic just weeks later at Midway. | ||||||||
| Torpedo Planes | ||||||||
| From the experience gained by VT-5 in the attacks of May 4, 7, and 8th, certain factors became apparent insofar as Material, Personnel, and Tactics are concerned. | ||||||||
| Material | ||||||||
| As previously stated in the report on the engagement of the 7th, this command is firmly convinced that a satisfactory torpedo plane must be fast, have a long range, the ability to dive, and sufficient gun power to defend itself. In connection with this a torpedo must be developed that can be dropped at high speed and from a height of 200 feet altitude. | ||||||||
| Personnel | ||||||||
| Torpedo plane pilots must be given every opportunity to make drops against a maneuvering target and to observe the torpedo run. This will clearly bring out to the pilot (1) The relative slowness of the torpedo after striking the water, (b) The great amount of lead necessary for a beam or close to beam shot, and (c) the large effect of small errors in target course and speed, if torpedo is dropped at long range. The practice of carrying and dropping dummy torpedoes is considered useless and a waste of time except for brand new pilots. | ||||||||
| Tactics | ||||||||
In the recent engagements, the Japanese screen has scattered instead of closing in to support the ship being attacked. This is, however, no indication that in the future it will be done. Such a method would be an excellent counter to our system of attack. Due to the slow speed and low altitude of drop required for the Mk. 13 torpedoes, our planes are forced to come in low and slow. In the event that the Japanese change their system and put a heavy cordon of ships around their large vessels, it is doubted whether a successful torpedo attack could be launched by TBDs without the loss of the major part of the squadron. Torpedo attacks alone, are not very effective against high speed maneuverable targets. This was amply proved in the attack on TULAGI, where VT-5 attacked a Japanese CA maneuvering at high speed outside the harbor and was unable to obtain a hit; another example was the inability of the Japanese torpedo planes to score a hit on the Yorktown on May 8. In order to inflict the maximum damage on a maneuvering ship it is essential that the torpedo and dive bombing attack starts just before and continues through the torpedo attack. This has the following advantages: It provides mutual support and forces the enemy to divide his fire. The spray and smoke from close misses will partially obscure the torpedo planes from the target, and the concussion will reduce the accuracy of the AA fire. With the present type of torpedo planes it is essential that they be furnished with fighter protection. It is considered that on the attack of May 8th, VT-5 would have suffered severe losses from enemy aircraft if the TBDs if they had been unescorted. While it is understood that TBFs are being provided, and the present type torpedo is being modified to allow for dropping at higher altitudes and greater speeds; the need for these has been so clearly emphasized by the BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA that it is again urgently recommended that immediate steps be taken to replace the TBDs with TBFs. |
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(The entire report can be found at: Battle
of the Coral Sea) |
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